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Abstract
In this thesis I study the meaning of tense, mood, and aspect (TMA) expressions in Nafsan (South
Efate), an Oceanic language of Vanuatu, from a typological perspective. I focus on the meanings of
the perfect aspect and realis/irrealis mood in Nafsan and other Oceanic languages, as case studies
for investigating the cross-linguistic features of these TMA categories.
Given the diversity of TMA systems in languages of theworld, the status ofmany TMA categories
as cross-linguistically valid has been disputed in the linguistic literature. Two such debates concern
the cross-linguistic validity of the perfect aspect and the realis/irrealis distinction. Oceanic languages
feature some of the most controversial aspects of the semantics of these categories. For instance,
many Oceanic languages, including Nafsan, have perfects that denote themeaning of change of state,
a propertywhich has recently been attributed to a newTMAcategory called “iamitive” (Olsson, 2013).
Regarding the realis/irrealis distinction, Nafsan and other Oceanic languages are said to express this
distinction by portmanteau subject markers. Both the validity of the realis/irrealis mood and its
expression by subject markers have been criticized in the literature (Bybee, 1998; Cristofaro, 2012).
In order to analyze the meanings of the perfect aspect and the realis/irrealis mood in Nafsan, I
studied the Nafsan grammar (Thieberger, 2006) and corpus by Thieberger (1995–2018), followed by
my own fieldwork (Krajinović, 2017b) which relied on semantic elicitation through storyboards (see
Burton &Matthewson, 2015) and questionnaires (e.g. Dahl, 2000c). These types of elicitationmethods
were used to target fine-grained TMAmeanings of Nafsan, which were then analyzed through some
formal semantic models, such as branching-times, and compared with descriptions of other Oceanic
languages through typological methods, such as semantic maps.
Regarding the perfect aspect, I found that the Nafsan marker pe has all the functions considered
to be typical of the English-style perfect, except for the additional meaning of change of state. I
place the analysis of the Nafsan perfect in the debate about the cross-linguistic validity of iamitives,
defined by the meaning of change of state akin to ‘already’ and lacking experiential and universal
perfect functions (Olsson, 2013). Based on the data from Nafsan and other Oceanic languages, I
show that when language-internal processes, such as aspectual coercion, are considered, the seman-
tic definition of perfect aspect proposed by Klein (1994) is sufficient to account for additional perfect
functions, without the need to posit the new iamitive category. Moreover, by creating a semantic
map of the perfect based the data from five Oceanic languages, I found that the spread of the pro-
posed iamitive functions is not attested in the Oceanic sample studied here, which means that the
change-of-state meaning as the proposed core iamitive meaning does not uniquely define this cate-
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gory, which can be taken as evidence against adopting iamitives as a new cross-linguistic category.
Regarding the realis/irrealis distinction, expressed by portmanteau subject markers in Nafsan, I have
found that the “realis” category is semantically underspecified in Nafsan, as it can occur in irrealis
contexts that should be incompatible with realis meanings. I propose that “realis” subject markers
are in fact only subject and person marking that occasionally receives realis meanings through prag-
matic competition with the irrealis subject markers. This analysis has the potential to explain similar
problems attested in other Oceanic languages of Melanesia. By adopting a branching-times model
that unites the expression of modality and temporal reference (von Prince, 2019), I show that Nafsan
and several other Oceanic languages provide evidence that irrealis as a mood category referring to
non-actual worlds is a semantically meaningful category.
The contribution of this work is to the areas of TMA semantics, typology, Oceanic languages, lan-
guage description and methodologies used in language documentation. Besides the theoretical con-
tribution to the understanding of cross-linguistic properties of the perfect aspect and realis/irrealis
mood, this thesis can also be used as a methodological guide to testing and assigning linguistic cat-
egories in language description and documentation.
Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit untersuche ich aus einer typologischen Perspektive die Bedeutung von Tempus,
Modalität und Aspekt (TMA) Ausdrücken in Nafsan (South Efate), einer ozeanischen Sprache Van-
uatus. Ich konzentriere mich auf die Bedeutung des perfektiven Aspekts und der Realis/Irrealis-
Modalität inNafsan und anderen ozeanischen Sprachen, als Fallstudien zur Untersuchung der sprach-
übergreifenden Merkmale dieser TMA-Kategorien.
Angesichts der Vielfalt der TMA-Systeme in den Sprachen derWelt wurde der Status vieler TMA-
Kategorien als sprachübergreifend gültige Kategorien in der linguistischen Literatur diskutiert. Zwei
dieser Debatten betreffen die sprachübergreifende Gültigkeit des perfektiven Aspekts und die Un-
terscheidung zwischen Realis und Irrealis. Ozeanische Sprachen weisen einige der kontroversesten
Merkmale der Semantik dieser Kategorien auf. Viele ozeanische Sprachen, u.a. Nafsan, benutzen Per-
fekt, um die Bedeutung von Zustandsänderungen (change of state) zu bezeichnen, eine Eigenschaft,
die kürzlich einer neuen TMA-Kategorie namens iamitive zugeschrieben wurde (Olsson, 2013). Die
Unterscheidung zwischen Realis und Irrealis wird in Nafsan und andere ozeanische Sprachen durch
Subjektmarker zumAusdruck gebracht. Sowohl die Gültigkeit der Realis/Irrealis als auch deren Aus-
druck durch Subjektmarker wurden in der Literatur kritisiert (Bybee, 1998; Cristofaro, 2012).
Um die Bedeutung des perfektiven Aspekts und der Realis/Irrealis-Modalität in Nafsan zu analy-
sieren, untersuche ich die Grammatik von Nafsan (Thieberger, 2006) und den Korpus vonThieberger
(1995–2018), gefolgt von meiner eigenen Feldarbeit (Krajinović, 2017b), die sich auf semantische Er-
hebungen durch Storyboards (see Burton & Matthewson, 2015) und Fragebögen (e.g. Dahl, 2000c)
stützt. Diese Art der Erhebungsmethode wurde verwendet, um einzelne TMA-Bedeutungen von
Nafsan zu erfassen, die dann durch einige formale semantische Modelle, wie zum Beispiel branching-
times, analysiert und mit Beschreibungen anderer ozeanischer Sprachen durch typologische Metho-
den, wie semantic maps, verglichen wurden.
MeineAnalysen zeigen, dass der Perfekt-Marker pe in Nafsan alle Funktionen hat, die ür das Per-
fekt im Englischen typisch sind, mit Ausnahme der zusätzlichen Bedeutung von Zustandsänderun-
gen. Die Verwendung des Nafsan-Perfekts liefert einen Beitrag zu der Debatte über die sprachüber-
greifende Gültigkeit von iamitive, definiert durch die Bedeutung von Zustandsänderungen, die das
Partikel ‘schon’ ähneln und denen es an experiential und universal Funktionen mangelt (Olsson,
2013). Basierend auf den Daten aus Nafsan und anderen ozeanischen Sprachen zeige ich, dass bei
Betrachtung sprachinterner Prozesse, wie z.B. aspectual coercion, die von Klein (1994) vorgeschla-
gene semantische Definition des Perfekts ausreichend ist, um zusätzliche Funktionen des Perfekts
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zu berücksichtigen, ohne eine neue iamitive Kategorie zu etablieren. Darüber hinaus habe ich durch
die Erstellung einer semantic map des Perfekts basiert auf Daten aus ünf ozeanischen Sprachen fest-
gestellt, dass die Verbreitung der vorgeschlagenen Funktionen von iamitive in der hier untersuchten
ozeanischen Stichprobe nicht belegt ist, was bedeutet, dass die Bedeutung des Zustandsänderns als
vorgeschlagene iamitative Kernbedeutung diese Kategorie nicht eindeutig definiert wird, was als
Beweis daür dienen kann, dass iamitive als neue sprachübergreifende Kategorie angenommen wer-
den kann. Was die Unterscheidung zwischen Realis und Irrealis betrifft, die in Nafsan durch Port-
manteau Subjekt-Marker zum Ausdruck kommt, so habe ich festgestellt, dass die Kategorie Realis in
Nafsan semantisch unterbewertet ist, wie sie in Irrealis-Kontexten auftreten kann, die mit der Bedeu-
tung von Realis unvereinbar sein sollten. Ich schlage vor, dass “Realis” Subjekt-Marker tatsächlich
nur Subjekt- und Personen-Marker sind, die gelegentlich Realis-Bedeutungen durch pragmatischen
Wettbewerb mit den Irrealis Subjekt-Markern erhalten. Dieses Muster hat das Potenzial, ähnliche
Probleme zu erklären, die in anderen ozeanischen Sprachen Melanesiens nachgewiesen wurden. In-
dem ich das branching-timesModell annehme, das den Ausdruck vonModalität und zeitlichem Bezug
vereint (von Prince, 2019), zeige ich, dass Nafsan und mehrere andere ozeanische Sprachen Beweise
daür liefern, dass Irrealis als Modalitätskategorie, die sich auf nicht-aktuelle Welten bezieht, eine
semantisch sinnvolle Kategorie ist.
Der Beitrag dieser Arbeit ist auf die Bereiche TMA-Semantik, Typologie, ozeanische Sprachen,
Sprachbeschreibung und Methoden, die in der Sprachdokumentation verwendet werden. Neben
dem theoretischen Beitrag dieser Arbeit zum Verständnis der sprachübergreifenden Eigenschaften
des perfektiven Aspekts und der Realis/Irrealis-Modalität kann diese Arbeit auch als methodischer
Leitfaden ür das Testen und Zuordnen von Sprachkategorien in der Sprachbeschreibung und Doku-
mentation verwendet werden.
Selbständigkeitserklärung zur
Dissertation
Ich erkläre ausdrücklich, dass es sich bei der von mir eingereichten Dissertation mit dem
Tense, mood, and aspect expressions in Nafsan (South Efate) from a typological perspective: e perfect
aspect and the realis/irrealis mood
um eine von mir erstmalig, selbständig und ohne fremde Hilfe verfasste Arbeit handelt.
Ich erkläre ausdrücklich, dass ich sämtliche in der oben genannten Arbeit verwendeten fremden
Quellen, auch aus dem Internet (einschließlich Tabellen, Grafiken u. Ä.) als solche kenntlich gemacht
habe. Insbesondere bestätige ich, dass ich ausnahmslos sowohl bei wörtlich übernommenen Aus-
sagen bzw. unverändert übernommenen Tabellen, Grafiken u. Ä. (Zitaten) als auch bei in eigenen
Worten wiedergegebenen Aussagen bzw. von mir abgewandelten Tabellen, Grafiken u. Ä. anderer
Autorinnen und Autoren (Paraphrasen) die Quelle angegeben habe.
Mir ist bewusst, dass Verstöße gegen die Grundsätze der Selbständigkeit als Täuschung betrachtet
und nach § 16 der Promotionsordnung der Sprach- und literaturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät vom 27.
April 2016 (AmtlichesMitteilungsblatt derHumboldt-Universität zu BerlinNr. 26/2016) entsprechend
geahndet werden.
Datum: 29.11.2019
Ana Krajinović Rodrigues
ix
x
Declaration
This is to certify that
1. the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD,
2. due acknowledgment has been made in the text to all other material used,
3. the thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and
appendices.
Ana Krajinović Rodrigues
xi
xii
Preface
All the chapters of this thesis consist of original text. However, some parts of the content of specific
sections have been published or accepted for publication. Here I list those publications and the
corresponding contents of the thesis.
A summarized and predated version of the content of Section 5.2 was accepted for publication in
Proceedings of TripleA 5 2018 by University of Tübingen on the 12th of March 2019. The full reference
to the paper is the following: Krajinović, Ana. The semantics of perfect in Nafsan and implications
for typology. In M. Ryan Bochnak, Miriam Butt, Erlinde Meertens & Mark-Matthias Zymla (eds.),
Proceedings of TripleA 5: Fieldwork Perspectives on the Semantics of African, Asian and Austronesian
Languages, Tübingen: Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen, Publikationssystem. This paper is cited in
the thesis as Krajinović (2019).
The content of Section 8.5 reflects some parts of an earlier analysis published in Krajinović, Ana.
2018. Comparative study of conditional clauses in Nafsan. In Boerger, Brenda H. and Unger, Paul
(eds.). SIL Language and Culture Documentation and Description 41 (Proceedings of COOL 10), 39–61.
SIL International. This paper is cited in the thesis as Krajinović (2018).
The argument about the irrealis referring to different areas of the branching-times model pre-
sented in Section 9.2.2 draws from my collaboration with Kilu von Prince and Manfred Krifka on a
joint paper: von Prince, Kilu and Ana Krajinović and Manfred Krifka. submitted. Irrealis is real. This
paper is cited as von Prince et al. (submitted). However, the resulting discussion of this main idea as
applied to the presented language data in Section 9.2.2 is my own.
In Section 9.2 some examples and figures are adopted from a joint paper: von Prince, Kilu, Ana
Krajinović, Manfred Krifka, Valérie Guérin &Michael Franjieh. 2019. Mapping Irreality: Storyboards
for eliciting TAM contexts. In Anja Gattnar, Robin Hörnig, Melanie Störzer & Sam Featherston
(eds.), Proceedings of Linguistic Evidence 2018: Experimental Data Drives Linguistic eory, Tübingen:
University of Tübingen. In all instances, the said figures and examples contain the citation von Prince
et al. (2019d).
All the content that discusses the work of my collaborators in the MelaTAMP project (see below)
in any way is cited in the relevant discussions.
This PhD project was funded by the German Research FoundationDFG for theMelaTAMPproject
(273640553) at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (‘A corpus-based contrastive study of tense, aspect,
modality and polarity (TAMP) in Austronesian languages of Melanesia (MelaTAMP)’) and the ARC
Centre of Excellence for the Dynamics of Language during my stay at the University of Melbourne.
xiii
xiv
Anowledgments
First and foremost, I wish to thank all Nafsan speakers who made this PhD thesis possible by partic-
ipating in my research, this work is for you: Lionel Emil, Gray Kaltap̃au, Yvanna Ataurua, Marinette
Kalpram, Belinda Kalopong, JulianMalnaem,Michael Joseph, Honoré Albert, Jefferey Taun, Lingkary
Carol Kalpram, Glenda Lalier, Lillot Reecy, Touskau Kaloros, Tumaira Kaltap̃au, and Rose Kalfabun.
I thank especially to Lionel Emil, a semanticist in disguise, and Gray Kaltap̃au for their particular
interest in my work and intricacies of linguistics, as well as the invaluable help with transcription
and translation of the Nafsan recordings. Most of all, thank you for your friendship and being there
for me and my academic questions even when we are apart. Needless to say, any mistakes in the
Nafsan examples used in this work are my own. I wish you all the luck in your future endeavors in
documenting Nafsan and promoting its speakers! I am especially grateful to Lingkary Carol Kalpram
and Yvanna Ataurua, as well as to Chylla, Jamin, Terry, Steeve, Vairua, and the rest of the Kalpram
family for hosting me in Erakor whenever I needed, and for taking care of me just like family does. I
also want to thank to Joel Kalpram, Endis Kalsarap, all the participants of the dictionary workshops
in Erakor in 2017 and 2018, and everyone else in Erakor who has helped me to reach out to people
and made me feel at home.
I am most indebted to Kilu von Prince and Manfred Krifka for giving me the opportunity to work
with them in the MelaTAMP project and for their support every step of the way during my PhD
project and all the side projects I had. Just the number of citations of our joint papers in this thesis
can tell how much great work we did in the MelaTAMP project. Besides being the source of my
inspiration and learning, Kilu and Manfred encouraged me to be both scientifically independent and
collaborative, through which I found my own scientific expression. I especially thank Kilu for her
emotional support and friendship that made it so much easier to navigate through the mental load
of an academic life. A big thanks also goes to the rest of the MelaTAMP team: Lena Weissmann,
Annika Tjuka, and Stephan Druskat, who gave me feedback on countless presentations and were
always there to hear about my achievements and struggles. And I am especially thankful to Annika
for helping out with the German abstract.
I am most grateful to Nick Thieberger for giving me the opportunity to stay at the University of
Melbourne andmaking it possible for me to study Nafsan by sharing his expertise about the language
and its speakers. His commitment to working on Nafsan and making the records of the language
available to the speakers was most inspiring and made me see the value of my work beyond my PhD.
I am especially thankful for his quick replies and extensive feedback on all aspects of my work, as
xv
xvi
well as standing up for me in difficult situations.
I thank Rachel Nordlinger for inspiring me through her scientific attitude and providing invalu-
able feedback on my work, as well as many insightful personal conversations we had.
I am grateful to Jozina Vander Klok for scientific collaboration on topics of our shared interests
and all the fun we had at conferences.
I want to thank many more people who have taken their time to hear about my research and
give me their advice in many different areas: Marie-Eve Ritz, Jurica Polančec, James Bednall, Patrick
Caudal, Nick Evans, Felicity Meakins, Evan Kidd, Östen Dahl, Johan van der Auwera, Elizabeth
Pearce, Tim Mcnamara, everyone in the ARC Centre of Excellence for the Dynamics of Language,
and everyone else I might have forgotten.
I also wish to thank Rosey Billington who is in many ways responsible for the success of my
fieldwork trips, due to her social, psychological, technological, bug-killing, and fire-making skills.
I would not have made it too far without you, Rosey! Rosey was also a great collaborator and my
support in our academic projects.
I have also had the privilege of meeting many other fieldworkers and expats in Vanuatu. I thank
John Lynch for being interested in my work and finding time to discuss my research in Port Vila. I
also thank Eleanor Ridge, Mike Franjieh, Georgia Noy, and Marie-France Duhamel for making my
time in Port Vila so enjoyable.
I especially thank my friends in Melbourne, Stefan Schnell, Vanya Kapitonov, Catalina Torres
Orjuela and others for getting me out of the house to have fun, and also having fruitful discussions
about my work. I also thank Seamus Donnelly for fun times in Canberra and Melbourne.
My fellow PhD students in Berlin have also made my PhD journey easier: thank you Paola Fritz,
Julian Rott, and Jens Hopperdietzel for sharing and being there for me! I also thank Leonel Morejon
for insightful discussions about science and life.
I also thank to the audiences of the conferences listed below, at which I presented my work and
received a lot of valuable feedback. And not less importantly, I wish to thank everyone with whom
I had fun times after the academic events.
• 13th Conference of the Association for Linguistic Typology (ALT), 4-6 September 2019, Pavia,
Italy
• 11th International Austronesian and Papuan Languages and Linguistics Conference (APLL),
13-15 June 2019, Leiden, Netherlands
• Austronesian Formal Linguistics Association (AFLA), 24-26 May 2019, London, Canada
• 9th Language & Technology Conference, May 17-19, 2019, Poznań, Poland
• Syntax of the world’s languages, 3-5 September 2018, Paris, France
• Vanuatu Languages Workshop, 25-27 July 2018, Port Vila, Vanuatu
• The Semantics of African, Asian and Austronesian Languages (TripleA 5), 27-29 June 2018,
Konstanz, Germany
xvii
• Colloque Chronos, 4-6 June 2018, Neuchâtel, Switzerland
• 10th APLL conference, 4–5 May 2018 at Surrey University, UK
• Linguistic Evidence, 15-16 February 2018, Universität Tübingen, Germany
• 12th ALT conference, December 11-15 2017, Canberra, Australia, and the adjacent workshop
‘Advances in corpus-based typology: exploring corpora of semi-parallel and indigenous texts’
• Workshop ‘TAM marking in languages of Australia and the Pacific’ which I organized with
James Bednall and Patrick Caudal at the Australian Linguistic Society (ALS) conference 2017,
4–7 December, Sydney, Australia
• 10th Conference On Oceanic Linguistics (COOL10), July 10-15, 2017, Honiara, Solomon Islands
• Workshop on the Meaning of Past Tense Morphology, 19–21 December 2016, Göttingen, Ger-
many
• Between EXISTENCE and LOCATION: Empirical, Formal and Typological Approaches to Ex-
istential Constructions, 1–2 December 2016, Universität Tübingen, Germany
• Students’ presentations at European Summer School of Linguistic Typology 2016, 4–17 Septem-
ber 2016, Porquerolles Island, France
• Documentary Linguistics – Asian Perspectives, The University of Hong Kong, 6–9 April 2016
I also thank my parents and my sister and brother for their support and encouragement every
step of the way. Thanks to my mom, I learned very early about the existence of linguistics and
because of the efforts of my family I had the privilege to be able to pursue higher education and
learn about everything I found interesting.
Finally, I thank my husband Xavier, who is my greatest support in all my scientific and personal
endeavors.
xviii
Contents
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Selbständigkeitserklärung zur Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxix
I Introduction 1
1 Introduction 3
II Baground 13
2 Nafsan and Oceanic languages 15
2.1 Location and genetic affiliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Basic structure and TMA in Oceanic languages of Melanesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 TMA in Nafsan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.1 Previous work on Nafsan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.2 Notes on reanalyzed categories in Nafsan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3 Methodology 37
3.1 Methodology in semantic fieldwork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 The MelaTAMP project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Corpus work and elicitation techniques used on Nafsan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.4 Typological perspective and semantic maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
III Aspect: perfect 53
4 Perfect aspect and related categories 55
4.1 The semantics of perfect based on English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2 Cross-linguistic categories related to perfect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
xix
xx CONTENTS
4.2.1 ‘Already’ and other aspectual particles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2.2 Perfect, nei, and iamitive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.3 Perfect/iamitive debate in Austronesian and Oceanic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5 Perfect in Nafsan 79
5.1 Setting the stage for the analysis of perfect in Nafsan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.1.1 Subject proclitics and perfect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.1.2 Challenges for the description of pe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.2 The semantics of perfect in Nafsan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2.1 Past, present, and future perfect meanings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.2.2 Change-of-state meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.2.3 Expectedness and duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.3 Perfect vs. other aspectual markers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.3.1 ‘Hot news’ meaning with po and paradigm effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.3.2 Postverbal su and composite TMA marking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6 Perfect in Oceanic languages 117
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.2 The semantic map of the perfect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.2.1 Previous semantic maps of the perfect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.2.2 Proposal for the semantic map of the perfect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.3 The Oceanic languages under study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.3.2 Toqabaqita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.3.3 Unua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.3.4 Niuean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.3.5 Māori . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.4 Evidence against iamitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
IV Mood and modality: realis and irrealis 143
7 e realis/irrealis distinction and related categories 145
7.1 The meaning of realis/irrealis and the surrounding debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.1.1 The basics of the realis/irrealis distinction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.1.2 The cross-linguistic meaning of realis and irrealis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
7.1.3 The proposal for the semantics of realis and irrealis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.2 Oceanic subject markers and semantic underspecification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.2.1 The case study of Unua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
7.2.2 Temporal reference in languages without tense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
CONTENTS xxi
7.2.3 Semantic underspecification and pragmatic competition . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
7.3 Realis/irrealis mood or non-future/future tense? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
8 Realis and irrealis in Nafsan 173
8.1 Portmanteau subject proclitics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
8.2 Challenges for the analysis of realis and irrealis in Nafsan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
8.3 The distribution and meaning of realis and irrealis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
8.3.1 Combinations with TMA markers and the underspecification of realis . . . . 178
8.3.2 Irrealis proclitics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
8.4 Modal force and flavor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
8.5 Conditional clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
8.5.1 Conditional constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
8.5.2 Storyboard results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
8.6 Complement and relative clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
8.6.1 False beliefs and relative clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
8.6.2 Desiderative, emotive and evaluative clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
8.7 Pragmatic account of realis and irrealis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
9 Realis and irrealis in Oceanic languages 219
9.1 Oceanic languages with underspecified categories: Wogeo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
9.2 The evidence for the validity of irrealis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
9.2.1 Combinations of the irrealis and TMA markers: Mav̋ea . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
9.2.2 TMA markers in the irrealis domain: North Ambrym . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
9.3 The definition of irrealis in relation to other categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
V Conclusion 231
10 Conclusion 233
Bibliography 238
Appendix A Examples and languages 259
Appendix B estionnaire data 273
Appendixestionnaire data 273
B.1 The Perfect Questionnaire (Dahl, 2000c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
B.2 The Iamitive questionnaire (Olsson, 2013) (AK1-156) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
B.3 The NondumQuestionnaire (Veselinova, 2018) (AK1-156) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
B.4 The FutureQuestionnaire (Dahl, 2000b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
xxii CONTENTS
List of Figures
1.1 Timeline of the English present perfect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 Oceanic within the branches of the Austronesian family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Location of Vanuatu and the island of Efate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 A map of the island of Efate with bullet locations where Nafsan is spoken . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Genetic classification of Oceanic languages analyzed in more detail in this thesis (in
bold), classification from Ross et al. (2016) and Lynch et al. (2002), and language data
from Glottolog (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1 “Did you play soccer yesterday?” “No, I did not play, it rained.”, from “Festival” by
von Prince (2018c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 Targeted context: “If I had played soccer yesterday, I would have gotten wet.”, from
“Festival” by von Prince (2018c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3 “While Lili is grating pink taro, Mary is grating white taro.” Targeted context: “Mary
says: I have grated the taro, what do we do now?”, from “Making laplap” (Krajinović,
2018c) (AK1-166-01) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4 A model of a semantic map with semantic functions A, B, C, D and imaginary cate-
gory boundaries in blue, yellow, and red . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.5 A model of a semantic map with an incorrect placement of functions . . . . . . . . . 50
3.6 Semantic map of tense in three most frequently attested linguistic systems . . . . . . 50
4.1 Representation of the resultative present perfect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2 Representation of the experiential present perfect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.3 Representation of the universal present perfect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4 Representation of the past perfect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.5 Representation of the future perfect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.6 Representation of example (13a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.7 Representation of example (13b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.8 Representation of Löbner’s (1989) analysis of ‘already’ (t = interval of time) . . . . . . 64
4.9 Duality schema with English, German, and Portuguese particles, based on Löbner
(1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
xxiii
xxiv LIST OF FIGURES
4.10 Representation of Krifka’s (2000) analysis of the meaning of ‘already’, adopted from
Krifka (2000:410) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.1 Representation of example (33) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.2 Representation of example (36) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.3 Representation of example (56) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.4 Duality schema with Nafsan perfect (in black font), based on Löbner (1989) . . . . . . 102
5.5 Representation of the positive perfect with the meaning of change of state . . . . . . 103
5.6 Representation of the negated perfect with the meaning of change of state . . . . . . 104
5.7 Representation of example (69) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.8 Representation of example (70) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.9 Semantic map of the English perfect in blue and the English ‘already’ in yellow . . . 108
5.10 Semantic map of the Nafsan perfect in red and the prospective po function in blue . . 108
5.11 Semantic map of the proposed iamitive functions (Olsson, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.12 Timeline of the English past tense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.13 Semantic map of the Nafsan perfect in red and the perfective su in dashed yellow
outline signalizing the perfect functions with which it combines . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.14 Semantic map of the English perfect in blue and the English ‘already’ in yellow (full
outline: core meanings, dashed outline: perfect meanings with which it can combine) 112
6.1 Anderson’s (1982) semantic map of the perfect with the English (full outline) and
Mandarin perfects (dashed outline), C-R = current relevance, ANT. = anterior . . . . 119
6.2 FromDahl &Wälchli (2016): “Philippine iamitives (red), Indonesian iamitives (green)
and European perfects (blue) as extreme clusters in the grammatical space of perfects
and iamitives” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.3 Semantic map of the English perfect in blue and the English ‘already’ in yellow . . . 122
6.4 Semantic map of the proposed iamitive functions (Olsson, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.5 Location of languages studied in this chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.6 Semantic map of Toqabaqita with the perfect naqa in red and immediate marker biqi
in blue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.7 Semantic map of Unua with ju/goj (nu) ‘(foc.)already (now)’ in red and the inceptive
ber in blue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.8 Semantic map of the perfect/inchoative kua in Niuean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.9 Semantic map of the perfect kua in Māori . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.10 Semantic map of the proposed iamitive functions (Olsson, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.1 Implicational hierarchy of realis/irrealis in several languages studied by Van Gijn &
Gipper (2009:174), SC = speaker commitment, TR = temporal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
7.2 The model of the possible worlds by McGregor & Wagner (2006:350) . . . . . . . . . . 154
7.3 A graphical representation of Thomason’s (1984) model by von Prince (2019) . . . . . 157
LIST OF FIGURES xxv
7.4 The three domains of the modal-temporal space, relative to the actual present ic: the
actual (eal); the possible (po); the counterfactual (cf), adapted from von Prince
et al. (2019a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.5 The three temporal domains of the modal-temporal space: the past (p); the present
(p); the future (f), adapted from von Prince et al. (2019a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.6 The temporal modal domains of the realis marker (dashed outline) and the distal
marker (solid outline) by von Prince (2018d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
8.1 Co-occurrences of subject proclitics and TMA markers in two Nafsan corpora . . . . 179
8.2 TMA meanings with which general and irrealis proclitics are used in Nafsan . . . . . 182
8.3 Representation of example (20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
8.4 Representation of example (21) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
8.5 The domain of meaning expressed by irrealis proclitics in Nafsan (see model in Sec-
tion 7.1.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.6 Semantic areas of past counterfactual p.cf, present counterfactual p.cf, future
counterfactual f.cf, and possible future meaning f.po, based on von Prince
et al. (2019d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
8.7 The irrealis domain in Nafsan, solid outline: irrealis subject proclitics; dashed outline:
optional mer, from von Prince et al. (2019d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
8.8 Frames 21 and 22 from “Bill vs. the weather” (Vander Klok, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . 208
9.1 The irrealis domain in Nafsan and Mav̋ea, solid outline: irrealis subject proclitics;
dashed outline: optional counterfactualmer and imte, from von Prince et al. (2019d:198) 223
9.2 The irrealis domain in North Ambrym, Solid outline: irrealis; dashed outline: coun-
terfactual (past/present); dotted outline: non-recent past, from von Prince et al. (2019d:200) 226
9.3 Semantic areas of past counterfactual p.cf, present counterfactual p.cf, future
counterfactual f.cf, and possible future meaning f.po, based on von Prince
et al. (2019d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
9.4 The domain of meaning expressed by future tense on the left and irrealis mood on
the right (see model in Section 7.1.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
10.1 Semantic map of Nafsan, Toqabaqita, and Unua with the perfect in red and another
aspectual marker in blue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
10.2 The domain of meaning expressed by irrealis proclitics in Nafsan (see model in Sec-
tion 7.1.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
xxvi LIST OF FIGURES
List of Tables
2.1 Pronouns and subject markers in Daakie, from Krifka (2018a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Example of subject markers in Neverver by Barbour (2012:165) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Subject markers inWogeo (Exter, 2012:181), in their forms as they would appear with
the verb lako ‘go’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Singular and plural subject markers in Mav̋ea by Guérin (2011:211) . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 An example of the stem-initial mutation in Paamese from Lynch (1975:90,92), and
Ray (1926) cited in Lynch (1975:90) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6 Subject markers in Sivisa Titan (Admiralty Islands), based on Bowern (2011:82-88) . . 25
2.7 Verbal complex in Nafsan fromThieberger (2006:243) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.8 Independent and oblique pronouns in Nafsan by Thieberger (2006:104) . . . . . . . . 28
2.9 Subject proclitics in Nafsan by Thieberger (2006:150) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.10 Subject proclitics and their combinations with TMAmarkers in Nafsan byThieberger
(2006:155) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.11 The auxiliary verbs and their slots in Nafsan (Thieberger, 2006:253) . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.12 Exemplified verbal complex in Nafsan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.13 Reanalyzed subject proclitics in Nafsan (reanalyzed items in bold) . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.14 Subject proclitics and TMA markers in Nafsan with new labels (reanalyzed items in
bold) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1 Elicited questionnaires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 MelaTAMP storyboards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 Totem field storyboards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4 Storyboards I designed to provide new evidence for my analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.1 Klein’s (1994) definitions of temporal and aspectual categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2 Iamitive functions, based on Olsson (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.1 Subject proclitics in Nafsan based on Thieberger (2006:150) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.2 Occurrence of perfect subject proclitics and pe in 3 empirical methods . . . . . . . . . 81
5.3 Occurrence of different functions of pe in 3 empirical methods (+ attested, ? un-
clear, - not attested, -/+ restricted to certain environments, perfect=light gray, iami-
tive/perfect=middle gray, iamitive/‘already’=dark gray) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
xxvii
xxviii LIST OF TABLES
6.1 The languages and their TMA markers studied in this chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.2 Meanings expressed by the perfect in Nafsan (+ attested, ? unclear, - not attested, -/+
restricted to certain environments, e.g. needing to occur with another marker) . . . . 126
6.3 Perfect values in Nafsan and other Oceanic languages (+ attested, ? unclear, - not
attested, -/+ restricted to certain environments, e.g. needing to occur with another
marker) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.1 Themodalmeanings of final verb categories classified according to their co-occurrence
with realis and irrealis markers in medial clauses in Amele by Roberts (1990:375) . . . 147
7.2 The division of modal meanings expressed by the realis/irrealis distinction by Roberts
(1990:398). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.3 Realis/irrealis portmanteau subject prefixes in Manam (Lichtenberk, 1983:182-183) . . 150
7.4 Subject prefixes with the verb xa ‘to go’ in Unua (Pearce, 2015a:212) . . . . . . . . . . 159
8.1 Tentative segmentation of subject proclitics in Nafsan, based on Thieberger (2006:150) 174
8.2 Subject proclitics in Lelepa (Lacrampe, 2014:243) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
8.3 Summarized data of auxiliary and proclitic combinations from storyboard “On the
lam” (OL) (TFS, 2011b), “Tom and Mittens” (TM) (Rolka & Cable, 2014), “Bill vs. the
weather” (BW) (Vander Klok, 2013), “Chore girl” (CG) (TFS, 2011a) and “Sick girl”
(TFS, 2011c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
8.4 Combinations of proclitics with fla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
8.5 Combinations of f with proclitics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
8.6 Storyboards eliciting conditional clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
8.7 Storyboard results for conditional protases, storyboards from Table 8.6, gen – general
proclitic, irr – irrealis proclitic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
8.8 Structure of conditional clauses in the storyboard data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
9.1 Subject markers inWogeo (Exter, 2012:181), in their forms as they would appear with
the verb lako ‘go’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
9.2 Paradigms of TMA and subject markers, from Franjieh (2012:114,118,122) . . . . . . . 225
10.1 Summary of contributions of the Nafsan perfect analysis to semantics and typology . 235
10.2 Main arguments for the underspecification of general proclitics in Nafsan . . . . . . . 236
10.3 Main arguments for the irrealis meaning of irrealis proclitics in Nafsan . . . . . . . . 237
Abbreviations
1 1st person
2 2nd person
3 3rd person
a aspect
ab absolutive
acc accusative
ad adverb
ag agent
al alternative
ana anaphoric
and andative
ancon anterior-continuing
appl applicative
a article
a assertive
aen attenuative
a auxiliary verb
a actor voice
ben benefactive
bi Bislama loan
ca causative
cf counterfactual
cl classifier
comp complementizer
cond conditional
conj conjuction
con continuous
con contrary to expectations
cood coordinative conjunction
cop copula
def definite
xxix
xxx ABBREVIATIONS
dem demonstrative
de determiner
di direction
di1 toward speaker
do direct object
dp direct possession
d different subject
d distant (distant location)
d dual
d durative
dn deverbal noun
eg ergative
ecl exclusive
f feminine
foc focus
FQ FutureQuestionnaire
f future
gen genitive
hab habitual
iam iamitive
imm immediacy
imp imperative
inch inchoative
incl inclusive
incp inceptive
ind indicative
inf infinitive
in intensifier
inej interjection
ipf imperfective
IQ IamitiveQuestionnaire
i irrealis
i iterative
link possessive linker
lm limiter
loc locative
m masculine
med medial distance
min minimal number
mod modality
xxxi
nec necessity
neg negation
neg1 first particle of negation in Nafsan
neg2 second particle of negation in Nafsan
neg negative verb
nei New Situation marker
nf non-future
ngen ngenitive (nen in Unua)
nml nominalizer
nom nominative
nec non-recent
ng non-singular
nm numeral
obj object
obl oblique
pc paucal
pe personal article
pf perfective
pl plural
po possessive
po potential
PQ Perfect Questionnaire
pep preposition
pf perfect
po pronominal element, refers to subject markers and proclitics
pog progressive
po proximate first person (near speaker)
p present
p particle
p partitive
pp prospective
p past
pcp participle
pp purposive
q question marker
eal realis
ecp reciprocal
ed reduplication
efl reflexive
el relativizer
xxxii ABBREVIATIONS
em remote
RT Reference Time
bj subject
bj subjunctive
eq sequential
g singular
im simultaneous action
 same subject
a stative
b subordinator
T/A tense/aspect marker
en tentative
e test
op topic
 transitivizer (-ki in Nafsan)
 transitive suffix (used to allow an object suffix to be expressed)
TSit Time of the Situation
TT Topic Time
UT Utterance Time
 used for the epenthetic vowel preceding the suffixes of direct possession in Nafsan
en ventive
nq yes-no question
Part I
Introduction
1

Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis studies the semantics of tense, mood, and aspect (TMA) expressions in Nafsan [erk]1 and
other Oceanic languages, with the aim of contributing to evaluating the cross-linguistic validity of
the debated categories of perfect aspect and the related iamitive gram,2 as well as the realis and
irrealis mood. In this chapter I present the main challenges of this area spanning across the fields of
semantics, typology, and language description, and I outline how this thesis addresses these problems
by focusing on Nafsan and Oceanic languages.
Establishing different linguistic categories as abstract representations of linguistic constructions
parts from the assumption that there are specific rules and tendencies in the way the meaning of
grammar is construed, and for a linguistic category to be considered cross-linguistic these tenden-
cies should be verified across many different languages.3 The comparison of diverse languages with
the aim of finding linguistic tendencies is the task of typology. Typology seeks to classify struc-
tural types across languages and focuses on explaining patterns that occur systematically across
languages (Croft, 2003). There have been several typological studies of tense, mood, and aspect
cross-linguistically, including Dahl (1985), Bybee & Dahl (1989), Bybee et al. (1994), Bhat (1999), and
Dahl (2000a). e World Atlas of Language Structures (Dryer & Haspelmath, 2013) also features sev-
eral chapters on tense, mood, aspect, and evidentiality. Dahl (1985) studied TMA in 64 languages that
were compared on the basis of a semantic questionnaire designed for that purpose. Bybee et al. (1994)
compared 76 languages through analyzing grammars and using a questionnaire. The importance of
the studies by Dahl (1985) and Bybee et al. (1994) lies especially in the innovative use of a semantic
questionnaire as the principal methodology. The usage of the same questionnaire for every studied
language aims at obtaining the same contexts across languages. While the questionnaire from Dahl
(1985) is still widely used in language documentation and description for the identification of TMA
1Each language is marked with its ISO 639-3 code in brackets when it appears for the first time in the text.
2A gram is a grammatical item with a specific form and meaning in a particular language (Bybee & Dahl, 1989).
3The ideal nature of linguistic categories has been hotly debated in typology and description (see Linguistic Typology
Volume 20, Issue 2 (Oct 2016)). This thesis does not enter the conceptual debate about the reality of linguistic categories (cf.
Haspelmath, 2007). I assume that linguistic categories are measures used by linguists to describe meanings expressed in
a given language and that discussing their cross-linguistic validity brings important insights into how different meanings
tend to be expressed in languages of the world.
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categories, there has not been another questionnaire-based cross-linguistic study on TMA of the
same extent as Dahl’s study.4 There seem to be two reasons for this. The first is that there is a grow-
ing number of grammars published on underdescribed languages, so some typologists make use of
grammars as the main source of data for large-scale typological comparisons (e.g. Dahl & Velupillai,
2013b; Velupillai, 2016). The second reason is that some typologists have moved away from quantify-
ing the appearance of linguistic categories cross-linguistically (called “typological grams” by Bybee
et al., 1994; Bybee & Dahl, 1989) and started quantifying precisely defined fine-grained meanings of
different linguistic categories (cf. Bickel, 2007). The research on TMA in typology has not yet been
fully included in studies based on quantifying fine-grained meanings. Some work has been done
on Multi‐Dimensional Scaling visualizations of the distribution of TMA functions in Dahl’s (1985)
sample by Croft & Poole (2008), and in parallel corpora by Dahl & Wälchli (2016) and van der Klis
et al. (2017). However, many of these works do not necessarily identify single TMA functions, as
the visualization is meant to precede the semantic analysis. The tenet of this thesis is the idea that
we should combine the study of typological tendencies for clustering of TMA functions with fine-
grained semantic analyses of TMA systems. While the fine-grained semantics can inform us about
the extent of different functions expressed by the same category, typology is needed to assess the
cross-linguistic prevalence of those functions occurring within the same category. Once the cross-
linguistic validity of a certain clustering of functions is attested, semantics provides us again with
tools necessary to relate these functions to each other and define the relevant categories they can fall
into. This thesis aims at contributing to each of these steps, with the focus on the perfect aspect and
the realis/irrealis mood as representing two important debates in the area of TMA. In the following
paragraph I explain how the misconceptions concerning these categories are caused by the bias of
the Indo-European tradition.
From the typological perspective, one of the main problems in the study of TMA semantics cross-
linguistically is the Indo-European bias. Most TMA categories used by linguists to explain different
linguistic phenomena stem from the tradition of studying grammars of Indo-European languages.
The first scholarly grammars were written on Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin. For instance, the con-
ceptual distinction between mood and modality5 stems from the Latin distinction of indicative and
subjunctive as grammatical categories on the one hand, and modal verbs and adverbials as more
lexical categories on the other. Some of the categories proposed for these ancient languages have
been carried over to modern Indo-European languages with similar constructions, such as indica-
tive/subjunctive in Romance languages. However, the growing understanding of cross-linguistic
diversity has challenged the applicability of many “Indo-European” categories to underdescribed
languages, even when they were thought to be universal. One of the most famous cases of this in the
4Dahl (2007) himself mentions this fact: “At the same time, in spite of the rapid development of language typology,
and although questionnaires are now a standard tool for typologists, I do not know of any investigations that have tried
to apply the methodology I used.”
5Mood is the term typically used for grammatical categories which relate to the truth-value status of a proposition as
well as questions, imperatives, and optatives, and modality is a semantic expression of different ways a proposition can
be judged as true either in the actual or non-actual worlds. Modality can be expressed with both lexical and grammatical
material, whereas mood is a strictly grammatical category.
5domain of TMA is the study of the Hopi language [hop] (Uto-Aztecan) byWhorf (1938). Whorf (1938)
discovered that Hopi does not have tenses in the Indo-European sense, which made him describe
Hopi independently of previously established grammatical categories, including creating some new
TMA categories. Some of these are “reportive”, “expective”, and “nomic” assertions, which according
to Whorf (1938:277) roughly correspond to non-future, future, and generic meanings, respectively.
Around the same time, Dempwolff (1937) used the distinction between realis and irrealis in order to
describe Jabêm [jae], a Western Oceanic language of Papua New Guinea. Dempwolff et al. (2005:12),
a translation of the original Dempwolff (1939), write the following:
“But the verb in Jabêm is not strictly a Zeitwort [‘time word’, the German term for
‘verb’], because it lacks any tense. Nor is there any difference between intransitive and
transitive verbs, nor any causatives or similar derived forms, nor any passive forms.
Instead, the only psychological notion that is expressed with regard to the event is the
speaker’s judgment as to whether he is speaking about an event in the real world or
only an event in his imaginary world; this is the difference between amodus realis and
a modus imaginativus [“irrealis” in this translation].6
Our present, imperfect, and perfect correspond to the realis; while we have to render
the irrealis by means of our future, imperative, subjunctive, or even by our auxiliary
verbs.”
Dempwolff (1939) was one of the first linguists to talk about the realis/irrealis distinction as a cat-
egory of mood,7 which was subsequently adopted by many linguists working on non-Indo-European
languages (for some of the first modern discussions on realis/irrealis see Mithun, 1995; Chafe, 1995).
The reason Dempwolff (1939) used a label different from tense or the indicative/subjunctive distinc-
tion lies in the different nature of these categories. As we can see in the quote above, both realis
and irrealis include several Indo-European categories. In Jabêm, realis expresses that the described
event holds true in the actual world, which corresponds to the past and present temporal reference,
as shown in (1). Irrealis expresses events which are not said to hold true in the actual world – they
hold true in possible worlds and yield interpretations of future, imperative, deontic, or desiderative
modalities, as shown in (2) and (3). This shows that irrealis is indeed quite different from the Ro-
mance subjunctive, which appears almost exclusively in subordinate clauses. Irrealis, on the other
hand, appears in both subordinate and main clauses. Despite the differences between the traditional
categories of mood, such as indicative/subjunctive, and realis/irrealis, the definition of realis/irrealis
as grammatical categories determining the reference to actual and non-actual worlds describes a
distinction of mood.
(1) kô-sôm
2g.eal-speak
‘you speak, spoke, have spoken’ (Dempwolff et al., 2005:12)
6All the brackets and bold letters are maintained as in the original, a translation by editors Joel Bradshaw and Francise
Czobor.
7Preceded by Sapir (1930) in his description of Southern Paiute, mentioned in Elliott (2000).
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(2) ô-sôm
2g.i-speak
‘you will speak, you would speak, speak!’ (Dempwolff et al., 2005:12)
(3) jà-mbic
1g.i-carry
‘I shall, would, have to, want to carry’ (Dempwolff et al., 2005:12)
Ever since Dempwolff’s (1939) description of Jabêm, many other Oceanic languages have been
described as having the realis/irrealis distinction (e.g. Bugenhagen, 1993; Lynch et al., 2002; Lichten-
berk, 2016b).8 However, the exact semantics of this distinction, as well as its cross-linguistic validity
are still considered to be a debated issue in the literature. This served as the main motivation for
initiating the MelaTAMP project led by Kilu von Prince and Manfred Krifka (‘A corpus-based con-
trastive study of tense, aspect, modality and polarity (TAMP) in Austronesian languages of Melanesia
(MelaTAMP)’) at Humboldt University of Berlin, in whose context this thesis was written (see Sec-
tion 3.2 for more details). Similarly to this thesis, one of the central goals of the MelaTAMP project
is to analyze TMA expressions in Oceanic languages of Melanesia in order to illuminate the existing
debates in the literature regarding the semantics of TMA categories. The main issue concerning the
realis/irrealis mood is the heated debate on whether this distinction is a cross-linguistically valid
linguistic category or not, which often resulted in disregard of this category in many studies of TMA
semantics and typology. In seminal works on the large-scale typology of TMA categories, the re-
alis/irrealis mood has typically been left out of the investigation. This is mainly due to three factors,
the first being the Indo-European bias of expecting an indicative/subjunctive distinction. For exam-
ple, Dahl (1985:53) writes the following: “categories traditionally labeled moods will not in general
be among the ‘major TMA categories’, since these […] predominantly occur in embedded contexts”.
We can see here that Dahl (1985) refers to the Indo-European subjunctive mood that is limited to
embedded contexts. The second factor is the difficulty of separating the irrealis category from the
category of future tense, and this is the case in Velupillai (2016), who writes: “if an ‘irrealis’ marker
is stated in the source as having as its primary function to locate an event9 after the deictic centre on
the timeline, I have categorized it as a future tense for this survey.” In e World Atlas of Language
Structures irrealis is also subsumed under the future tense (Dahl & Velupillai, 2013a) and it is also not
included as a feature of any other modal category. The third factor for excluding realis/irrealis from
consideration is the argument that it does not constitute a cross-linguistically valid category, which
was probably initiated by Trask (1993) and Bybee et al.’s (1994) large-scale typology of TMA.
The argument against the cross-linguistic validity of the realis/irrealis distinction has been made
by many linguists (e.g. Bybee, 1998; de Haan, 2012; Cristofaro, 2012). Nevertheless, there are many
who have defended its cross-linguistic validity (Elliott, 2000), and emphasized its importance in spe-
cific language groups, such as Amerindian (e.g. Mithun, 1995; Chafe, 1995), Australian (McGregor
8I found that in grammar sketches in Lynch et al. (2002) 22 out of 43 languages have the realis/irrealis distinction, and
in other recent grammars chosen as a convenience sample I found realis/irrealis as a described category in 27 out of 32
languages (Krajinović, 2017a).
9Abbreviated as “E” in the original.
7& Wagner, 2006), Papuan (Roberts, 1990), and Oceanic languages (Bugenhagen, 1993; Lichtenberk,
2016b). Bybee (1998) and de Haan (2012) argue that irrealis is used to describe a variety of linguistic
phenomena which do not form a semantically coherent category, and that mood and modality are
rarely expressed by a single binary distinction. Cristofaro (2012) shows that the phenomena treated
as realis or irrealis, such as portmanteau subject markers, can in fact be alternatively analyzed as
having a different grammatical role altogether. Another issue is that “realis” is often found in modal
contexts which should be associated with irrealis, such as future (Chafe, 1995), directives (Mauri
& Sansò, 2012), or counterfactuals (Exter, 2012), and irrealis is often considered polyfunctional and
interrelated with other TMA categories, such as habituals and generics (see Boneh & Doron, 2010;
Baker & Travis, 1997). In fact, the realis/irrealis distinction in Nafsan and several other Oceanic
languages features precisely this type of problematic behavior, with realis occurring in contexts typ-
ically associated with irrealis, as can be seen in Thieberger’s (2006) description of Nafsan and the
corpus (Thieberger, 1995–2018). By using the Nafsan realis/irrealis as a case study and comparing it
to several Oceanic languages with similar structures, I address these problems and show that what
has been analyzed as either realis or irrealis can be semantically underspecified for TMA and can in
fact be reanalyzed as general subject markers (see Chapter 8). Examples (4) and (5) from targeted
storyboard elicitations collected during my fieldwork on Nafsan show that both “realis” and irrealis
subject markers, analyzed as such by Thieberger (2006), occur in the protasis of counterfactual con-
ditionals, respectively. Since the analysis of subject markers as realis in (4) would mean that “realis”
can refer to non-actual contexts in the same way as irrealis in (5), I reanalyze this category as mark-
ing only subject person and number in Nafsan. This reanalysis is supported by the occurrence of
these “realis” subject markers in a number of different modal contexts (see Chapter 8). I also show
that this type of reanalysis can solve similar problems with semantically underspecified categories
in other Oceanic languages, such as in Wogeo (see Section 9.1).
(4) a=f
1g.eal=cond
mer
cf
mes
play
matol,
tomorrow
go
and
nfag
sore
nen
el
kin
comp
a=tai
1g.eal=cut
nakn-i-k
finger--1g.dp
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
mer
again
makot
break
‘If I played tomorrow, the sore I cut onmyfingerwould bleed again.’ (AK1-098-01, 00:03:39.185-
00:03:57.063)
(5) ka=f
1g.i=cond
mer
cf
mes
play
volibol
volleyball
matol,
tomorrow
nakn-i-k
finger--1g.dp
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
mra
bleed
‘If I played volleyball tomorrow, myfingerwould bleed.’ (AK1-004-01, 00:03:27.921-00:03:33.286)
I also argue that although Cristofaro’s (2012) argument that realis/irrealis markers can be reanalyzed
as having a different grammatical role altogether holds true for some languages, this fact does not
invalidate the realis/irrealis distinction as a cross-linguistic category. I argue that the existence of
irrealis is not necessarily defined by the binary distinction with the overt category of realis. Instead,
the contrast between the semantically specified irrealis category and the realis meaning can come
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about as a pragmatic inference that does not need to be encoded in the semantics of the TMA system
of the language (see also Matić & Nikolaeva, 2014). Moreover, in Chapter 9 I argue that the cross-
linguistic variability of irrealis can be explained as an inherent part of its semantic definition of
referring to non-actual worldswithin the branching-timesmodel (von Prince et al., 2019d; von Prince,
2019). Based on examples of a fewOceanic languages, I offer evidence for the cross-linguistic validity
of the irrealis category.
Thus, by solving a particular problem of realis/irrealis meaning in Nafsan, this thesis aims to
offer a) a solution of semantic underspecification that can be applied to other Oceanic languages,
b) a semantic definition of irrealis that can be applied cross-linguistically, and c) a relationship of
pragmatic competition that can also be applied cross-linguistically.
I turn now to the perfect aspect, as the second TMA category studied in this thesis. The category
of perfect aspect in its most prototypical meaning refers to the result state of a given event (e.g.
Comrie, 1976; Dahl & Velupillai, 2013b). Although there are many semantic definitions proposed for
the perfect category (see Section 4.1),10 I adopt the widely accepted definition of perfect as referring
to the posttime of the described situation, in the neo-Reichenbachian approach (Reichenbach, 1947)
by Klein (1994). As Figure 1.1 shows, the sentence I have arrived in the English [eng] present perfect
refers to the posttime of the arrival event. Since we are dealing with present perfect, the posttime
includes the utterance time (UT) and we get an interpretation that the event of arriving has current
relevance.
Figure 1.1: Timeline of the English present perfect
In cross-linguistic studies on perfect, the English perfect has been taken as the prototype of the
perfect aspect (Dahl, 1985; Dahl & Velupillai, 2013b; Dahl, 2014b). Since the English perfect has
several possible readings (resultative, experiential, universal, ‘hot news’, and anteriority, see Section
4.1), we expect that the perfect aspect in other languages would exhibit most or all of these functions
(Dahl, 1985). In his seminal typological study on TMA, Dahl (1985) also notes that the categories
that exhibit only one of the typical uses of perfect constitute a category different from the perfect.
However, the semantic analysis of different functions of perfect is still a matter of debate even within
the study of English, as some linguists derive them from a single definition of perfect (Klein, 1994),
and others take their existence as evidence that perfect is polysemous (McCawley, 1981; Mittwoch,
10Perfect is also often considered to be a category with properties of both tense and aspect (e.g. Comrie, 1976).
91988; Michaelis, 1994; Kiparsky, 2002). The cross-linguistic diversity on this issue should then shed
some light on the plausibility of perfect being a cross-linguistic category, by attesting whether the
functions of the English perfect tend to cluster under a single TMAmarker in languages of the world.
Considering the typological studies which take the English perfect as the prototype, perfect appears
in at least 37%11 (24 out of 64) of the languages of Dahl’s (1985) sample and in Dahl & Velupillai’s
(2013b) sample 48% (108 out of 222) of the studied languages have perfect. These numbers seem to
be a striking piece of evidence that perfect has cross-linguistic validity. However, despite taking the
functions of the English perfect as the prototype, Dahl (1985) and Dahl & Velupillai (2013b) analyze
many Indo-European languages as having perfect even when their perfects do not have the same
semantic restrictions as in English. For instance, German [deu] as one of the languages with perfect
in Dahl (1985) and Dahl & Velupillai (2013b) famously uses the “perfect” with temporal adverbials in
the past (6), which would not be possible with the English present perfect (e.g. Klein, 1992).12 Similar
problems arise with other Indo-European languages, such as French [fra] or Spanish [spa]. Although
the perfect structures in these languages are used to express the functions of the English perfect and
have some of the expected semantic restrictions (de Swart, 2007; Rothstein, 2008), they seem to have
evolved into a much more generalized category closer to the past tense than the perfect aspect (see
also Klein, 1994; Bertrand et al., 2017; Drinka, 2017). Given that the synchronic “perfect” categories in
these languages differ in many relevant properties from the English perfect, following Klein (1994),
in this thesis I do not consider these categories to be instantiations of the perfect category.
(6) Ich
1g.nom
bin
be:1g.p
gestern
yesterday
angekommen.
pcp:arrive
‘I arrived yesterday./ *I have arrived yesterday.’
Similar cases of problematic categorization of perfect are attested cross-linguistically. Quite often
languages are reported to have a category with most of the functions of the English perfect, but
not all, or having all the functions of the English perfect and some additional ones (see Section
4.2). Both cases are attested across Oceanic languages, and the latter is the case in Nafsan. Oceanic
languages are particularly interesting because they are often described as having the category of
perfect which expresses an additional function of change of state (e.g. Tongan, Koontz-Garboden,
2007). Olsson (2013) found the same type of perfect with the change-of-state meaning in several
genetically unrelated languages of Asia and the Pacific, including several Oceanic languages, and
analyzed it as a new typological category of “iamitives” (name derived from Latin iam ‘already’).
The iamitive is proposed to be a category that unites the resultative function of perfect and the
meaning of change of state, as well as some other meanings such as expectedness, which are related
to ‘already’ as its proposed diachronic source (see Section 4.2.2 and Chapter 5).
My work on perfect in Nafsan situates itself within the debates which discuss the cross-linguistic
validity of the perfect and the iamitive categories. After identifying the challenges for the analysis
11This number depends on the accepted criteria for determining the category of perfect; if all languages where some
kind of perfect was found are counted this percentage rises to 55% (Dahl, 1985:130).
12For semantic explanations of this restriction see Section 4.1.
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of the perfect in Nafsan in Thieberger’s (2006) description (see Section 5.1.2), I carried out targeted
storyboard and questionnaire elicitations in the field and found that the perfect in Nafsan has all
the relevant functions of the English perfect (e.g. Comrie, 1976; McCoard, 1978; McCawley, 1981), as
shown in examples (7)-(9) (see also Thieberger, 2006). However, it also has the additional function
of change of state (10), which could be taken as a piece of evidence for analyzing it as the iamitive
category.
(7) Resultative
Kineu
1g
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
maa
grate
ntal
taro
su.
pf
‘I have grated the taro.’ (AK1-146-02, 00:02:32.335-00:02:41.410)
(8) Experiential
Ag
2g
kui=pe
2g.pf=pf
paam
eat
kapu?
laplap
‘Have you eaten laplap before?’ (AK1-151-02, 00:01:18.633-00:01:20.950)
(9) Anteriority
Me
but
malnran
when
kin
comp
i=pan
3g=go
check,
check:bi
i=pan
3g=go
lak
see
tp̃er
fence
ni
of
waak
pig
me
but
i=laka
3g=see
na
comp
waak
pig
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
p̃rai
break
tp̃er,
fence
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
sef.
escape
‘But when he went to check, he went to see the fenced off pig and he saw that the pig had
broken the fence, it had escaped.’ (AK1-022-01, 00:03:24.726-00:03:37.121)
(10) Change of state
Malfane
now
nal-u-k
hair--1g.dp
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
taar.
white
‘My hair is blond now.’ (AK1-146-03, 00:03:31.991-00:03:33.853)
In Chapter 5 I analyze the Nafsan perfect in detail and take its features and language-internal pro-
cesses, such as aspectual coercion (Koontz-Garboden, 2007), as evidence to argue for the cross-
linguistic validity of the perfect and against postulating the new iamitive category. In a typological
approach, I compare my findings about Nafsan with four other Oceanic languages whose properties
of the perfect bear relevance for the iamitive/perfect debate (see Chapter 6). By creating a classical
semantic map (cf. Haspelmath, 2003) of the perfect, I argue that the semantic space of Oceanic per-
fects and related categories covers the aspectual area of the English-style functions of perfect and
the change-of-state meaning, assumed to be the core iamitive meaning. Since these semantic spaces
occupied by the analyzed Oceanic categories can be explained by existing aspectual categories and
independent language-internal processes, I conclude that the iamitive as defined by Olsson (2013)
is not a cross-linguistically relevant category. In addition, I argue that the spread of a specific cat-
egory over most of the perfect functions but not all is also conditioned by paradigmatic effects of
blocking. The analysis of the perfect aspect presented here provides a theoretical contribution to the
understanding of the cross-linguistic semantics of the perfect aspect, which can also be used as a
methodological guide to identifying aspectual categories in underdescribed categories.
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Regarding the theoretical approach of this thesis, it is necessary tomention one caveat. As shown
in this introduction, the main research questions motivating this study are the debated questions
about the categorial status of the realis/irrealis mood and the perfect aspect, and the cross-linguistic
validity of their proposed semantic definitions. For this reason, this thesis takes any theoretical ap-
proach that can adequately address these fundamental questions. Given that the debates surrounding
the realis/irrealis and the perfect have already set particular theoretical directions, this work neces-
sarily inherits some theoretical assumptions that are prominent in both debates. For instance, while
the realis/irrealis debate has been prominent in the typological studies, the perfect has comparatively
been more heavily studied in formal semantics. This necessarily leads to different initial expectations
about the restrictiveness and the degree of formalization of semantic definitions of these categories.
While this thesis has both the formal and the typological angle in the analysis of both realis/irrealis
and perfect, given the two different starting points regarding the two topics, the discussion on the
realis/irrealis mood has a more of a prototype-based cross-linguistic approach, and the definition
of the perfect aspect can be seen as slightly more restrictive and formal, despite allowing for cross-
linguistic variability. However, this difference should not be seen as a theoretical setback, but rather
as an indication that both of these theoretical approaches can be simultaneously valid, as this the-
sis provides evidence that the cross-linguistic definitions of the realis/irrealis mood and the perfect
aspect can be successfully described by typological and formal semantic methods.
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 I introduce the basic information about Nafsan
and Oceanic languages, including the morphosyntactic structure of Oceanic languages and previ-
ous work on Nafsan by Thieberger (2006). Chapter 3 outlines the methodology used in this thesis,
namely the corpus work, semantic fieldwork, and the typological perspective. In Chapter 4 I present
the semantic definitions of the perfect and the related categories of iamitives and ‘already’, as well
as the discussion on their cross-linguistic validity in the context of Oceanic languages. That chapter
foreshadows the questions addressed in Chapter 5, in which I analyze all the meanings associated
with the perfect, iamitives, and ‘already’ in Nafsan, and provide evidence that the definition of the
English-style perfect aspect (Klein, 1994) is sufficient to account for all the attested properties, espe-
cially when different language-internal processes such as aspectual coercion are considered. Chapter
6 studies the meanings of the perfect, iamitives, and ‘already’ in four additional Oceanic languages
– Toqabaqita [mlu], Unua [onu], Niuean [niu], and Māori [mri]. On the basis of the data of these
languages and Nafsan, I create a semantic map of the semantic space of the perfect, iamitives, and
‘already’, and show that the spread of the functions expressed by single markers in these languages
does not match the proposed iamitive functions, despite the existence of the meaning change of
state. Turning to the realis/irrealis distinction, in Chapter 7 I present the current state of the art
regarding the realis/irrealis debate and other issues related to the semantics of languages without
the grammatical marking of tense, foreshadowing the questions relevant for the analysis of realis
and irrealis in Nafsan in Chapter 8. In Chapter 8 I focus on the distribution of the realis and irre-
alis mood in Nafsan and offer a detailed semantic analysis of these categories. In a typological and
cross-linguistic perspective, in Chapter 9 I present evidence that the analysis of realis and irrealis
as proposed for Nafsan can be applied to other Oceanic languages, including the semantic defini-
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tion of irrealis as a cross-linguistically valid category. Chapter 10 is a conclusion which summarizes
the main arguments made in the thesis. Appendix B provides all the Nafsan data I elicited through
translation-based questionnaires, such as Dahl (2000c,b).
Part II
Baground
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Chapter 2
Nafsan and Oceanic languages
2.1 Location and genetic affiliation
Oceanic languages form a genetic subgroup within the larger Austronesian family, and are spoken
across Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. Oceanic languages were first established as a subgroup
of Austronesian by Dempwolff (1937), who postulated the existence of Urmelanesisch (Proto Melane-
sian), nowadays called Proto-Oceanic. Lynch et al. (2002) count 450 to 600 languages classified as
Oceanic. The largest Oceanic language is probably Fijian, spoken by around 300,000 people, and it
is followed by Polynesian languages, such as Samoan [smo], Kiribati [gil], and Tongan [ton] (Lynch
et al., 2002:10-12). In Melanesia the number of speakers per language is significantly smaller than
in Polynesia. According to Lynch et al. (2002:12), in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Solomon Islands
the average populations amount to 4,000 speakers per language (including Oceanic and Papuan lan-
guages), 2,000 in New Caledonia, and 1,500 in Vanuatu. Melanesia is also recognized as one of the
most linguistically diverse areas of the world. Vanuatu alone, as a country with the population of
272,459 people,1 has been said to have 138 different languages (François et al., 2015).
Figure 2.1: Oceanic within the branches of the Austronesian family
The main focus of this thesis is the study of Nafsan, also known as South Efate. The geographical
name South Efate has been recently substituted by the name speakers refer to their language: nafsan,
which means ‘language’ (see Thieberger, 1995–2018). Nafsan is spoken in the south of the island of
1Information from the 2016 Mini Census of Vanuatu, available at https://vnso.gov.vu/index.php/
mini-census-2016.
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Efate, situated in Shefa Province in Vanuatu (see Figure 2.2),2 on the outskirts of the capital Port
Vila, in the villages of Erakor, Eratap, and Pango, see Figure 2.3. The corpus data of Nafsan were
collected in Erakor and Eratap (Thieberger, 1995–2018) and I collected my fieldwork data in Erakor
(Krajinović, 2017b). Lynch et al. (2002) estimate that Nafsan is spoken by 5,000-6,000 people, but
this number must be higher today. The 2016 Mini Census of Vanuatu counts 8,918 inhabitants in
Erakor, 6,640 in Eratap, and 2,326 in Pango. Given that the census did not collect language data and
that there are migrations from other islands of Vanuatu to these villages, it is uncertain how many
people are speakers of Nafsan. Nafsan is spoken alongside Bislama [bis], the official language of
Vanuatu, and education is carried out in English and French. Lynch et al. (2002) classify Nafsan as
belonging to the South Efate/Southern Melanesian linkage (see Figure 2.4), which sets it genetically
apart from the North Efate languages (see also Tryon, 1976), such as Lelepa [lpa] (Lacrampe, 2014),
Nguna [llp] (Schütz, 1969), and Namakir [nmk] spoken on Shepherd Islands situated to the north of
Efate (Sperlich, 1991). There is one more language spoken on the island of Efate and that is Ifira-Mele
[mxe], a Polynesian outlier spoken in the villages of Ifira and Mele in the vicinity of Port Vila, see
Figure 2.3.
Apart from the study of Nafsan, in a typological perspective I compare the Nafsan structures with
several other Oceanic languages, as well as languages from other families with relevant structures,
with the aim of establishing the semantic spaces of studied TMA categories, and providing cross-
linguistically applicable analyses of certain categories. Appendix A contains a list of all the examples
in this thesis and the languages they represent, accompanied by their ISO 639-3 codes. The Oceanic
languages which are analyzed in more detail in this thesis are represented together with their genetic
relationships in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.2: Location of Vanuatu and the island of Efate
2I created all the maps in this thesis with the Generic Mapping Tools (Wessel et al., 2019).
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Figure 2.3: A map of the island of Efate with bullet locations where Nafsan is spoken
Figure 2.4: Genetic classification of Oceanic languages analyzed in more detail in this thesis (in bold),
classification from Ross et al. (2016) and Lynch et al. (2002), and language data from Glottolog (2017)
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2.2 Basic structure and TMA in Oceanic languages of Melanesia
In this section I describe some salient structural properties of Oceanic languages of Melanesia, with
special emphasis on the verb phrase and TMA properties that will be addressed in the following
chapters. As we can see from Figure 2.4, apart from two Polynesian languages (Niuean and Tongan),
all the other languages studied in this thesis are from the Melanesian region. Given that Melanesian
linguistic features differ in many ways from their Polynesian counterparts, this introduction of the
basic Oceanic structures is limited to the languages of Melanesia. Polynesian structures relevant for
this study are addressed in the chapters where they first appear. The choice of represented Oceanic
languages ofMelanesia in this section is based on a convenience sample of languageswith typological
properties of interest for this thesis. Nevertheless, the represented languages are intended to serve
as examples of Oceanic properties that are widespread in the region.
Oceanic languages tend to have a simple CV syllable structure and small phoneme inventories
with few complex articulations. However, in Melanesia there are some exceptions to this general
trend. For instance, Nafsan has lost many medial vowels which resulted in the occurrence of nu-
merous consonant sequences. The loss of medial vowels can be illustrated with the word nafsan
‘language’ that has been recorded as nafisan in 1950s by Pastor Sope (Thieberger, 2006:3). Another
feature of Nafsan and other Oceanic languages is the existence of two labiovelar stops3 with a phone-
mic contrast (Lynch, 2002; Thieberger, 2006). Examples (1) and (2) from Nafsan show two minimal
pairs contrasting the labiovelar stop /p̃/ with /p/, and the labiovelar nasal /m̃/ with /m/.
(1) p̃as [k͡pas] ‘to chase’ vs. pas [pas] ‘dolphin’ (Thieberger, 2006:47)
(2) m̃ol [ŋ͡mol] ‘to be alive’ vs. mol [mol] ‘hunt (for coconut crab)’ (Thieberger, 2006:51)
Nouns in Oceanic languages typically do not have the morphological categories of case, number,
and gender, but there are other distinctions that are frequently morphologically marked. At the
lexical level, some languages distinguish nouns according to whether they are personal, locational,
or common nouns. In Nafsan, for instance, locational nouns are marked with the locative affix e-, as
shown by the contrast between examples (3) and (4). The article na in (3) has diachronically fused
with nouns and in the synchronic system it can be analyzed as a formative element of common
nouns.4
(3) na-sum̃
dehouse
‘house’ (Thieberger, 2006:76)
(4) e-sum̃
lochouse
‘at the house’ (Thieberger, 2006:76)
3This terms refers to consonants which are doubly articulated at the velum and the lips, as exemplified with [k͡p] and
[ŋ͡m] in (1) and (2). I do not use this term to refer to labialized velars, such as [kw].
4About the loss of articles in Southern Oceanic languages see Lynch (2001).
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Some Oceanic languages have a distinction between definite and indefinite articles, and we can see
an example of this in Mav̋ea [mkv]. Examples (5) and (6) show the use of the definite article le and
the indefinite article aite, respectively. Examples (7) and (8) show the same type of distinction in
Nafsan with the definite determiner ne and the indefinite skei ‘one’.
(5) [Mav̋ea (North Vanuatu)]
ko-adi
2g-can
sile
give
nao
1g
dam
yam
le?
de.def
‘Can you give me the yam?’ (Guérin, 2011:150)
(6) [Mav̋ea (North Vanuatu)]
Ok,
ok
me
f
ro
then
ka-var
1g.i-talk
sur
about
tamlese
old.man
ta-tuva
cl-Tutuba
aite
one
[…]
‘Ok, I will talk about an old Tutuba man […]’ (Guérin, 2011:149)
(7) [Nafsan, context: two friends tried to reach for bananas that were merely a reflection in the
water, from “Bundle of bananas” (von Prince, 2018a)]
Komam
1pl.ecl
ra=mro-ki-n
1d.ecl=think--3g.obj
na
comp
ple
bundle
nanre
banana
ne
de.def
i=to
3g=stay
naum̃.
river
‘We thought the bananas were in the river.’ (AK1-021-01, 00:12:13.920-00:12:22.511)
(8) [Nafsan, context: Bong is preparing a kastom ceremony, from “Fat pig” (von Prince, 2018b)]
Me
but
nen
pp
ke=freg
3g.i=make.i
kastom
kastom.ceremony
ga
3g.po
nen
de.def
i=mur
3g=want
waak
pig
ke=skei.
3g=one
‘In order to do the kastom ceremony he needs a pig.’ (AK1-028-01, 00:00:15.755-00:00:18.623)
Nouns can be classified as alienably and inalienably possessed, as examples (9) and (10) illustrate
with the alienable and inalienable reading of the noun bura ‘blood’ in Daakaka [bpa]. In (9) the
noun ‘blood’ is marked by a transitivizer5 and interpreted as a body part relationship and in (10) it is
marked by a possessive classifier and a possessive linker and interpreted with the sense of ownership
(von Prince, 2016).
(9) [Daakaka (Central Vanuatu)]
bura=ne
blood=
vyanten
person
en=te
dem=med
‘this person’s blood’ (body part reading) (von Prince, 2016:70)
(10) [Daakaka (Central Vanuatu)]
bura
blood
ø-e
po.cl-po.link
vyanten
person
en=te
dem=med
‘this person’s (animal) blood’ (ownership reading) (von Prince, 2016:70)
5Besides marking transitivity on verbs, in Daakaka the transitivizer (a)ne is also used for increasing valency, and thus
marking inalienability, with intransitive nouns and pronouns (von Prince, 2015:161). Intransitive nouns are defined by
von Prince (2016:73) as nouns that cannot express inalienable possession by simple juxtaposition with another noun or
noun phrase, without any additional morphology.
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Regarding the pronominal system and person marking, most Oceanic languages have clusivity
distinctions in the first person and some languages have up to four different number distinctions.
One such case is Daakie [ptv], with singular, dual, paucal, and plural number. In example (11)-(13)
we can see how different numbers of participants – two, three, and ten – require the person marking
in dual, paucal, and plural, respectively.
(11) [Daakie (Central Vanuatu)]
timaleh
child
woro-ló
number-two
kolo-m
3d-eal
pwet/du
stay
pán
under
em
house
‘Two children were in the house.’ (Krifka, 2018a)
(12) [Daakie (Central Vanuatu)]
timaleh
child
woro-syee
number-three
kiye-m
3pc-eal
du
stay
pán
under
em
house
‘Three children were in the house.’ (Krifka, 2018a)
(13) [Daakie (Central Vanuatu)]
timaleh
child
songavi
ten
la-m
3pl-eal
du
stay
pán
under
em
house
‘Ten children were in the house.’ (Krifka, 2018a)
The pronominal systems in Oceanic languages make the distinction between free pronouns and
subject markers that typically attach to the verb either as clitics or prefixes. In examples (11)-(13) we
saw different subject-marking prefixes, but Daakie also has free pronouns. Table 2.1 shows the full
paradigm of pronouns and subject markers in Daakie. Despite the similarity in form between the
two the paradigms, the subject markers are significantly shorter and sometimes have a different form
altogether. As we can see in (11)-(13) the subject markers are typically prefixed to a TMA marker.
Table 2.1: Pronouns and subject markers in Daakie, from Krifka (2018a)
Person Singular Dual Paucal Plural Forms
1.ecl ngyo komoo kidyee kemem Pronounna- komo- kidye- keme- Subject Marker
1.incl adoo adyee et Pronoundo- dye- da- Subject Marker
2 ngyak kamoo kamdyee kimim Pronounko- ka- ka- ki- Subject Marker
3 ngye koloo ki(l)yee ngyee Pronounø kolo- kiye- la- Subject Marker
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Although many Oceanic languages in Melanesia exhibit pronominal patterns similar to Daakie,
the grammatical status of subject markers can differ in respect to the degree of morphological sep-
aration from TMA markers. I identify four levels of morphological separation-fusion between the
subject markers and TMA markers, shown in (14).
(14) Degrees of morphological separation-fusion between the subject markers and TMA markers:
a. Independent morphology
b. Adjacent and partially dependent
c. Morphologically dependent (integrated in the paradigm)
d. Portmanteau TMA subject markers
The TMAmarkers which are completely morphologically independent from the subject markers
(14a) typically occupy the preverbal or the postverbal position. Example (15) exemplifies this pre-
verbal position with the modal/sequential marker kabo in Saliba [sbe], and (16) with the prospective
ha in Koro [kxr]. Both kabo and ha precede the verb marked with the subject marker prefixed to the
verb. Markers occupying this preverbal position tend to have modal meanings or future reference.
(15) [Saliba (Papuan Tip)]
ku-lao
2ggo
na
conj
malaitom
next.day
kabo
will/then
ku-lao-ma
2ggo-hither
‘You go now, and tomorrow you will come (back).’ (Margetts, 1999:13)
(16) [Koro (Admiralty Islands)]
mwah
next.day
ha
pp
you
1g.bj
k-u
i-1g
me
come
‘Tomorrow I’ll come.’ (Cleary-Kemp, 2015:23)
The postverbal position is usually occupied by aspectual markers and depending on the description
of a given language, markers in this position can be labeled as perfective (Nafsan, see Section 5.3.2),
perfect, as in Neverver [lgk] (Barbour, 2012) and Lelepa [lpa] (Lacrampe, 2014), or ‘already’, as in
Unua (Pearce, 2015a). Example (17) offers an example of the postverbal particle ju ‘already’ in Unua,
analyzed in more detail in Section 6.3.3.
(17) [Unua (Central Vanuatu)]
Rate
3pl
tebeg
all
veverngo
now
re-rex
3pl-married
ju
already
‘They are all married now.’ (Pearce, 2015a:321)
The second possibility regarding the degree ofmorphological fusion between the subject markers and
TMAmarkers is adjacencywithout complete morphological dependency (14b). We saw this situation
in Daakie (11)-(13), where subject markers were attached to the realis marker -m. However, the realis
marker maintains its full form mwe or a morphophonologically conditioned variant thereof when
there is no subject marker that it can attach to, as is regularly the case in 3g, as exemplified in (18).
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(18) [Daakie (Central Vanuatu)]
timaleh
child
soo
one
mwe
eal
pwet
stay
pán
under
em
house
‘A / one child was in the house.’ (Krifka, 2018a)
In Daakaka, a language closely related to Daakie, the TMA markers cliticize to the preceding
subject marker ending in a vowel. However, if there is no such preceding word, they will form a
monosyllabic independent word, just like in Daakie. In examples (19) and (20) we can see that the
realis marker can be realized as a clitic =m or as a monosyllabic word mwe due to the null subject
marker (nge 3g in (20) is a full independent pronoun and not a subject marker von Prince 2015:155),
respectively.
(19) [Daakaka (Central Vanuatu)]
Na=m
1g=eal
vyan
go
stoa.
store
‘I’m going to the store./ I went to the store.’ (von Prince, 2015:235)
(20) [Daakaka (Central Vanuatu)]
maa
dove
nge
3g
mwe
eal
kuk=ane
cook=
dom
yam
pi∼pili.
ed∼red
‘The dove cooked/cooks red yam.’ (von Prince, 2015:231)
In some Oceanic languages the adjacent TMA markers similar to the realis marker m in (11)-
(13) and (19) became systematically integrated into the regular paradigm of subject markers where
different morphemes can be identified for person, number, and mood (14c). One such language is
Neverver, spoken on the island of Malakula, Vanuatu. Neverver has a system of subject markers in
which the morphemes for person, number, and mood can be morphologically identified (Barbour,
2012:165). As we can see in Table 2.2, every subject marker is composed by the person marking,
clusivity/number marking (Num(1) in Table 2.2), mood marking, and number marking (Num(2) in
Table 2.2), each occupying specific positions within the form. The paradigm of subject markers that
lacks the mood marker is labeled as realis, and irrealis is constructed by combining the unmarked
realis and the irrealis mood marker m (quite different from the realis m in Daakaka and Daakie).
In someOceanic languages, themorphological boundaries between TMA and subject markers are
not as clear as in Neverver. In this case, described in (14d), the adjacent TMA and subject markers
diachronically merged and resulted in portmanteau TMA subject markers (Ross & Lithgow, 1989;
Moyse-Faurie & Lynch, 2004), which denote the person and number of the subject as well as TMA
values. This is the case in Nafsan (see Section 2.3). Many Oceanic languages with portmanteau TMA
subject markers display asymmetrical paradigms with unpredictable syncretisms, and sometimes
with a lack of TMA distinctions in certain persons. One typical example of such subject-marking
paradigm is a Western Oceanic language Wogeo [woc] spoken on the island of Wogeo in the north
of Papua New Guinea (Exter, 2012), see also Section 9.1. Its irrealis paradigm of subject markers also
appears to be morphologically based on the realis paradigm, as we can see in Table 2.3, but there is
no systematic way of forming irrealis. In some cases, as in 1d, a g element is added as a suffix and
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Table 2.2: Example of subject markers in Neverver by Barbour (2012:165)
Marker Person Num(1) Mood Num(2)
1.g.eal ni n i
1.g.i nim n i m
1.incl.d.eal nir n i r
1.incl.d.i nimr n i m r
1.ecl.d.eal nar n a r
1.ecl.d.i namr n a m r
1.incl.pl.eal nit n i t
1.incl.pl.i nimt n i m t
1.ecl.pl.eal nat n a t
1.ecl.pl.i namt n a m t
2.g.eal ku k u
2.g.i kum k u m
...
sometimes as a prefix, as in 1g. Additionally, 3g has d- instead of g- and in paucal and plural many
realis and irrealis forms are the same.
Table 2.3: Subject markers in Wogeo (Exter, 2012:181), in their forms as they would appear with the
verb lako ‘go’
Realis Irrealis
1g o- go-
2g go-, ko- go-
3g e- de-
1d to- tog-
2d kad-
3d do- dog-
1pc to- tog-
2pc koto-
3pc doto-
1pl ta-
2pl ka-
3pl da-
A similar situation is found in Mav̋ea, where the realis/irrealis distinction is attested only for
1g and 3g, as shown in Table 2.4. The forms of subject markers cannot be easily segmented in the
mood-indicating and the person/number-indicating parts, which shows they are not compositional.
24 CHAPTER 2. NAFSAN AND OCEANIC LANGUAGES
This is clear if we compare na 1g with ka 1g.i and mo 3g with i 3g.i.
Table 2.4: Singular and plural subject markers in Mav̋ea by Guérin (2011:211)
Realis Irrealis
1g na- ka-
2g ko-
3g mo- i-
1pl.incl da-
1pl.ecl ki-
2pl ki-
3pl ra-
Themost extreme type of fusion between the TMAmarkers and the verb is the expression of the
realis/irrealis or non-future/future by the stem-initial mutation of the verb, also called root-initial
alternation by Crowley (1982, 1991) and oral/nasal alternation by Lynch (1975). The latter name
is motivated by the fact that in many Oceanic languages of Central Vanuatu, such as Lewo [lww],
Paamese [pma], and Nguna, verbs have initial oral or non-nasal consonants in the irrealis and initial
nasal consonants in the realis, as shown for Paamese in Table 2.5. Lynch (1975) shows that the
nasal mutation of the verb stem in realis or non-future is a result of the fusion of the Proto-Oceanic
preverbal realis particle *m(V) (cf. Daakie and Daakaka above) with the initial consonant of the
verb. He also shows evidence of the irrealis particle *namerging with verb stems in some languages.
However, the stem-initial mutation does not necessarily involve an oral/nasal contrast, as we can
see in the last row in Table 2.5. Similarly, in Nafsan the stem-initial mutation does not have nasal
consonants in the synchronic system, as it refers to the contrast between the initial p- and f- (see
Section 2.3.1).
Table 2.5: An example of the stem-initial mutation in Paamese from Lynch (1975:90,92), and Ray
(1926) cited in Lynch (1975:90)
Alternation rule Future Non-future Meaning
v > m voasi moasi ‘kill’
V > mV um mum ‘work’
C > muC tisi mutisi ‘write’
t > r tou rou ‘abide’
So far we have seen languages with a binary realis/irrealis distinction, but there are also cases
of tripartite distinctions which typically include realis, irrealis, and an aspectual category. One such
case is Sivisa Titan [ttv] for which Bowern (2011:82-88) identifies the paradigms of realis, irrealis, and
perfective. In Table 2.66 I show these paradigms and I propose a possible morphological separation of
6This table shows only the distinctions relevant for distinguishing the three different paradigms. Realis also has specific
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Table 2.6: Subject markers in Sivisa Titan (Admiralty Islands), based on Bowern (2011:82-88)
Realis Irrealis Perfective
1g u k-u (k-o) k-u-ne
2g a k-o (k-u) k-o-ne
3g i k-i k-i-ne
non g [more distinctions] k-a k-a-ne
the irrealis and perfective morphemes as opposed to person/number parts. Although the paradigms
in Sivisa Titan look entirely compositional at first glance, we can see that 2g in irrealis and perfective
takes o instead of the unmarked a used in realis, and irrealis and perfective take a for non-singular,
while realis has more pronominal distinctions in this field, which are expressed by forms equivalent
to independent pronouns (see Bowern, 2011:82). Additionally, due to vowel harmony 1g and 2g
irrealis can also have forms k-o and k-u, respectively (see Bowern, 2011:83).
In comparison to the languages mentioned so far, Sivisa Titan seems to be somewhere in between
the degree of morphological fusion found in Neverver and the portmanteau morphemes in Wogeo
and Mav̋ea. In the context of this study, Sivisa Titan provides an important example of a tripartite
TMA distinction because a surprisingly similar system in both form and function is found in Nafsan.
This also applies to Koro (Admiralty Islands) which has the same three TMA categories expressed by
the portmanteau subject markers as in Nafsan: unmarked realis, irrealis, and perfect.
Based on the examples we have seen in this section, we can extrapolate a synchronic typologi-
cal abstraction of a simplified structure of available TMA slots in Oceanic languages of Melanesia,
presented in (21).
(21) TMA1 + bj.po + TMA2 + verb + TMA3
The preverbal TMA1 and the postverbal TMA3 slot have been exemplified on Saliba (15) and Unua
(17), respectively. I focus now on the TMA2 slot, which is situated between the subject marking and
the verb. While we have seen examples of the realis marker in this slot in Daakie and Daakaka,
we have not yet seen cases where TMA2 is divided in several other TMA slots. In many Oceanic
languages, these TMA slots obey strict ordering principles, and since several markers can co-occur,
this frequently results in highly complex structures. In order to illustrate this, we can look at the
ordering of the elements of the predicate, also called verbal complex in Oceanic literature, in Lelepa
(22) (Lacrampe, 2014:325). The elements in bold are the only obligatory elements. If we focus on
the area between the subject marker and the verb (preverbal complex), we can see that the subject
marker is followed by several ordered slots, including TMA, a numeral and negation. In example
(23) the first three slots are filled with the obligatory subject marker, irrealis, and the modal marker
‘maybe’.
pronouns for dual, paucal, and plural.
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(22) = i a/mod7 nm neg a8 ad ecp/efl Verb post-verb pf ad obl a/di9
(23) e=ga
3g=i
lag
maybe
puro
be.empty
ri…
sorry
e=puro.
3g=be.empty
‘It may be empty, sorry… it is empty.’ (Lacrampe, 2014:403)
In Mav̋ea, the verbal complex exhibits similar compositional properties. In (24) we can see that the
subject prefixes are once again followed by TMA slots, negation, and numerals. This is exemplified
in (25), where every slot of the preverbal complex is filled.
(24) - cond- neg- i-/incp- nm- ipf- Verb ad = =obj (Guérin, 2006:210)
(25) Ra-mo-sopo-m̋e-r-lo-v̋a.
3pl-cond-neg-i-d-ipf-go
‘If they (two) do not go anymore.’ (Guérin, 2006:219)
These kinds of rich combinatorial possibilities of TMA marking also plays a role in the TMA system
of Nafsan (see Section 2.3) and it is present to varying degrees in most of the Melanesian languages
mentioned in this thesis.
Another property of Oceanic languages worthmentioning in this section is the verbal behavior of
property words in predicative function (van Lier, 2017) and the flexibility of lexical classes in general
(van Lier, 2016). In her study of the typology of property words in a balanced sample of 36 Oceanic
languages, van Lier (2017) found that in 72% of the languages in her sample the major property word
class is a verbal construction in predicative function. In the case of Nafsan, Thieberger (2006:85)
shows how different property words can carry more or less verbal morphology, depending on the
lexeme. Example (26) shows the word wi ‘good’ in Nafsan, which can function as a modifier (26a),
but it can also carry all types of verbal morphology, including the subject person/number and TMA
marking, as shown in (26b) and (26c), as well as the transitive marker -ki in (26d). This shows that,
in comparison to the Indo-European parts of speech, wi ‘good’ is flexible between the categories
of verbs and adjectives. Thieberger (2006:178) also notes that there are stative intransitive verbs in
Nafsan, with property meanings, which cannot function as modifiers, as exemplified with semsem
‘happy’ in (27).
(26) a. tesa
child
wi
good
‘good child’
b. tesa
child
i=wi
3g.eal=good
‘the child is good’
c. ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
wi
good
‘it will be good’
7Aspectual and modal particles.
8Expresses aspect, modality and motion.
9Particles that express aspect and direction.
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d. wi-ki
good-
‘be good for’ (Thieberger, 2006:85)
(27) A=semsem
1g.eal=happy
ni
ben
natkon
village
preg
make
te-namrun.
de-something
‘I am happy to do something for the village.’ (Thieberger, 2006:220)
There aremany other characteristics of Oceanic languages that were not discussed in this section.
Some of them include verb reduplication (Harrison, 1973; Haji-Abdolhosseini et al., 2002), serial verbs
(Crowley, 2002), polyfunctionality and optionality of functional words (e.g. Lichtenberk, 2016a; Bril,
2007), and lexical underspecification in comparison to Indo-European languages (see Section 8.6.2).
2.3 TMA in Nafsan
In this section I outline the previous work on TMA in Nafsan (Section 2.3.1) and I introduce some
terminological differences between my work andThieberger’s (2006) work on Nafsan (Section 2.3.2).
2.3.1 Previous work on Nafsan
The first modern linguistic work on Nafsan was done in the areas of phonology and its genetic
classification within different Oceanic groups (e.g. Tryon, 1976; Clark, 1985; Lynch, 2000, 2004).10
Thework I discuss in this section and rely on to formmy hypotheses about TMA in Nafsan is the first
reference grammar of Nafsan by Thieberger (2006), and the accompanying corpus of data collected
by Thieberger (1995–2018). All the examples taken fromThieberger (1995–2018) contain a reference
to their identifiers in the corpus, and are in this way distinguished from the data I collected, which
starts with the reference to my PARADISEC collection, AK1 (Krajinović, 2017b). More recent studies
published by my co-authors and myself (von Prince et al., 2019e,d; Krajinović, 2018; Krajinović, 2019)
were written as part of the project in the context of which this thesis was written (see Section 3.2)
and are addressed and cited in the relevant discussions (see also Preface). Billington et al. (2018,
submitted) have also done work on the phonetics of Nafsan.
Nafsan is an SVO languagewith the predicate structure consisting of several orderedmorphosyn-
tactic slots, shown in Table 2.7. Elements in different slots are in a fixed order relative to each other
and the elements of the same slot cannot co-occur. The only obligatory elements of the verbal com-
plex are the subject markers and the verb (in bold). The first slot is occupied by the obligatory subject
markers which are portmanteau markers of either realis, irrealis, or perfect. They cliticize to any fol-
lowing word within the preverbal complex, such as a TMA marker, an auxiliary verb, a benefactive
phrase, or the verb (Thieberger, 2006). Table 2.7 lists all the available categories according to their
morphosyntactic position in the predicate (Thieberger, 2006:243). We can see that the preverbal slots
include TMA markers, negation, and other grammatical elements, such as benefactive, and in the
10For a list of missionary works on Bible translations since 1868 see Thieberger (2006:38) and about the work of the
missionary Daniel Macdonald on Efate languages see Thieberger & Ballard (2008).
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Table 2.7: Verbal complex in Nafsan fromThieberger (2006:243)
= Slot 2 Slot 3 ben V=obj pf neg2
realis,
irrealis,
perfect
perfect,
prospective,
durative,
negation,
conditional/
‘may’
auxiliary,
reflexive, direct
possessive suffix,
quantifier
second part of
negation
postverbal domain we find the perfective particle and the second part of the discontinuous negation.
The verb can optionally have a cliticized object pronoun.
Just as shown for Daakie and other Oceanic languages in Section 2.2, Nafsan too has different
forms for independent pronouns and for the portmanteau subject markers. Table 2.8 shows the forms
of independent and oblique pronouns, which differ from the portmanteau subject markers in Table
2.9. As we can see, the forms of independent and oblique pronouns do not bear any similarity to
the subject markers. The subject markers are clitics in Nafsan and for that reason they are referred
to as subject proclitics. Thieberger (2006) divides the subject proclitics in three paradigms: realis,
irrealis, and perfect, see Table 2.9. The TMA markers (from the slot 2 in Table 2.7) attach to the
subject proclitics and according to Thieberger (2006:155), they can combine with only one of the
three paradigms of subject proclitics. The TMA markers and their choices of subject proclitics are
listed in Table 2.10.
Table 2.8: Independent and oblique pronouns in Nafsan by Thieberger (2006:104)
Independent pronoun Oblique (indirect possession/benefactive)
1g kineu/neu (nig)neu
2g ag (ne)gaag
3g ga (ne)ga
1pl.incl akit (ne)gakit
1pl.ecl komam (nig)mam
2pl akam (ne)gamus
3pl gar (ne)gar
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Table 2.9: Subject proclitics in Nafsan by Thieberger (2006:150)
Realis Irrealis Perfect
1g a= ka= kai=
2g ku= p̃a= kui=
3g i= ke= ki=
1d.incl ta= tak= takai=
1d.ecl ra= rak= rakai=
2d ra= rak= rakai=
3d ra= rak= rakai=, rai=
1pl.incl tu= tuk= tu=, tui=, tukoi=
1pl.ecl u= ko= ui=, koi=
2pl u= ko= koi=
3pl ru= ruk= rui=, rukui=
Table 2.10: Subject proclitics and their combinations with TMA markers in Nafsan by Thieberger
(2006:155)
Subject proclitic TMA marker
realis prospective realis po
irrealis prospective irrealis fo
realis, irrealis durative ta
realis conditional f/fla
perfect perfect pe
Thesubject proclitics have awide range ofmeanings evenwhen occurringwithout TMAmarkers.
Thieberger (2006:161) analyzes realis as referring to realized events with the past (28) or present
reference (29) and irrealis as referring to unrealized events, such as future (30), imperatives (31) and
possibilities, especially in complement clauses with desiderative or purposive meaning (Thieberger,
2006:304), as in (32). Thieberger (2006:167) notes that realis is used in a wider range of time frames
than irrealis. The semantics of realis and irrealis in Nafsan is discussed in detail in Chapter 8.
(28) Nanom
yesterday
p̃og,
night
u=mai
1pl.ecl.eal=come
praktis.
practice
‘Yesterday evening we came to practice.’ (Thieberger, 2006:151)
(29) Mes
today
i=pi
3g.eal=be
nalelewen
opinion
neu
1g.po
kin
el
i=tefla.
3g.eal=thus
‘Today it is my opinion that it is like this.’ (Thieberger, 2006:167)
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(30) Komam
1pl.ecl
rak=tap
1d.i=neg
fam
eat.i
mau
neg2
me
but
rak=to.
1d.i=stay
‘We won’t eat, but we’ll stay.’ (Thieberger, 2006:164)
(31) P̃a=fa=n
2g.i=go.i=d
preg.pta-ki
make.ready
pano.
panel
‘You go and prepare the panel.’ (Thieberger, 2006:164)
(32) Kineu
1g
a=mur
1g.eal=want
na
comp
ka=traus
1g.i=tell
tete
some
natrauswen
story
ses.
small
‘I want to tell some short stories.’ (Thieberger, 2006:310)
Similarly to many languages of Central Vanuatu, the realis/irrealis distinction in Nafsan can also be
expressed by a stem-initial mutation of the verb, as discussed in Section 2.2 in the context of Oceanic
languages. Irrealis is expressed by the stem-initial mutation of verbs with an initial p-which changes
to f-, when preceded by an irrealis proclitic (Thieberger, 2006:162). In (31) the verb pan changes to fan
in the irrealis. This stemmutation also distinguishes the prospective realis po and prospective irrealis
fo markers. The stem mutation is not strictly limited to occurring with irrealis proclitics. Thieberger
(2006, 2012) finds the stem mutation with realis and perfect proclitics in intransitive clauses, as in
(33). Thieberger (2012) shows that this only happens in intrasitive clauses, as the transitive clauses
require the realis p- form, as in (34). He explains this by semantically relating the irrealis mood to
the expression of intransitivity, as suggested by Hopper & Traugott (2003).
(33) Kai=pe
1g.pf
faam
eat.i
su.
pf
‘I have finished eating.’ (Thieberger, 2012:396)
(34) Kai=pe
1g.pf
paam
eat.eal
magko.
mango
‘I have eaten the mango.’ (Thieberger, 2012:396)
Thieberger (2006) analyzes the category of perfect as being marked by the perfect subject procli-
tics and the perfect marker pe (see Table 2.10). According to Thieberger (2006), pe can only combine
with the perfect proclitics and its semantics is not distinguished from them. Perfect marks events that
have been completed (35) or ongoing states that have been achieved (36), but it can also be used with
a future reference marking the anteriority of one future event in relation to another (37) (Thieberger,
2006). Interestingly, pe cannot combine with the irrealis proclitics, even when the future reference
is denoted, as in (37). The semantics of perfect in Nafsan is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
(35) Me
and
apap
father
me
and
iak
mother
rai=pe
3d.pf=pf
mat.
die
‘And their father and mother were dead.’ (Thieberger, 2006:168)
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(36) Me
but
famle
family:bi
neu
1g.po
rui=pe
3pl.pf=pf
tar
white
taos
like
ag.
2g
Ga
3g
i=mer
3g.eal=in.turn
ta
neg1
slat
take
nask-o-k
skin-1g.dp
mau,
neg2
rui=pe
3pl.pf=pf
tar∼tar.
white∼white
‘But my family are white like you. He didn’t get my skin, they are really white.’ (Thieberger,
2006:168)
(37) malnen
as
p̃a=ler
2g.i=return
mai
come
me
and
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
mtir
write
leta
letter
su
pf
[Talking to someone who is leaving in a while] ‘When you return, I will have written this
letter.’ (Thieberger 2012:392, based on Dahl 1985:TMAQ 107)11
The prospective markers po and fo attach to realis and irrealis subject proclitics, respectively.
The realis prospective marker po is used for realized events that are in the future in relation to the
time frame of the event the utterance is about (Thieberger, 2006:168). The prospective realis po also
appears as a sequential marker, and it is not uncommon in clause chaining, where it is not necessarily
preceded by a subject proclitic (Thieberger, 2006:168). Example (38) shows an event marked by po
as posterior to the event of “being in class six”, and example (39) shows po marking the last event in
the sequence. The marker po is discussed in more detail in Section 5.3.1.
(38) Go
and
ntau
year
katol
third
nen
that
a=to
3g.eal=stay
klas
class
siks,
six
go
and
a=po
1g.eal=pp.eal
pas
pass
examination.
examination:bi
‘And the third year that I was in class six I was to pass the examination.’ (Thieberger, 2006:169)
(39) Apu
grandfather
gar
3pl.po
i=pakor
3g.eal=born
Epag,
Pango
i=to
3g.eal=stay
Epag,
Pango
ø=po
ø=pp.eal
pak
go.to
Efil.
Vila
‘Their grandfather was born at Pango, he stayed at Pango then went to Vila.’ (Thieberger,
2006:327)
The prospective irrealis fo refers to possible future events and hypothetical situations (Thieberger,
2006:169), as we can see in (40).
(40) me
but
i=piatlak
3g.eal=have
natam̃ol
person
nen
that
kin
el
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
mer
again
gaag
2g.ben
preg
make
naul
leaf
nkas
tree
nen
that
ke=tu-o-k
3g.i=give2g.obj
p̃a=min-gi-ø
2g.i=drink3g.obj
‘But there are people who will then give you leaf medicine to drink.’ (Thieberger, 2006:169)
The markers f and fla are glossed by Thieberger (2006) as a conditional and a ‘may’ particle, respec-
tively. While f typically introduces the protasis (=subordinate clause) of a conditional construction
(41),12 fla can appear both in conditional apodoses and protases (Thieberger, 2006:250), as in (41) and
(42), respectively. According toThieberger (2006:250), f and fla combine only with the realis subject
11TMAQ followed by a number indicates the question number in Dahl’s (1985) questionnaire.
12The protases, i.e. the antecedents (typically subordinate clauses), of conditional clauses are indicated by square brack-
ets.
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proclitic.
(41) [A=f
1g.eal=cond
mer
in.turn
pa]
go
me
but
a=fla
1g.eal=may
lakor
maybe
wel
like
Jimmy
Jimmy
Stevens.
Stevens
‘If I went, I would be like Jimmy Stevens.’ (041.014, Thieberger (2006:251))
(42) [Ko
or
ga
3g
i=fla
3g.eal=cond
mur-i-n
want--3g.obj
na
comp
ke=tau
3g.i=leave
tete
some
nanromien
present
ses],
small
i=kano
3g.eal=unable
trau
just
leg
straight
mai
hither
tau.
leave
‘Or if he wanted to leave a small present he couldn’t just come and leave it.’ (Thieberger,
2006:320)
Thieberger (2006:319) also identifies i=f-wel as a conditional-introducing expression. I=f-wel (kin) is
glossed as 3g.eal=cond-like (comp) and it can be literally translated as ‘if it is like (that)’. In (43)
the protasis is introduced by the expression i=f-wel, and the verb is also marked by f attached to a
subject proclitic. The apodosis, i.e. the main clause, is frequently marked by the irrealis proclitic and
the prospective irrealis fo, as in (43).
(43) [i=f-wel
3g.eal=cond-like
ku=f
2g.eal=cond
tae
know
trok-wes]
agree-3g.obl
go
and
ka=fo
1g.i=pp.i
plak-e-ø
with-3g.obj
ler
return
‘If you agree to it, then I will take him back.’ (103.023)
Another TMA marker from slot 2 (cf. Table 2.7) is the durative marker ta which is used for “an
activity that keeps on going” (Thieberger, 2006:170, 248) and can be glossed as ‘still’ (Thieberger,
2006:248).13 This marker occurs with realis and irrealis subject proclitics (my observation), as in (44)
and (45), respectively.
(44) i=ta
3g.eal=still
sees
small
i=lakor
3g.eal=maybe
piatlak
have
ntau
year
a=ta
1g.eal=neg1
tae
know
mau.
neg2
‘He is still small, he is around I don’t know how old.’ (015.018)
(45) U=tl-i-ø
1pl.eal=tell--3g.obj
i=wi
3g.eal=good
tuk=ta
1pl.incl.i=d
tao
leave
kafman
government
ke=ta
3g.i=d
nranru
two
rak=ta
3d.i=d
tu-kit
give-1pl
ntaewen
knowledge
ke=ta
3g.i=d
lakor
maybe
pa.
go
‘We said it is good (that) we still leave the two governments to keep giving us education, that
it might still go on.’ (Thieberger, 2006:249)
Thieberger (2006:250) notes that the durative marker should be distinguished from the first particle
of negation ta(p). Negation is formed by the discontinuous double negation forms ta(p)…mau and it
13This type of grammatical marking of the meaning of ‘still’ is also called “persistive” in African linguistics (see Nurse
& Philippson, 2007).
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Table 2.11: The auxiliary verbs and their slots in Nafsan (Thieberger, 2006:253)
a1 a2 a3 a4
mer ‘again’ kano ‘cannot’15 ler ‘return’ mai ‘come’
lakor ‘maybe’ pan ‘go’
mal ‘not want to’
mas ‘must’
nrus ‘just’
pei ‘first’
traem ‘try’
tae ‘know, be able to’
to pog/hab
can co-occur with the durative ta, as in (46).14 In combination with negation and negative verbs, the
durative marker is typically interpreted as ‘not yet’, as in (46) and (47).
(46) Nasum̃
house
ru=ta
3pl.eal=d
ta
neg1
p̃elgat-i-ø
open--3g.obj
mau.
neg2
‘The house, they haven’t opened it yet.’ (Thieberger, 2006:250)
(47) Ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
pitlak
have
asel
friend
ga
3g.po
me
but
i=ta
3g.eal=d
tik-ki
not.have-
tesa.
child
‘He has got his girlfriend, but he doesn’t have any children yet.’ (Thieberger, 2006:250)
Moving to the slot 3 from Table 2.7, we can identify auxiliary verbs as elements with TMAmeanings.
Each auxiliary verb belongs to a specific morphosyntactic slot, whose ordering is shown in Table
2.11. Auxiliaries can express a range of different meanings, which can be considered to be more or
less grammaticalized. For the sake of brevity, I focus here on Thieberger’s (2006) description of two
auxiliaries that are mentioned in other chapters in this thesis: mer ‘again’ and to pog/hab.
Thieberger (2006:254) glossesmer as ‘again’, ‘in turn’, and ‘too’. Although the meaning of ‘again’
seems to be the prevalent one (48), in (49) there is no suggestion that the addressee used to be married
before, which means mer should be translated as ‘in turn’ in this case (Thieberger, 2006:255). The
meaning of mer in conditional clauses is addressed in Section 8.5.
(48) I=mer
3g.eal=again
ga
3g.ben
preg
make
timen
arrow
i=lim.
3g.eal=five
‘He again got five arrows for him.’ (Thieberger, 2006:254)
(49) A=mro-ki-n
1g.eal=think--3g.obj
nag
say
akam
2pl
u=f
2pl.eal=cond
mer
in.turn
taulu
marry
tete.
some
‘I think that you should now marry someone.’ (Thieberger, 2006:255)
14As we have seen in Table 2.7, Thieberger (2006) analyzes the durative marker and negation as occurring in the same
slot, but he also notes that negation can be in the auxiliary slot (Thieberger, 2006:246). This is discussed in Section 2.3.2.
15Thieberger (2017) proposed that kano might be a borrowing from English, introduced by Scottish missionaries.
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Thieberger (2006:259) classifies to as a habitual marker (50) when used as an auxiliary verb (see also
von Prince et al., 2019e), and as a main verb it means ‘to be in the state o’. He also glosses it as a
progressive (51) and a stative marker (52). This marker has a similar distribution to the Bislama stap
‘stay’.
(50) Gar
3pl
nen
el
ru=to
3pl.eal=hab
lekor
watch.over
nmatu
woman
e-sum̃.
loc-house
‘They look after women at home.’ (Thieberger, 2006:260)
(51) Kaltog
Kaltog
i=to
3g.eal=stay
erfale
cave
nen
that
a=to
1g.eal=pog
til-i-ø
say--3g.obj
‘Kaltog was in this cave that I am talking about.’ (Thieberger, 2006:346)
(52) Me
but
tkanwan
thus
kin
comp
ag
2g
ku=to
2g.eal=a
maet
fright
kuk
cook
pog
day
tefla?
like
‘But why are you scared to cook in the daytime like this?’ (Thieberger, 2006:98)
The only postverbal TMAmarker is the perfective suwhich encodes a completed action (Thieberger,
2006:265), as in (53) and (54). This marker has a similar distribution to the Bislama finis ‘finish’. The
marker su is analyzed in Section 5.3.1.
(53) Kineu
1g
a=pam
1g.eal=eat
natam̃ol
man
i=tol
3g.eal=three
su.
pf
‘I have eaten three men.’ (Thieberger, 2006:265)
(54) Komam
1pl.ecl
u=skul
1pl.ecl.eal=school
pan
go
u=skul
1pl.ecl.eal=school
su
pf
‘We schooled until we finished school.’ (Thieberger, 2006:265)
2.3.2 Notes on reanalyzed categories in Nafsan
Since parts of my reanalysis of TMA categories in Nafsan in comparison toThieberger’s (2006) anal-
ysis cannot be presented in an ideal order for the reader, this section offers a brief overview of all
the reanalyzed categories in relation to the features presented in Section 2.3.1. Most of the points
made here are related to morphosyntax and terminology. The semantic analyses are presented in
the relevant chapters which are referenced here.
The first point of reanalysis is the position of the first element of negation in the verbal complex.
In Table 2.7 in Section 2.3.1, the negation was placed in the same slot as the other TMAmarkers (slot
2), according to Thieberger (2006). Thieberger (2006:246) also notes that negation can occur after
the auxiliary mer. However, judging from the corpus data (Thieberger, 1995–2018) I can conclude
that ta neg1 should always follow both the a1 and a2 slots from Table 2.11 in Section 2.3.1.16
Example (55) shows the co-occurrence of the TMA marker fo, the auxiliary mer from the a1 slot,
and the negation ta. In (56), the negation ta follows the auxiliary lakor of the a2 slot. Since in
16I adopt the economic approach that ta is always in the same position, regardless of whether a1 and a2 are filled
or not.
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Table 2.12: Exemplified verbal complex in Nafsan
= ma a1 a2 neg1 ben V pf neg2
ruk= (3pl.i) fo (pp.i) mer (‘again’) lakor (‘maybe’) ta(p) ga (3g) su mau
both cases ta follows an auxiliary verb, we need to conclude that ta is positioned after the a2 slot,
as illustrated in Table 2.12.17 In Thieberger’s (1995–2018) corpus I did not attest any co-occurrences
of ta preceding the a1 and a2 slots. In Table 2.12 each slot is exemplified with an element that
belongs to it. In the corpus data I did not find any co-occurrences of ta and the a3 and a4 slots.
(55) a=ta
1g.eal=still
mro
think
kin
comp
na
comp
ruk=fo
3pl.i=pp.i
mer
again
ta
neg1
puet
pull
kineu
1g
mau.
neg2
‘I still think that they will not pull me again.’ (130.096)
(56) ku=lakor
2g.eal=maybe
ta
neg1
tae
know
san
there
kin
comp
a=to
1g.eal=pog
til-i-ø
say--3g.obj
mau
neg2
ko
or
ku=tae?
2g=know
‘Do you not know there what I said, or do you?’ (097.062)
The relabeling of subject proclitics is a result of my analysis in Sections 5.1.1 and 8.3. There
are two relevant differences in comparison to Thieberger (2006). The first one is reanalyzing the
realis paradigm of subject proclitics as being underspecified for TMA meanings and marking only
the person and number of the subject. For this reason, I call this paradigm the “general” subject
proclitics. I gloss them only as person and number, without the gloss eal used in previous sections.
The second difference is the reanalysis of the perfect paradigm as “perfect-agreeing”. As I argue in
Section 5.1.1, the subject proclitics of this paradigm do not encode the perfect aspect on their own
and in my fieldwork data they rarely occur without the perfect marker pe. Since they are still the
most common choice of subject proclitics with the perfect pe I call them “perfect-agreeing”. In order
to avoid ambiguity with general proclitics, I continue glossing them as pf. Another additional
discovery is the existence of the 1d.incl form tai= in the perfect-agreeing paradigm. The three
paradigms are outlined in Table 2.13 with the reanalyzed items in bold.
The restrictions imposed by the subject proclitics on TMA markers were also revisited in light
of my fieldwork. Table 2.14 lists all the TMA markers with their functions and the proclitics they
combine with. The reanalysis concerning the perfect-agreeing proclitics and pe and the discovery
of a new immediate-future morpheme fe is discussed in 5.1.1. All the other markers combining with
the general and irrealis proclitics are discussed in Chapter 8.
17Note that this differs from my previous analysis in Krajinović (2018), where I proposed ta is positioned between the
ma and a slots.
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Table 2.13: Reanalyzed subject proclitics in Nafsan (reanalyzed items in bold)
General Irrealis Perfect-agreeing
1g a= ka= kai=
2g ku= p̃a= kui=
3g i= ke= ki=
1d.incl ta= tak= takai=, tai=
1d.ecl ra= rak= rakai=
2d ra= rak= rakai=
3d ra= rak= rakai=, rai=
1pl.incl tu= tuk= tui=, tukoi=
1pl.ecl u= ko= ui=, koi=
2pl u= ko= koi=
3pl ru= ruk= rui=, rukui=
Table 2.14: Subject proclitics and TMAmarkers in Nafsan with new labels (reanalyzed items in bold)
Subject proclitic TMA marker
general prospective realis po
irrealis prospective irrealis fo
irrealis immediate future fe
general, irrealis ta ‘still’
general, irrealis conditional f
general, irrealis potential fla
perfect-agreeing, general perfect pe
There is one important discovery regarding the auxiliary mer ‘again’, which I found to mark
counterfactuality in conditional clauses without any indication of the ‘again’ meaning (Krajinović,
2018), as in (57). Although it is optionally used in counterfactual conditional clauses, it is restricted
to counterfactual contexts and it cannot be used in hypothetical conditionals like (58). This counter-
factual function of mer is analyzed in more detail in Section 8.5.
(57) P̃a=f
2g.i=cond
mer
cf
pei
first
taulu
marry
Adam
Adam
rak=fo
2d.i=pp.i
pitlak
have
mane
money:bi
laap.
a.lot
‘If you hadmarried Adam, you twowould have had a lot ofmoney.” (AK1-030-01, 00:03:02.556-
00:03:05.695)
(58) I=f-wel
3g.eal=cond-like
kin
comp
p̃a=(*mer)taulu
2g.i=(*cf)marry
John,
John
akam
2d
rak=fo
2d=pp.i
pitlak
have
teesa
child
laap.
many
‘If you get married to John, you two will have a lot of children.’ (AK-010, 00:05:58.038-
00:06:02.385)
Chapter 3
Methodology
In this study, I employed a number of methods, including corpus work and elicitation techniques,
such as questionnaires and storyboards, used in my fieldwork. After laying out the background of
semantic fieldwork and the MelaTAMP project in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively, I discuss these
methods inmore detail in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 I explain the nature of the typological perspective
of this thesis.
3.1 Methodology in semantic fieldwork
There has been increased attention paid to methodologies used in semantic fieldwork in recent years
(e.g. Matthewson, 2004; Majid, 2012; Bochnak & Matthewson, 2015; Matthewson et al., 2017; Lahaus-
sois & Vuillermet, 2019). There are also many studies focusing explicitly on eliciting and analyzing
TMA categories in a fieldwork setting, such as Cover (2015), Cover & Tonhauser (2015), Bar-el (2015),
Bohnemeyer (in press), and Matthewson et al. (2017).
In linguistic fieldwork, the collection of naturalistic texts, including narratives, dialogs, and pro-
cedural texts, is one of the central methods for building a language corpus. In the context of un-
derdocumented and underdescribed languages, the corpus plays an essential role in preserving a
large body of language materials that can be used for future research. In order to understand the
general distribution of any grammatical morpheme, the linguist needs to study naturalistic texts
represented in the corpus. However, the study of texts is not in itself sufficient (Matthewson, 2004;
Cover, 2015), because a) the corpus may be lacking certain contexts where the morpheme would
otherwise occur, and b) semanticists are not only interested in contexts where a certain morpheme
can occur, but also in contexts in which it cannot occur. The problem a) can be addressed by using
different kinds of experiments or stimuli. This will be addressed below in a wider discussion about
questionnaires and storyboards. Regarding problem b), the only way to obtain negative evidence
is through elicitation. Although the elicitation of speaker’s judgments has been criticized by some
linguists (Schütze, 1996; Mithun, 2001), I followMatthewson (2004) in considering that it is the job of
the linguist to understand why a specific sentence was accepted or rejected, and to question possible
influences of different variables during the elicitation. One way of understanding the variables that
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influence speakers’ responses in elicitation is to identify different types of judgments. Matthew-
son (2004) proposes three types of speaker’s judgments linguists need to look for: grammaticality
judgments (dependent on the grammatical structure), truth value judgments (true or false in a given
situation), and felicity judgments (dependent on the context). The linguist needs to be able to identify
if the judgment given by the speaker matches the one she was looking for by asking questions and
understanding the context of the interaction (see Matthewson, 2004).
One of the best semantic tools for making sure the speaker reaches the meaning the linguist
intends to capture is to provide a rich discourse context in which that meaning occurs (Matthewson,
2004). The understanding that providing a context is an essential tool in any kind of semantically
oriented elicitation led to the creation of different kinds of questionnaires, tests, and stimuli in both
formal semantics and typology. I focus first on translation-based questionnaires and semantic tests
and then I discuss the use of stimuli in TMA semantics. Dahl (1985, 2000a) provides various question-
naires targeting specific contexts in which a given TMA category would be expected. For example,
in (1) and (2) Dahl (2000c) is aiming at the contrast between the experiential function of the perfect
(1) and a general past tense indicated by the past temporal adverbial (2). In this questionnaire the
context and the targeted sentence are presented in English, with the targeted verb in an uninflected
formwritten in capital letters. Leaving the verb form uninflected aims at reducing possible influences
from English on the targeted language. The same method has been adopted in the Iamitive Ques-
tionnaire by Olsson (2013) and in the Nondum questionnaire by Veselinova (2018) (see Appendix B
with Nafsan data).
(1) Question: You MEET my sister (at any time in your life up to now)? (Dahl, 2000c:801, PQ 4)1
(2) [It is morning. A wakes up, looks out of the window and sees that the courtyard (or the street)
is wet.]
A: It RAIN during the night. (Dahl, 2000c:801, PQ 14)
In the formal semantics literature, similar tests with context manipulation have been used to
capture minimal pairs of meaning. In (3) and (4), Koontz-Garboden (2007:133) is aiming at capturing
the difference between a neutral stative meaning (3) and the meaning of change of state (4).
(3) Context: Sione randomly walks into a room and sees that there are dry clothes on the ground.
He has no knowledge about the state of their dryness prior to walking into the room.
Answer: The clothes are dry. (Koontz-Garboden, 2007:133)
(4) Context: Sione has done the laundry and has a bunch of wet clothes. He hangs them out on
the line to dry while they are still wet. He leaves to go do something else and returns after
some period of time, finding that they have dried in the interim.
Answer: The clothes dried. (Koontz-Garboden, 2007:133)
As we can see from the examples above, the only difference between the Dahl (1985, 2000c,b) ques-
1I use PQ to refer to the Perfect Questionnaire, followed by the number of the example.
3.2. THE MELATAMP PROJECT 39
tionnaires and Koontz-Garboden’s (2007) test is that Koontz-Garboden (2007) is aiming at more fine-
grained meanings which are distinguished in his subject language, while Dahl (1985, 2000c,b) ques-
tionnaires aim at discovering more basic functions of a given category that can then be related to
cross-linguistic TMA categories. In any case, both of these approaches rely on the translation from
the meta-language, and on an established concept or meaning they are testing. In Section 5.2.1, I
show that this can be problematic, as a given structure might appear to “fail” a semantic test, when
in fact it is due to the properties of that particular language that the test does not work the way we
might expect.
In order to diminish the influence of translation as much as possible and create naturalistic ut-
terances, Burton & Matthewson (2015) and Matthewson et al. (2017) advocate for the usage of story-
boards in semantic fieldwork. Storyboards are picture-based stories which contain targeted semantic
contexts and are told to the consultant in a meta-language, which is followed by the speaker’s telling
of the story by looking at the pictures and without any other linguistic stimuli. Although there
are different kinds of stimuli used by linguists (video, Pear Story, games etc.), the storyboards are
probably one of the only types of stimuli where very controlled semantic contexts can be obtained
and be directly compared with other speakers. The storyboard methodology as used in this work is
addressed in more detail in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
3.2 e MelaTAMP project
Since this thesis is being developed within the framework of a broader project, in this section I
describe the workflow and the methods of the project which were used in this thesis.
This thesis waswrittenwithin theMelaTAMPproject: ‘A corpus-based contrastive study of tense,
aspect, modality and polarity (TAMP) in Austronesian languages of Melanesia (MelaTAMP)’. The
MelaTAMP project is led by Kilu von Prince and Manfred Krifka and funded by the German Research
Foundation or Deutsche Forschungsgemeinscha, at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. The MelaTAMP
project studies TMA expressions in seven Oceanic languages of Melanesia, which are listed below
together with the reference to their corpora.
• Saliba/Logea [sbe] (Margetts et al., 2017)
• Mav̋ea [mkv] (Guérin, 2006)
• Daakie [ptv] (Krifka, 2018b)
• Daakaka [bpa] (von Prince, 2013)
• Dalkalaen2 (von Prince, 2018g)
• North Ambrym [mmg] (Franjieh, 2018)
2Dalkalaen does not have the ISO 639-3 code at the time of the writing. Although Dalkalaen is closely related to
Daakaka, as von Prince (2015:4) puts it, “Dalkalaen and Daakaka sound quite different when spoken—mostly because of
significant differences between sound systems and because some very frequent words are not cognates”.
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• Nafsan [erk] (Thieberger, 1995–2018)
The starting point of the project was the work on the above-mentioned corpora through which
we identified the distributions of different morphemes with TMA meanings. Druskat (2018) im-
ported the corpora into ANNIS3 (Krause & Zeldes, 2016), a corpus platform where the corpus data
can be optimally searched and visualized. The following steps included choosing TMA contexts
where the project languages showed the most interesting features and the contexts which were un-
derrepresented in the corpora. For the latter, we created storyboards that included those contexts.
Some storyboards were created by Kilu von Prince and others were adopted from Totem Field Sto-
ryboards4, for a full list see titles in bold in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 in Section 3.3. These storyboards were
elicited in the field in 2017 in Nafsan (by mysel), Mav̋ea (by Valérie Guérin), Daakie (by Manfred
Krifka), Daakaka (by Kilu von Prince), Dalkalaen (by Kilu von Prince), and North Ambrym (by Mike
Franjieh). All the storyboards were transcribed and imported into the ANNIS platform.
In Section 3.3 I explain in detail the methods I used in my work on Nafsan. The methods that
are directly related to the MelaTAMP project are the use of the Nafsan corpus (Thieberger, 1995–
2018) and the storyboards. I used all the MelaTAMP storyboards that were also elicited in the other
project languages and some additional storyboards in the two field trips in 2017 and 2018 (see Table
3.4 in Section 3.3). The most important contribution of the MelaTAMP data to this work lies in the
possibility to compare the Nafsan data to project languages in two ways: a) through corpus work,
and b) through comparing parallel texts obtained through storyboards. Both of these methods are
employed in this work whenever MelaTAMP languages exhibit properties relevant for the discus-
sion at hand. Additionally, Nafsan is also compared to some languages which are not a part of the
MelaTAMP project and in these cases the relevant data is taken from reference grammars, other
published materials, and corpora if possible. The choice of these languages is based on the existence
of categories of the realis/irrealis mood and the perfect aspect in their grammars.
3.3 Corpus work and elicitation teniques used on Nafsan
In this section I describe the methods and the methodological steps I took in my research on Nafsan.
My work involved three main methodological steps: corpus work, data collection, and data analysis.
I started working on Nafsan by analyzing occurrences of different TMAmarkers and subject pro-
clitics in the corpus (Thieberger, 1995–2018) and comparing them to their descriptions in the gram-
mar of Nafsan (Thieberger, 2006). This process allowedme to form new andmore specific hypotheses
about its TMA categories than available in the reference grammar and to determine the type of lin-
guistic evidence needed to confirm or disprove them. For the case of the perfect category this process
is described in more detail in Section 5.1. Prior to my data collection, I chose several questionnaires
and storyboards that could address my hypotheses. The questionnaires I elicited in the field are
listed in Table 3.1 and storyboards in Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. All the results from the questionnaires
3Available at https://korpling.org/annis3/.
4Available at http://totemfieldstoryboards.org.
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Table 3.1: Elicited questionnaires
Name of the questionnaire Targeted categories Source/reference
The FutureQuestionnaire
(Appendix B.4)
absolute/relative/immediate
future, irrealis
Dahl (2000b:FQ)
The Perfect Questionnaire
(Appendix B.1)
perfect Dahl (2000c:PQ)
The Iamitive Questionnaire
(Appendix B.2)
iamitive Olsson (2013:IQ)
The Nondum Questionnaire
(Appendix B.3)
nondum ‘not yet’ Veselinova (2018:NQ)
in Nafsan, as well as the elicited meta-linguistic judgments, are attached in Appendix B. All the sto-
ryboards are easily accessible through online sources and PARADISEC, as explained below. The text
file with the current version of the transcribed Nafsan data elicited through storyboards is available
at https://anakrajinovic.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/storyboard_corpus.txt.5
I now turn to explaining in detail how each of these methods was implemented in the field.
I had two field trips that lasted for two months each, first in 2017 and second in 2018. All the
collected recordings and their transcriptions are archived in PARADISEC in the collection Krajinović
(2017b). Every example in this thesis contains the reference to the sound file name, and whenever
possible the time stamp. In my first field trip I conducted the Future and the Perfect Questionnaire
from Dahl (2000a) and in my second field trip, I used the Iamitive (Olsson, 2013) and the Nondum
questionnaires (Veselinova, 2018). I chose Dahl’s (2000a) questionnaires because they targeted cate-
gories and meanings which are relevant in Nafsan – future reference expressed by irrealis in Nafsan
and perfect aspect, see Table 3.1. Through the PerfectQuestionnaire it also became clear that the Naf-
san perfect might be related to iamitives (Olsson, 2013) and nondums (Veselinova, 2018). Moreover, I
needed to choose questionnaires which focus on specific categories in more detail, since the general
TMA questionnaire from Dahl (1985) was already elicited by Thieberger (2006). In this particular
case, the advantage of Dahl’s (2000a) questionnaires in comparison to more fine-grained question-
naires used in formal semantics (cf. (3) and (4) in Section 3.1) is that they aim at being comprehensive
and cross-linguistically applicable, and do not require precise hypotheses based on good knowledge
of the language. Although I had initial hypotheses about different TMA structures in Nafsan, these
hypotheses were quite general and not sufficiently precise for building my own questionnaire based
on fine-grained semantic meanings. I elicited the questionnaires from one or two speakers, depend-
ing on the session, both male and between 27 and 29 years old. The questionnaires were completed
by presenting the speaker with a sentence in English, with the targeted verb in an uninflected form
written in capital letters. The sentence is then translated into Nafsan, with the appropriate marking
on the verb. The completion of the questionnaire was a slow process, which was partially accelerated
5This file was created by extracting only the speaker tiers from ELAN files. Full transcriptions with translations, some
of which might not be entirely translated, are archived in Krajinović (2017b).
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by giving the questionnaire to the speaker prior to the recording session. In this way some of the
examples would already be written down and we could discuss the alternative ways of saying the
examples during the recording. Naturally, this type of elicitation is prone to translation effects and it
can only be done with speakers who speak English. However, the crucial benefit of this process was
the elicitation of felicity judgments. This implies discussing with the speaker about how different
contexts from the questionnaire can be manipulated so that a given category becomes acceptable in
that new context. One example of this is the unacceptability of perfect in sequences. Examples like
(5) from the Dahl’s (2000c) Perfect Questionnaire aim at testing whether the grammatical element
at hand can felicitously be used in sequences of events (see also Lindstedt, 2000). Since perfect de-
notes the posttime of an event that holds at the utterance time in the case of the present perfect or
reference time in the case of the past perfect (see also Chapter 4), it cannot be used in sequences of
events, which follow each other in a linear order. For (5) in Nafsan, the speaker who answered the
questionnaire judged the usage of the general subject proclitic as the only grammatical marking of
verbs in sequences. Upon my questions about the possibility of using the perfect for every event in
the sequence, the speaker provided a different context where perfect would be felicitous (6). This is a
list reading in which every clause is taken to fall within a different context or a time frame, and is not
considered to form a temporal sequence of events. In other words, we are dealing with two different
text types – (5) is an example of narration and (6) is a list.6 The list reading is also compatible with
the English perfect (Iatridou et al., 2003:146).
(5) Context: Do you know what happened to me yesterday? Target: I WALK in the forest. Sud-
denly I STEP on a snake. It BITE me in the leg. I TAKE a stone and THROW (it) at the snake.
It DIE.
A=to
1g=pog
siwer
walk
namlas
forest
me
but
a=kam-ø
1g=step3g.obj
m̃at
snake
i=skei.
3g=one
A=kam-ti
1g=step3g.obj
go
and
i=trau
3g=really
kat
bite
natu-o-k.
leg-1g.po
A=wes
1g=take
faat
stone
i=skei
3g=one
trau
really
p̃kapun-i.
kill3g.obj
‘I was walking in the forest. Suddenly I stepped on a snake and it bit me in the leg. I took a
stone and killed it.’ (AK1-116-01, from Dahl (2000c:801, PQ 9))
6As noted by an anonymous reviewer, in (6) the particular world knowledge around this example results in an un-
derstanding that the described events happened in a particular order, otherwise the sentence would be incomprehensible.
However, as is widely accepted in formal semantic literature (e.g. Iatridou et al., 2003), the list reading is different from a
narrative sequence of events, because it does not encode how the events unfolded temporally and sequentially, it is rather
a list of answers to a particular demand (or a check list), in this case “addressing boss’s demands”. So, in list readings the
temporal order does not matter, except for the world knowledge in (6) that people first had a workshop and were paid
later.
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(6) Context: The boss orders X to call people, gather some words in Nafsan, and pay them. The
employee reports on what she did addressing boss’s demands one by one:
Kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
sos-o-r
call-3pl.obj
su,
pf
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
pestaf-i-r
talk3pl.obj
su
pf
ki
pep
nafsan,
language
rui=pe
3pl.pf=pf
tao
give.me
nafsan
word
faum
new
su,
pf
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
paktof-i-r.
pay3pl.obj
‘I have called the people, I have talked to them, they have given me new words, and I have
paid them [just like you asked].’ (AK1-116-01)
As we can see, the context offering a list reading in (6) was provided by the speaker and was not
a part of the questionnaire. This type of information is invaluable, especially when the linguist is
not a native speaker of the language. If I had elicited only example (5) and had not insisted on
asking whether perfect could be used in the same context, I could be left wondering whether the
speaker could have used perfect and chose the general proclitic for other reasons, such as style. If
the speaker had simply rejected the sentence with perfect, this would be a good indication the perfect
is not felicitous in sequences, but there would still be a doubt about other possible variables that could
restrict the appearance of this morpheme in sequences. In the end, providing an entirely different
context in (6) is the final proof that the Nafsan perfect is not acceptable in sequences precisely for the
reasons that make the category of perfect unacceptable in sequences. I adopted this type of approach
in drawing conclusions from speaker’s judgments whenever possible.
Unfortunately, the kind of work described above is only possible with one or two speakers at the
time, who also have a good command of English and are interested in meta-linguistic discussions.
Although this type of work was essential in creating successful hypotheses and analyses in my work,
I also understood the limitations of relying on judgments of one speaker alone. In order to minimize
individual biases, I conducted experimental elicitations based on storyboards across several speakers.
The storyboards I used were designed in three distinct ways corresponding to their slightly different
initial purposes. These are the following:
• MelaTAMP storyboards designed to address mostly modal meanings and to be used across all
the languages studied in the MelaTAMP project, see Table 3.2. Additionally, the MelaTAMP
project also used some Totem field storyboards (see below). All the storyboards elicited in the
languages of the MelaTAMP project are printed in bold in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
• Totem field storyboards (http://totemfieldstoryboards.org) designed to address differ-
ent TMA meanings by researchers of the British Columbia University, see Table 3.3.
• Storyboards I designed to obtain new evidence for my hypotheses and analyses based on the
elicitation of the Dahl’s (2000a) questionnaires and previously elicited storyboards, see Table
3.4.
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Table 3.2: MelaTAMP storyboards
List of used storyboards Targeted categories Num. of speakers
“Festival” (von Prince, 2018c) modality (conditionals) 9
“Red yam” (von Prince, 2018e) modality (conditionals) 8
“Fat pig” (von Prince, 2018b) modality (relative clauses) 6
“Bundle of bananas” (von Prince, 2018a) modality (complement clauses) 7
“Tomato and pumpkin” (von Prince, 2018f) aspect (change of state) 6
Table 3.3: Totem field storyboards
List of used storyboards Targeted categories Num. of speakers
“e fortune teller” (TFS, 2010) modality (conditionals) 6
“e woodopper” (TFS, 2011d) modality (conditionals) 6
“Tom and Mittens” (Rolka & Cable, 2014) modality (epistemic) 6
“Bill vs. the weather” (Vander Klok, 2013) modality (epistemic) 9
“Chore girl” (TFS, 2011a) modality (deontic) 6
“Hawaii trip” (Underhill & Cable, 2015) aspect (sequences, temp. adverbs) 3
“Chameleon story” (TFS, 2012a) aspect (change of state) 2
“Sick girl” (TFS, 2011c) modality (deontic) 2
“Feeding fluffy” (TFS, 2012b) modality (epistemic) 2
“Miss Smith’s bad day” (Matthewson, 2014) aspect (perfect) 5
“On the lam” (TFS, 2011b) modality (epistemic) 4
Table 3.4: Storyboards I designed to provide new evidence for my analyses
List of used storyboards Targeted categories Num. of speakers
“Garden” (Krajinović, 2018a) modality (conditionals) 6
“Garden 2” (Krajinović, 2018a) modality (conditionals) 5
“Making laplap” (Krajinović, 2018c) aspect (perfect), modality/negation 6
“Making laplap 2” (Krajinović, 2018c) modality/negation 5
“Haircuts” (Krajinović, 2018b) aspect (perfect, change of state, dual-
ity)
5
“The fortune teller 2” based on TFS
(2010)
negation 3
Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 list the targeted categories of each storyboard and the number of speakers
who produced the storyboard. Besides the provided citations in these Tables, the versions of the
storyboards I used in the field are also archived under itemsAK1-142 andAK1-166 inmy PARADISEC
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Figure 3.1: “Did you play soccer yesterday?” “No, I did not play, it rained.”, from “Festival” by von
Prince (2018c)
Figure 3.2: Targeted context: “If I had played soccer yesterday, I would have gotten wet.”, from
“Festival” by von Prince (2018c)
collection (Krajinović, 2017b). Following the storyboard methodology by Burton & Matthewson
(2015), each storyboard contains specific targeted sentences which are embedded in the storyline that
provides a carefully selected TMA context. This context enables the targeted semantic reading of the
targeted sentence. A few frames from the storyboard “Festival” containing one targeted sentence are
exemplified in Figures 3.1 and 3.2: the storyboard frames in Figure 3.1, where the event of playing
soccer is negated, lead up to the targeted past counterfactual meaning in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3 is an
example of two frames from the storyboard “Making laplap”. In this case, the process of grating of
the taro in the first picture sets up the context in such a way that Mary’s statement, as the targeted
context, can only be interpreted as talking about the result of grating. This targeted sentence is
expected to capture the resultative function of the perfect aspect. In my first field trip in Erakor in
2017, I elicited all the storyboards from Tables 3.2 and 3.3, except for “Miss Smith’s bad day” and “On
the lam”, which were elicited in 2018 together with the storyboards from Table 3.4. I focus first on
describing the process of elicitation in 2017 and then I describe the second field trip in 2018.
In 2017, the process of eliciting the storyboards took 2 to 3 weeks. The total of 9 speakers partici-
pated in the elicitation and their age ranged between 26 and 48 years, with similar numbers of female
and male participants. Most speakers were between 24 and 33 years old, with only 2 speakers being
48 years old. All participants speak Nafsan, Bislama and a foreign language which was either English
or French, depending on the school they attended. Five speakers produced all the storyboards used
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Figure 3.3: “While Lili is grating pink taro, Mary is grating white taro.” Targeted context: “Mary says:
I have grated the taro, what do we do now?”, from “Making laplap” (Krajinović, 2018c) (AK1-166-01)
in the MelaTAMP project (in bold), and others produced some but not all storyboards. I followed
the procedure for eliciting storyboards as proposed by Burton & Matthewson (2015), which can be
summarized as follows. The linguist tells the story to the speaker in a meta-language, in the case
of Vanuatu this is Bislama as the national language and English used in a few instances mentioned
below. The speaker can then go through the story again and have a practice round if necessary.
After the speaker feels comfortable and has understood the story, the linguist records her telling the
story. In case the speaker did not produce the targeted sentence, the linguist can elicit directly the
desired form, having the advantage of having the sentence embedded in a clear semantic context.
In my first field trip, the speakers were first presented with the storyboard with Bislama subtitles
explaining each picture. The Bislama translations of the MelaTAMP and Totem field storyboards
were created by Kilu von Prince, as a part of the MelaTAMP project. Only a few additional story-
boards outside of the scope of theMelaTAMP project were presented with English subtitles and these
were elicited only with speakers who had a good level of English. These storyboards are “Hawaii
trip”, “Chameleon story”, “Sick girl” , “Feeding fluffy”, see Table 3.3. After the participants heard the
story fromme, they were asked if they could tell the story with the same set of pictures, but this time
without the Bislama (or English) subtitles. Most speakers did not feel comfortable with telling the
story just with the blank storyboard, so in most cases they were telling the story from the blank ver-
sion, while also occasionally looking at the version with Bislama subtitles. With one of the speakers
I recorded two versions of each story: one with the Bislama version, and one with the blank version.
In a few instances, I also asked speakers to tell the story one more time, because I noticed a large
number of borrowings from Bislama. Having the two versions of each story from one of the speakers
proved to be very useful because it showed that the chosen grammatical constructions in Nafsan did
not differ from one version to another, which means that there was no visible influence of Bislama.
Moreover, using only the blank version had the disadvantage that the speaker sometimes did not
produce the targeted sentences. Therefore, letting speakers tell the story from both versions at the
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same time proved to be the most economic and successful way of elicitation. Most story tellings were
followed by an elicitation about the targeted contexts, but depending on the speaker’s understanding
of my questions, the reliability of those elicitations varies. One result of the storyboard collection in
2017 is the storybook Natrauswen ni teesa nen rumtri ki nafsan ni Erakor ‘Children book written in
the language of Erakor’, which contains all the storyboard stories accompanied by text in Nafsan. I
distributed several storybooks across speakers who participated in my fieldwork.
In my second field trip in 2018, 6 speakers participated in the study and were between 28 and 50
years old, with the same numbers of female and male speakers. All the participants were speakers of
Nafsan and Bislama, and additionally either French or English. The translations of the storyboards
from English to Bislamawere done in Erakor with Gray Kaltap̃au and Lionel Emil, as two participants
with a high level of English, who also worked with me on the TMA questionnaires discussed in the
beginning of this section and who had the affinity to work on my elicitation tasks. The process of
elicitation of storyboards proved to be easier in comparison to 2017. Out of the total 6 speakers,
3 of them had already participated in the 2017 study. These 3 speakers had more confidence in
the storyboard task and were able to produce a story from the storyboards without consulting the
Bislama subtitles. This showed me that, when given enough time for practice rounds and confidence
building, speakers were able to produce the task as ideally intended by Burton &Matthewson (2015).
Most importantly, the success of these speakers was not based solely on their knowledge of the
storyboard method. It was in big part a result of the ease they felt when working with me, due to
our ongoing friendship. Unfortunately, the limited amount of time of being in the field restricted my
relationships with other speakers and the time I could spend per storyboard recording. Nevertheless,
as explained above, even when speakers consulted the Bislama subtitles, there was no perceivable
effect of translation. Another aspect worth mentioning are cultural references in storyboards. The
storyboards created in the MelaTAMP project, including the ones I created, are situated in the Pacific
cultural context, while the Totem field storyboards contain references to the Western (Canadian)
culture and history in some stories. However, in my work in Erakor I did not notice any influence
of the storyboard topic on the overall understanding of the task. All the participants in my study
attended schools in either French or English, which could explain their familiarity with storytelling
from different cultures. All the storyboard recordings from 2017 and 2018 were transcribed in ELAN,
usually with the help of participants in both the transcription and translation (for more details on
community engagement see Krajinović et al., 2019).
There are two other methods I used in my data collection. The first is the traditional elicitation
which includes asking for translations from English to Nafsan, followed by a meta-linguistic dis-
cussion about different contexts in which the obtained forms can be used. I applied this method
in order to understand more abstract distinctions in Nafsan which I could not easily represent in a
storyboard. One example of such a distinction are different interpretations of complement clauses.
Examples (7) and (8) exemplify a contrast between ‘want’ and ‘like’ that is based on the mood and
aspect used in the complement clause (see Section 8.6.2). This distinction would be hard to elicit
without asking for translations. All the examples elicited in this way are referenced as “elicited”.
Sometimes I also elicited some structures through an online chat with the participants, and in these
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cases the reference contains the date and the name of the speaker.
(7) A=mur
1g=want
ka=tae
1g.i=know
nafsan.
language
‘I want to know Nafsan.’ (Elicited, AK1-045-01, 00:06:20.880-00:06:24.921)
(8) A=trau
1g=really
mur-i-n
like--3g.obj
kin
comp
a=to
1g=pog
tae
know
nafsan.
language
‘I really like that I am learningNafsan right now.’ (Elicited, AK1-045-01, 00:06:41.180-00:06:49.570)
I also elicited a few impromptu dialogs and narratives. I would tell speakers which topic I am
interested in and record themmaking a dialog or a narrative. The topics I chosewere usually based on
contexts in real life in which I observed speakers using specific structures. Speakers had no problem
in performing this task, probably due to the level of familiarity with everyday topics I proposed and
the level of familiarity with their interlocutors. These types of data have also proved to contain
important contexts in which specific TMA functions can be identified.
One other type of data was considered in this work. Although the focus of this work is a syn-
chronic rather than a diachronic analysis, in the context of providing additional arguments for the
semantics of perfect subject proclitics in Section 5.1.1 I briefly mention diachronic data of Nafsan.
This data is the Nafsan Bible translation of Genesis from the 19th century, translated by Rev. J.Cosh
in 1874 and collected by Thieberger (1864). As mentioned in Section 2.3.1 there have been mission-
ary works on Bible translations to Nafsan and other Efate languages since 1868 (Thieberger, 2006;
Thieberger & Ballard, 2008).
3.4 Typological perspective and semantic maps
In this section I discuss the nature of the typological perspective of this work and the methods used
to achieve it.
Besides situating the analysis of the Nafsan realis/irrealis and perfect categories within typo-
logical debates about their cross-linguistic validity, I also compare the Nafsan data to several other
Oceanic languages. I use published articles and grammars of Oceanic languages and, whenever
possible, corpora and parallel storyboards from the MelaTAMP project or otherwise. The choice of
Oceanic languages to be considered is based on the existence of categories of realis/irrealis and per-
fect (or ‘already’) in their grammars, and the degree of detail in their descriptions. For instance, in
the case of the perfect aspect, I considered grammars and articles which provide positive or negative
evidence for the existence of most of the functions of perfect considered in this study. Regarding
the realis/irrealis distinction, several Oceanic languages in which this distinction was identified are
taken as exemplifying some of its properties. In the case of the reanalysis of the realis mood, I fo-
cused on two Oceanic languages which seem to have a very similar problem in analyzing realis as
in Nafsan. Note that in comparison to the targeted semantic data of Nafsan I collected in fieldwork,
many Oceanic languages with structures similar to Nafsan and studied here usually do not provide
sufficient fine-grained data for an entirely parallel comparison with Nafsan. However, this does not
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Figure 3.4: A model of a semantic map with semantic functions A, B, C, D and imaginary category
boundaries in blue, yellow, and red
hinder the aims of this work, since the available descriptions of other relevant Oceanic languages
are only used as measures of whether certain predictions made by the Nafsan analysis can capture
some Oceanic and possibly wider cross-linguistic tendencies.
One method I use for comparing TMA functions in Nafsan and other Oceanic languages is the
creation of semantic maps. Semantic maps are geometrical representations of semantic functions
and their relationships cross-linguistically. The aim of semantic maps is to represent the universal
cognitive relationships of meaning underlying cross-linguistic variation (Croft, 2001; Regier et al.,
2013). The semantic functions (nodes in the semantic map) are placed next to other closely related
semantic functions and connected via connecting lines. As noted by Croft (2001), the nodes need
not be strictly semantic meanings, they can also represent pragmatic and discourse knowledge re-
lated to the meaning of the studied item. As we can see in Figure 3.4, the colored lines indicate
the semantic space covered by imaginary grammatical categories, which could represent three cat-
egories within one language or in three different languages. A semantic function is chosen to be
represented as a node if there is at least one language which has a dedicated marker for that function
(Haspelmath, 2003; Georgakopoulos & Polis, 2018). Since the adjacency of one function to another
is based on their semantic similarity, one lexeme or a grammatical category has to cover a con-
nected area in the semantic map (Croft, 2001; Haspelmath, 2003; Gärdenfors, 2014). This means that
a map in which one category has disjoint functions, as shown in Figure 3.5, is incorrect because
it does not fulfill the purpose of semantic maps, which is to map the similarity between functions
expressed by the same category. This rule of connectivity is supported by observations about linguis-
tic systems cross-linguistically (see also Gärdenfors, 2014). We can illustrate this with a simplified
semantic map of tense in Figure 3.6. The semantic map under a) shows a tripartite system with
tense categories dedicated to past, present, and future, while b) and c) show the non-future/future
and past/non-past distinctions, respectively. This map predicts that there are no tense categories
of present/non-present. Depending on one’s definition of tense, there are categories that could be
analyzed as counter-evidence to this prediction. This is the case of categories that express temporal
immediacy or remoteness, which can refer to either past or future, but not present (this has been
noted most frequently for adverbs, see Tent 1998).7 This simple illustration shows us the motiva-
tion for assuming the connectivity hypothesis (Croft, 2001), and how, by adopting it, semantic maps
generate testable predictions about possible distributions of semantic functions cross-linguistically.
The reasons for using the method of semantic maps in this work are threefold: semantic maps
7In Oceanic languages, there are cases of grammatical morphemes expressing temporal immediacy with reference to
either past or future, see markers with the dedicated ‘hot news’ meaning in Chapter 6.
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Figure 3.5: A model of a semantic map with an incorrect placement of functions
Figure 3.6: Semantic map of tense in three most frequently attested linguistic systems
enable easier cross-linguistic comparison, they generate cross-linguistically testable predictions, and
they are agnostic as to the monosemy or polysemy of the studied item (Haspelmath, 2003). The
cross-linguistic comparison between TMA categories in different languages is possible only when
fine-grained semantic meanings that constitute these categories are identified and compared. Thus,
choosing these basic semantic functions and determining their relationships based on language data
permits relating categories of different languages to each other without assuming their analysis a
priori. The fact that semantic maps do not assume any particular semantic analysis enables them
to remain agnostic as to the monosemy or polysemy. This is advantageous in typological research,
because we want to compare similar categories in different languages, even when they are analyzed
differently in terms of their semantics. Moreover, semantic maps generate transparent predictions
that aim at capturing universal cognitive relationships between different meanings. Because of this,
semantic maps are a powerful scientific tool for testing and creating new theories of meaning.
The semantic maps presented so far are sometimes called “classical” semantic maps (van der
Auwera, 2008; Georgakopoulos & Polis, 2018). The other type of semanticmaps are “proximity”maps,
whose meanings are represented as data points which are distributed on a two‐dimensional space
typically via Multi‐Dimensional Scaling (Georgakopoulos & Polis, 2018). They are called proximity
maps because they display the semantic proximity of different meanings, based on large quantitative
data of parallel texts/questionnaires from different languages. Some proximity maps about TMA
categories were created by Croft & Poole (2008), Dahl (2014b), Dahl & Wälchli (2016), and van der
Klis et al. (2017). Dahl &Wälchli’s (2016) maps is discussed in Section 6.2. In this work I use classical
semanticmaps because I workwith uncontrolled linguistic data based on grammatical descriptions of
different languages (with the exception of MelaTAMP parallel storyboards). Moreover, the work on
proximity maps typically does not generate strong predictions about expected relationships between
different meanings. The visualization of proximity of data points is intended to prompt an inference
of typological tendencies (Croft & Poole, 2008) and not to postulate a testable theory of meaning.
The aim of this work, however, is to postulate a stronger falsifiable theory of how different semantic
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TMA functions are related cross-linguistically, for which classical semantic maps are better suited.
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Part III
Aspect: perfect
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Chapter 4
Perfect aspect and related categories
As we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, Nafsan and other Oceanic languages have a distinct perfect category,
which has, due to its additional functions in comparison to the English perfect, also been claimed to
be a distinct category called “iamitive”. In this chapter I discuss the semantic definition of perfect
adopted in this work, as well as iamitives and ‘already’ as TMA categories which are considered to
be related to it, before turning to a detailed discussion of the Nafsan perfect category in this context
in Chapter 5.
4.1 e semantics of perfect based on English
The study of perfect has attracted a lot of research in formal semantic approaches to English and other
Indo-European languages (e.g. McCoard, 1978; McCawley, 1981; Kamp & Reyle, 1993; Klein, 1994;
Michaelis, 1994; Iatridou et al., 2003; Pancheva, 2003; Portner, 2003; de Swart, 2007; Mittwoch, 2008;
Rothstein, 2008; Nishiyama & Koenig, 2010), as well as in semantics of non-Indo-European languages
(e.g. Li et al., 1982; Howard, 2000; Tatevosov, 2001; Koontz-Garboden, 2007; Matthewson et al., 2015;
Tallman & Stout, 2016), and in cross-linguistic typological studies (e.g. Comrie, 1976; Dahl, 1985;
Bybee et al., 1994; Dahl & Velupillai, 2013b; Bertrand et al., 2017). Grønn & von Stechow (in press)
list three main theoretical approaches to perfect in English: the anteriority analysis (e.g. Klein, 1994),
the result state analysis (e.g. Kamp & Reyle, 1993), and the extended now analysis (e.g. McCoard,
1978; Dowty, 1979). Among these different approaches there is still no theoretical consensus on how
different functions of perfect should be semantically or pragmatically derived, nor which perfect
functions are cross-linguistically present. For this reason, I limit this discussion to describing the
perfect functions which are attested in English and assumed to be cross-linguistic, at least to the
extent that they were assumed as functions of perfect in large-scale typological works by Dahl (1985)
and Dahl & Velupillai (2013b). I also outline a widely accepted semantic approach to perfect by Klein
(1994), which is adopted in this work.
Comrie (1976) lists the functions of the English present perfect as in (1), which are also assumed
by the authors cited above.
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(1) a. perfect of result, also called resultative
b. existential perfect, also called experiential
c. perfect of persistent situation, also called universal
d. perfect of recent past, also called ‘hot news’ perfect
The perfect of result refers to a present state that is a result of some past event (Comrie, 1976:56).
I refer to this function as resultative.1 This meaning of perfect is possible in English only with telic
predicates (e.g. Kiparsky, 2002; Koontz-Garboden, 2007). Comrie (1976:56) illustrates the resultative
perfect with (2) in which John’s arrival is a past event and the result state referred to by the perfect
denotes that John is now here. This notion of current relevance of a past event is considered by many
linguists as one of the defining properties of the present perfect (Bybee et al., 1994; Comrie, 1976)
and plays an important role in some formal approaches (McCoard, 1978; Iatridou et al., 2003).
(2) John has arrived.
The second function of the present perfect is the experiential perfect, which indicates that the
described event happened at least once at any time in past (Comrie, 1976:58). Dahl & Velupillai
(2013b) consider the resultative and the experiential functions of perfect to be the core functions of
the perfect category cross-linguistically. Example (3) asserts that ‘at some moment in my life up
to now I spent time in Paris’. It is typically assumed that the interpretation that this type of event
happened one or more times up to now is due to the iterative aspect of the predicate (Kiparsky, 2002).
Thus, the experiential perfect is said to be incompatible with events that cannot be repeated anymore,
as shown in (4) and (5).
(3) I have been to Paris.
(4) *Fred has been born in Paris. (Kiparsky, 2002)
(5) *Einstein has visited Princeton. (Chomsky, 1970)
The third function of the present perfect is the perfect of persistent situation, which I refer to as the
universal function of perfect. This meaning indicates that the described state/event started in the
past and still obtains in the present (Comrie, 1976:60), as in (6). This reading of present perfect is
limited to stative and progressive situations (Iatridou et al., 2003).
(6) John has been living in Paris since 2007.
The last function listed here is the perfect of recent past, also called ‘hot news’ perfect, which indicates
that the described event occurred in the recent past. The predicate typically includes adverbials such
as ‘recently’ and ‘just’ (Comrie, 1976:60), as in (7).
(7) John has just arrived.
1This term should not be confused with the “resultative” category in the sense of Nedjalkov (1988), see footnote 6 in
this chapter.
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The past and the future perfect differ from the present perfect in that they prototypically have a
reading of anteriority in relation to a given reference time. In (8) we see this with the past perfect
and in (9) with the future perfect.
(8) When you arrived, I had already written the letter.
(9) When you arrive, I will have written the letter.
At first, the functions of perfect listed above might appear quite different from each other. In
fact, a large amount of research on the English perfect deals exactly with the questions of whether
the perfect is polysemous or not, and whether its different readings are derived semantically or prag-
matically. Two common debates have to do with discussing how to differentiate the experiential and
the universal function (Dowty, 1979; Mittwoch, 1988; Klein, 1994; Iatridou et al., 2003), and whether
the anteriority meaning of the past and future perfect should be treated as a case of polysemy, in
some accounts interpreted as relative tense (see Comrie, 1985; Dahl, 1985; Kiparsky, 2002; Bohne-
meyer, 2014; Kroeger, 2019). Klein’s (1994) proposal followed in this work assumes that perfect is
monosemous in that it has a general underlying semantic definition that is susceptible to various
interpretations listed above, dependent on grammatical/quantificational aspect, telicity and tempo-
ral adverbials. The motivation for adopting this approach will become clear in Chapter 5 in which I
show that Nafsan has almost all of the above mentioned functions of perfect, which do not preclude
the necessity to assume polysemy.
In order to define perfect semantically, we need three main concepts from Klein (1994), which
are based on Reichenbach’s (1947) theory of tense and aspect:
• Topic Time (TT): the interval of time the assertion is about
• Situation Time (TSit): the interval of time at which the event takes place
• Utterance Time (UT): the interval of time at which the utterance is produced
A famous example from Klein (1994:4) illustrating these distinctions is shown in (10). The first
sentence sets the TT with ‘when you looked into the room’ and two TSits of ‘being on the table’ and
‘being in Russian’ are contained in that TT. However, since they denote states they also hold true at
times prior and posterior to the TT. They are both in the past tense because they precede the UT.
(10) What did you notice when you looked into the room?
There was a book on the table. It was in Russian.
For Klein (1994), tense is defined as the relationship between the TT and the UT, and aspect is defined
as the relationship between the TT and the TSit. Notice that this means that for Klein (1994) there
is no need to postulate the existence of relative tenses, as they are combinations of tense and aspect
(for a discussion on this see Bohnemeyer, 2014). Klein’s (1994) definitions of temporal and aspectual
categories are listed in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Klein’s (1994) definitions of temporal and aspectual categories
Relationship between TT, TSit, and UT Category
TT included in TSit imperfective aspect
TT at TSit perfective aspect
TT after TSit perfect aspect
TT before TSit prospective aspect
TT before UT past tense
UT included in TT present tense
TT after UT future tense
Figure 4.1: Representation of the resultative present perfect
Klein (1994) defines the perfect aspect as situating the Topic Time in the posttime of TSit. This
is illustrated with the sentence ‘I have arrived’ in Figure 4.1 (repeated from Chapter 1). The same
illustration could represent the ‘hot news’ perfect in which an adverbial such as ‘just’ would strictly
indicate that the TT immediately follows the TSit. This need not to be the case in readings other
than the ‘hot news’ perfect, for examples see Figures 4.4 and 4.5.
As we can see, this definition of the perfect as referring to the posttime of the event in question
captures the behavior of perfect with the functions listed in (1), but it also sets the resultativemeaning
as its prototypical function. Other functions of perfect require some additional context to arise. The
experiential perfect is obtained when the event described in TSit is potentially iterative. This reading
is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
The universal perfect is often recognized by the presence of adverbials introduced by ‘since’,
which set the starting point of TSit, or ‘for’, which sets the duration of TSit. The universal reading
arises with states and progressives, as illustrated in Figure 4.3. Although in this reading it might
seem like the TSit continues into the TT (posttime), Klein (1994:112) shows that the universal perfect
simply denotes that the TT is in the posttime of an event that started at a particular time or had a
particular duration, which means that the perfect only refers to the posttime of TSit, as in Figure
4.3. The interpretation of continuity refers only to the state, such as ‘live’, and not to the whole
proposition of ‘live since 2007’. Thus, the interpretation of continuity is due to the stative aspect of
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Figure 4.2: Representation of the experiential present perfect
Figure 4.3: Representation of the universal present perfect
‘live’ and is independent of the perfect itself.
The anteriority reading that is obtained with the past and the future perfect is illustrated in
Figures 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. In both cases the posttime and the TT ‘when you arrive’ overlap
because the perfect situates the TT in the posttime of TSit. Note that the posttime of TSit and the TT
(‘when you arrive’) do not coincide completely. The definition of perfect does not say how long the
TT is after TSit: the TSit can immediately precede the TT (Figure 4.1) or it can be in a more distant
past, depending on the context (Klein, 1992:538). Thus, ‘being in the posttime of writing the letter
when you arrived’ means that the event of ‘writing the letter’ preceded the event of ‘you arriving’.
One interesting property of the present perfect is that it cannot combine with any temporal ad-
Figure 4.4: Representation of the past perfect
60 CHAPTER 4. PERFECT ASPECT AND RELATED CATEGORIES
Figure 4.5: Representation of the future perfect
Figure 4.6: Representation of example (13a)
verbs that specify the position of the time interval denoted by the described event, such as ‘yesterday’
or ‘last year’ (Klein, 1992), as shown in (11). This restriction also holds with WH-words referring to
a time interval at which the event took place, as shown in (12).
(11) *John has arrived yesterday/last year/at 3 o’clock.
(12) *When has John arrived?
On the other hand, the past perfect does not have such restrictions, and in fact offers two distinct
meanings in the presence of a past temporal adverbial, as shown in (13). The interpretation of (13a)
says that the event of ‘John leaving’ happened at ten o’clock and in (13b) we understand that John
left before ten o’clock. Thus, in (13a) the adverbial of ten o’clock is contained in TSit and twelve
o’clock is the TT. In (13b), on the other hand, ten o’clock is the TT. This is illustrated in Figures 4.6
and 4.7, respectively. The same interpretations are equally possible with the future perfect.
(13) a. Mary came to visit John at twelve o’clock, but John had left at ten o’clock.
b. Mary came to visit John at ten o’clock, but John had already left at ten o’clock. (Comrie,
1985:66)
We can conclude that the main difference between the present and the past perfect, in terms of
co-occurrences with adverbials, can be described as the past perfect allowing temporal adverbials in
the TSit, and the present perfect not allowing any past temporal adverbials in the TSit (Klein, 1992).
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Figure 4.7: Representation of example (13b)
However, this interpretation is not without problems, as the question here is why the past perfect
allows past adverbials in TSit (13a) and the present perfect does not (11). There have been several
proposals in formal semantics dealing with this “present perfect puzzle” and each one focuses on
different aspects of this problem. Most of the approaches exploit the difference between the present
and the past tense component in order to explain the differences in the interpretation (e.g. Klein,
1992; Kiparsky, 2002; Pancheva & von Stechow, 2004). For example, some linguists prefer to assume
that all temporal adverbials can only establish the reference time (here TT) and cannot appear in
the TSit (Kiparsky, 2002; Kroeger, 2019). If that is the case, then the incompatibility of the present
perfect with past adverbials is simply due to the fact that the they are situated in the past and do not
include the utterance time (Kiparsky, 2002). This is further supported by examples like (14) in which
the present tense adverbial ‘today’ is compatible with the present perfect. However, Klein’s (1992)
proposal that the past adverbs in cases like (13a) can be situated in the TSit accounts for the difference
in interpretation between (13a) and (13b), which cannot be explained under Kiparsky’s (2002) and
Kroeger’s (2019) analysis. In order to describe this difference in meaning while maintaining his
analysis, Kiparsky (2002) assumes that the perfect in (13a) is in fact the experiential perfect and the
perfect in (13b) is the resultative perfect. This conclusion is not appealing, because it is not clear how
the iterative component of the experiential meaning is expressed in (13a) and why the same example
could not be interpreted in the resultative meaning.
(14) John has arrived today.
Considering the evidence in (14), Klein (1992) points out that ‘today’ is an indefinite adverbial which
includes the whole posttime of ‘arriving’, and that the present perfect is not compatible with any
definite adverbials which include or refer to the utterance time directly, as shown in (15). Klein
(1992) also offers a discussion on why other indefinite adverbs, like ‘just’, ‘recently’, and ‘before’ are
all compatible with the present perfect (16).
(15) *John has arrived right now/at present.
(16) John has been to Paris before.
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On the other hand, other linguists who support the analysis that temporal adverbs occur only in the
reference time manage to explain the contrast in (13a) and (13b) by treating (13a) as a case of relative
tense and (13b) as the perfect aspect (Bohnemeyer, 2014; Kroeger, 2019).2 However, the problemwith
this analysis is that it assumes two different semantic definitions for the same grammatical structure
and loses the elegance of a unifying explanation for the meanings of past perfect. One reason to
assume Bohnemeyer’s (2014) and Kroeger’s (2019) proposal would be if a language at hand had two
different forms for the meanings corresponding to (13a) and (13b), but that is not the case either in
English or in Nafsan.3
As a solution to the “present perfect puzzle”, Klein (1992:545) proposes the following difference
between the present and the past tense. Within its semantics, the present tense can fix only a definite
position of TT on the time axis (the one of referring to the UT). Unlike the present, the past and the
future tense do not have this constraint, as the position of their TTs is not necessarily definite. Klein
(1992:545) exemplifies this with the contrast between Chris is ill, which has only one possible TT
overlapping with the UT, while Chris was ill can refer to several TT’s in which Chris was ill in the
past. Based on this, Klein (1992:546) proposed the following pragmatic constraint:
(17) In an utterance, the expression of TT and the expression of TSit cannot both be independently
fixed in a definite position on the time axis.
Klein (1992:546) corroborates this constraint with examples (18) and (19), where both the TT and the
TSit have a definite position on the time axis within the same sentence. In (18), the position of TT is
explicitly specified by ‘at seven’, and in (19) the position of TT is explicitly specified by the present
tense in ‘has’.
(18) *At seven, Chris had left at six.
(19) *Chris has left at six.
According to Klein’s (1992) proposal, it would be pragmatically odd (but not false) to confine our
claim in (18) to the specific time interval ‘at seven’ at which Chris was in the posttime of leaving at
six. In (19) it would also be pragmatically odd to single out the utterance time as the time at which
Chris is in the posttime of leaving at six. The oddness of (18) is also due to the fact that both ‘at seven’
and ‘at six’ are new information, which means that there should be contextually possible alternatives
for which the sentence is not true. However, if ‘at six’ is fixed, then there are alternatives of ‘at seven’
for which the sentence would also be true (Manfred Krifka, personal communication, see also Krifka
1992). Klein’s (1992) proposal is attractive in that it provides a single explanation for the behavior of
the present, past, and future perfect.
The “present perfect puzzle” is still hotly debated in formal semantics (e.g. Kiparsky, 2002; Katz,
2For a similar approach see also Mittwoch (2014).
3Even if such a language has been attested, that finding would not be a direct evidence that the theory of the English
or the Nafsan perfect has to change in order to reflect the properties of that language. TMA categories in different lan-
guages can have different semantic definitions and it is still more desirable to find a unifying semantic definition for one
grammatical category.
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2003; Portner, 2003; Pancheva & von Stechow, 2004; Terry, 2006; Schaden, 2009; Kamp et al., 2015;
Grønn & von Stechow, in press) and I do not intend to offer a definite solution to this problem. The
reason I discussed this issue in some detail is because this puzzle is also present in Nafsan. The Naf-
san perfect exhibits almost the same pattern of co-occurrences of perfect and temporal adverbials as
the English perfect, despite its lack of tense categories. While the Nafsan perfect with past reference
is compatible with temporal adverbials referring to the time at which the event took place, the per-
fect with the present reference is not (see Section 5.2.1). This property of the Nafsan perfect sets it
apart from other types of perfect-like categories hypothesized to exist in Oceanic languages, such as
iamitives.
4.2 Cross-linguistic categories related to perfect
In this section I discuss the perfect and other TMA categories which are either semantically related
to it, or which have been proposed as new cross-linguistic categories. I focus on the perfect as a
cross-linguistic category, the proposed nei (Ebert, 2001) and iamitive (Olsson, 2013) categories,
and the aspectual particle ‘already’, which is considered to be related to the iamitive semantics as its
diachronic source (Olsson, 2013; Dahl, 2014a).
4.2.1 ‘Already’ and other aspectual particles
In this section I analyze the semantics of ‘already’, an aspectual particle which is considered to be
one of formative elements of the iamitive semantics (discussed in Section 4.2.2). The meaning of
‘already’ interacts with other aspectual particles through negation, and for that reason they are also
analyzed here.
The meaning of ‘already’ and other aspectual particles has a long tradition of research in formal
semantics and typology, and it is characterized by several approaches. For instance, Löbner (1989)
defines the meaning of ‘already’ as involving an assertion P and a presupposition ¬P which result
in an interpretation of change of state, as shown in Figure 4.8. Another approach considers that
‘already’ is also semantically defined by the expression of speaker’s expectations (van der Auwera,
1993; Michaelis, 1996; van Baar, 1997). The approaches followed in this work are Löbner’s (1989)
duality proposal for interactions of aspectual particles through negation, and Krifka’s (2000) analysis
of aspectual particles as focus-sensitive operators that place restrictions on the alternatives of the
focus. I also follow Krifka (2000) and Vander Klok & Matthewson (2015) in analyzing the change of
state meaning of ‘already’ as a conversational implicature.
The aspectual particles4 ‘already’ ‘still’, ‘not yet’, and ‘not anymore’ stand in a special relationship
when it comes to negation, and the pattern of these relationships is called “duality”. Löbner (1989)
noticed that the outer negation of ‘already’ is truth-conditionally equivalent to the inner negation of
‘still’ (20). Also, the outer negation of ‘still’ is truth-conditionally equivalent to the inner negation
of ‘already’ (21) (Löbner, 1989). Thus, ‘already’ and ‘still’ are duals. In English the duality pattern,
4This term was introduced by König (1991).
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Figure 4.8: Representation of Löbner’s (1989) analysis of ‘already’ (t = interval of time)
Figure 4.9: Duality schema with English, German, and Portuguese particles, based on Löbner (1989)
as in (20)-(21), is not as transparent as in some languages, because ¬already [p] and ¬still [p] have
suppletive forms ‘not yet’ and ‘not anymore’, respectively. If we compare this to a more transparent
language, like Portuguese [por], we find that if we negate já ‘already’, we get já não ‘not anymore’,
and if we negate ainda ‘still’, we get ainda não ‘not yet’. However, note that even in English ‘yet’
is also used with the meaning of ‘already’ in questions (Krifka, 2000; Traugott & Waterhouse, 1969).
The set of these relationships is illustrated in Figure 5.4, including English, German, and Portuguese
aspectual particles that express these meanings.
(20) ¬already [p] = still [¬p]
It is not yet [raining] = It is still [not raining]. (Vander Klok & Matthewson, 2015:184)
(21) ¬still [p] = already [¬p]
It is not [raining] anymore. It is already [not raining]. (Vander Klok &Matthewson, 2015:184)
The second component of the meaning of aspectual particles has to do with pragmatic effects of
expectedness. According to Krifka (2000), all aspectual particles are focus-sensitive. Focus requires
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that there is at least one alternative to the asserted expression, and aspectual particles then express
a restriction of the considered alternatives of the focus, which are ordered in a specific way, e.g.
numerically or temporally. In (22) and (23), where ‘3 months old’ is the focus, we can see the contrast
between the presence and absence of ‘already’ in terms of considered and asserted alternatives. While
the neutral sentence in (22)makes no restriction on the considered alternatives, ‘already’ presupposes
that the only salient alternatives for Lydia’s age are ranked lower than the asserted focus (23). In (24)
we can see the representation of ‘not yet’, which maintains the same presupposition of restriction
on the alternatives as ‘already’ and negates the focus. ‘Still’ and ‘not anymore’ however, indicate
that the alternatives are ranked higher than the focus (25), with the only difference between the two
being the negation of the focus by ‘not anymore’ (26).
(22) Lydia is 3 months old. (Krifka, 2000:405)
Alternatives considered: 1 2 3 4 5 months old
Alternatives asserted: 3 months old
(23) Lydia is already 3 months old. (Krifka, 2000:405)
Alternatives considered: 1 2 3 months old
Alternatives asserted: 3 months old
(24) Lydia is not yet (not already) 3 months old. (Krifka, 2000:410)
Alternatives considered: 1 2 3 months old
Alternatives asserted: ¬3 months old
(25) Lydia is still 3 months old. (Krifka, 2000:405)
Alternatives considered: 3 4 5 months old
Alternatives asserted: 3 months old
(26) Lydia is not 3 months old anymore (not still). (Krifka, 2000:410)
Alternatives considered: 3 4 5 months old
Alternatives asserted: ¬3 months old
This semantics of aspectual particles gives rise to pragmatic effects governed by conversational im-
plicatures, which have in some other approaches been interpreted as being a part of the particles’
semantics (van der Auwera, 1993). Krifka (2000:405) reasons about this in the following way. ‘Al-
ready’ indicates that Lydia’s age is the greatest of those that are considered as relevant in a given
context. If we assume that the “expected” age is the average of the alternatives, then ‘already’ and
‘still’ depart from these expected values in particular directions. In the case of ‘already’ (23) this gives
rise to the implicature that Lydia’s age is greater than expected, and in the case of ‘still’ (25) it gives
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Figure 4.10: Representation of Krifka’s (2000) analysis of the meaning of ‘already’, adopted from
Krifka (2000:410)
rise to the implicature that Lydia’s age is lower than expected. In examples (22)-(26), the considered
alternatives refer to the age which is ordered numerically. However, when the alternatives are or-
dered temporally there is an implication that the described event happened earlier than expected, as
in (27). In order to explain this Krifka (2000) redefines ‘already’ as requiring that the asserted event
has a faster development speed than the alternatives. Assuming that the alternatives are ordered in
terms of the “fastest development speed” results in Lydia’s age being the greatest among the alter-
native ages and in Lydia’s arrival in (27) being the earliest among the alternative arrival times. The
latter leads to an implicature that Lydia arrived earlier than expected. This is illustrated in Figure
4.10.
(27) Lydia already arrived at 3 p.m. (Krifka, 2000; Vander Klok & Matthewson, 2015:200)
Alternatives considered: 3 p.m. 4 p.m. 5 p.m.
Alternatives asserted: 3 p.m.
As we have seen, Krifka’s (2000) analysis of ‘already’ differs from Löbner’s (1989) in that it does not
assume the existence of a ¬P presupposition resulting in a meaning of change of state, cf. Figures
4.8 and 4.10. Nevertheless, in Krifka’s (2000) approach, the reference to a previous negative state
can be analyzed as a conversational implicature. Vander Klok & Matthewson (2015:201) describe the
derivation of this conversational implicature in the following way:
“If the speaker is conveying that the predicate becomes true at an earlier time point
than would have been expected, then the speaker does not believe the predicate to be
timelessly true. On the contrary, the speaker is acutely aware of a previous time interval
during which the predicate did not hold. From this, the hearer concludes that there was
an immediately prior time interval at which the plain proposition is false.”
Löbner (1989) also showed that German has an additional focus particle, erst (which can be
roughly translated as ‘only (then)’ in English), which replaces noch ‘still’ as a dual of schon ‘already’
in the following situation described by Löbner (1989:190): “noch is used in those cases where the state
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p and the contrasting posterior state represent an exhaustive (or binary) alternative, erst in contrast
is used if there are more than these two possibilities”. This can be illustrated with our examples
about Lydia’s age. In (28), Lydia’s age is contrasted to only one month older than her actual age,
so the appropriate answer in (28b) can include noch ‘still’, and according to my German informants
also erst ‘only (then)’. But, if Lydia’s age is contrasted with the age of several months older (29), the
appropriate answer in (29b) includes erst ‘only’ and not noch ‘still’. In (28), there are two competing
alternatives (3 and 4 months), and in (29) there are six competing alternatives referring to Lydia’s
age (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 months). This shows that erst makes no restrictions on the number of alterna-
tives, while noch has the restriction of having only two alternatives. German differs from English in
this regard because the English ‘only’ can be used to denote both quantity and temporal reference,
while erst is used only in the temporal sense. Although the use of an aspectual particle specialized
for the meaning equivalent to erst is not analyzed in the languages presented in this thesis, there is
an indication that the meaning of change of state in some Oceanic languages is more related to erst
rather than ‘already’, e.g. wet ‘only.then’ in Daakaka (von Prince, 2015:83).5
(28) a. Ist
be:3g.p
Lydia
Lydia
son
already
4
4
Monate
month:pl
alt?
old
‘Is she already 4 months old?’
b. Nein,
no
sie
3g.f
ist
be:3g.p
no/
still
erst
only
3
3
Monate
month:pl
alt.
old
‘No, she is still 3 months old.’
(29) a. Ist
be:3g.p
Lydia
Lydia
son
already
9
9
Monate
month:pl
alt?
old
‘Is she already 9 months old?’
b. Nein,
no
sie
3g.f
ist
be:3g.p
erst/
only
#no
#still
3
3
Monate
month:pl
alt.
old
‘No, she is only 3 months old.’
4.2.2 Perfect, , and iamitive
Some of the first typological studies that considered the perfect (based on the English prototype) as a
cross-linguistic category are Dahl (1985), Bybee & Dahl (1989), and Bybee et al. (1994). As mentioned
in Section 4.1, for Dahl & Velupillai (2013b), the core cross-linguistic functions of the perfect are the
resultative6 and the experiential perfect. In their typological WALS sample, Dahl & Velupillai (2013b)
considered languages to have the perfect only if they had both of these functions expressed by one
construction or form. Interestingly, most large-scale typological studies focus on the properties of
5The contrast between (28)-(29) is also attested in Croatian, where tek ‘only’ is the dual of već ‘already’ when there is
two or more available alternatives. Just like in German, još (uvijek) ‘still’ would be used with two competing alternatives.
6Note that Bybee et al.’s (1994) terminology differs from Dahl (1985) and Dahl & Velupillai (2013b). Bybee et al. (1994)
use the term “anterior” for the perfect and “resultative” to refer to a subpart of the resultative meaning of perfect. Following
Nedjalkov (1988), for Bybee et al. (1994:54) “resultative” refers to “an intransitive verb, as in He is gone, without a change
of subject” as a separate category different from perfect. In this work, “resultative” is always understood as the resultative
function of perfect which is not restricted in transitivity.
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the present perfect as the prototypical perfect. In Dahl’s (1985) study, the pluperfect/past perfect
was counted separately from the present perfect, due to potential categorial differences between the
two (see Section 4.1). If we compare the numbers of languages with the present and the past perfect
in Dahl’s (1985) study, we find that the present perfect is slightly more common (24-35 languages
in Dahl 1985:130) than the past perfect (19-23 languages in Dahl 1985:144-145). Interestingly, many
languages that are listed as having the present perfect, but not the past perfect in Dahl (1985) are
tenseless languages whose perfects have been later been analyzed as belonging to a typologically
different kind of perfect called “iamitive” (Olsson, 2013). The Austronesian languages listed by Dahl
(1985:130) as only marking the present perfect are Māori (see Section 6.3.5 for a different analysis),
Indonesian [ind], Javanese [jav], Sundanese [sun], and Bugis Makassar [bug]. There are also two
Southeast Asian languages (Kammu [kjg] and Thai [tha]) and a few Niger-Congo languages (Isekiri
[its], Akan [aka], Yoruba [yor], and Wolof [wol]).
The idea that there is a different kind of perfect that can be identified in some languages origi-
nates from a proposed cross-linguistic nei category by Ebert (2001). According to Ebert (2001),
nei is a category which denotes a new situation that was expected to occur. In her analysis, she
mentions the Burmese pi and the Mandarin le as possibly instantiating this category. The difference
between the perfect and nei is that nei does not refer to the posttime of the described situ-
ation, as it is compatible with states and activities which hold at the reference time. Because of this,
in tenseless languages, nei can give rise to both resultative and ‘new situation’ readings with
activities (Ebert, 2001), as in (30). The predicate ‘eat rice’ can be conceived as atelic, then nei
refers to the beginning of the activity, or as telic, in which case nei refers to the completed event.
Ebert (2001) calls this property “tense-aspect flip-flop” between two opposite meanings in terms of
completion and tense. Although not stated explicitly by Ebert (2001), this case seems to show that
predicates like ‘eat’ in Thai are ambiguous between an activity and an accomplishment reading, and
there is nothing in the semantics of nei that would restrict one of these meanings.
(30) [Thai (Tai-Kadai)]
phom4
1g.m
kin
eat
khau2
rice
lɛɛu3
nei
‘He has eaten’ or ‘He is eating now.’ (Jenny, 2001:127)
Ebert (2001) also compares the meaning of nei to the aspectual particle ‘already’, but she es-
tablishes that they are different in that nei has a general meaning of expectedness rather than
an implication that the event happened earlier than expected, as in the case of ‘already’.7 Although
Ebert’s (2001) proposal of nei has been adopted by Jenny (2001) for Thai in the same edited vol-
ume, it has not gained a wider usage in language descriptions and typology. The continuation of
work on this category has been taken up under a different name: the iamitive. The work on iami-
tives as a cross-linguistic category is quite recent and has been comprehensively studied only by
Olsson (2013). Olsson’s (2013) work was followed by Dahl & Wälchli (2016) who developed a mul-
7For this reason, I adopt the term “expectedness” in this work as denoting this general notion of expectedness, which
does not necessarily imply the “earlier than expected” reading.
4.2. CROSS-LINGUISTIC CATEGORIES RELATED TO PERFECT 69
tidimensional scaling map of iamitives. This term seems to have gained a wider usage than nei
and is now used in typology (Gil, 2015), referring to language-specific categories in grammars (e.g.
Döhler, 2018; Arnold, 2018), and in relation to other semantic phenomena such as phasal polarity
(Veselinova, 2017, 2018), which refers to the aspectual particles studied in Section 4.2.1.
The term “iamitive” was first used in Olsson (2013) and Dahl (2014a), and it is derived from Latin
iam ‘already’. This name intends to capture the ‘already’ component of meaning of this newly pro-
posed cross-linguistic category. In a simplified fashion it can be described as uniting the resultative
meaning of the perfect and the meaning of the aspectual particle ‘already’ from which it is hypoth-
esized to have developed diachronically (or the verb ‘finish’) (Dahl, 2014a). The iamitive’s proposed
core meaning by which it can be distinguished from the perfect is the expression of “the result of a
change from the earlier negative state” (Olsson, 2013:17-18), or “a transition to a new scene” (Dahl
& Wälchli, 2016). Examples (32)-(34) show sentences with hypothesized iamitive markers in In-
donesian, Thai and Mandarin, which Olsson (2013) obtained as an answer to (31) in his Iamitive
Questionnaire. The state of ‘being rotten’ implies an earlier state of ‘not rotten’ and iamitives were
the obligatory choice for this type of meaning in Olsson’s (2013) sample of 4-5 languages (Indone-
sian/Malay, Thai, Vietnamese [vie] and Mandarin Chinese [cmn]). Dahl & Wälchli (2016:328) call
these types of predicates “natural development predicates”, which are defined as “predicates which
become true sooner or later under normal circumstances”. On the other hand, the iamitives are not
chosen to refer to states which cannot denote this change of state, such as ‘be raw’. In English, this
meaning of change of state can also be expressed by ‘already’, but not with perfect (see Section 4.2.1).
(31) You can’t eat this one. It BE ROTTEN. (Olsson, 2013:47, IQ 5)
(32) [Jakarta Indonesian]
Kamu
2g
tidak
neg
bisa
can
memakan-nya.
eat-3
Itu
it
sudah
iam
busuk.
rotten
‘You can’t eat this one. It is rotten.’ (Olsson, 2013:18)
(33) [Thai]
an
cl
níi
this
kin
eat
mây
neg
dâay,
can
man
it
nàw
rotten
lɛ́ɛw.
iam
‘You can’t eat this one. It is rotten.’ (Olsson, 2013:18)
(34) [Mandarin Chinese]
nǐ
2g
bù
neg
néng
can
chī
eat
zhè-ge.
this-cl
tā
3g
làn
rotten
le
iam
‘You can’t eat this one. It is rotten.’ (Olsson, 2013:18)
Similarly to nei, iamitives with activities can be interpreted as either the completion or the
beginning of the activity, as we have seen in Thai in (30). Olsson (2013) also offers an example from
Mwotlap [mlv] (35), an Oceanic language from North Vanuatu.
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(35) [Mwotlap]
Ige
pl
susu
small
may
iam
laklak.
dance
Reading 1: ‘Ça y est, the children have started to dance.’8
Reading 2: ‘Ça y est, the children have finished dancing.’ (François 2003:118, translation from
Olsson 2013:20)
Olsson (2013:19) explains this ambiguity in the following way: “The interaction with predicates
lacking a clear inherent end point is more complicated since a iamitive can be interpreted as apply-
ing either to the initial boundary, thus yielding an on-going interpretation, or to the final boundary,
yielding a completed, “past” interpretation.” However, this observation does not provide a semantic
explanation of why iamitives behave in this way. If iamitives only denote the beginning of a new
situation as proposed by Ebert (2001), the question is why they would allow culminated readings
with activities, as in Reading 2 in (35). Moreover, this phenomenon might simply be a result of
the underspecification of the lexical aspect (Aktionsart), resulting in the ambiguity between accom-
plishments and activities at the lexical level in certain languages, and it might not be related to the
grammatical marking by iamitives at all. This is supported by the fact that all languages studied by
Olsson (2013:21), except Indonesian and Mwotlap,9 require the progressive marker to co-occur with
the iamitive for the reading of change-of-state with activities (Reading 1 in (35)) to be felicitous. This
means that these languages do need to mark the differences in telicity. The only difference in com-
parison to Indo-European languages is that this happens at the grammatical level – the progressive
marking gives rise to atelic meanings and the lack of it to telic ones.
Another property of iamitives is that in combination with prospective or modal markers, iami-
tives can have readings of “imminent future” or prospective aspect, as shown in (37), as an answer
to the question in (36).
(36) (At a birthday party for a child:) Little brother is about to arrive! (So hide the gifts/get ready
to scream “surprise!”) (Olsson, 2013:48, IQ 28)
(37) [Vietnamese]
Nam
boy
sắp
pp
đến
come
rồi!
iam
‘Little brother is about to arrive!’ (Olsson, 2013:22)
Olsson (2013) argues for another meaning as a part of the iamitive semantics of many languages
(Thai, Indonesian and Mwotlap in his sample), namely the notion of speaker’s expectation that the
described event would happen, similarly to Ebert (2001) for nei (cf. Section 4.2.1 for deriving the
8Ça y est is a French idiom which roughly corresponds to ‘that’s it’ or ‘there we go’, referring either to the beginning
or the end of an event, and as such it was a suitable translation of the telic/atelic ambiguity in (35) (François, 2003; Olsson,
2013:20).
9Notice that the analysis of Mwotlap needs to be revisited, as it is the only language reported to have both the iamitive
and the perfect category (François, 2003; Olsson, 2013), which is, granted iamitives are a typologically valid category which
overlaps to a large extent with perfect functions, extremely unlikely from a typological point of view. It is more likely that
one of the markers is in fact a category more dissimilar from the perfect, such as ‘already’.
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earlier than expected implicature of ‘already’). He illustrates this with the agrammaticality of using
the iamitive in Indonesian and Thai to refer to an unexpected event of ‘losing a wallet’ (38)-(40).
(38) I LOSE my wallet! Can you help me look for it? (Olsson, 2013:47, IQ 2)
(39) [Jakarta Indonesian]
Aku
1g
(*sudah)
iam
menghilangkan
lose
dompet-ku!
wallet-1
Bisa-kah
can-q
kamu
2g
membantu
help
mencarikan-nya?
find-3
‘I (have) lost my wallet! Can you help me look for it?’ (Olsson, 2013:24)
(40) [Thai]
chûay
help
hǎa
find
krà pǎo ŋən
wallet
nɔ̀y?
little
raw
1g
tham
make
krà pǎo ŋən
wallet
hǎay
disappear
(*lɛ́ɛw).
iam
‘I (have) lost my wallet! Can you help me look for it?’ (Olsson, 2013:24)
Olsson (2013:25) also offers a minimal semantic pair from Mwotlap, which shows the difference
between marking an expected event (marriage) by a iamitive marker (41a) and a neutral, not neces-
sarily expected, event by a perfect marker (41b). Note that ‘already’ is used in the English translation
of (41a). In Olsson’s (2013) study, the feature of expressing expectedness was not attested in Viet-
namese, Mandarin, and Malay.
(41) a. ithi-k
brother-1g
may
iam
leg.
married
‘My brother is already married, ça y est.’
b. ithi-k
brother-1g
me-leg
pf-married
mi
with
ni-misis
a-white.woman
vitwag.
one
‘My brother is married to a European woman (*ça y est).’ (François 2003:123, translation
from Olsson 2013:25)
Another pair of properties of iamitives that can be related to the meaning of ‘already’ are the
incompatibility with downward-entailing operators such as ‘only’ and duality effects in negation.
Olsson (2013:33-35) notes that the iamitives in his sample cannot co-occur with the quantifier ‘only’,
as shown in (42) for Mandarin Chinese. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, the meaning of ‘only’ can be
compared to the meaning of erst in German, which is also a dual of ‘already’ and cannot co-occur
with it.
(42) [Mandarin Chinese]
Hén
not
hǎo,
good
wǒ
1g
xiànzài
so.far
cái
only
kàn-wán
look-finish
sān-běn
three-cl
shū
book
(*le)
iam
(How is the reading going so far?) ‘Bad, I only read three books (so far).’ (Olsson, 2013:34)
Regarding the duality effects, Olsson (2013:35-37) argues that when iamitives are negated, they
give rise to the meaning of ‘no longer’/‘not anymore’ (43). The expression of ‘not yet’ is incompatible
with iamitives, due to their resemblance with ‘already’ (cf. duality in Section 4.2.1), and some lan-
guages with iamitives even have simplex words for this meaning (44), called nondums by Veselinova
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(2017). Although nondums are not necessarily a property of languages with iamitives, the meaning
of ‘not yet’ is quite often expressed by a nondum marker in languages with iamitives.10
(43) [Indonesian]
Karena
because
asap
smoke
menara
tower
pengendali
controller
sudah
iam
tidak
neg
terlihat
be.seen
lagi.
again
‘Because of the smoke the control tower could no longer be seen.’ (Sneddon et al. 2010:210,
glossing from Olsson 2013:36)
(44) [Indonesian]
Dia
3g
belum
not.yet
professor.
professor
‘He is not a professor yet.’ (Sneddon et al. 2010, my glossing)
As we can see from Olsson’s (2013) proposal of iamitive properties, they are defined by several
‘already’-like meanings and some other meanings including the resultative perfect. These iamitive
functions are summarized in Table 4.2. However, Olsson (2013) only discusses a set of iamitive func-
tions, but does not provide a semantic definition of this category. Moreover, although Olsson (2013)
focuses on similarities between ‘already’ and iamitives, it is not clear what the semantic differences
between them are, and what the relationship between iamitives and perfects is, except the possibility
to express the resultative meaning.
Table 4.2: Iamitive functions, based on Olsson (2013)
‘Already’-like meanings Perfect-like meanings Other meanings
change of state resultative on-going/completed ambiguity
expectedness immediate future
incompatible with ‘only’
duality with negation
4.3 Perfect/iamitive debate in Austronesian and Oceanic
In this section I present the debate regarding the cross-linguistic validity of iamitives, and differ-
ent approaches that have emerged in analyzing perfect/iamitive/‘already’ categories, especially in
Oceanic and Austronesian languages in general. I also briefly present the contribution of this work
to the perfect/iamitive debate, which is developed in Chapters 5 and 6.
10I hypothesize that the frequency of nondums in languages with iamitives emerges due to the following reason. Since
iamitives are sometimes the only available category in the language to express past temporal reference and perfect mean-
ings, such as in Indonesian, and they are incompatible with the meaning of ‘not yet’, the combination of the past/perfect
reference and ‘not yet’ meaning needs to be expressed by a new grammatical from, which can be the simplex nondum
form.
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The category of perfect is ubiquitous in descriptions of Oceanic languages, which suggests that
this category is strongly represented in this language family. However, it has been noted by sev-
eral linguists that the perfect in Oceanic languages does not behave as expected from the semantic
theories of perfect, based on the English perfect. In other words, the perfect sometimes has addi-
tional functions which are absent in English. For example, this is the case with the marker naqa
in Toqabaqita (Lichtenberk, 2008) and ku/xu/u in Nêlêmwa [nee] (Bril, 2016), where the perfect can
express a change of state as shown in (45) and (46), respectively.
(45) [Toqabaqita (Southeast Solomonic)]
Fanua
place
e
3g.nf
rodo
be.dark
naqa.
pf
‘It is dark now./It has gotten dark.’ (Lichtenberk, 2008:712)
(46) [Nêlêmwa (New Caledonia)]
Na
1g
u
pf
hulak.
old
‘I’m old (now).’ (lit. ‘I have gotten old’) (Bril, 2016:79)
This feature of change of state, unusual for “typical” perfects, led to two different ways of analyzing
the perfect in languages with this feature. In the typological approach, this meaning was taken
as symptomatic of a new typological category of iamitives (Olsson, 2013; Dahl & Wälchli, 2016),
described in Section 4.2.2. On the other hand, in formal semantics, it has been argued that the
perfect and perfect-like categories instantiate known aspectual categories. I discuss three different
approaches in formal semantics which deal with the change-of-state meaning in three Austronesian
languages: Tongan (Central Pacific linkage, Polynesia), Niuean (Central Pacific linkage, Polynesia),
and Javanese (Western Malayo-Polynesian).11
In Tongan, when states are marked with the perfect kuo, they can receive all readings associated
with the perfect aspect (Koontz-Garboden, 2007:142), as well as the interpretation of change of state
(see below). In his analysis of the Tongan perfect, Koontz-Garboden (2007) argues that this change-
of-state meaning is derived through aspectual coercion. Aspectual coercion is considered to be an
operation by which tenses, aspects, and temporal/aspectual adverbials transform situations of one
type of lexical aspect into another (Moens & Steedman, 1988). Moens & Steedman (1988:18) offer
the example of Harry has hummed, as requiring a scenario in which the “act of humming has a
momentousness that it usually lacks”. In this case, the perfect aspect coerced a non-culminating event
into a culminating event. Aspectual coercion has been proven to be a powerful tool in explaining
interactions between grammatical and lexical aspect (see also de Swart, 1998; Michaelis, 2004).12
Koontz-Garboden (2007) shows that in Tongan the imperfective-marked states (47) differ from the
perfect-marked states in that the latter can receive the interpretation of change of state, as in (48).
11Outside of the Austronesian family, there is another approach in which the meaning of change of state with the
perfect is attributed to the lexical aspect of verbs which are known as “inchoative states”, for example in Korean (Choi,
2015), Skw̲x̲wú7mesh (Bar-el, 2005), and Sənčáθən (the Saanich dialect of Straits Salish) (Kiyota, 2008). I address this
approach in my analysis of Nafsan in Section 5.2.2.
12For opposing opinions arguing against coercion see Ziegeler (2007).
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(47) ‘Oku
ipf
mokomoko
cool
‘a
ab
e
def
loki.
room
‘The room is cool.’ (Koontz-Garboden, 2007:129)
(48) CONTEXT: Sione has done the laundry and has a bunch of wet clothes. He hangs them out
on the line to dry while they are still wet. He leaves to go do something else and returns after
some period of time, finding that they have dried in the interim.
Kuo
pf
mōmoa
dry
‘a
ab
e
def
vala.
clothes
‘The clothes dried.’ (Koontz-Garboden, 2007:133)
The states marked by the imperfective can only be coerced into a change of state meaning by rate
adverbs such as quickly or slowly (49). The same type of coercion by rate adverbs referring to the
change-of-state interval is also possible with states in English (50). The only difference between
English and Tongan is the fact that the property-denoting concepts (term fromDixon 1982) are verbs
in Tongan, while in English they are adjectives. Moreover, Tongan does not posses any derivational
morphology to express the meaning of change of state.
(49) ‘Oku
ipf
loloa
long
vave
fast
ho
your
‘ulu.
hair
‘Your hair is quickly getting long.’ (Koontz-Garboden, 2007:117)
(50) Kim quily believed Sandy.
‘Kim quickly came to believe Sandy.’ (Change-of-state reading) (Koontz-Garboden, 2007:147)
Koontz-Garboden (2007) takes these facts as evidence for analyzing the change-of-state meaning
with the perfect kuo as a result of aspectual coercion. If states marked by the perfect receive the
resultative interpretation (as the default reading of perfect), there is an inference that the result
state was preceded by a change into it, which is in conflict with the stative meaning of the verb. In
order to resolve that conflict, the states are then coerced into changes of state (Koontz-Garboden,
2007:142). In other readings of perfect which are compatible with stative verbs, such as experiential
and universal, there is no conflict, and, thus, the meaning of change of state does not arise (Koontz-
Garboden, 2007:142), as shown in the experiential and the universal examples in (51) from Tongan.
(51) a. Kuo
pf
(‘osi)
‘osi
kulokula
red
tu‘o
occasion
taha
one
hoku
my
fale.
house
‘My house has been red before (not red now).’ (Existential)
b. Kuo
pf
loloa
long
hoku
my
‘ulu,
hair
talu
since
pe
and
mei
since
he
def
1980.
1980
‘My hair has been long since 1980 (still long now).’ (Universal) (Koontz-Garboden, 2007:142)
The second approach to explaining the appearance of the change-of-state meaning is to integrate
this meaning in the semantics of perfect. In Niuean, Matthewson et al. (2015) analyze the marker
kua, which is diachronically related to the Tongan perfect, as a marker that semantically combines
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inchoative and perfect meanings. As we can see in (52), only the states marked by the perfect kua
receive the interpretation of change of state.
(52) a. Kula
red
e
ab
tau
pl
lau
leaf
akau.
tree
‘The leaves are red.’
b. Kua
pf
kula
red
(tei)
(recent)
e
ab
tau
pl
lau
leaf
akau
tree
‘The leaves have turned red.’ (Comment: ‘It’s autumn. Or it could be you’re dyeing
them.’) (Matthewson et al., 2015:15)
Matthewson et al. (2015) adopt Iatridou et al.’s (2001) analysis of perfect which proposes the existence
of the Perfect Time Span, which is defined by Matthewson et al. (2015:22) as “an interval whose left
boundary is provided by some temporal adverbial, and whose right boundary is provided by tense,
and within which an event is placed by the perfect”. This analysis aims at capturing the effects of
current relevance of the English present perfect (see also, McCoard, 1978). Following this approach,
Matthewson et al. (2015) define the Niuean kua as placing the change of state within the Perfect Time
Span.13
In comparison to Tongan, the rate adverbs in Niuean can also coerce states into changes of state
(53). However, Matthewson et al. (2015) do not adopt the analysis of aspectual coercion in Niuean
because, unlike in Tongan, the perfect cannot have universal and experiential readings with states,
as shown in (54). In Koontz-Garboden’s (2007) analysis of Tongan, only the resultative perfect trig-
gers aspectual coercion, while the universal and experiential readings of perfect-marked states are
perfectly grammatical. In comparison, Matthewson et al.’s (2015) analysis that inchoativity is built in
the semantics of kua predicts that states are always interpreted as changes of state. This explains the
lack of other perfect interpretations with states in Niuean, and also the lack of universal meanings
in general.14 Matthewson et al. (2015) also show that the Niuean perfect cannot be analyzed as a
iamitive because it does not have implicatures involving expectedness, and it successfully combines
with ‘only’.
(53) Momoho
ripe
vave
quickly
e
ab
tau
pl
fua
fruit
lākau.
plant
‘The fruit ripen quickly.’ (Matthewson et al., 2015:28)
(54) a. *Kua
pf
loa
long
e
ab
ulu
hair
haaku
1g.po
tali
since
mai
from
he
loc
tau
year
1980.
1980
‘My hair has been long since 1980.’
13A similar reanalysis of perfect as inchoative aspect has also been adopted for the Samoan ‘ua by Hohaus (2017). This
approach is not discussed in this work because Hohaus (2017) does not discuss the full distribution of ‘ua in relation to the
functions of the perfect aspect.
14The universal perfect readings can only arise with homogeneous predicates, and these are states and progressives in
English. Since the change of state is non-homogeneous, this predicts the impossibility of the inchoative perfect in Niuean
receiving universal readings (Matthewson et al., 2015:25).
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b. *Kua
pf
kula
red
tei
pf
e
ab
fale
house
haaku
1g.po
he
loc
vaha
time
tuai.
old
‘My house has been red before (not red now).’ (Matthewson et al., 2015:29)
The third approach to analyzing the change-of-state meanings is to adopt the semantic analysis of
‘already’. This has been done by Vander Klok & Matthewson (2015) for the Javanese wis (Paciran
Javanese wes), which has also been analyzed as iamitive by Dahl & Wälchli (2016). Since ‘already’
and the perfect can easily occur in similar environments (Vander Klok & Matthewson, 2015:179),
Vander Klok & Matthewson (2015) establish three features that can distinguish ‘already’ from the
perfect: having the change-of-state meaning with states (55), presence of duality with negation (56),
and presence of the “earlier than expected” implicature (57). Since wes shares these three properties
with the English ‘already’, Vander Klok & Matthewson (2015) analyze it as having the semantics of
‘already’ as proposed by Krifka (2000) (see Section 4.2.1).
(55) [Change of state]
Context: ‘I haven’t seen Kana in one year. When I left before, she was still short.’
Kana
Kana
(sa’iki)
now
kok
p
wes
already
gedhe
big
/
/
dhuwur!
tall
‘Kana is already big now!’ (Vander Klok & Matthewson, 2015:189)
(56) [Duality]
Mas
Mr.
Mawon
Mawon
wes
already
gak
neg
ndandan-i
a.fix-appl
jareng-e.
fishing.net-def
‘Mawon is no longer fixing the fishing net.’ (Vander Klok & Matthewson, 2015:185)
(57) [Earlier than expected]
Mbok
grandmother
wes
already
jam
hour
setengah
half
wolu
eight
ndak-an
to-an
engko
later
kari
left.behind
reng
at
pasar.
market
‘Grandmother, it’s already 7:30 a.m. so there won’t be anything at the market soon.’ (Van-
der Klok & Matthewson, 2015:187)
Vander Klok & Matthewson (2015) also consider the co-occurrence with past temporal adverbs as
a possible way to distinguish the meaning of ‘already’ from the perfect aspect. The Javanese wes
can combine with past temporal adverbs (58), which can be interpreted as evidence against analyz-
ing it as perfect. However, Vander Klok & Matthewson (2015) assume that in tenseless languages
the restriction on the co-occurrence with past temporal adverbs does not hold. They derive this as-
sumption by following Giorgi & Pianesi (1997) who propose that whenever the present tense is not
syntactically realized in the language, the perfect allows the co-occurrence with past adverbials. In
Section 5.2.1 I contest this view by showing that the Nafsan perfect has restrictions on past temporal
adverbs despite the lack of tense in Nafsan.
(58) [Temporal adverbs]
Gek
just
ngi
yesterday
aku
1g
wes
already
ngomong…
a.speak
sik
Mr.
pak
Mr.
Arif
Arif
iku
dem
loh.
p
‘Yesterday I already spoke to Mr. Arif.’ (Vander Klok & Matthewson, 2015:192)
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Vander Klok &Matthewson (2015) additionally argue against the necessity to postulate the new iami-
tive category and suggest instead that the properties analyzed as belonging to the iamitive semantics
can be explained by adopting the semantic analysis of ‘already’, as described in Section 4.2.1. More-
over, they criticize the lack of precise semantic comparison between the postulated iamitive category
and the perfect in Olsson (2013). As Vander Klok & Matthewson (2015) note, in order to discuss the
cross-linguistic validity of iamitives, we would also need to know if iamitives share any of the re-
strictions of perfect aspect, such as incompatibility of the present perfect and past temporal adverbs
(see Section 4.1).
Following these different perspectives on the perfect, iamitives, and ‘already’ in Oceanic lan-
guages, the Nafsan perfect lends itself as a good case study, particularly because it can co-occur with
temporal adverbials in certain contexts, it can encode a change of state with stative verbs, has some
duality effects, and it lacks one of the readings of the English perfect. In the semantic analysis of
the perfect in Nafsan presented in this thesis, I show that all the functions of the perfect, including
the “unexpected” ones, can be derived from Klein’s (1994) definition of perfect as placing the Topic
Time (TT) in the posttime of the Situation Time (TSit), discussed in Section 4.1. I analyze all the
attested functions of perfect in Nafsan and show how their meanings are derived. By analyzing the
processes through which certain “unexpected” meanings are derived, in Chapter 5 I argue for five
main generalizations regarding the nature of the perfect:
1. The present perfect is incompatible with past temporal adverbials.15 If the perfect can occur
with temporal adverbials in a tenseless language, this might be due to its reinterpretation as
the past or future perfect. In this case, the temporal adverbial is interpreted as being in TSit
instead of TT (see Section 5.2.1).
2. In languages without any dedicated morphology for the expression of change of state, this
meaning can be achieved through aspectual coercion of states marked by perfect (cf. Koontz-
Garboden, 2005, 2007) (see Section 5.2.2).
3. Duality in negation does not necessarily arise from the meaning of aspectual particles like ‘al-
ready’ (Löbner, 1989). It can arise from two other mechanisms: as a consequence of aspectual
coercion of states into changes of state marked by the perfect, and because of morphosyntactic
restrictions on co-occurrence of some TMA markers (see Section 5.2.3).
4. One of the reasons for creating the new iamitive category has to do with the fact that many
languages said to have iamitives do not express all the “expected” functions of perfect.16 I
show that the distribution of functions of one grammatical marker depends on other elements
15As mentioned in Chapter 1, in this work I treat the perfect category as having the properties of the prototype of the
English perfect and I exclude languages which happen to have a category called “perfect” for historical reasons, which in
fact behaves as past tense, e.g. German, French, Italian, Portuguese, etc.
16For instance, Indonesian and Mandarin Chinese do not express the experiential meaning of perfect with the iamitive
marker, because they have dedicated experiential markers (Olsson, 2013). Since for Dahl & Velupillai (2013b) the experi-
ential meaning is one of the core functions of perfect, a new category needed to be designed in order to explain a cluster
of functions similar to perfect, but which excludes some of the “core” functions.
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of the TMAparadigm. If the perfect does not have all the cross-linguistically attested functions,
this is because there are other markers in the paradigm specialized for those meanings (e.g.
experiential in languages studied by Olsson (2013) and ‘hot news’ in Nafsan), see Section 5.3.1.
5. We need to make a distinction between having certain meanings and being compatible with
certain meanings. Based on the case of the Nafsan perfective marker, I show that a given as-
pectual marker can co-occur with many perfect functions, due to their semantic compatibility.
However, this does not mean that the same marker necessarily denotes these perfect functions
as a part of its semantic definition. Thus, the aspectual markers analyzed as iamitives might
in fact be simply compatible with certain meanings of perfect or ‘already’, while their core
meanings belong either to the perfect, ‘already’, or some other aspectual category.
Finally, these five points are taken to show the importance of language-internal and system-
dependent factors that govern how a specific TMA category will be expressed.17 This speaks against
the category of iamitives, which neglects complex language-internal interactions between semantics,
pragmatics, and syntax. In contrast to iamitives, I argue that the perfect as a category that places
the TT in the posttime of the TSit is a good candidate for a typologically valid category, whose
cross-linguistic differences can be explained by different processes operating in individual language
systems, without the need to posit different semantic definitions of the perfect, which would distin-
guish iamitives as a new kind of perfect.
17In typology, the fact that the criteria of category assignment are often different from language to language due to
language-internal properties is called “categorial particularism” (Haspelmath, 2010).
Chapter 5
Perfect in Nafsan
As shown in Chapter 4, the debate about the status of the perfect aspect as a cross-linguistic cat-
egory has resulted in proposing a number of features expected of perfects, as well as proposing a
new typological category of iamitives intended to explain the additional function of change of state.
However, as foreshadowed in Chapter 4, Nafsan may speak against some of these proposals, includ-
ing the existence of the iamitive as a typological category. In this chapter, I discuss this in more detail
by analyzing the fine-grained semantic meanings expressed by the perfect marker pe in Nafsan and
relating them to the relevant debates regarding the perfect aspect and iamitives.
5.1 Setting the stage for the analysis of perfect in Nafsan
5.1.1 Subject proclitics and perfect
In this section I describe the distribution of “perfect” proclitics and argue that they should be reana-
lyzed as perfect-agreeing proclitics which do not carry any perfect semantics as they only formally
agree with the perfect marker pe.
As shown in Section 2.3.1, Thieberger (2006) labels as perfect two elements in the TMA system
of Nafsan: one paradigm of subject proclitics (see Table 5.1) and the marker pe. Thieberger (2006)
shows that they typically co-occur (1), and he proposes that they have the same meaning of perfect
aspect. I formulate that proposal as the SP_Hypothesis 0.1
(1) ru=lap
3pl=many
te-pur
de-big
rui=pe
3pl.pf=pf
mat.
dead
‘And very many have died.’ (Thieberger, 2006:110)
SP_Hypothesis 0: The perfect subject proclitics have the same meaning as the perfect marker pe.
The second possibility is that the perfect subject proclitics and the marker pe have different
distributions, which means that they do not always co-occur. In this case we can formulate the
1SP refers to “subject proclitic”.
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Table 5.1: Subject proclitics in Nafsan based on Thieberger (2006:150)
General Irrealis Perfect-agreeing
1g a= ka= kai=
2g ku= p̃a= kui=
3g i= ke= ki=
1d.incl ta= tak= takai=, tai=
1d.ecl ra= rak= rakai=
2d ra= rak= rakai=
3d ra= rak= rakai=, rai=
1pl.incl tu= tuk= tu=, tui=, tukoi=
1pl.ecl u= ko= ui=, koi=
2pl u= ko= koi=
3pl ru= ruk= rui=, rukui=, rukoi=
SP_Hypothesis 1 which says that they simply overlap in certain meanings.
SP_Hypothesis 1: The perfect subject proclitics have ameaning which overlaps with themeaning
of pe in certain contexts.
In terms of the distribution of the perfect proclitics and the marker pe, judging fromThieberger’s
(2006) description, we can see that besides their co-occurrence there are also cases in which the per-
fect subject proclitics occur without pe, as shown in (2) with the subject proclitic rakai. As explained
below, when subject proclitics occur alone they do not denote any perfect meanings. This is also
visible from (2), in which the proclitics are used in a narrative context, incompatible with the perfect
aspect (see below discussion around example (9)). Thus, we can conclude that only SP_Hypothesis
1 is tenable.
(2) Kaltog
Kaltog
i=kel
3g=hold
ntak
back
Selwin
Selwin
tefla=n
thus=d
go
and
rakai=ler
3d.pf=return
mai
come
pak
to
e-sum̃.
loc-house
‘Kaltog rubbed Selwin’s back like that and they returned to the house.’ (Thieberger, 2006:111)
In order to test the SP_Hypothesis 1 and find out what meanings can be assigned to the perfect
proclitics, I first analyzed the distribution of co-occurrences of pe with subject proclitics. I analyzed
three different sources of Nafsan data: corpus data, storyboards/dialogs, and questionnaires (see Sec-
tion 3.3 for details). Table 5.2 lists the number of all occurrences of pe with subject proclitics. My
first finding is that pe felicitously occurs with the general subject proclitics in any context. In other
words, pe can occur in the same contexts with both the general and the perfect subject proclitics.
Examples (3) and (4) show the experiential and anteriority readings of perfect from Dahl’s (2000c)
questionnaires for which speakers accepted/offered both the general and the perfect subject proclitic
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Table 5.2: Occurrence of perfect subject proclitics and pe in 3 empirical methods
Method bj.pf without pe bj.pf=pe pe with general
bj.po
Corpus 159 152 7
Storyboards/Dialogs 10 271 55
Questionnaires 4 209 31
in elicitation. Example (5) is from a storyboard and in this case the speaker produced the same sen-
tence with the resultative meaning once with the perfect proclitic and second time with the general
proclitic. The meaning of change of state in the last sentence in (5), characteristic for the Nafsan
perfect, is also expressed by the general proclitic in combination with pe.
(3) [Experiential perfect]
ag
2g
kui=pe/ku=pe
1g.pf=pf/1g=pf
paatlas
meet
kor-e-k
sister--1g.dp
te
some
mal
time
ko?
or
‘Have you met my sister (at any time in your life up to now)?’ (AK1-120-01, based on Dahl
2000c:PQ 35)
(4) [Anteriority]
Malnen
when
p̃a=ler,
2g.i=return
kai=pe/a=pe
1g.pf=pf/1g=pf
mtir
write
natus
letter
su.
pf
‘When you come back, I will have finished writing the letter.’ (AK1-083-01, based on Dahl
2000b:FQ 17)
(5) [Resultative perfect, change of state]
“Mama,
mom
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
preg
make
siilu
every
nawesien,
chore
a=pe
1g=pf
preg
make
siilu
every
nawesien
chore
neu.”
1g.po
Ale
then
Mama
mom
ga
3g.po
i=na:
3g=say
“Malfane
now
go
and
ku=pe
2g=pf
tae
can
taf,
go.out
p̃a=fan
2g.i=go.i
mes.”
play
‘Mom, I have done all the chores, I have done all the chores. Then her mom said: “You can go
out now, go play!” ’(AK1-034-01, 00:01:55.610-00:02:13.171, from the storyboard “Chore girl”
(TFS, 2011a))
My second finding is that pe cannot combine with the irrealis subject proclitics. However, I have
encountered the form fe which can be analyzed as the irrealis stem-mutation of pe. Unfortunately,
despite various elicitations in questionnaires and storyboards, this form has been attested only in one
context explained below, which makes it hard to understand its meaning and the semantic relation
to pe. The only context in which I have recorded fe is the immediate future typically translated as
‘going to’ or ‘about to’ (6).2 Although we can easily assume that this is fe’s sole function, its use
still seems marginal because immediate future can also be expressed by using the irrealis form alone
2Because of the low frequency and restricted use of fe and its unclear status in relation to pe I also cannot offer a
conclusion about whether it presents any new evidence regarding the proposed iamitive feature of immediate future.
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(7).3 In example (6) we can see that both pe, attached to a perfect proclitic and followed by an irrealis
complement clause, and fe, attached to the irrealis proclitic, can be used in the context of immediate
future (see also Section 5.2.2). The form fe cannot be used with the meaning of future perfect (see
recording AK1-156), which is the only irrealis context in which the perfect pe regularly occurs (see
Section 5.2.1).
(6) [I BE ABOUT to fall asleep.] (Dahl, 2000b:FQ 85)
Ka=fe
1g.pf=pf.i
matur./
sleep/
Kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
to
pog
na
comp
ka=matur.
1g.i=sleep
‘I’m going to sleep now.’ [speaker’s translation] (AK1-109-01, 00:03:17.991-00:03:20.388)
(7) [Talking about the speaker’s immediate plans:] I GO to town. (Dahl, 2000b:FQ 37)
Ka=fak
1g.i=go.i
taon.
town:bi
‘I’m going to town./I’m about to go to town.’ (AK1-086-01)
My third finding is that in my fieldwork data the occurrence of the perfect subject proclitics
without pe is highly dispreferred, except for ki= 3g.pf which accounts for all 10 occurrences of
bj.pfwithout pe in the storyboard data shown in Table 5.2. The occurrence of ki= alone is illustrated
in example (8). The 4 instances counted in the questionnaire data include forms other than ki= 3g.pf
because I asked about them in elicitation.
(8) Yokon
Yokon
i=pak
3g=go.to
namlas,
bush
ru=to
3pl=pog
rik
wait
go
and
Ros
Rose
ki=mer
3g.pf=also
taus-i-ø
follow--3g.obj
pa.
go
‘Yokon went to the bush, they waited and Rose went after her.’ (AK1-027-01, 00:11:20.431-
00:11:25.116)
When eliciting the paradigm of perfect proclitics, speakers said that using the perfect subject procli-
tics alone sounded like “old language”, but did not judge it as completely agrammatical (see recording
AK1-045-01). In the same elicitation session speakers judged the perfect proclitics as being short ver-
sions of the forms including the perfect proclitics and pe. This indicates that nowadays the perfect
proclitics are only seen as a part of the perfect form, as they do not typically stand alone anymore.
This type of presumably diachronic change might be similar to the processes underlying the for-
mation of portmanteau subject morphemes – the subject markers and a TMA marker co-occur until
they gradually become dependent on each other and merge morphologically, forming a portmanteau
morpheme. However, since speakers still do not reject the perfect subject proclitics occurring alone
on grounds of agrammaticality, this means that we are witnessing a grammatical change. If we look
again at Table 5.2, it is quite surprising to see such different values between the corpus data and my
fieldwork data. In the corpus data, the perfect subject proclitic occurred more times without than
with pe, which is drastically different from only 10 occurrences of bj.pf alone (all in 3g) in story-
boards.4 The fact that these different types of data show evidence of a diachronic change in progress
3See discussion about how irrealis marking alone gets this interpretation in Section 8.3.2.
4One caveat to this is the fact there are some differences in the glossing of the corpus and my fieldwork data, which
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can be partially explained if we consider the following facts. All participants in my fieldwork were
between 26 and 50 years old in 2017 and 2018, and the corpora from Thieberger (1995–2018) were
recorded from 1995 to 2018 with most of the data having been recorded in the 90s and early 2000s.
The corpus recordings include large numbers of older speakers who told traditional kastom stories.
Thus, the age difference and the language used in the telling of traditional stories, as opposed to
the storyboards and questionnaires referring to everyday life, might be factors that led to such stark
differences in the usage of the perfect subject proclitics. I also compared this situation to the subject
proclitics in the Nafsan Bible translation of Genesis from the 19th century, translated by Rev. J.Cosh
in 1874 and collected byThieberger (1864), and I found that the perfect proclitics were almost as fre-
quent as the general ones and were largely used in the same environments as the general proclitics.
The diachronic hypothesis would be that the originally more widespread perfect proclitics5 started
to be restricted to the combinations with the perfect marker pe in the synchronic system.
The next question we need to ask is what kind of meaning do the perfect subject proclitics have
in the attested cases listed in Table 5.2. More importantly, the question is whether we can observe
the same functions as with pe. The answer to this is negative. While pe has perfect functions (see
Section 5.2), the perfect proclitics do not, because they appear in contexts in which the perfect pe is
not grammatical. For instance, the perfect proclitics appear in sequences of events as in (2), (8) and
(9), and with past temporal adverbials (10), both of which are infelicitous contexts for the perfect
pe. The perfect cannot occur in sequences because they denote progression of events (each posterior
to each other), and the perfect denotes anteriority (see also Lindstedt, 2000). In the case of past
temporal adverbials, the perfect pe can only co-occur with them if reinterpreted as past perfect (11)
(see Section 5.2.1).
(9) selwan
while
ki=(*pe)ler
3g.pf=(*pf)return
tok
stay
e-tog
loc-foreign.place
mai
come
ki=(*pe)preg
3g.pf=(*pf)make
nsaiseiwen
meeting
p̃ur
big
i=skei
3g=one
go
and
ki=(*pe)til-i-ø
3g.pf=(*pf)say--3g.obj
nag
that
[…]
‘When he came back from abroad he called a big meeting and he told them […]’ (026.012)
(10) [Question: When Columbus ARRIVE at America for the first time?] Answer: He ARRIVE at
America in 1492. Dahl (2000c:PQ 25)
Columbus
Columbus
ki=(*pe)taasak
3g.pf=(*pf)come.ashore
America
America
ntau
year
ni
of
1492.
1492
‘He arrived in America in 1492.’ (AK1-120-01)
might have slightly increased the number of subject proclitics occurring alone in the corpus. With verbs of saying it is
common to use the expression kin na, following the verb. For instance, in my data I gloss nrik-i-n kin na as ‘say--
3g.obj  ’, while in the corpus some cases were glossed like this and others as nrik-i-n ki=na ‘say--3g.obj
3.=say’, analyzing ki as 3g.pf and na as the verb ‘to say’. Regardless of which approach is in fact correct, ki(n)na
is a conventionalized construction that appears only with verbs of saying and cannot be regarded as a case of productive
use of the subject pronoun. Apart from this issue of glossing, even the productive use of 3g.pf= in the corpus is the
highest with verbs of speaking, which might be some kind of idiomatic retention.
5The semantics of these “widespread perfect proclitics” in Bible translations must have been much more underspecified
than referring to perfect aspect. It is unclear at this point what TMA values, if any, were expressed by perfect proclitics.
84 CHAPTER 5. PERFECT IN NAFSAN
(11) [A says: I think Columbus came to America in the 1700s.] B says: No, Columbus had already
come in 1492.
Columbus
Columbus
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
pan
go
taasak-wes
come.ashore-3g.obl
1492.
1492
‘Columbus had arrived in America in 1492.’ (AK1-120-01)
This comparison of the functions of pe and the “perfect” proclitics in the attested occurrences is
sufficient to show that these proclitics do not denote perfect aspect. Since they have very restricted
usage in Nafsan nowadays, we also cannot ascertain with confidence if any another grammatical
functions might have been associated with these proclitics in the past. The analysis of the perfect
proclitics in the corpus data also does not show any characteristics of known TMA categories. The
only conclusion that can be taken from the corpus data is that the perfect proclitics occur more
frequently with certain lexemes, such as verbs that mean ‘to say’. However, these preferences do
not seem to indicate a choice based on TMA values. For these reasons, the best synchronic label
for the perfect proclitics is “perfect-agreeing” proclitics, which means that they are simply subject
markers which agree with pe only in form. This analysis captures their tendency to co-occur with
the perfect pe (see Table 5.2), but it does not say anything about their semantic contribution.6 We
can conclude that the SP_Hypothesis 1 was neither confirmed nor disproved, as the newly collected
Nafsan data could not provide insights into the meaning of the perfect-agreeing proclitics, but it did
confirm a higher degree of co-occurrence of the perfect-agreeing proclitics with pe, in comparison
to the general proclitics and pe. Thus, from now on, when talking about the Nafsan perfect, I refer
exclusively to the marker pe.
5.1.2 Challenges for the description of pe
In this section I discuss the challenges for the perfect analysis of pe found in the previous work
on perfect in Nafsan (Thieberger, 2006), as well as the data from the Dahl questionnaire elicited by
Thieberger (2006) and the corpus of Nafsan (Thieberger, 1995–2018). There are many instances of
uses of the Nafsan perfect that do not correspond to the definition of perfect aspect. Some of these
instances are analyzed here and alternative analyses are suggested in the form of hypotheses. Some
of these hypotheses are then tested and disproved, and others are analyzed in Section 5.2.
As the initial hypothesis I takeThieberger’s (2006) labeling of the category in question as perfect.
P_Hypothesis 0. The marker pe has the meaning of perfect, as described in Section 4.1.7
Perfect aspect is defined by a range of functions, such as expressing resultative, experiential, or
anteriority meanings, which can be analyzed as placing the TT in the posttime of the event described
6By saying that the proclitics agree with pe in form, I do not wish to propose any specific analysis of how this agreement
takes place. Possible theoretical accounts could rely on different syntactic frameworks, for instance by using the generative
operation ofAgree (e.g. Zeijlstra, 2012) or even on the construction-based approach fromConstruction Grammar (e.g. Croft,
2001).
7P in “P_Hypothesis” refers to “perfect”.
5.1. SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PERFECT IN NAFSAN 85
by the verb (Klein, 1994). Thus, if pe in Nafsan is a true perfect it should have most, if not all, of the
following functions: resultative, experiential, universal, ‘hot news’, and anteriority referring to past
and future perfect readings (see Section 4.1).
When it comes to the resultative meaning, Thieberger (2006) describes the perfect in Nafsan as
denoting resultative meanings with dynamic verbs (12) and states (13). However, the resultative
meaning with states, as in (13), receives an interpretation of change of state which is not something
that would be expected from an English-style perfect.
(12) Nlaken
because
nasum̃
house
rui=pe
3pl.pf=pf
maui
all
saprek.
discard
‘Because the houses, they have broken all of them.’ (Thieberger, 2006:168)
(13) Me
but
famle
family:bi
neu
1g.po
rui=pe
3pl.pf=pf
tar
white
taos
like
ag.
2g
Ga
3g
i=mer
3g=in.turn
ta
neg1
slat
take
nask-o-k
skin-1g.dp
mau,
neg2
rui=pe
3pl.pf=pf
tar∼tar.
white∼white
‘But my family became white like you. It [the family] didn’t get my skin, they are really
white.’ (Thieberger, 2006:168)
If we hypothesize that the meaning of change of state is the defining core meaning of pe, we can
posit the first hypothesis:
P_Hypothesis 1. The perfect pe can be reanalyzed as a change-of-state marker.
Although change of state can be analyzed as a property of lexical aspect, in some languages
this meaning has been analyzed as the main function of certain grammatical markers, such as le in
Mandarin Chinese (Soh, 2009) or bwet in Daakaka (Central Vanuatu) (von Prince, 2015). This analysis
would also be similar to what Matthewson et al. (2015) call an inchoative marker in Niuean (Central
Pacific linkage). Another possible analysis of resultative and change-of-state meanings, as in (12)
and (13), is to reanalyze the perfect pe as a iamitive marker.
P_Hypothesis 2. The perfect pe can be reanalyzed as a iamitive marker.
As shown in Section 4.2.2, Olsson (2013) proposes that iamitives are a new typological category
that encompasses the resultative perfect meanings and the meanings of ‘already’. For instance, the
above mentioned Mandarin le has also been analyzed as iamitive by Olsson (2013). Thus, the change-
of-state meaning would be the main indicator of this category in Nafsan. Another problem that could
be solved by adopting either the P_Hypothesis 1 or 2 is the occurrence of perfect in sequences, as
illustrated with the corpus example (14). The perfect is not expected to appear in sequences of events,
because it would give rise to an interpretation of anteriority in relation to the previously mentioned
event (Lindstedt, 2000). On the other hand, if the function of pe is analyzed as marking changes of
state, then this interpretation would be compatible with sequences of events.
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(14) I=taulu
3g.eal=marry
iak
mother
neu
1g.po
go
and
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
to
stay
san
there
to.
at
‘He married my mother and he stayed here.’ (061.016)
For his work on the Nafsan grammar, Thieberger (2006) also conducted the Dahl (1985) ques-
tionnaire on TMA categories. There are several examples which show that perfect can have readings
of anteriority, as in (15) with a future reference. This reading of anteriority of the Nafsan perfect
behaves just like the past and future perfect in English. There are also examples from the Dahl (1985)
questionnaire where the temporal reference is clearly indicated by temporal adverbials as in (16),
which is possible in English only with the past and future perfect, and not with the present perfect.
(15) [Talking to someone who is leaving in a while] When you RETURN, I WRITE this letter (=I
FINISH it already at that time) (Dahl, 1985:TMAQ 107)
malnen
as
p̃a=ler
2g.i=return
mai
come
me
and
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
mtir
write
leta
letter
su
pf
‘When you return I will have written this letter.’ (Thieberger, 2012:392)
(16) My brother SAY (yesterday) that the water BE COLD (the day before yesterday, but I think he
was wrong) (Dahl, 1985:TMAQ113)
p̃al-u-k
brother1g.dp
i=tl-i-ø
3g=say3g.obj
nanom
yesterday
na
comp
nai
water
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
mlanr
cold
nas
day.before.yesterday
‘My brother said yesterday that the water was cold the day before yesterday.’ (Thieberger,
2006)
Since the present perfect should not be able to combine with past temporal adverbials, the fact that
the Nafsan perfect does combine with them, as in (16), suggests that the basic meaning of the Nafsan
perfect could be the meaning of anteriority, which is in some accounts analyzed as relative tense
(Bohnemeyer, 2014). Taking this in consideration, I formulate P_Hypothesis 3.
P_Hypothesis 3. The perfect pe can be reanalyzed as a marker of anteriority.
There are also several examples from Dahl’s (1985) questionnaire which target the meaning of
‘already’, implying that the event happened earlier than expected (see Section 4.2.1). In many elicited
sentences with this meaning, as in (17), pe is used in Nafsan. Thus, we can posit P_Hypothesis 4,
which says that pe could have a meaning equivalent to ‘already’.
(17) [The speaker has just seen the king arrive (earlier than was expected):] The king ARRIVE
already (Dahl, 1985:TMAQ 153)
naot
chief
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
mai
come
su
pf
‘The king has already arrived.’ (Thieberger, 2006)
5.1. SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PERFECT IN NAFSAN 87
P_Hypothesis 4. The perfect pe can be reanalyzed as ‘already’.
In order to test these hypotheses, we need to go back to more fine-grained functions and effects
that can be associated with each hypothesized category. In our P_Hypotheses 0 to 4, there are some
complex categories which refer to a cluster of functions and some simpler categories which corre-
spond to smaller units of meaning. The complex categories are the perfect, iamitives, and ‘already’
and the two simple categories are the change of state and anteriority. (18)-(20) list the main functions
and semantic/pragmatic effects found in the perfect, iamitives, and ‘already’ (see Section 4.2). These
functions are represented in Table 5.3 together with their occurrences in different empirical methods
used in this work. Note that “Temp. adv.” refers to the co-occurrence of temporal adverbs with the
perfect.
(18) Perfect: resultative (Result.), anteriority (Ant.), experiential (Exper.), universal (Univer.), re-
strictions on past temporal adverbs with present perfect (Temp. adv.)
(19) Iamitive: expectedness (Expected), duality (Dual.), change of state (CoS), resultative (Result.),
compatible with temporal adverbs (Temp. adv.)
(20) ‘Already’: expectedness (Expected), duality (Dual.), change of state (CoS), compatible with
temporal adverbs (Temp. adv.)
Table 5.3: Occurrence of different functions of pe in 3 empirical methods (+ attested, ? unclear, - not
attested, -/+ restricted to certain environments, perfect=light gray, iamitive/perfect=middle gray,
iamitive/‘already’=dark gray)
Method Univer. Exper. Ant. Result. Temp. adv. CoS Dual. Expected
Corpus ? ? + + + + ? ?
Storyboards + + + + -/+ -/+ -/+ -/+
Questionnaires + + + + -/+ -/+ -/+ -/+
Judging from the distribution of the attested functions in Table 5.3, the analyses according to
which the basic function of pe would be only anteriority (P_Hypothesis 3) or only change of state
(P_Hypothesis 1) do not seem to hold. While in the corpus data there was still a lot of uncertainty
about possible readings of pe, marked with “?” in Table 5.3, the storyboard and questionnaire data
either confirmed the existence of these functions of perfect/iamitive/‘already’, or they explained
semantic/pragmatic restrictions on their occurrence. Thus, the marker pe can express quite a number
of different functions, such as experiential and universal, which are not reducible to the meaning of
either anteriority or change of state.
Thus, the hypotheses that are left to be discussed are the hypotheses about pe being the perfect
(P_Hypothesis 0), iamitive (P_Hypothesis 2), and ‘already’ (P_Hypothesis 4). In Section 5.2.1 I argue
for the analysis of pe as perfect aspect and I address the other two hypotheses, by discussing the
results presented in Table 5.3 in more detail.
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5.2 e semantics of perfect in Nafsan
This section studies the semantics of the marker pe as a marker of perfect aspect. Each subsection
describes one or several major functions of the Nafsan perfect aspect, and directly compares them
either to the theory of the English perfect or to the proposals for the iamitive and ‘already’ categories.
A shorter and a predated version of this section was published in Krajinović (2019).
5.2.1 Past, present, and future perfect meanings
In this section I analyze the functions of the perfect in Nafsan which are equivalent to the functions
of past, present, and future perfect in English. These functions are resultative, experiential, and
universal perfect, as well as the presence of adverbial restrictions and anteriority readings.
The resultative function of the perfect was tested with the storyboard “Making laplap” (Kraji-
nović, 2018c). This story is about two friends who are preparing laplap, Vanuatu’s national dish.
One of the steps of the cooking process shown in the storyboard is the grating of the taro. One of
the friends finishes grating the taro and produces the sentence in (21). For this targeted sentence 6
out of 6 consulted speakers produced the perfect pe with the verb.
(21) Kineu
1g
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
maa
grate
ntal
taro
su.
pf
‘I have grated the taro.’ (AK1-146-02, 00:02:32.335-00:02:41.410)
As we can see, the process leading up to the completion of grating the taro in the story ensures that
a resultative reading is unambiguously intended. Interestingly, when there is no indication of a clear
preceding cause of the event, the perfect marking is optional. We can confirm this with an example
from the storyboard “Miss Smith’s bad day” (Matthewson, 2014). In this storyboard, Miss Smith tries
to teach her class but gets continuously interrupted by her students. At one point, one student tells
her that Bob has fallen asleep, as in (22). In this context, there is no clear cause or a process leading
up to Bob falling asleep. This means that the speaker can choose whether they want to express that
“Bob falling asleep” is a resultative state or not. This is confirmed in the Nafsan data, where only 1
out of 5 speakers used the perfect in this context and others resorted to the general marking on the
verb (23). Since matur in Nafsan means ‘to sleep/to be asleep’, example (22) can be interpreted as
involving a change of state. In Section 5.2.2 I analyze the relationship between the resultative perfect
and the meaning of change of state.
(22) Bob
Bob
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
matur.
sleep
‘Bob has fallen asleep.’ (AK1-146-04, 00:03:25.753-00:03:30.766)
(23) Miss
Miss
Smith,
Smith
Bob
Bob
i=matur.
3g=sleep
‘Miss Smith, Bob is asleep.’ (AK1-147-04, 00:02:17.878-00:02:20.450)
Another property of the Nafsan perfect is that it requires an interpretation of completion with dy-
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namic predicates, just as demonstrated with the English example Harry has hummed by Moens &
Steedman (1988:18), mentioned in Section 4.3. For instance, the semelfactive ‘to knock’ which is
typically interpreted as iterative due to its instantaneous nature (Smith, 1997), is in fact interpreted
as a single knock with the perfect marking alone, as in (24).
(24) Ki=pe
1g.pf=pf
tum̃otum̃
knock
su.
pf
‘He has knocked (once).’ (Lionel Emil, 08/02/2019)
The second function discussed here is the experiential function of the perfect. In the storyboard
“Miss Smith’s bad day” this meaning is targeted by Miss Smith asking a question in (25) and a stu-
dent’s answer in (26). Perfect was used in both sentences by 5 out of 5 speakers. The analysis that
experiential meanings are a function of perfect is supported by the fact that speakers judge sentences
without perfect unacceptable when the experiential reading is intended (cf. recording AK1-123-01).
(25) Fei
who
kin
comp
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
pag-ki
climb-
ntaa?
mountain
‘Who has ever climbed a mountain?’ (AK1-147-04, 00:00:48.786-00:00:50.800)
(26) Kineu
1g
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
pag-ki
climb-
ntaf
mountain
i=skei
3g=one
su.
pf
‘I have climbed a mountain.’ (AK1-147-04, 00:00:57.590-00:01:01.796)
Experiential readings are also possible with stative verbs. In (27) the state of being red8 receives an
experiential reading.
(27) Nasum̃
house
neu
1g.po
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
pei
first
miel,
red
me
but
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
tap
neg1
miel
red
malfanen
now
mau.
neg2
‘My house has been red before, but it’s not red anymore.’ (Lionel Emil, 04/02/2018, based on
Koontz-Garboden 2007:142)
Universal readings of perfect in Nafsan were targeted in the storyboard “Haircuts” (Krajinović,
2018b). In this storyboard two friends who have not seen each other in a long time meet and com-
ment on their haircuts. After his friend points out how his hair has grown, the character produces
the sentence in (28). In this context, all the speakers that produced the targeted ‘since’ structure used
the perfect.9 The postverbal usage of a temporal adverb meaning ‘before’ followed bymai ‘come’, an-
alyzed as directional particle by Thieberger (2006:240), seems to be related to the universal meaning
of perfect, as in (28) and (29) fromThieberger’s (1995–2018) corpus.
8In Nafsan all property concepts are verbs.
93 out of 5 speakers produced the targeted ‘since’ structure.
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(28) nal-u-k
hair-1g.dp
ga
that
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
pei
first
top
big
malpei
before
mai
come
malen
when
kin
comp
a=to
1g=pog
lag
sing
em̃rom
inside
ni
of
band
band
i=skei
3g=one
‘My hair has been long since I started singing in a band.’ (AK1-152-03, 00:03:00.705-00:03:14.338,
based on Koontz-Garboden 2007:142)
(29) ku=tae
2g=can
weswes
work
ofis,
office:bi
me
but
kui=pe
2g.pf=pf
to
pog
miusik
(play)music:bi
teetwei
before
mai,
come
me
but
malfane
now
p̃a=traem.
2g.i=try
‘you know how to work in an office, you’ve played music for a long time, but try working in
an office.’ (063.211, 063.212)
The universal reading with future reference has also been attested in the Perfect Questionnaire
(Dahl, 2000c), as in (30). In this example pe is followed by the progressive marker to(k) in order to
denote the progressive reading of the verb weswes ‘work’, which is an activity.
(30) [A began working here in June for almost thirty years ago. It is April and A tells that the an-
niversary is approaching:] A: In June this year I WORK here for thirty years. (Dahl, 2000c:PQ
85)
atlag
month
ni
of
june
June:bi
ntau
year
nen
this
ke=fo
3g=pp.i
paap̃not
finish
ntau
year
ralim
ten
i=tool
3g=three
nen
el
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
tok
pog
weswes
work
esan.
here
‘In June this year it will be thirty years that I have been working here.’ (AK1-132-01)
I turn to the expression of anteriority in Nafsan, which is equivalent to the meaning of past and
future perfect in English. In Nafsan, the same form of perfect can express anteriority in past and
future contexts. One such future context is presented in (31).
(31) Context: [B is setting out on a journey. A intends to sell her own house while B is away. A
tells B:] (Dahl, 2000c:PQ 84)
malraan
when
p̃a=ler
2g.i=return
mai
come
ntau
year
nen
that
tu
next
me
and
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
sor
sell
nasum̃
house
neu
1g.po
kia.
dem
‘When you come back next year, I will have sold my house.’ (AK1-132-01)
The interesting property of anteriority readings is that, unlike other readings mentioned so far, they
allow co-occurrences with past temporal adverbials. This can be illustrated by the contrast between
(32) and (33). However, note that the Nafsan perfect behaves just like the English present perfect in
allowing co-occurrences with some present temporal adverbials, like ‘today’ (34), see also Section
4.1.
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Figure 5.1: Representation of example (33)
(32) Context: A question asked at 9 o’clock a.m.: Why do you look so tired? Answer: I WAKE UP
at 4 o’clock this morning (TT). (Dahl, 2000c:PQ 2, TMAQ 16)10
(*kai=pe)
*1g.pf=pf
a=pilo
1g=wake.up
4
4
oklok
o’clock
p̃ulp̃og.
morning
‘I woke up at 4 o’clock this morning.’ (AK1-119-01)
(33) Context: If your alarm is set for 5 a.m. (TT), but by chance you woke up at 4 a.m. (TSit).
Kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
pilo
wake.up
4
4
oklok
o’clock
p̃ulp̃og.
morning
‘I had woken up at 4 o’clock in the morning.’ (AK1-119-01)
(34) o
oh
me
but
mees
today
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
mai
come
paakor
appear
esa
here
‘Oh, but today I have come out here’ […] (107.012)
Example (32) shows that the past temporal adverbial of 4 a.m., which sets the TT, is incompatible
with the perfect. This is equal to the English present perfect which is incompatible with past temporal
adverbs. However, (33) shows that 4 a.m. can be reinterpreted as being in TSit, if there is an indicated
TT which is temporally posterior to it (5 a.m. in this case). This is illustrated in Figure 5.1, which
shows that the perfect places the TT in the posttime of the TSit (Klein, 1994), see Section 4.1.
This pattern is confirmed by numerous other examples. For instance, example (35) with the past
temporal adverbial nanom ‘yesterday’ is judged infelicitous with the perfect in the given present
context, but in (36) from “Miss Smith’s bad day” storyboard, on the other hand, the co-occurrence
of the perfect and nanom is possible because we get an interpretation of past perfect. Since there is
a salient TT referring to ‘just now’, the function of the perfect here is to contrast that TT with the
time at which the event actually happened, which is yesterday. I model the meaning of (36) in Figure
5.2: ‘just now’ is the TT situated in the posttime of the TSit, and ‘yesterday’ is situated in TSit. The
only difference between (33) and (36) is that ‘just now’ indicates that TT immediately precedes the
utterance time.
10Some questions are published in both the Perfect Questionnaire (Dahl, 2000c) and the general TMA questionnaire
(Dahl, 1985), indicated by TMAQ.
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Figure 5.2: Representation of example (36)
(35) [It is morning. A wakes up, looks out of the window and sees that the courtyard (or the street)
is wet.] A: It RAIN during the night. (Dahl, 2000c:PQ 14)
Uus
rain
(*ki=pe)
(*3g.pf=pf)
i=wo
3g-rain
nanom
yesterday
p̃og.
night
‘It rained yesterday night.’ (AK1-119-01)
(36) [Student A: “The rat the class takes care of has just died.”] Student B: “He is lying, he died
yesterday.” (Perfect used by 5 out of 5 speakers) (Matthewson, 2014)
i=to
3g=pog
psir,
lie
ga
3g
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
mat
die
nanom
yesterday
su.
pf
‘He is lying, he had died yesterday.’ (AK1-146-04, 00:04:03.626-00:04:10.640)
One surprising fact about Nafsan is that the anteriority meaning can be established even when
the TT includes the utterance time, as in (37) where both the TT and the TSit contain temporal
adverbialsmees ‘today’ and nanom ‘yesterday’, respectively. However, this structure is only possible
when the sentence is saliently conveying the temporal contrast between the TSit and TT, and it
would not be possible in an out-of-the-blue context without such a contrast, as in (35). Thus, the
meaning of perfect in (37) is once again the one of anteriority, equivalent to the English past perfect
and not present perfect. This is confirmed by the fact that the speaker’s answer to the same stimuli
as in (37), when leaving out the complement clause that created the anteriority relation between the
two clauses, included the general subject marking and not the perfect (38).
(37) [My brother SAY yesterday that it RAIN today.] (Dahl, 2000b:FQ 73)
P̃al-u-k
brother--1g.dp
i=pe
3g=pf
til-i-ø
say--3g.obj
nanom
yesterday
na
comp
us
rain
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
wo
rain
mees.
today
‘My brother had said yesterday that it would rain today.’ (AK1-105-01)
(38) Tai
brother
i=to
3g=pog
tl-i-ø
say--3g.obj
kia.
that
‘My brother was saying that.’ (‘yesterday’) (AK1-105-01)
The analysis of examples like (33), (36), and (37) has very important consequences for our under-
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standing of the temporal adverb restrictionwith perfect in tenseless11 languages, as well as languages
in which perfect does not combine with tense. First and foremost, Matthewson (2014) designed the
context in (36) in order to test the co-occurrence of temporal adverbials with perfect. AsMatthewson
et al. (2017) say, if the perfect can occur in that context then it does not satisfy the “past adverbial
restrictions” and fails one of the tests for being identified as perfect aspect. Another problematic
assumption about tenseless languages comes from Vander Klok & Matthewson (2015) who assume
that when the present tense is not realized in a given language, it is expected that there is no re-
striction on past temporal adverbials. However, we have seen that in the case of Nafsan, where the
perfect does not combine with any tenses, the co-occurrence with past adverbials is infelicitous in
an out-of-the-blue context in which the TT includes the UT (present reference), which would be the
default interpretation of perfect. That is why (32) and (35) are infelicitous with perfect: the perfect
is understood as having the meaning of present perfect simply because there is no indication in the
context that any kind of anteriority relation can be established. In the literature on tenseless lan-
guages it has been frequently noted that the perfect can combine with past temporal adverbs only
in the meaning of past perfect (e.g. Tallman & Stout, 2016), but this discovery has not been clearly
expressed as something that has to do with the lack of tense in a given language. Instead, it is often
seen as something that needs to be explained away and is potentially hindering analyses of certain
morphemes as markers of perfect in underdescribed languages.
As a tenseless language, Nafsan has shown that perfect can have either past, present or future
readings, which has important implications on adverbial restrictions with perfect. One of the main
tests for the perfect cross-linguistically is to see whether it can co-occur with temporal adverbials,
since that is not expected from the present perfect. However, in a tenseless language or a language
where the perfect cannot combine with tense,12 the perfect can easily be reinterpreted as either past
or future perfect and temporal adverbials as being in TSit. This property needs to be expected from
perfects in tenseless languages and included in the typology of the perfect aspect.
5.2.2 Change-of-state meaning
In this section I analyze the meaning of change of state that arises with the Nafsan perfect and I show
how it relates to the definition of perfect as situating the TT in the posttime of TSit. I also compare
this meaning of change of state13 to the iamitive category.
Olsson (2013) observed that in some languages the resultative perfect behaves differently from
the English perfect when it comes to states. He illustrates this difference by comparing examples
11I take the term “tenseless” to mean “lacking tense categories”. In Chapter 8 I show how Nafsan gets different temporal
interpretations through realis/irrealis mood.
12As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, it is not only the lack of tense in general that interferes with the co-occurrence
of temporal adverbials with the perfect. The lack of tense distinctions of past and present, as, for instance, in the case of
future/non-future tense combined with perfect could yield the same effects with temporal adverbs occurring with the
non-future perfect, as found with the tenseless perfect in Nafsan.
13I follow Koontz-Garboden’s (2007) usage of the term “change of state” to refer to an interpretation that involves
a moment of change of state, and not strictly to refer to that moment alone. Some authors refer to this meaning as
“inchoative” (Choi, 2015; Matthewson et al., 2015; Hohaus, 2017).
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(39) and (40), where (39) includes the English perfect and (40) illustrates the meaning of “iamitives”
(see also Section 4.2.2).
(39) The fruit has been ripe.
(40) The fruit is/has become ripe.
Unlike the English perfect which gets only experiential or universal readings with states (39), iami-
tives necessarily express a change of state with stative verbs, in which they resemble the meanings
of the aspectual particle ‘already’. Essentially, the meaning of change of state is only possible with
states which have an initial boundary like ‘ripe’, but not with properties like ‘raw’ (Olsson, 2013).
This prediction is borne out in Nafsan, where perfect can be used with the property of ‘ripe’ (41), but
not ‘raw’ (42).
(41) (Imagine some fruit that is common in your area) You can eat this one. It BE RIPE. (Olsson,
2013:47, IQ 7)
ku=tae
2g=can
paam
eat
tene,
that
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
mam.
ripe
‘You can eat that, it’s ripe.’ (AK1-156-01)
(42) (Imagine some fruit that is common in your area) You can’t eat this one. It BE RAW. (Olsson,
2013:47, IQ 6)
ku=kano
2g=cannot
paam
eat
tene,
this
(*ki=pe)
3g.pf=pf
i=ta
3g=still
met.
raw
‘You can’t eat this, it’s still raw.’ (AK1-156-01)
This meaning of change of state can also arise with the Nafsan perfect whenever the verb is marked
with the progressive marker, as in (43).
(43) Me
but
Meri
Mary
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
to
pog
mur
laugh
seseerik.
little
‘But Mary started laughing a bit.’ (AK-017, 00:22:23.126-00:22:25.838)
This property of combining the perfect/iamitive with the progressive marker has not been dis-
cussed for the languages which Olsson (2013) analyzes as having iamitives. Moreover, it has been
noted by Ebert (2001) and Olsson (2013) that the nei/iamitives result in double readings with ac-
tivities: they can be interpreted both as having been completed or holding at the utterance time (see
Section 4.2). However, this is not possible in Nafsan because activities can only have the change-of-
state interpretation if they occur with the progressive marker and the perfect, as in (44). This means
that the coercion of activities into completed events by the perfect (Moens & Steedman, 1988), as ex-
emplified by (24) in Section 5.2.1, can be blocked by the use of the progressive marker.14 As expected,
activities marked by the perfect aspect without the progressive marker are interpreted as completed,
14As mentioned in Section 4.2.2, “iamitive” languages typically also require a progressive marker in combination with
the iamitive with verbs denoting activities in order to express the change-of-state meaning (Olsson, 2013:21). This property
seems to exist due to the underspecification of lexical aspect.
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as shown by the dialog in (45). The completion can also be specified by using the postverbal perfec-
tive marker su, as in (46).
(44) [Context: You are feeding a child and she doesn’t want to eat the food you prepared for her.
You stand up from the table and tell your sister ‘Oh, she doesn’t want to eat!’, but then your
sister says: ‘Look, she is eating now/she started eating!’]
P̃a=lek-a-ø,
2g.i=look--3g.obj
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
to
pog
faam.
eat.i
‘Look, she is eating now.’ (Lionel Emil, 23/11/2018)
(45) Author: So, ki=pe to faam sounds better than just ki=pe faam [in (44)]?
Speaker: Yes, if she is eating now, then you say ki=pe to faam. But if she ate already a while
ago then you say ki=pe faam.
(46) [Context: while taking plates from the dinner table]
ku=pe
2g=pf
faam
eat.i
su?
pf
‘Have you finished eating?’ (AK1-023-01)
Interestingly, if the perfect combines with the verb to ‘stay’ as the main verb and is followed by an
irrealis complement clause, we obtain the meaning of immediate future, as in (47) (see also Section
5.1.1). This meaning seems to arise due to the presence of the irrealis subject marking which is
typically interpreted as immediate future when there are no other TMAmarkers present (see Section
8.3.2). The verb ‘stay’ marked by perfect denotes a change of state that leads to the described irrealis
event interpreted as immediate future.
(47) (At a birthday party for a child) Little brother BE ABOUT TO ARRIVE! (So hide the gifts he
is to get and be ready to scream “surprise!”) (Olsson, 2013:IQ 28)
Tai
brother
sees
small
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
to
stay
na
comp
ke=mai
3g.i=come
ki.
dem
‘Little brother is about to arrive!’ (AK1-156)
In the storyboard “Haircuts”, the meaning of change of state was elicited through the following
context. Mary and her friend Kal are talking about how they changed their haircuts since they last
met. So, Mary says that her hair used to be red, but it is blond now. This meaning of change of state
was derived by the perfect pe, as shown in (48). This shows that the perfect gives rise to a change-
of-state interpretation with states and contrasts with states marked only with the general marking,
as shown in the corpus example (49), which refers to the permanent property of a stone.
(48) Malfane
now
nal-u-k
hair--1g.dp
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
taar.
white
‘My hair is blond now.’ (AK1-146-03, 00:03:31.991-00:03:33.853)
(49) ku=lek
2g=look
faat
stone
ne.
this
faat
stone
nen
that
i=top
3g=big
‘You look at that stone. That stone is big.’ (015.033)
96 CHAPTER 5. PERFECT IN NAFSAN
The question here is how to analyze the meaning of change of state in Nafsan. As discussed in
Section 4.3, there have been various approaches to solving this problem in other languages and
they can be divided into two main streams: the change-of-state meaning is a part of the modified
perfect semantics, and the change-of-state meaning is not a part of the perfect semantics. The former
approach includes reanalyzing the perfect either as an inchoative marker (Matthewson et al., 2015;
Hohaus, 2017), as ‘already’ (Vander Klok & Matthewson, 2015), or a iamitive (Olsson, 2013), and the
latter proposes that this meaning is somehow related to the properties of the lexical aspect. In Section
5.2.1 I showed that Nafsan has almost all functions associated with the perfect aspect, and especially
so with the well-described English perfect. Thus, the cluster of these perfect functions in Nafsan
is best explained without reanalyzing the Nafsan perfect. The iamitive and the inchoative analysis
would not be able to account neither for the experiential, universal, and anteriority readings of pe,
nor for the restrictions on past temporal adverbials.
There are three different approaches within analyses relating the change-of-state meaning to the
lexical aspect:
• Some verbs are lexically defined as states and others as “inchoative states”, which means that
the latter lexically encode the change-of-state meaning (for Korean [kor] see Choi 2015, for
Skw̲x̲wú7mesh [squ] see Bar-el 2005, and for Sənčáθən [str] see Kiyota 2008).
• All ‘stative’ verbs are underspecified lexically: there is no lexical difference between the stative
and the change-of-state meanings, e.g. ‘big’ means both ‘big’ and ‘become big’.
• The states are lexically only stative and are differentiated from dynamic verbs: their change-
of-state meaning is a result of coercion into dynamic verbs under the resultative reading of
perfect (for Tongan, Koontz-Garboden, 2007).
I adopt Koontz-Garboden’s (2007) analysis of coercion because, as will become clear through
my argumentation, the other two approaches cannot capture the fact that the main difference in
the interpretation of states in Nafsan is between the presence and absence of perfect. Thus, if we
compare (50) and (51), we see that the same stative verb top ‘big’ is interpreted either in its default
stative reading with the general subject marking (50) or with the interpretation of change of state
with the perfect marking (51). Equally, the verb pi ‘be’ is interpreted as a state with the general
subject proclitic in (52) and as involving a change of state or ‘become’ in (53).
(50) go
and
faat
rock
p̃ur
big
i=nrik-i-n
3g=tell--3g.obj
kin
comp
na
comp
ag
2g
ku=sees
2g=small
me
but
kineu
1g
a=top
1g=big
‘And the big rock said: “You are small, but I am big.”’ (046.012)
(51) [Context: There used to be some devils in the village a long time ago.]
i=welkia
3g=thus
naor
place
ki=pe,
3g.pf=pf
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
top
big
me
and
ru=lakor
3pl=may
to
stay
me
but
ru=kus
3pl=hide
‘Well, the place [village] got bigger and bigger and they may still be there, but they are hiding.’
(073.052)
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(52) [Context: describing American people in the World War II]
ru=pi
3pl=be
nam̃er
people
wi
good
nafisoklepwen
richness
gar
3pl.po
i=top
3g=big
‘They were good men. They were very rich.’ (041.007)
(53) [Context: young people of today follow unhealthy new fashion]
welkia
like.that
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
pi
be
nam̃olien
life
ni
of
mes
today
ne
de
‘This is what the life of today has become.’ (127.044)
These examples make it appear implausible that there are states in Nafsan which could be lexically
defined as “inchoative states” – depending on the verb marking, any states can receive a change-
of-state interpretation. The underspecification approach also cannot account convincingly for these
data, because the stative meaning obtained with the general proclitic is the default meaning obtained
in neutral, out-of-the-blue contexts, and it does not require special constructions or morphology.
Crucially, in examples like (50) and (52), the change of state interpretation would simply not be
possible with the general subject proclitics. I show how the coercion analysis captures the fact that
stative verbs with the general subject proclitics express their primary meaning which is stative, and
how a secondary meaning of change of state can be derived through aspectual coercion.
I maintain the analysis of perfect as placing the TT in the posttime of TSit and I adopt the analysis
of aspectual coercion proposed by Koontz-Garboden (2007) for Tongan. In Nafsan, like in Tongan,
there is no derivational change-of-state morphology, which leads to the possibility of the same form
of the verb having both stative and change-of-state interpretations. One of the crucial arguments
in Koontz-Garboden’s (2007) analysis is accounting for different types of constructions that make
reference to the time interval at which the change from a previous state to a new state takes place.
Koontz-Garboden (2007:140) analyzes the rate adverbs in the following way: “What quickly and
slowly do as rate adverbials is to say something about the relationship between change and time, in
particular about the amount of time over which the change took place.” Thus, since the rate adverbs
refer to the time interval involving change they are incompatible with states in English, as in (54).
(54) #Kim knew Sandy quickly. (unless CoS ‘come to know’) (Koontz-Garboden, 2007:139)
In languages like Tongan or Nafsan, the rate adverbs can occur with stative verbs because they get
coerced into a dynamic event of change-of-state. Although in neutral contexts like (50) and (52) only
a stative meaning is possible in Nafsan, in special constructions which involve rate adverbs referring
to the interval of change in time, the stative semantics of the verb is in conflict with the reference
to the interval of a dynamic change into a new state. In Nafsan, just like in Tongan, these stative
verbs can then be coerced into the meaning of change of state (Koontz-Garboden, 2007). In Nafsan,
in (55) we see that the statemaet ‘angry’ can be interpreted as ‘become angry’ even with the general
proclitic because of the presence of the rate adverbial pelpel ‘quickly’.
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(55) Question: In the context of a teacher who gets angry in the classroom because all the kids are
misbehaving, how would you say ‘the teacher got angry quickly’?
Teplaksok
teacher
i=maet
3g=angry
pelpel.
quickly
‘The teacher got angry quickly.’ (Lionel Emil, 28/11/2018)
Naturally, the same change-of-state meaning as in (55) can be expressed by using the perfect, as
shown in (56) which was elicited for the same context.
(56) teplaksok
teacher
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
maet.
angry
‘The teacher got angry.’ (Lionel Emil, 28/11/2018)
The process of aspectual coercion parallel to that of rate adverbs is exactly what happens with read-
ings of perfect that require a dynamic event – in Nafsan, the change-of-state interpretations with
perfect arise only with the resultative perfect, which requires a dynamic event. Experiential and
universal functions of perfect are compatible with states without triggering a change-of-state mean-
ing, see examples (27) and (28) in Section 5.2.1.15 A definition of the resultative perfect by Koontz-
Garboden (2007:124) is given in (57).
(57) “A perfect in the resultative reading denotes a state φ which is true at an interval R iff there
is an interval E, the final moment in E is the initial moment in R, and φ is false at the initial
bound of E and true at the interval R.” (Koontz-Garboden, 2007:124)
When the resultative perfect semantics combines with states, it gives rise to an inference that the
state denoted by it was preceded by a change into it, which is in conflict with the stative semantics,
and this leads to the coercion of states into changes of state (Koontz-Garboden, 2007). Thus, the
interval of change of state is interpreted as TSit and TT is placed in the posttime of this change
of state. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3 for example (56). Regarding the definition in (57), TSit
corresponds to E, TT to R, and the posttime ‘be angry’ to φ.
Crucially, this process of aspectual coercion resulting in the meaning of change of state affects
only states and progressive-marked activities, whereas other dynamic events receive a completive
interpretation with the resultative perfect, as shown in examples (46) in this section and (24) in
Section 5.2.1.
The existence of the meaning of change of state with the Nafsan perfect is directly relevant for
the proposal of the iamitive category as a cross-linguistic category. The iamitive proposal attempts
to capture the connection between the resultative reading of perfect and the meaning of change of
state by analyzing it as a new typological gram, and it separates these meanings from other functions
of the perfect (Olsson, 2013). The case of Nafsan shows that the meaning of change of state and the
15This also shows that an inchoative analysis, where the inchoative/change-of-state meaning is the basic meaning of
this grammatical category, as suggested by Matthewson et al. (2015) for Niuean, could not explain the Nafsan data. The
inchoative analysis implies that the states marked by the inchoative marker can only be interpreted with the inchoative
meaning, and it excludes the possibility of experiential and universal readings of states (Matthewson et al., 2015).
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Figure 5.3: Representation of example (56)
resultative meaning can be functions of the same grammatical morpheme that expresses experiential,
universal, and anteriority meanings. This shows that these meanings are semantically related within
the category of perfect, and that the meaning of change of state is not necessarily symptomatic of a
new TMA category. Moreover, the derivation of the meaning of change of state can be explained via
language-internal processes, such as aspectual coercion. For Oceanic languages, Koontz-Garboden
(2007) observes that there are two typological Oceanic features that might make these languages
susceptible to developing the change-of-state meaning. Firstly, Oceanic languages do not encode
the meanings of change of state derivationally and thus need to employ other processes triggered
in specific contexts, such as aspectual coercion, to disambiguate the change of state readings from
states. Secondly, they typically do not distinguish verbs from adjectives in the predicate position.
This means that property concepts behave like verbs and in a resultative reading of perfect require
a dynamic interpretation of change of state. In conclusion, we should focus on these language and
family-internal processes that lead to the perfect developing the change-of-state meanings instead of
positing that themeaning of change of state is indicative of the new typological category of iamitives.
5.2.3 Expectedness and duality
It has been shown that the meaning of change of state, as described in Section 5.2.2, is related to the
meaning of ‘already’ (Vander Klok & Matthewson, 2015). Olsson (2013) considers the meaning of
‘already’ to be an integral part of the iamitive semantics. Coming back to the example of ‘fruit being
ripe’ (Section 5.2.2), we can see that the change-of-state meaning in Nafsan is semantically closer to
a sentence with ‘already’ in English (58) than it is to the version with the English perfect, which can
only get experiential or universal readings (cf. (39) in Section 5.2.2).
(58) The fruit is already ripe.
This section addresses the relationship between the Nafsan perfect meanings and the meaning of
‘already’. There are two defining semantic properties of ‘already’ I explore here. These are the
implications of deviating from what was expected and effects of duality with negation (see Section
4.2.1). Olsson (2013) also takes “expectedness” that an eventwas going to take place as a characteristic
of iamitives in some languages.
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In Nafsan the implications involving expectedness are not a part of the perfect semantics. Ex-
ample (59) comes from the storyboard “Fat pig” (von Prince, 2018b), where the main character gets a
pig he needs for his big traditional ceremony. He fenced the pig off, but the next day, to his surprise,
the pig was not there. As we can see, perfect is used here to indicate the anteriority of the event of
the pig escaping and the interpretation that the event was expected would not be possible.
(59) Me
but
malnran
when
kin
comp
i=pan
3g=go
check,
check
i=pan
3g=go
lak
see
tp̃er
fence
ni
of
waak
pig
me
but
i=laka
3g=see
na
comp
waak
pig
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
p̃rai
break
tp̃er,
fence
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
sef.
escape
‘But when he went to check, he went to see the fence with the pig and he saw that the pig
had broken the fence, it had escaped.’ (AK1-022-01, 00:03:24.726-00:03:37.121)
The implication about expectedness does not arise in Nafsan even in the case of resultative readings.
Example (60) comes from the Iamitive Questionnaire (Olsson, 2013:48) and targets an unexpected
event. In Nafsan, the perfect can be felicitously used in this case, which shows it does not behave
like ‘already’ in this respect.
(60) How strange, my uncle COME. (He wasn’t invited/I thought he wouldn’t come.) (Olsson,
2013:48, IQ 36)
Kau,
Oh
ga
3g
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
mai!
come
‘Oh, he came!’ (AK1-156-04)
There are some cases in which it might appear that the perfect has implications involving expected-
ness, as in (61). This example targets an event that happened earlier than expected, which would be
expressed by ‘already’ in English.
(61) [The baby wakes up one hour earlier than expected and starts screaming. Mother (in another
room):] Oh, no! He WAKE UP already! (Dahl, 2000c:PQ 31)
ga
3g
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
pilo
wake.up
(su).
(pf)
‘He has woken up already!’ (AK1-120-01)
This earliness/expectedness interpretation in (61) is highly context-dependent and it does not seem
to be a contribution of the perfect meaning. As mentioned above, the typical meanings of perfect do
not involve these types of inferences, which means that the expectedness must be a more general
property derived from the discourse. Also, although some Oceanic languages have markers meaning
‘already’ as well as some kind of perfect aspect, Nafsan does not have a single lexeme dedicated to
the meaning of ‘already’. This means that the meaning of ‘already’ overlaps with the available TMA
markers in Nafsan: sometimes this is the perfect and other times it is another TMA marker. For
instance, the prospectivemarker po seems to be equally well acceptable inmost of the cases involving
some kind of expectedness in the questionnaires. We can see this in (62) where both the perfect pe
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and the prospective po are chosen as appropriate expressions (for more details on the meaning of
the prospective po see Section 5.3.1).
(62) (Talking about a teenager who didn’t come home on time) Max CALL (YET)? (Veselinova,
2018:NQ 51)
Max
Max
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
ring
call
ko?/
or
Max
Max
i=po
3g=pp.eal
ring?
ring
‘Did Max call yet?’ (AK1-156)
We can conclude that the meaning of expectedness can arise independently of the perfect itself.
The best evidence for this is that this meaning arises with other aspectual markers as well. Thus,
the expectedness can only be analyzed as governed by the particular discourse situation and not as
related to the semantics of perfect. Interestingly, even in the case of iamitives, this meaning was
found as relevant only in some languages proposed to have iamitives by Olsson (2013). In Olsson’s
(2013) analysis, it is also not clear whether this property is accidentally related to the iamitives in
question or whether there is a systematic correlation between the expectedness and the proposed
iamitive semantics which is somewhere in between the perfect and ‘already’. Moreover, even in
the case of ‘already’, the meanings related to expectedness are often considered to be implications
derived through the pragmatics and not semantics (Krifka, 2000), as shown in Section 4.2.1. Equally,
even the usage of the perfect in English leads to interpretations of expectedness in questions and
under negation (Traugott & Waterhouse, 1969), as in the question has he finished the paper? or a
negative statement I haven’t done it. Thus, the meaning of expectedness should not be regarded as
encoded in the semantics of these grammatical categories. It is also needed to say that “expectedness”
is a highly ambiguous term (here adopted from Olsson, 2013) and should be avoided as a general
concept, because there are many different ways in which something can be expected (cf. “earlier or
greater than expected” for ‘already’ in Section 4.2.1), and there are possibly many different pragmatic
strategies which can lead to these interpretations.
The second property of ‘already’ considered here is duality, which has to do with the interac-
tion of ‘already’, ‘still’, ‘not yet’, and ‘not anymore’ in negation. As shown in Section 4.2.1, Löbner
(1989) argued that the outer negation of ‘already’ is ‘not yet’, which is truth-conditionally equiv-
alent to the inner negation of ‘still’. Also, the outer negation of ‘still’ is ‘not anymore’, which is
truth-conditionally equivalent to the inner negation of ‘already’ (Löbner, 1989) . The set of these
relationships is illustrated in Figure 5.4, including both Nafsan and English strategies for expressing
these meanings.
As we can see in Figure 5.4, the Nafsan perfect enters the duality schema only with states and
progressives as unbounded predicates, with which the negated perfect obligatorily gives rise to the
meaning of ‘not anymore’, as in (63) from the storyboard “Haircuts”. This meaning is also found in
the corpus data (64).
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Figure 5.4: Duality schema with Nafsan perfect (in black font), based on Löbner (1989)
(63) totur
during
ntau
year
i=nru
3g=two
nal-u-k
hair--1g.dp
ga
3g
i=miel
3g=red
me
but
malfane
now
nal-u-k
hair--1g.dp
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
ta
neg1
miel
red
mau.
neg2
‘During these two years my hair was red, but it’s not red anymore.’ (AK1-154-03, 00:03:36.645-
00:03:52.483)
(64) A=to
1g=pog
lek
see
nawesien
work
me
but
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
kano
cannot
weswes.
work
‘I see work (that needs to be done), but I can’t work anymore.’ (040.044)
In the case of perfect-marked predicates with a perfective/bounded reading, the meaning of ‘not
anymore’ does not arise with negation and we can see this in (65), where the intended meaning
is a simple negation of the described event. This is also possible with states which are temporally
delimited by an adverbial (66). Another case comes from the storyboard “Chore girl” (TFS, 2011a) in
which Mary’s friends invite her to go out several times, but every time they come by she says she
has household chores to do and cannot join them. The last time they come by, she says she cannot go
out because she broke her leg (67). Since there is no indication that prior to that Mary could in fact
go out, the intended meaning here is not ‘not anymore’. The negated perfect here is better analyzed
as referring to the result of breaking a leg.
(65) Malen
when
p̃a=ler
2g.i=back
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
ta
neg1
mtir
write
natus
letter
mau.
neg2
‘When you come back, I will not have written the letter.’ (by Lionel Emil, 19/06/2018)
(66) [Question: Why do you look so tired?] Answer: I NOT SLEEP for three days. (Dahl, 2000c:PQ
47)
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
ta
neg1
matur
sleep
p̃og
night
i=tool
3g=three
mau
neg2
to
stay
ki.
op
‘I haven’t slept for three days.’ (AK1-124-01)
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Figure 5.5: Representation of the positive perfect with the meaning of change of state
(67) me
but
nlaken
because
a=p̃rai
1g=break
natuo-k
leg-1dp
go
and
malfanen
now
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
kano
cannot
taf.
go.out
‘I broke my leg so I can’t go out.’ (AK1-094-01, 00:03:53.321-00:04:07.180)
However, even with bounded predicates the meaning of ‘not yet’ cannot be expressed with the
negated perfect. As we can see in (68), the perfect can only be chosen for positive resultative read-
ings, but not for the negative ones expressing ‘not yet’. Instead, the only possible structure is the
negation of ta ‘still’ marked with the general subject marking. The reason for this comes from the
fact that the only way to express ‘not yet’ is to negate ta ‘still’. Since ta ‘still’ is a TMA marker
which occupies the same syntactic slot as the perfect pe (see Table 2.14 in Section 2.3.2), they cannot
co-occur. In fact, none of the TMA markers of that slot (e.g. po, fo, f, fla) can combine with each
other. Thus, the perfect is incompatible with ‘still’ and ‘still not’(=‘not yet’) due to a morphosyntactic
restriction.16
(68) Ale
then
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
ptu-ki
give-
nuan
fruit
me
but
tomat
tomato:bi
i=ta
3g=still
tap
neg1
ptu-ki
give-
nuan
fruit
mau.
neg2
‘It [pumpkin] gave fruit, but tomato hasn’t given any fruit yet.’ (AK1-038-01, 00:01:28.459-
00:01:39.486)
In contrast, the ‘not anymore’ meaning with states and progressives deserves a semantic explanation.
As shown in Section 5.2.2, the states and progressives are aspectually coerced into changes of state.
Thus, if P is the posttime of the change of state, we need to assume that prior to the change of state
¬P was the case, as illustrated in Figure 5.5. If we negate P, then, given that it resulted from a change
of state, we must assume that prior to that P was the case, as shown in Figure 5.6, and this is the
meaning of ‘not anymore’.
In conclusion, the meaning of ‘not anymore’ is simply a result of the aspectual coercion process
that affects all stative and progressive predicates marked with the perfect. Equally, the marker ta
‘still’ is morphosyntactically incompatible with the perfect pe because they occupy the same mor-
16A question that arises here is why does such a morphosyntactic restriction exist in the first place. In other words,
the morphosyntactic incompatibility of ‘still’ and the perfect could have been diachronically motivated by semantics. In
lack of an understanding of its diachronic development, at present it is not clear whether semantic incompatibility has
necessarily played a role in this process.
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Figure 5.6: Representation of the negated perfect with the meaning of change of state
phosyntactic slot. Thus, the effects of duality we see in Nafsan result from different language-internal
processes and, in contrast to ‘already’ and iamitives, these effects do not arise as a consequence of
the semantic definition of the perfect.
Regarding the debate about the cross-linguistic and semantic validity of iamitives, in Olsson’s
(2013) proposal it is not clear what processes in the iamitive semantics lead to the duality effects:
is it through the same processes as in the case of ‘already’ in English or other types of language-
specific processes as described above for Nafsan? In order to distinguish between these different
ways duality effects can arise, we need to focus on the processes specific to the language under
study and we might find that duality effects exist in different TMA categories for different reasons.
This means that, unlike what has been proposed by Vander Klok & Matthewson (2015), identifying
duality in a language does not necessarily indicate that we are dealing with the semantics of ‘already’.
5.3 Perfect vs. other aspectual markers
In this section I focus on two relationships between the perfect pe and other aspectual markers in
Nafsan, which are relevant for our understanding of the perfect aspect. One relationship is that of
paradigmatic contrast, addressed in Section 5.3.1 and the second is that of compositionality of TMA
marking discussed in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 ‘Hot news’ meaning with po and paradigm effects
In this section I address the issue of certain perfect functions lacking in a category that otherwise
fits the description of the perfect aspect. The choice of which functions are crucial to the perfect
semantics and need to be present in any category labeled as perfect plays a very important role in our
understanding of the cross-linguistic properties of the perfect and its use in language description. For
instance, one of the reasons for proposing the new category of iamitives was to explain the existence
of “perfect-like” categories that do not include the experiential function, which was considered a
core function of perfect by Dahl & Velupillai (2013b). However, one might question how to decide
on the quality and the number of “core” functions of a given category. I contribute to this discussion
by showing that, regardless of what the “expected” functions of some category are, if any expected
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Figure 5.7: Representation of example (69)
function is not expressed by the expected category, that is because there is another marker used for
that meaning. In other words, the paradigmatic contrasts between the available TMA markers play
as much of a role in governing the clustering of functions as do semantic principles. I focus on the
‘hot news’ meaning in Nafsan, which cannot be expressed with the perfect pe. Although the ‘hot
news’ meaning does not play a crucial role in theories of perfect, if the English perfect is taken as the
model of the perfect category, as in Dahl (1985) and Dahl & Velupillai (2013b), we need to explain the
absence of this meaning in the case of the Nafsan perfect. Moreover, there is nothing in the semantic
definition of perfect in Nafsan that would make it incompatible with the ‘hot news’ meaning. I argue
that the reason for the absence of this meaning with perfect is the usage of the prospective marker po
for the ‘hot news’ meaning. I start by briefly describing the general meaning of po and then present
its usage with the ‘hot news’ meaning.
The marker po is labeled as prospective realis (Thieberger, 2006) and I define its meaning more
specifically as situating the TT in the pre-time of the described event, and denoting that the event
belongs to the actual world as per its realis component of meaning. Moreover, unlike the English
prospective (‘going to/about to’) where the inference in the past is that the event did not happen,
since po refers to the actual world, it denotes that the event did happen.17 In this sense, po is sim-
ilar to sequential markers in Oceanic languages (see also Lichtenberk, 2014). Example (69) shows a
prospective event which took place at 4 a.m., but the TT (3 a.m.) necessarily precedes it. This exam-
ple is represented in Figure 5.7. This meaning is the mirror image of the perfect meaning in example
(33) in Section 5.2.1.
(69) [If you are supposed to wake up at 3 a.m. and then you wake up at 4 a.m.] Based on Dahl
(2000c:PQ 16)
a=po
1g=pp.eal
pilo
wake.up
4
4
oklok
o’clock
p̃ulp̃og.
morning
‘I woke up (only) at 4 o’clock.’ (AK1-119-01)
Another example in which the event marked by po is posterior to the TT is presented in (70) and
17See also Copley’s (2018) work on futurates, “which make reference to a planned, scheduled, or settled future without
any obvious future morphology” (Copley, 2018:32). According to her work, the futurates mark events in the future, but
are considered realistic because their preparations are real.
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Figure 5.8: Representation of example (70)
in Figure 5.8.
(70) [(Yesterday evening) I GO to bed before my brother COME home.] (Dahl, 2000b:FQ 22)
Nanom
yesterday
p̃og,
evening
a=pei
1g=first
matur
sleep
me
but
paluk
brother
i=po
3g=pp.eal
mai
come
pak
to
esum̃.
house
‘I went to bed before my brother came home.’ (AK1-083-01, 00:42:35.506-00:42:40.883)
Although po is most frequently used with the past reference in my data and in the corpus, the
present reference is also possible, especially with habitual readings in narratives, as in (71). In (71)
the TT is the event of ‘falling at Tasiriki’ and the TSit is ‘calling it Kalros ree’.
(71) i=sog
3g=fall
to
stay
leg
straight
ki
to
Tasrik
Tasrik
pak
to
elau
shore
san
there
kin
el
mees
today
ru=po
3pl=pp.eal
sos-o-ø
call--3g.obj
ki
pep
nskau
reef
Kalros.
Kalros
‘he fell right at Tasiriki on the beach where today they call it Kalros ree’ (128.027)
I turn now to the ‘hot news’ uses of po. At this stage, I do not offer an analysis that explains how
this meaning is semantically or pragmatically derived from the prospective realis definition of po. I
can only conclude that, in contrast to the perfect pe, events marked by po obligatorily denote realis
events, and that means that po is a better candidate than the tenseless perfect to express the past
reference immediately preceding the utterance time. In all cases where the ‘hot news’ meaning was
elicited or produced po instead of pe was chosen by the speakers. Examples (69)-(75) show some of
the ‘hot news’ meanings in the questionnaires and (76) in a spontaneous dialog.
(72) [Telling what a baby just DO. “N” should be replaced with a girl’s name.] N just SAY her first
word! (Dahl, 2000c:PQ 57)
N
N
i=po
3g=pp.eal
til
say
nafsan
word
pei
first
ga.
3g.po
‘N has just said her first word.’ (AK1-126-01)
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(73) (Talking about a teenager who didn’t come home on time) Max JUST COME (Veselinova,
2018:NQ 53)
Max
Max
i=po
3g=pp.eal
mai
come
kia.
de
‘Max has just come.’ (AK1-156)
(74) [The speaker meets his friend about once a week; “the film” refers to a different film each
time:] Every time I MEET him, he TELL me about the film he (just) SEE. (Dahl, 2000c:PQ 53)
ser
every
nrak
time
nen
comp
ka=lek-a-ø,
1g.i=see--3g.obj
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
neu
1g.ben
traus
tell
film
film
nen
el
i=po
3g=pp.eal
lek-a-ø
see--3g.obj
su.
pf
‘Every time I meet him, he tells me about the film he has just seen.’ (AK1-125-01)
(75) [A’s sister finished writing two letters just before A came home. A tells:] When I COME home
yesterday, my sister WRITE two letters. (Dahl, 2000c:PQ 75)
kor-e-k
sister--1g.dp
i=po
3g=pp.eal
to
pog
mtir
write
silu
every
natus
letter
i=nru
3g=two
malen
when
a=tkal
1g=reach
esum̃.
home
‘My sister had just written the two letters when I reached home.’ (AK1-132-01)
(76) Kineu
1g
ga
inej
a=po
1g=pp.eal
mai
come
ki
dem
me
but
a=to
1g=pog
na
comp
ka=mer
1g.i=again
sak
up
teflaan
like
ki,
dem
ka=fan
1g.i=go.i
lek
see
teet
sister
neu.
1g.po
‘I have just come now, but I’m going up this way again to see my sister.’ (AK1-053-01,
00:00:41.125-00:00:45.578)
The idea that different members of the paradigm can have effects of blocking on other elements
has most extensively been studied on the morphological level (Embick & Marantz, 2008) and lexical
level (Blutner, 1998). For example, the existence of the irregular form gave blocks the usage of an
otherwise regular form *gived in the English past tense (Embick & Marantz, 2008). In semantics,
the notion of blocking has been used to explain why “kill” is not equivalent in its meaning to “cause
to die”. While “kill” gets an interpretation of “direct killing”, “cause to die” refers to more “indirect
killing” (Fodor, 1970). Thus, since “kill” already denotes the direct killing, this meaning is blocked
for “cause to die” (see Zeevat, 2000; Benz, 2006). In the MelaTAMP project, we have noticed that
in the languages of our study, this type of reasoning extends to the semantics of TMA paradigms
(see also von Prince, 2018d). Thus, whenever a certain category does not have all the functions that
are cross-linguistically or semantically related to its definition, there is always another marker with
that function in the TMA system of the language. In Nafsan, the meaning of ‘hot news’ is the only
meaning that cannot be expressed by the perfect even though it is compatible with its semantic
definition of being in the posttime of the described event. The reason for this is that the marker po
is specialized for this meaning in Nafsan (for the reason offered above) and is thus considered to be
a more informative choice for this meaning than the perfect pe. This means that po blocks the usage
of pe for the ‘hot news’ meanings. This type of reasoning can explain why in some languages certain
“perfect” functions are absent – their TMA morphology for expressing different meanings typically
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associated with perfect is simply more granular than in other languages. This renders proposing new
categories of the same but slightly restricted semantic space unnecessary. I illustrate these semantic
spaces by presenting the semantic maps that will be further discussed and analyzed in Chapter 6.
Figures 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11 show the semantic spaces of the English perfect, the English ‘already’, the
Nafsan perfect, and the iamitives. In Figure 5.9 we can see that the semantic space studied in this
chapter is occupied by the perfect and ‘already’ in English (see also Section 5.3.2). In Nafsan, the
perfect occupies almost the same space as the English perfect, except for the change-of-state and the
‘hot news’ meaning, as shown in Figure 5.10. Note that there is no dedicated word for ‘already’ in
Nafsan, which could explain why perfect extends to the change-of-state meaning. On the other hand,
the ‘hot news’ meaning is expressed by the prospective po marker and that makes it unavailable for
the perfect pe. For the pragmatic explanation of expectedness, see Section 5.2.3. Lastly, Figure 5.11
shows the semantic space of the iamitive category proposed by Olsson (2013). On the basis of these
semantic maps, the only predicted difference between different languages is the level of granularity
in expressing different perfect and ‘already’ meanings. As implied by the semantic maps, in some
languages each of these functions might be expressed by a single marker and in others one marker
can comprehend several functions. Thus, proposing the existence of a separate iamitive category
does not capture a new semantic identity separate from the perfect or ‘already’ nor does it bring
new insights about the configuration of meanings in this semantic space. In the next chapter this
argument is supported by cross-linguistic evidence from other Oceanic languages.
Figure 5.9: Semantic map of the English perfect in blue and the English ‘already’ in yellow
Figure 5.10: Semantic map of the Nafsan perfect in red and the prospective po function in blue
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Figure 5.11: Semantic map of the proposed iamitive functions (Olsson, 2013)
5.3.2 Postverbal su and composite TMA marking
In Section 5.3.1 I discussed relationships between TMAmarkers based on paradigmatic contrasts and
in this section I focus on composite TMA marking. One of the features of the Nafsan TMA system
are the rich combinatorial possibilities of the TMA marking, which means that TMA markers of
different slots can co-occur. In this section I describe the distribution of the perfective marker su in
relation to the perfect.
Themarker su occurs in the clause-final position, as we can see in (77), where it follows the object
‘three men’. It is an optional marker of a much lower frequency than the perfect pe. Although it has
a similar distribution as finis ‘finish’ in Bislama, which was labeled as completive by Crowley (2004),
its distribution can be better explained under the category of perfective (Thieberger, 2006). I follow
the definition of perfective by Smith (1997:66), as including both the initial and final endpoints of
the situation, as illustrated in Figure 5.12 with English past tense, where the situation of walking is
included in its entirety in the reference time of ‘yesterday’.
(77) Kineu
1g
a=pam
1g.eal=eat
natam̃ol
man
i=tool
3g.eal=three
su.
pf
‘I have eaten three men.’ (Thieberger, 2006:265)
Figure 5.12: Timeline of the English past tense
The marker su is analyzed as perfective by Thieberger (2006), which conforms to its appearance
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in contexts that can be characterized as expressing either anteriority (78)-(79) or boundedness that
advances narration (80)-(81). It cannot be used with events ongoing at the utterance time (82). As
we can see, in the meaning of anteriority su co-occurs with the perfect (78)-(79) and in denoting the
boundedness in sequences it co-occurs with the general subject marking (80)-(81).
(78) Context: Why wouldn’t you be happy if I had chosen to marry Adam? (TFS, 2010)
nlaken
because
kineu
1g
kai=pe
1g=pf
lak
marry
skot
with
Adam
Adam
su
pf
‘Because I had been married to Adam.’ (AK1-018-01, 00:20:12.185-00:20:18.821)
(79) malnen
as
p̃a=ler
2g.i=return
mai
come
me
and
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
mtir
write
leta
letter
su
pf
[Talking to someone who is leaving in a while] ‘When you return, I will have written this
letter.’ (Thieberger 2012:392, based on Dahl 1985:TMAQ 107)
(80) ra=na
3d=then
ra=marmar
3d=rest
su
pf
ra=tuleg
3d=get.up
me
but
ra=mer
3d=again
talm̃at.
garden
‘after they rested, they got up and went back to the garden.’ (AK1-027-01, 00:11:29.965-
00:11:34.465)
(81) Context: retelling the day from a vacation (Underhill & Cable, 2015)
Pulp̃og
morning
a=pilo,
1g=wake.up
a=pan
1g=go
los
wash
su,
pf
a=taf
1g=exit
nen
comp
ka=fan
1g=go.i
pag
climb
bus.
bus
‘In the morning, I woke up, I had a bath, I went out to catch a bus.’ (AK1-019-01, 00:36:57.310-
00:37:16.613)
(82) i=pen
3g=there
matur
sleep
malfane
now
*su.
pf
‘He is sleeping there.’ (AK1-086-01)
The perfective su can also mark termination of activities, which otherwise do not have an inherent
endpoint, as shown in (83), see also (80) and (81) above. However, with accomplishments su does not
necessarily mark a completion of the event. This is shown in (84), in which we get the interpretation
that the object of eating is not completely affected. Singh (1998) calls this type of perfective a neutral
perfective which “like the standard perfective, it presents an event as a whole. However, in contrast
with the standard perfective, it does not require that the event be completed” (Singh, 1998:173).18
(83) Context: It rained, it stopped and you refer back to the rain.
Uus
rain
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
wo
rain
su.
pf
‘It had rained.’ (AK1-119-01)
(84) kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
paam
eat
cake
cake:bi
na
that
su
pf
me
but
nakon
half
i=tu
1g=stay
‘I have eaten the cake, but there is half left.’ (Lionel Emil, 11/02/2019)
18See also Pearce (2015b) who distinguishes the perfective and terminative aspect in Unua.
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The perfective su is compatible with the perfect pe in almost all of its perfect functions, including
the experiential (85) and the resultative (86), but not the function of change of state. In fact, su is not
used with states marked by the perfect,19 as shown in (87a) for the meaning of change of state and
(88a) for the experiential meaning. In these cases speakers prefer to use pei, as shown in (87b) and
(88b), respectively. Although it is not yet clear to which extent su can or cannot combine with states
in general, its dispreference to occur with states can be related to the fact that the perfective aspect
is incompatible with states in some languages, such as Mandarin Chinese and Navajo [nav] (Smith,
1997:66).20
(85) Kineu
1g
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
pag-ki
climb-
ntaf
mountain
i=skei
3g=one
su.
pf
‘I have climbed a mountain.’ (AK1-147-04, 00:00:57.590-00:01:01.796)
(86) Kineu
1g
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
maa
grate
ntal
taro
su.
pf
‘I have grated the taro.’ (AK1-146-02, 00:02:32.335-00:02:41.410)
(87) a. ⁇ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
mam
ripe
su.
pf
Intended:‘[the fruit] it has (already) become ripe’ (Lionel Emil 14/02/2019)
b. ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
(pei)
first
mam.
ripe
‘[the fruit] it has (already) become ripe’ (Lionel Emil 14/02/2019)
(88) a. ?Nasum̃
house
neu
1g.po
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
miel
red
su,
pf
me
but
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
tap
neg1
miel
red
malfanen
now
mau.
neg2
b. Nasum̃
house
neu
1g.po
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
pei
first
miel,
red
me
but
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
tap
neg1
miel
red
malfanen
now
mau.
neg2
‘My house has been red before, but it’s not red anymore.’ (Lionel Emil, 04/02/2018, based
on Koontz-Garboden 2007:142)
If we compare the meaning of su and the perfect aspect through their co-occurrence, we can
conclude that su is compatible with most perfect functions. However, su does not contribute se-
mantically to determining these perfect meanings; instead it simply co-occurs with them because its
perfective semantics is compatible with these perfect meanings. We can represent this in a semantic
map of perfect functions and its relation to perfectivity in Figure 5.13. As we can see, the marker su
is compatible with all perfect functions except the change of state, due to its perfective meaning. The
meaning of perfectivity is placed next to the anteriority, which is one of the most frequent perfect
functions with which it co-occurs.
The semantic map in Figure 5.13 can be compared to the situation in English represented in
19Theoccurrence of suwith states marked by the perfect might be accepted in some other contexts, such as in anteriority
readings, but this was not investigated in great detail here.
20As Smith (1997:66, 67) puts it: “The span of the perfective includes the initial and final endpoints of the situation.[…]
As such it does not apply to stative situations, because endpoints do not appear in the temporal schema of a state.” For the
case of the Mandarin Chinese perfective, see also Soh (2009).
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Figure 5.13: Semantic map of the Nafsan perfect in red and the perfective su in dashed yellow outline
signalizing the perfect functions with which it combines
Figure 5.14: Semantic map of the English perfect in blue and the English ‘already’ in yellow (full
outline: core meanings, dashed outline: perfect meanings with which it can combine)
Figure 5.14. We can see that ‘already’ also combines with many perfect meanings, and in each of
these combinations it maintains its original semantic and pragmatic contribution of change of state
and expectedness. We can exemplify this with (89) in which the experiential meaning comes from
the perfect aspect and the meaning of “earlier than expected” and change of state is triggered by
‘already’.
(89) I have already been to Paris.
This situation in which there is a large area of overlapping environments between two aspectual
markers, but different core meanings can easily lead to problems in description: which of these
two markers has perfect aspect as its core meaning? This problem is of particular importance for the
iamitive proposal. Most languages proposed to have iamitives by Olsson (2013) have several markers
that are compatible with perfect meanings. For example, this is the case of Mandarin Chinese which
has a number of aspectual markers: perfective post-verbal le (Smith, 1997; Soh, 2009), “iamitive”
clause-final le (Olsson, 2013), experiential21/discontinuous22 guo, completive wan (Smith, 1997:73),
and yijing ‘already’ (Dahl & Wälchli, 2016). In a language with such a high number of perfect-like
markers, it is of crucial importance for any analysis to consider whether these markers are in a
21According to Olsson (2013).
22According to Smith (1997).
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relationship of paradigmatic contrast or whether they can combine in specific environments. As I
have shown in the case of Nafsan: a) the extent of meanings expressed by the perfect are influenced
by contrasts with other markers (Section 5.3.1), and b) there are other aspectual markers whichmight
appear to behave like the perfect (su in Nafsan), but are in fact simply compatible with certain perfect
meanings. In the case of iamitives, it remains to be answered whether some of the markers labeled
as such are in fact perfect markers, or markers with non-perfect core meanings which happen to
occur in some perfect environments, such as su in Nafsan or ‘already’ in English.23
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I analyzed different readings of the perfect aspect in Nafsan, which can all be derived
from its definition of placing the TT in the posttime of TSit. These perfect readings were analyzed
in comparison to the functions of English perfect, ‘already’ and the proposed iamitive category. The
analysis of past, present, and future perfect functions in Section 5.2.1 showed that Nafsan does not
have adverbial restrictions with perfect in the same sense as the English perfect. Since Nafsan is a
tenseless language, the perfect can easily be interpreted with any temporal reference. Thus, although
past temporal adverbials are incompatiblewith present perfect readings, in the presence of a temporal
adverbial with perfect in Nafsan, it is possible to reinterpret it as the past or future perfect. In this
case, the temporal adverb is interpreted as being in TSit and another contextually available reference
point, posterior to TSit, is the TT where the posttime of the event is situated. This observation has
important consequences for the expected behavior of the perfect in tenseless languages. Crucially,
the co-occurrence with temporal adverbials is not necessarily a sign that we are not dealing with the
category of perfect. These co-occurrences might be restricted to the interpretation of the past and
future perfect.
The analysis of the meaning of change of state in Section 5.2.2 showed that states marked by per-
fect in Nafsan are aspectually coerced into changes of states. When the resultative perfect combines
with states in Oceanic languages, its semantics requires there to be a dynamic event leading to the
result state, which causes the aspectual coercion of states into changes of state. Cross-linguistically,
there might be several factors that make Nafsan and other Oceanic languages likely to have a change
of state interpretation with perfect-marked states. Koontz-Garboden (2005) found that only in lan-
guages where states are lexicalized as verbs and not adjectives, as is the case in Oceanic languages,
these verbs can be used with both stative and change-of-state meanings. Thus, since the meanings of
change of state are not marked derivationally and stative verbs can be coerced into changes of state
in certain contexts, perfect aspect is just another context where the aspectual coercion is possible.
Section 5.2.3 argued that the meaning of expectedness is not expressed by the Nafsan perfect and
that duality effectswith theNafsan perfect are caused differently from ‘already’ in English. Regarding
the duality effects, firstly, the perfect pe cannot combine with ta ‘still’ because they occupy the same
syntactic position, which explains the lack of ‘still not/not yet’ and ‘still’ meanings with perfect.
The second duality effect has to do with the meaning of ‘not anymore’ which arises only when the
23For a similar point about distinguishing ‘already’ from the perfect aspect see Vander Klok & Matthewson (2015).
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posttime of a change of state is negated. This duality effect is a consequence of the aspectual coercion
into a change-of-state meaning which implies that the negated posttime did hold prior to the change
of state. Regarding the meaning of expectedness proposed to characterize iamitives, I have shown
that this meaning can arise in different contexts in Nafsan (and even in English), regardless of the
aspectual marker being used, and is thus not a good predictor of any aspectual category.
In Section 5.3.1 I argued for the importance of considering paradigm effects when discussing
which functions are “expected” from the perfect category in a given language. I showed that the
‘hot news’ meaning in Nafsan is not expressed by the perfect because the prospective po has that
function, which blocks the perfect pe from those uses. This means that positing new categories in
order to explain lack of certain functions of perfect, as is the case with iamitives, can be avoided if
we consider the paradigm effects in those languages.
In Section 5.3.2, I showed that it is important to make a distinction between having certain mean-
ings and being compatiblewith certain meanings. In the aspectual domain it is often the case that dif-
ferent aspectual markers can be combined and the separation of their semantic contributions might
not be trivial. Just as su is a perfective marker compatible with certain perfect meanings in Nafsan,
the aspectual markers called “iamitives” might in fact be simply compatible with certain meanings of
perfect or ‘already’, while their core meanings belong either to the perfect, ‘already’, or some other
aspectual category.
The four main arguments made in Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, and 5.3.1 evidence that specific “un-
expected” meanings of the perfect can be derived successfully without positing the iamitive category,
and Section 5.3.1 argues that some functions of perfect might be absent because of paradigm effects
and not because they represent a different TMA category. Iamitives are semantically broadly de-
fined by the change of state meaning that differentiates it from “ordinary” perfects (Olsson, 2013).
The change of state meanings are taken to originate from the meaning of ‘already’ as the diachronic
source of iamitives, and other iamitive functions stem either from the resultative perfect or ‘already’.
This means that other perfect functions such as experiential or anteriority readings are excluded
from its definition as a typological gram. In the case of Nafsan we have seen that neither the change
of state meaning nor duality with perfect are semantically related to ‘already’. Separate language-
internal processes, such as aspectual coercion, and possibly lack of change-of-state morphology lead
to such interpretations of perfect-marked verbs. This speaks against the iamitive proposal which
takes the change-of-state meaning as the defining meaning of that category, because its existence
does not seem to predict the cluster of iamitive functions.
Lastly, Klein’s (1994) semantic definition of the perfect aspect as placing the TT in the posttime
of TSit is a good candidate for a typologically valid TMA category. In contrast to other proposals for
the semantics of perfect, this definition successfully relates the meanings of the past, present, and
the future perfect. The case study of Nafsan showed us that the availability of these three mean-
ings with the same construction might be more typologically relevant than previously thought. As
mentioned in Chapter 4, different meanings of the English perfect have often been analyzed as pol-
ysemous and the present perfect has been taken as the model for the semantics of the category of
perfect cross-linguistically. However, the Nafsan perfect brings new evidence for different interpre-
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tations of perfect in tenseless languages: it has the readings of the present perfect as well as the
anteriority readings with past and future references, which would be triggered by the past and the
future perfect in English as a tense language. Thus, Klein’s (1994) unifying semantic definition of
the perfect meanings needs to be considered as a possible cross-linguistically valid definition of the
perfect aspect.
The main conclusion about the Nafsan perfect is that all its readings analyzed in this chapter are
instantiations of the same semantic definition of the perfect aspect (placing the TT in the posttime of
TSit) (Klein, 1994). Moreover, the study of the Nafsan perfect showed us that the differences attested
between perfects across languages can often be explained by specific processes operating in their
systems and are not necessarily related to different semantic definitions of perfect.
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Chapter 6
Perfect in Oceanic languages
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter I study the semantic space of categories described as perfect/iamitive/‘already’ in de-
scriptions of several Oceanic languages through the semantic map of the perfect proposed in Section
6.2.2. I argue that the configurations of meanings of these categories in analyzed Oceanic languages
offer evidence against the cross-linguistic validity of the proposed iamitive semantic space, which
confirms the conclusions of the analysis of the Nafsan perfect presented in Chapter 5.
The motivation for the study carried out in this chapter is the question of whether the proposed
functions of iamitives can be cross-linguistically attested, and whether the meaning of change of
state as their core function can predict the spread of iamitive functions. As discussed in Section
4.2.2, the proposed core meaning of iamitives is the change-of-state meaning (Olsson, 2013), which
is intended to uniquely identify iamitives as a separate category from the perfect. Moreover, iamitives
are defined as lacking the experiential, universal, and anteriority functions, which are present in the
English-style perfect. Although the comparison between iamitives and the perfect is not explicitly
done by Olsson (2013), he mentions that iamitives do not express experiential meanings, and Dahl
& Wälchli (2016) note that the universal perfect is typically found in European perfects and not in
iamitives. The reference to the anteriority meaning, equivalent to the meaning of the English past
perfect, is excluded from both Olsson’s (2013) and Dahl &Wälchli’s (2016) analysis of iamitives. This
suggests that anteriority is not considered to be a feature of iamitives.
In Chapter 5 I discussed several types of evidence against the cross-linguistic validity of this def-
inition of iamitives, based on the case of pe in Nafsan. In this chapter I focus on the cross-linguistic
validity of the semantic space which is said to be occupied by iamitives. As we saw in the case of
Nafsan, the meanings expressed by pe include change of state, which would be a iamitive-defining
meaning, but also other meanings typically associated only with the perfect aspect, such as expe-
riential, universal, and anteriority meanings. This poses a challenge for the definition of iamitives
as denoting a change of state and excluding experiential, universal, and anteriority meanings. In
order to test this type of behavior of perfect/iamitive/‘already’ markers in other Oceanic languages,
I created a semantic map of the perfect/iamitive/‘already’ meanings and studied their distribution
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in a convenience sample of Oceanic languages, for which sufficiently detailed semantic analyses of
perfect are available.
Another aspect I discuss in this chapter is the importance of paradigm effects for explaining why
certain meanings are not expressed by a given TMA marker. As shown in Section 5.3.1, the ‘hot
news’ meaning in Nafsan is not expressed by the perfect marker because there is another marker
that is used for expressing that meaning. The study in this chapter shows that this pattern is also
common in other Oceanic languages.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 I make a proposal for a semantic map of
the perfect and in Section 6.3 I analyze the semantic space of perfect/iamitive/‘already’ meanings in
several Oceanic languages. I take my findings to argue against the cross-linguistic validity of the
definition of iamitives in Section 6.4.
6.2 e semantic map of the perfect
6.2.1 Previous semantic maps of the perfect
In order to facilitate comparison between perfect and related categories in Oceanic languages I cre-
ated a semantic map with different functions of perfect attested in a convenience sample of Oceanic
languages (for definition and theoretical aspects of semantic maps see Section 3.4). In this section I
discuss different semantic maps that have been proposed in the literature for the perfect aspect and
I motivate the need for creating a new classical perfect’s semantic map that interacts with different
cross-linguistic meanings presented in Section 4.2.
There have been several proposals for perfect’s semantic map in the literature so far. To the best
of my knowledge the only classical semantic map proposed in the literature is Anderson’s (1982)
semantic map of the perfect based on English, Mandarin, Turkish, Akkadian, and Arabic. Anderson
(1982) centers the perfect meaning around the notion of “current relevance” and identifies the follow-
ing core functions of perfect: intransitive result-state, current relevance of anterior, new situation
(hot news), experiential, anterior continuing (continuous), and anterior. Anderson (1982) identifies
two functions which have not been mentioned in this work: the intransitive result-state refers to
cases like he is gone (Nedjalkov, 1988) and the current relevance of anterior refers to cases like he
has studied the whole book (so he can help) (Anderson, 1982:228), both of which I call the resultative
meaning of perfect. These meanings are represented in Anderson’s (1982) semantic map of perfect
in Figure 6.1. The full oval outline comprises the meanings of the English perfect and the dashed
outline comprises the meanings of three Mandarin perfect-like categories. The three Mandarin cate-
gories refer to, reading from top to bottom and from left to right, sentence-final le, guo, and verb-final
le. Anderson (1982:237) concludes that the Mandarin sentence-final le emphasizes the meaning of
current relevance (C-R in Figure 6.1) and is much more closely tied to the present reference than the
English perfect, which can also express regular anterior and experiential meanings without encoding
current relevance. In comparison to proposed iamitive functions, we can see that Anderson’s (1982)
semantic map includes C-R new situation which refers to the meaning of change of state and C-R
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Figure 6.1: Anderson’s (1982) semantic map of the perfect with the English (full outline) and Man-
darin perfects (dashed outline), C-R = current relevance, ANT. = anterior
future which roughly corresponds to the immediate future reading.1 Regarding expectedness in the
sense of iamitives, Anderson (1982) relates the meaning of a new situation to an unexpected event,
or “C-R of unprepared mind”. This refers to cases in which the subject discovers something or com-
ments on something that surprised them or came to their attention (Li et al., 1982:31). This meaning
is the opposite of what is proposed for iamitives, in which the event is interpreted as expected or
having happened earlier than expected (Olsson, 2013). In fact, Olsson (2013:27-31) also analyzes the
Mandarin sentence-final le as a iamitive involving less strong expectations than other iamitives in
his study. Anderson’s (1982) proposal anticipates many perfect meanings addressed in this work,
including the meanings related to ‘already’ and iamitives. However, Anderson (1982) does not offer
a proposal on the semantic space of ‘already’ and its relation to the perfect. He also assumes that
the Mandarin sentence-final le is a perfect, and not a different kind of perfect. Thus, the objective
of making my own semantic map is to address these recent debates which focus of the relationship
between ‘already’ and the perfect, as well as the validity of iamitives as a cross-linguistic category
with specific functions.
The semantic space of perfect aspect has also been explored through “proximity maps” (see Sec-
tion 3.4), which are created on the basis of parallel corpora. Dahl (2014b) and van der Klis et al. (2017)
created these types of maps for the perfect in European languages and Dahl &Wälchli (2016) for the
perfect and iamitives in the languages of the world represented in the parallel Bible corpus. The only
1For Anderson (1982:235), the C-R emphatic refers to correcting a wrong assumption and closing a statement.
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proximity map that bears relevance to the discussion in this chapter is the perfect/iamitive map by
Dahl & Wälchli (2016). Dahl & Wälchli (2016) constructed a grammatical space of 305 perfect and
iamitive grams from the parallel Bible corpus, by means of Multidimensional Scaling. By comparing
the distribution of different iamitive/perfect-like markers in Bible translations, they identify three
extreme points or clusters of grams in their data, European, Indonesian, and Philippine, as shown in
Figure 6.2. The forms meaning ‘already’ also form a cluster but their frequency is too low to appear
on the map in Figure 6.2 (Dahl & Wälchli, 2016:333). However, most data points are placed in be-
tween these clusters, in the perfect/iamitive continuum (Dahl &Wälchli, 2016). Since the theoretical
approach by Dahl & Wälchli (2016) to the semantics of perfect and iamitives is diachronic, they un-
derstand the relationships between these clusters as representative of grammaticalization paths of
‘already’ into iamitives and iamitives into perfects, defined respectively as “one which involves uses
in natural development contexts with mainly stative predicates, and one which involves an increase
mainly with dynamic predicates, causing iamitive grams to be more similar to European-style per-
fects” (Dahl & Wälchli, 2016:326).2 As Dahl & Wälchli (2016) point out, the advantage of this map
(Figure 6.2) is that prototypical uses of gram types3 can be established on the basis of data without a
prior semantic definition. Although this approach provides a good cross-linguistic overview of the
distribution of grammatical categories, it still features two main problems when it comes to seman-
tics: a) the choice of the semantic definition of the “prototypical” categories (and their identification)
in the map remains dependent on linguist’s theoretical approach and is minimally determined by
the map itself, and b) it cannot deal with any language-specific problems, as it is not intended to do
so, and c) this method only compares translational equivalents in the parallel Bible corpus, without
targeting any specific semantic contexts which might be decisive for determining linguistic cate-
gories. Regarding these problems, we see in Figure 6.2 that despite the extreme categories identified
as European, Indonesian, and Philippine, most data points are situated somewhere in between these
categories. Thus, for most languages represented in the graph there are no clear cut-off points be-
tween perfects and iamitives. For that reason, deciding on individual-language categories must be
informed by some theoretical definitions of perfects and iamitives as distinct categories. However,
as already argued in Chapter 5, the definition of iamitives as being defined by the meaning of change
of state is not viable because it wrongly predicts that a marker with that meaning should not have
other “European” perfect meanings, such as experiential and universal. In contrast, the semantic def-
inition of perfect paired up with language-internal semantic and pragmatic processes can be flexible
enough to accommodate the meaning of change of state as a perfect function. In order to test the
relation of the meaning of change of state with iamitives and the perfect as grammatical categories
on Oceanic languages other than Nafsan I propose a classical semantic map of the perfect/iamitive
semantic space in the following sections and I apply it to individual Oceanic languages. The main
advantage of a classical semantic map is that it can relate language specific-meanings to proposed
2It is not clear what is meant by “increase mainly with dynamic predicates”, because all the languages studied in this
chapter, as well as all the languages studied by Olsson (2013) already use the perfect/iamitive markers with dynamic
predicates.
3“Gram type” refers to cross-linguistically attested clusters of grams (Dahl & Wälchli, 2016).
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Figure 6.2: From Dahl &Wälchli (2016): “Philippine iamitives (red), Indonesian iamitives (green) and
European perfects (blue) as extreme clusters in the grammatical space of perfects and iamitives”
cross-linguistic meanings and categories.
6.2.2 Proposal for the semantic map of the perfect
In this section I propose a classical semantic map of the perfect and describe the relationships be-
tween the meanings it contains.
Before presenting the semantic map, I discuss how the classical semantic map of the perfect
presented here relates to Anderson’s (1982) semantic map discussed in Section 6.2.1. The perfect
meanings distinguished by Anderson (1982) coincide to a large extent with the perfect meanings in
the semantic map proposed here. The differences are mainly due to his focus on different grammati-
cal categories and different languages. For example, Anderson (1982) maps the meaning of perfect in
relation to other categories such as passive, “ethical dative”,4, perfective, and others. For this reason,
he differentiates “C-R of anterior” from “intransitive result state” and “anterior perfective”. My se-
mantic map focuses on the core meanings of perfect in relation to the core meanings of ‘already’ and
iamitives, without going into detailed peripheral meanings associated with other categories such as
passive or perfective (for my proposal for the relationship between perfective and perfect, similar to
Anderson (1982), see Section 5.3.2). In comparison to Anderson’s (1982) map, some perfect meanings
in my semantic map use different names to refer to the same or similar concepts, such as “change of
state”, which is called “new situation” by Anderson (1982). The only major difference is that I do not
use the concept of current relevance. As can be seen in Chapters 4 and 5, the semantics of perfect
can be successfully modeled by positing a basic resultative/anteriority-based definition of placing
the TT in the posttime of TSit. Thus, I regard the current relevance meaning as a pragmatic effect
that occurs with different meanings derived from this basic definition, and for that reason I do not
4These are the cases of the type I had something wonderful happen tome today (Anderson, 1982:232).
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Figure 6.3: Semantic map of the English perfect in blue and the English ‘already’ in yellow
include it in the semantic map.
My proposal for the semantic map which includes the core meanings of the perfect, ‘already’
and iamitives is presented in Figure 6.3, where the English perfect and ‘already are outlined. The
links between different functions are based on proposed theoretical semantic relations between these
meanings and on attested combinations of thesemeanings in Oceanic languages, presented in Section
6.3. Notice that the closeness of the meanings at the edges of the map that are not connected by lines
is not intentionally determined. For instance, the meanings of expectedness and hot news are not
thought to be necessarily semantically closer than anteriority and expectedness. The main claim of
this map is the close semantic relationship between the resultative perfect meaning and the meaning
of change of state, as supported by the theoretical background in Section 5.2.2. The only claim I
make about other meanings is that they are peripheral and might eventually be related to other
TMA categories. I do not wish to make strong claims about the particular connection of experiential,
universal, and hot news meaning with the resultative meaning exclusively. Some of these meanings
could also be semantically linked with the anteriority meaning. My intention is to show that in the
perfect/iamitive/‘already’ semantic space the resultative meaning is more central than expectedness,
experiential, universal, hot news, and anteriority meanings.
The proposed space of iamitive semantics is outlined in Figure 6.4. According to the iamitive
definition, they combine the resultative and the change of state meaning, and optionally expected-
ness, to the exclusion of other perfect meanings. Notice that duality effects are not a part of the
semantic map, as they do not represent a single meaning. At least some duality effects are an inher-
ent way of how the change of state meaning interacts with negation, for instance the meaning of
‘not anymore’, as discussed in Section 5.2.3. Similarly, the meaning of immediate future is also not
included in the semantic map, because it usually seems to arise in combination with modal markers
(see Section 5.2.2), which indicates that the future reference is a component of the meaning of these
modal markers and not the perfect itself. Nevertheless, this feature will be discussed for languages
in the Oceanic sample in Section 6.3. If placed on the map, the meaning of immediate future could
be connected to the meaning of change of state.
There are two caveats to keep in mind regarding the granularity of the meanings represented
in this semantic map. The nodes in a semantic map should be differentiated only if there is at least
one language in which that meaning is expressed by a single marker (Haspelmath, 2003). However,
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Figure 6.4: Semantic map of the proposed iamitive functions (Olsson, 2013)
in my map there are two meanings for which I have not found evidence of being expressed by a
single marker, and these are the universal perfect and expectedness. The decision to keep these
meanings as separate and represent them on the map is motivated by the fact that they are said to
be perfect or iamitive meanings/functions, and their presence or absence in a given language has
important consequences for deciding whether we are dealing with a perfect or a iamitive marker.
These meanings also do not seem to be subsumed under other meanings or functions. The universal
meaning should be kept as a node separate from other nodes because there are languages which
do not express universal meanings with perfect, but express all the other meanings around it, such
as experiential, resultative, and anteriority. This is the case in Niuean (see Section 6.3.4). Similarly,
expectedness does not occur in all languages in which a given marker expresses the meaning of
change of state. As a pragmatic effect, expectedness occurs only in some languages and it is often
confined to certain contexts.
6.3 e Oceanic languages under study
6.3.1 Introduction
As mentioned in Section 3.4, the typological aspect of this work relies on analyzing TMA phenom-
ena in Oceanic languages, which are relevant for the debates discussed in this work. In this case,
the perfect aspect and related phenomena in Oceanic languages are analyzed in order to bring in-
sight into the debate about the cross-linguistic validity of iamitives. I selected the Oceanic languages
studied here based on the availability of clear evidence for the existence of perfect/iamitive/‘already’
meanings represented in my semantic map of the perfect. This type of evidence and sufficient lan-
guage data was found for Toqabaqita (Lichtenberk, 2008), Niuean (Matthewson et al., 2015), Unua
(Pearce, 2015a), and Māori (Bauer, 1993). Table 6.1 shows the languages together with their TMA
markers analyzed in this chapter. They are also represented geographically in Figure 6.5. Several
additional Oceanic languages were initially included in this study, but they had to be excluded be-
cause the analyzed markers were either not in the perfect/iamitive/‘already’ semantic space or there
was not enough positive and negative evidence for the existence of certain meanings. Some of these
languages were mentioned in previous sections, such as Koro (Cleary-Kemp, 2015), Nêlêmwa (Bril,
2016), Neverver (Barbour, 2012) and Daakaka (von Prince, 2015). The reason for not including the
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languages from the MelaTAMP project in this sample has to do with the lack of evidence for specific
categories to be situated in this semantic space. For instance, Daakaka has several markers which
seem to be related to perfect/iamitive/‘already’, such as the change-of-state marker bwet, wuk ‘al-
ready’, wet ‘only.then’, and dakap ‘just’. However, in the corpus and the storyboard data of Daakaka
there is not enough evidence of the usage of these markers with the meanings represented in my
semantic map of the perfect. One reason for this is the fact that the perfect storyboards I created for
testing pe in Nafsan (Krajinović, 2018c,b) were not elicited in other MelaTAMP languages. The only
storyboard aiming at perfect meanings which was elicited in other MelaTAMP languages is “Tomato
and pumpkin” (von Prince, 2018f), but it did not produce sufficient occurrences of relevant TMA
markers for a semantic analysis.
Table 6.1: The languages and their TMA markers studied in this chapter
Language TMA marker Label Source
Toqabaqita naqa perfect grammar (Lichtenberk, 2008)
Niuean kua perfect/inchoative article (Matthewson et al., 2015)
Unua ju/ goj nu ‘already’/ ‘foc.already now’ grammar (Pearce, 2015a),corpus (Pearce, 2009)
Māori kua perfect grammar (Bauer, 1993)
As shown in Table 6.1, the sources of language data are mostly published materials, such as
reference grammars and articles, with the exception of Unua for which I also consulted the corpus
available in PARADISEC. Since my analysis of these languages is based on published materials and
not on carefully elicited data, as it was the case for Nafsan, I cannot easily account for language-
internal properties that might influence the distributions of the studied markers. For instance, I
cannot easily distinguish whether the studied marker has certain meanings or is simply compatible
with certain meanings by co-occurring with other markers with those meanings, as argued for the
Nafsan su in Section 5.3.2. I minimize this problem by focusing on the semantic distribution of a given
marker and representing it on the semantic map, without assuming a specific semantic definition of
the marker.
The markers in each language from Table 6.1 are analyzed against the meanings from the seman-
tic map proposed in Section 6.2.2: resultative, anteriority, experiential, universal, hot news, change
of state, and expectedness. Other considered features and effects are immediate future, imperative,5
duality, occurrence with temporal adverbs, and presence of telic ambiguity. Table 6.2 shows all the
functions and effects studied in this chapter, together with their occurrence with the perfect marker
pe in Nafsan.
5The occurrence of perfect/iamitive/‘already’ markers in the context of imperatives was considered for reasons of
completeness, because several authors reported this context as relevant for the markers in question.
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Figure 6.5: Location of languages studied in this chapter
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Table 6.2: Meanings expressed by the perfect in Nafsan (+ attested, ? unclear, - not attested, -/+
restricted to certain environments, e.g. needing to occur with another marker)
Meanings Nafsan
Resultative +
Anteriority +
Experiential +
Universal +
Hot news -
Change of state +
Expectedness -
Other effects
Immediate fut. -/+
Imperative -
Duality -/+
Temp. adverb -/+
Telic ambiguity -
6.3.2 Toqabaqita
Toqabaqita is a language spoken on the north of the island of Malaita in Solomon Islands and belongs
to the Southeast Solomonic branch of Oceanic (Lichtenberk, 2008). According to the Ethnologue
there were 12,572 speakers of Toqabaqita in 1999 (Eberhard et al., 2019). The perfect aspect in To-
qabaqita is expressed by the postverbal marker naqa, which is analyzed by Lichtenberk (2008:709) as
signaling “a new state of affairs at the time of reference”.6 The form naqa is occasionally reduced to
the proclitic na= (Lichtenberk, 2008:709). The marker naqa/na= appears with all the typical perfect
functions, such as resultative (1), anterior (2), experiential (3) and universal meanings (4).
(1) Araqi-a
be.old.man-dn
e
3g.nf
fula-toqo-ku
arrive-e-1g.obj
naqa.
pf
‘Old age has caught up with me.’ (A man speaking.) (Lichtenberk, 2008:710)
(2) Nau
1g
ku
1g.nf
manta-i-a
think--3.obj
s=o
i=2g.nf
lae
go
naqa.
pf
‘I thought you had gone/left.’ (Lichtenberk, 2008:711)
(3) Qo
2g.nf
lae-toqo-na
go-e-3.obj
qerofulae
airplane
qi
loc
naqo?
pf
‘Have you gone on an airplane before?’ (Lichtenberk, 2008:711)
6An additional function of naqa is that of an intensifier (Lichtenberk, 2008:208).
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(4) Si
p
manta-a
think-dn
qeri
that
ku
1g.nf
manta-i-a
think--3g.obj
quu
ancon
na=mai.
pf=en
‘This thought I have had (lit.: thought) for some time now.’ (Lichtenberk, 2008:718)
Similarly to the Nafsan pe, naqa is not used for the meaning of hot news, as shown by the agram-
maticality of example (5). A possible reason for naqa not having this function is the usage of the
immediate past/future marker biqi with this meaning, as shown in (6). The marker biqi expresses
temporal immediacy that can refer to the immediate past or future (Lichtenberk, 2008). As discussed
in Section 5.3.1, the availability of a marker like biqi, specialized for the particular meaning of hot
news, can block the usage of a more general perfect marker, such as naqa.
(5) *Kera
3pl.nf
biqi
imm
lae
go
na=kau.
pf=and
(‘They have just left.’) (Lichtenberk, 2008:711)
(6) Kera
3pl.nf
biqi
imm
lae
go
bo=kau.
a=and
‘They have just left.’ (Lichtenberk, 2008:165)
Naqa also expresses the meaning of change of state, as shown in (7). In order to express the meaning
of immediate future, naqa can combine with the expression ‘be near to’ and the future tense marking,
as shown in (8) and (9). Lichtenberk (2008:717) notes that naqa can also be used in imperatives, as
shown in (10) and (11).
(7) Fanua
place
e
3g.nf
rodo
be.dark
naqa.
pf
‘It is dark now. / It has gotten dark.’ (Lichtenberk, 2008:712)
(8) Nau
1g
karangi-a
be.near.to-3.obj
kwai
1g.f
fanga
eat
naqa.
pf
‘I am about to eat.’ (Lichtenberk, 2008:682)
(9) Nau
1g
kwai
1g.f
lae
go
naqa.
pf
‘I’ll be going now.’ (Said by a person getting up to go.) (Lichtenberk, 2008:716)
(10) Weleqi,
man!
qoko
2g.eq
mamalo
rest
naqa.
pf
‘Man! Take a rest now.’ (Lichtenberk, 2008:717)
(11) Sifo!
descend
Sifo
descend
naqa!
pf
‘Get down! Get down now! (Ordering a little boy to climb down from a tree.) (Lichtenberk,
2008:717)
Regarding duality effects with negation, there is some indication in the Toqabaqita grammar that
when naqa is negated with states it can receive the meaning of ‘no longer/not anymore’, as shown
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in (12). However, with dynamic verbs it does not necessarily receive that interpretation (13).7 The
negative resultative in example (13) contrasts with example (14) which expresses the meaning of ‘not
yet’ with the event not being expected to happen. In fact, Lichtenberk (2008:715) notes that naqa
would be agrammatical in (14). Examples (12)-(14) show that Toqabaqita has some duality effects,
but it is not clear whether they are generalized across all negative contexts with naqa or whether
they are restricted to states, in which case they could be analyzed as a result of aspectual coercion as
proposed in Section 5.2.3 for Nafsan. Regarding the meaning of expectedness, naqa does not seem
to express expectedness or an earliness implicature in the examples shown so far and in (13) it has
the opposite meaning that contrasts with expectedness in (14).
(12) Kera
3pl.nf
araqi
(married.couple)be.old.
naqa.
pf
Kesi
3pl.neg
talaqa-na
fit-3.obj
naqa
pf
raa-laa
work-nml
[…]
‘They [the speaker’s parents] had grown old. They were no longer able to work […]’ (Licht-
enberk, 2008:1283)
(13) Wane
man
baa
that
qe=aqi
3g.nf=neg
si
3g.neg
fula
arrive
naqa.
pf
‘The man has not arrived.’ (And he is no longer expected to arrive.) (Lichtenberk, 2008:180)
(14) Wane
man
baa
that
qe=aqi
3g.nf=neg
si
3g.neg
fula
arrive
quu.
still
‘The man has not arrived yet.’ (But he is still expected to arrive.) (Lichtenberk, 2008:180)
The last considered feature are combinations of the perfect naqa and past temporal adverbs. In
Toqabaqita’s grammar there is one example in which naqa co-occurs with the adverb ‘yesterday’
(15). However, in this example the perfect contributes to an avertive irrealis meaning, different from
the present perfect in which adverbial restrictions are expected. Since this is the only example in
the grammar in which ‘yesterday’ co-occurs with naqa instead of the general non-future marking,
it is unclear what kind of status should be attributed to this co-occurrence of the perfect and the
temporal adverb.
(15) Nau
1g
kaa∼karangi-a
ed∼be.near.to-3.obj
sa
i
kwai
1g.f
qaru
fall
bo=naqa
a=pf
qana
pep
keekene
breadfruit
qi
loc
roqo.
yesterday
‘I very nearly fell off the breadfruit (tree) yesterday.’ (Lichtenberk, 2008:691)
By summarizing our findings we can outline the perfect functions in Toqabaqita in the proposed
semantic map of the perfect in Figure 6.6. There are three main contributions of the study of the To-
qabaqita perfect to our understanding of this semantic space: a) the Toqabaqita perfect expresses the
meaning of change of state as well as other “typical” perfect function such as experiential, universal,
and anterior, b) the specialized ‘hot news/immediate’ marker blocks the usage of the more general
perfect marker, and c) expectedness is not encoded semantically by the Toqabaqita perfect.
7An open question remains about whether the implication ‘no longer expected’ given in the translation is somehow
related to the duality effect that would yield the ‘no longer’ meaning.
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Figure 6.6: Semantic map of Toqabaqita with the perfect naqa in red and immediate marker biqi in
blue
6.3.3 Unua
Unua is a language spoken on the south east coast of Malakula Island in Vanuatu (Pearce, 2015a)
and belongs to the Central Vanuatu linkage (Clark, 2009). According to Pearce (2015a:2), Unua has
approximately 1,053 speakers. Unua markers analyzed in this section are the postverbal particles ju
‘already’ and goj ‘foc.already’ often followed by nu ‘now’. The analyzed data is from the reference
grammar (Pearce, 2015a) and the corpus of Unua (Pearce, 2009).8 Pearce (2015a:320) analyzes ju
and goj as denoting both perfective and perfect aspect, depending on their syntactic position. For
Pearce (2015a), the perfective function of ju/goj typically yields the meaning of anteriority, as shown
in (16), which is in contrast with the unmarked example (17) with a sequential reading. The main
morphosyntactic difference between ju/goj and goj nu observed by Pearce (2015a:322) is the strictly
clause-final position of goj nu (18) in contrast to ju/goj which can be in the post-verbal (16) and
clause-final position. Pearce (2015b) also argues that the post-verbal ju/goj express the “perfective”
aspect (16), and the clause-final particles express the perfect aspect (18). However, in my work
anteriority is understood as a function of the perfect aspect, which can but does not need to be
compatible with the perfective aspect (see Section 5.3.2). Moreover, Pearce (2015a,b) glosses ju/goj
and goj nu as involving the meaning of ‘already’ and does not provide evidence of strictly perfective
meanings other than what I call anteriority, associated with the postverbal position. For this reason,
all these markers, regardless of their syntactic position, are considered here as possibly belonging
to the perfect/‘already’/iamitive semantic domain. However, the emphasis is placed on ju, which is
more frequent9 and is also a formative element of goj (go foc + ju).10
(16) Nano
yesterday
no-jbar-i
1g-reach-
aim
home
go
and
tue
brother
xina
1g
i-r-i
3g-write-
ju/goj
already/foc.already
naur
letter
xeru.
two
‘Yesterday I arrived home andmy brother had (already)written two letters.’ (Pearce, 2015a:321)
8The examples from the corpus contain the reference identifiers from the corpus.
9In the Unua corpus there are 68 occurrences of ju, 38 occurrences of goj, and 15 occurrences of goj nu.
10The particle goj ‘foc.already’ seems to originate from the fusion of the focus particle go and ju ‘already’ (Pearce,
2015b:15). The relationship between focus and ‘already’/perfect meanings has also been attested in Lakurumau (Western
Oceanic, PNG) (Mazzitelli, 2019), which is consistent with the focus properties of ‘already’ as per Krifka’s (2000) analysis,
see Section 4.2.1.
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(17) Nano
yesterday
no-jbar-i
1g-reach-
aim
home
go
and
tue
brother
xina
1g
i-r-i
3g-write-
naur
letter
xeru.
two
‘Yesterday I arrived home and then my brother wrote two letters.’ (Pearce, 2015a:321)
(18) Xini
3g
i-r-i
3g-write-
naur
letter
goj
foc.already
nu.
now
(*Xini
3g
i-r-i
3g-write-
goj
foc.already
nu
now
naur.)
letter
‘He is writing a letter now./He has already written a letter.’ (Pearce, 2015a:322)
Based on the study of the examples provided in the grammar and the corpus, ju/goj occurs with all
the typical perfect meanings, including resultative, as in (19) and (20), anteriority, as in (16) and (21),
universal, as in (22) and (23), and experiential (24).
(19) Ale,
alright
ien
here
xina
1g
motara
old.man
Bongbae
Bongbae
se
gen
Aulua
Aulua
i-mej
3g-die
ju.
already
‘Alright, from here, a man, Bongbae from Aulua has already died.’ (SA.04b.01.189)
(20) Go
and
mama
mama
se-n
gen-3g
i-mej
3g-die
goj.
foc.already
‘And his mama is dead now.’ (SW.05.60.039)
(21) Go
and
rraxum
crab
i-seb-rej
3g-neg-speak
rre
neg
xini
3g
i-mej
3g-die
goj.
foc.already
‘But the crab did not speak, he had already died.’ (XR.04.32.034)
(22) Xini
3g
i-tebatin
3g-start
i-pur
3g-cough
nangais
when
ju?
already
‘For how long has he been coughing?’ (Pearce, 2015a:233)
(23) Tongo
pe.the
demej
devil
ro-tox
3pl-stay
rroni
with
xini
3g
tue
past
ju
already
vena.
come
‘The devils had been in him for a long time.’ (Pearce, 2015a:325)
(24) Go
and
mende
1ecl.pl
i-xa
3g-go
ju
already
vex
to
aim.
village
‘And we had already been to that village.’ (SA.04b.01.205)
Similarly to the perfect aspect in Nafsan and Toqabaqita, ju/goj in Unua also does not express the
meaning of hot news. The marker used to express that meaning is the inceptive ber (25), which can
refer to the events in the immediate past (25) and future (26). In this respect ber is very similar to
the immediate past/future marker biqi in Toqabaqita.
(25) No-ke-i
1g-see-
naus
rain
i-ber-us
3g-incp-rain
ma.
only
‘I see it has just rained.’ (Pearce, 2015a:229)
(26) B-u-ber-xa
i-2g-incp-go
bi-kiki
i-little
mu?
again
‘Will you go soon?’ (Pearce, 2015a:232)
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Ju/goj also expresses the meaning of change of state with stative predicates, as shown in (27) and
(28).
(27) i-ve
3g-be
nevet
stone
i-matur
3g-sleep
goj
foc.already
raman.
loc.garden
‘she had now become a stone asleep in the garden.’ (WC.03.06.049)
(28) Tuen
other
[xina]
1g
i-vra-i:
3g-say-
“Ii,
yes
no-kro
1g-awake
ju.
already
Rrarru!”
1incl.d
‘And the other one said: Yes, I am awake. Let’s go!’ (NR.04.47.015)
When combined with the irrealis marking, goj nu can also express immediate future (29) and imper-
ative meanings, as shown in (30).
(29) B-u-xa
i-2g-go
goj
foc.already
nu?
now
‘Are you about to go?’ [KB27/11/07] (Pearce, 2015a:327)
(30) B-u-xa
i-2g-go
goj
foc.already
b-u-matur
i-2g-lie.down
nu
now
b-i-vena
i-3g-come
nen
ngen
nga
comp
b-u-ngor∼ngor.
i-2g-tire∼tire
‘Go and lie down now before you get tired.’ (Pearce, 2015a:327)
Regarding duality effects with negation, the meaning of ‘not yet’ is typically expressed by the
structure neg + ‘still’ (31) and the meaning of ‘not anymore’ can be expressed by the negation of
goj/ju (32).11 Interestingly, the meaning of ‘not yet’ can also arise when goj/ju is negated, as in (33).
This shows that, just like in Nafsan and Toqabaqita, the duality effects do not necessarily arise with
goj/ju in Unua.
(31) Xamru
2d
mur-seb-rex
2d-neg-marry
rrobb?
still
I-jxe
3g-not
rrobb.
still
‘Aren’t you married yet? – Not yet’ [SS.04,05] (Pearce, 2015a:334)
(32) no-berax
1g-not.want
ju
already
be-re
1g.i-hear
mur-b-ngar
2d-i-cry
ien.
here
‘I don’t want to hear you crying here anymore.’ (Pearce, 2015a:282)
(33) Naus
papaya
ngo
the
b-i-mirr
i-3g-ripe
ju
already
go
foc
i-jxe
3g-not
tin.
very
‘The papaya will not be very ripe yet.’ (Pearce, 2015a:352)
Similarly to the duality effects, the meaning of expectedness seems to arise with goj/ju only in certain
contexts. Example (34) with ju is produced in a context in which one devil repeatedly asks another
devil if the moon has appeared. This repetition is indicated withmu ‘again’, which suggests that the
appearance of the moon was expected in the discourse. However, in a different context, as in (35)
where a boy found out his brothers were planning to kill him, ju is used to describe an event which
11There is another more frequent strategy for expressing ‘not anymore’, which involves the negation of the markermu
‘again’ (Pearce, 2015a:328).
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was surprising and unexpected from the point of the view of the narrative.
(34) demej
devil
nga
comp
mavren
other.side
i-ke
3g-call
mu
again
i-vra-i:
3g-say-
“Seser,
Seser
navur
moon
nga
comp
nungon
dem.po2
ju?”
already
‘the devil man on the other side, he called again and said: Seser, is the moon up over there
yet?’ (DD.04a.01.011, DD.04a.01.012)
(35) Go
and
mokiki
boy
i-rivsa(i)
3g-know-
ju
already
seten
what
nga
comp
tue-n
brother-3g
rin
pl
re-m-vaxe.
3pl-el-plan
‘And the boy had found out what his brothers were planning.’ (GS.07a.08.056, GS.07a.08.057)
Regarding other meanings and restrictions, we saw a case of telic ambiguity in (18) with goj nu, but
there is no clear evidence that the same ambiguity would be possible with ju/goj alone. I could also
not find any conclusive examples with the occurrence of temporal adverbs with these markers.
With all the main meanings of the perfect/‘already’/iamitive space having been discussed, we
can now outline the meanings of ju/goj (nu) in the semantic map of the perfect proposed here. As we
can see in Figure 6.7, the perfect/‘already’ and immediate markers in Unua occupy the same semantic
spaces in the semanticmap as the perfect and immediatemarkers in Toqabaqita. The perfect/‘already’
ju/goj denote the meanings of change of state, resultative, anterior, experiential, and universal, while
the ‘hot news’ meaning is dedicated to the inceptive ber. As previously argued, the usage of ber for
that particular meaning pragmatically blocks the usage of the more general ju/goj (nu).
Figure 6.7: Semantic map of Unua with ju/goj (nu) ‘(foc.)already (now)’ in red and the inceptive ber
in blue
6.3.4 Niuean
Niuean is a Polynesian language of the Tongic subgroup spoken on Niue and in diaspora in New
Zealand (Matthewson et al., 2015). According to Ethnologue there are 5,910 speakers of Niuean in
total (Eberhard et al., 2019). TheNiueanmarker studied in this section is the preverbal perfect marker
kua, based on the study by Matthewson et al. (2015). Matthewson et al. (2015) analyze this marker
as an inchoative marker which introduces the meaning of change of state and places it in the Perfect
Time Span in Iatridou et al.’s (2001) approach (see Section 4.3 for a more detailed account). In this
section I focus on the available meanings of kua in Niuean, based on the data and analysis from
Matthewson et al. (2015).
6.3. THE OCEANIC LANGUAGES UNDER STUDY 133
Matthewson et al. (2015) show that kua can express most of the typical perfect meanings, such as
anteriority (36), resultative (37), experiential (38), and hot news (40). However, kua cannot express
the universal meaning, as shown in (39), where the grammatical expression of the universal meaning
is unmarked and does not contain kua (39b). Kua is for themost part incompatible with past temporal
adverbs, according to Matthewson et al. (2015),12 as shown in (41).
(36) Kua
pf
fitā
be.already.done
he
comp
fano
leave
a
ab
Tom
Tom
he
loc
mogo
time
ne
nf
hoko
arrive
au
1g
ke
to
he
loc
fale
house
haana.
1g.po
‘When I got to Tom’s house, he had already left.’ (Matthewson et al., 2015:4)
(37) Context: Breaking up with someone.
Kua
pf
oti
finish
tei
recent
e
ab
kapitiga
friend
ha
po
taua.
1d.incl
‘Our relationship is/has finished!’ (Matthewson et al., 2015:11)
(38) Kua
pf
toli
climb
mouga
mountain
nakai
nq
a
ab
koe?
2g
‘Have you ever climbed a mountain?’ (Matthewson et al., 2015:8)
(39) Context: I see your long hair and ask you how long it’s been like that.
a. ⁇Kua
pf
loa
long
(tei)
recent
e
ab
ulu
hair
haaku
1g.po
tali
since
mai
di1
he
loc
tau
year
1980.
1980
‘My hair has been long since 1980.’
b. Loa
long
e
ab
ulu
hair
haaku
1g.po
tali
since
mai
di1
he
loc
tau
year
1980.
1980
‘My hair has been long since 1980.’ (Matthewson et al., 2015:9)
(40) Kua
pf
oti
finish
lā
just
ia
dem
e
ab
vahega.
class
‘The class has/is just finished.’ (Seiter, 1980:8)
(41) ⁇Kua
pf
fano
go
a
ab
Tom
Tom
ki
to
Hawaii
Hawaii
he
loc
tau
year
kua
pf
mole.
pass
‘Tom has gone to Hawaii last year.’ (Matthewson et al., 2015:9)
Just like all Oceanic languages discussed so far, the Niuean perfect also expresses the meaning of
change of state with states (42) and dynamic verbs which are activities, which can be interpreted as
having been completed (telic) or in progress (atelic) whenmarked by kua (43). In contrast to activities,
accomplishments and achievements marked with kua can only be interpreted as completed.
(42) Kua
pf
ita
angry
tei
recent
a
ab
Malia.
Mary
‘Mary is angry/Mary has become angry.’ (speaker’s volunteered translations) (Matthewson
et al., 2015:14)
12Matthewson et al. (2015:9) note that there is some variation in acceptability of certain temporal adverbs.
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Figure 6.8: Semantic map of the perfect/inchoative kua in Niuean
(43) Kua
pf
kai
eat
tei
recent
au.
1g
‘I am eating.’ or ‘I’ve already eaten.’ (Matthewson et al., 2015:16)
In combination with the particle teitei ‘nearly’, the usage of kua can also lead to the interpretation
of immediate future, with the meaning of ‘about to’.
(44) Context: Your friend rings you on the phone and asks you to come over. But you already have
someone coming over to your house so you can’t leave. You say ‘My friend is about to arrive.’
Kua
pf
teitei
nearly
hoko
arrive
mai
di1
(tei)
(recent)
e
ab
kapitiga
friend
haaku.
1g.po
‘My friend is nearly here.’ (Matthewson et al., 2015:18)
Regarding the meaning of expectedness, associated with iamitives, the Niuean perfect does not show
any effects of this meaning. Kua is perfectly acceptable with completely unexpected events, as in
(45).
(45) Context: You are at a family gathering and your cousin comes running up and says:
Kua
pf
tō
fall
(tei)
(recent)
a
ab
Agukolo
Uncle
Bill
Bill
he
loc
akau.
tree
‘Uncle Bill has fallen from a tree!’ (Matthewson et al. 2015:18, adapted from Olsson 2013:24)
Duality effects are not analyzed in detail by Matthewson et al. (2015). However, they mention that
kua cannot co-occur with agaia ‘still’ (46a) and that it is also not used with the meaning of ‘not yet’
(46b).
(46) Context: Talking about fruit.
a. (*Kua)
(*pf)
mata
unripe
agaia.
still
‘It’s unripe.’
b. Ai
neg
lā
just
momoho.
ripe
‘It is not yet ripe.’ (Matthewson et al., 2015:14)
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Now that all the relevant functions have been considered, we can create an outline of the mean-
ings expressed by kua in our semantic map, as shown in Figure 6.8. We can see that kua expresses all
the meanings associated with the perfect aspect, except for the universal meaning, which Matthew-
son et al. (2015) analyze as resulting from kua’s inchoative semantics. In comparison to the three
Melanesian languages discussed so far, the Niuean perfect differs in two main respects; firstly that
it can also express the meaning of hot news and secondly that it cannot express the universal mean-
ing. In contrast to Toqabaqita and Unua, Niuean does not have a different marker used for ‘hot news’
which would contrast with the perfect. Thus, there are no paradigmatic blocking effects and perfect
can also be used for the ‘hot news’ meaning.
6.3.5 Māori
Māori is a Central Eastern Polynesian language spoken on New Zealand by 148,000 people (159,700
total in all countries), according to Ethnologue (Eberhard et al., 2019). The analysis of the Māori
perfect in this section is based on the data provided in the reference grammar of Māori by Bauer
(1993).
Māori has a marker kua which is cognate to Niuean kua and can also be labeled as a marker
of perfect aspect. Just like in Niuean, it is used to express all main functions of perfect, such as
anteriority (47), experiential (48), universal (49), and the ‘hot news’ meaning (50).13
(47) I
at
taku
1g.gen
tae·nga
arrive.nml
atu
away
ki
to
te
the
kaainga,
home
kua
pf
maoa
cooked
kee
con
i
ca
a
pe
ia
3g
ngaa
the(pl)
kai
food
‘When I got home, he had already cooked the dinner.’ (Bauer, 1993:421)
(48) Kua
pf
tuutaki
meet
koe
2g
ki
to
taku
1g.gen
tuakana?
brother
‘Have you ever met my brother?’ (Bauer, 1993:431)
(49) Kua
pf
pau
exhausted
te
the
haaora
hour
e
T/A
mare∼mare
cough∼cough
ana
T/A
‘He has spent an hour coughing.’/‘He has been coughing for an hour.’ (Bauer, 1993:432)
(50) Kua
pf
haere
move
kee
con
ia
3g
‘He’s just gone.’ (Bauer, 1993:433)
Once again, kua also results in themeaning of change-of-state or ‘beginning of a state’ with states
(Bauer, 1993:432), as shown in (51) and (52). Unlike Niuean, this change-of-state meaning does not
arise with dynamic verbs which are activities, as shown in (53), which is interpreted as completed.
In order to obtain a change-of-state meaning with activities, the verb tiimata ‘start’ must be used
(Bauer, 1993:442), as shown in (54). This shows that Māori does not have the telic ambiguity that we
saw in Niuean.
13Note that Bauer (1993:434) mentions that kaatahi…ka is “probably more common if the immediate past is stressed.”
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(51) Kua
pf
moohio
know
ahau
1g
i
T/A
hee
wrong
ia
3g
‘I know/I’ve realized she was wrong.’ (Bauer, 1993:432)
(52) Kua
pf
tangi
sound
te
the
piana
piano
‘The piano has begun to play.’ (Bauer, 1993:442)
(53) Kua
pf
horoi
clean
raaua
3d
i
do
te
the
whare
house
‘They’ve washed the house.’ (Bauer, 1993:442)
(54) Ka
T/A
tiimata
start
raaua
3d
ki
to
te
the
horoi
clean
i
do
te
the
whare
house
‘They started to wash the house.’ (Bauer, 1993:442)
Similarly to Niuean, when kua combines with a marker meaning ‘near’, it can result in a meaning of
immediate future, as shown in (55).
(55) Kua
pf
tata
near
mutu
finished
ia
3g
ki
to
te
the
peita
paint
i
do
tana
3g.gen
whare
house
‘He is about to finish painting his house.’ (Bauer, 1993:432)
Bauer (1993) does not explicitly comment on the meaning of expectedness in relation to kua or
duality effects with negation. The lack of contextual clues in the examples cited above also makes it
hard to argue for either the presence or absence of thesemeanings. However, there is some indication
that there might be some duality effects associated with perfect, namely the fact that the meaning of
‘not yet’ is expressed by the combination of the negation and the marker anoo ‘again’, without using
kua (Bauer, 1993:418), as in (56).
(56) Kaahore
neg
anoo
again
te
the
raa
sun
kia
bj
whiti
rise
‘The sun is not yet up.’ (Bauer, 1993:184)
Figure 6.9 outlines the meanings expressed by kua in Māori. We can see that the Māori perfect
expresses all the meanings of the English-style perfect and the additional meaning of change of state.
In the next section, I discuss the implications of attesting these particular meaning clusters for the
debate about the semantic validity of iamitives.
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Figure 6.9: Semantic map of the perfect kua in Māori
6.4 Evidence against iamitives
In this section I summarize the observations about the semantic domain of perfect/‘already’/iamitive
and use these observations to argue against the validity of the proposed definition of iamitives as a
new linguistic category. Firstly, it is important to stress that the argumentation against assuming the
category of iamitives aims specifically at the semantic definition of iamitives as proposed by Olsson
(2013) and Dahl &Wälchli (2016). In other words, I argue against the specific clustering of functions
which is proposed to identify iamitives, with the main identifying function being the meaning of
change of state. I also reiterate some of the arguments made on the basis of Nafsan, such as the
paradigmatic effects of blocking, or the problem of associating iamitives with other meanings and
effects, such as expectedness and immediate future.
Table 6.3: Perfect values in Nafsan and other Oceanic languages (+ attested, ? unclear, - not attested,
-/+ restricted to certain environments, e.g. needing to occur with another marker)
Meanings Nafsan Toqabaqita Unua Niuean Māori
Resultative + + + + +
Anteriority + + + + +
Experiential + + + + +
Universal + + + - +
Hot news - - - + +
Change of state + + + + +
Expectedness -/+ - -/+ - ?
Other effects
Immediate fut. -/+ -/+ -/+ + (-/+) + (-/+)
Imperative - -/+ -/+ ? ?
Duality -/+ -/+ -/+ ? ?
Temp. adverb -/+ +/? ? - ?
Telic ambiguity - ? + + -
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Table 6.3 lists all the meanings expressed by the markers studied in this section together with
Nafsan. The meanings expressed by the studied markers in all five languages are the resultative,
anteriority, experiential, and the change of state. Other functions were attested to varying degrees.
The universal meaning can be expressed by the studied markers in all languages except Niuean. We
can see that these particular combinations of meanings do not correspond neatly to the meanings
expected from a perfect, ‘already’, or a iamitive. However, as shown in Section 5.2.2, the marker
that expresses the meaning of change of state together with other perfect functions can still be an-
alyzed as a perfect marker. This can be achieved by a simple assumption that the change-of-state
meaning is in fact the resultative perfect applied to states, which were then aspectually coerced into
changes of state (see Section 5.2.2). On the other hand, given that all the analyzed markers express
the meaning of change of state, we could also postulate that they are iamitives. The meaning of
change of state is said to be one of the core meaning of iamitives, and also the main point of differ-
entiation between the perfect aspect and iamitives (Olsson, 2013; Dahl & Wälchli, 2016). Moreover,
iamitives are not expected to have anteriority, experiential, and universal meanings (Olsson, 2013;
Dahl & Wälchli, 2016). The semantic map with proposed iamitive meanings is presented again in
Figure 6.10 for convenience. If iamitives were uniquely defined by the change-of-state meaning, we
would expect that whenever a given marker expressed the meaning of change of state and was fre-
quent enough to be considered grammaticalized (Dahl & Wälchli, 2016), it would necessarily be a
iamitive, which means it would have only the meanings presented in Figure 6.10. However, that is
not the case in the five Oceanic languages analyzed in this work. All of these languages express the
meaning of change of state as well as other perfect functions by a single marker. In other words, we
do not find the clustering of the resultative meaning and the change of state to the exclusion of oth-
erwise perfect functions like experiential, universal and anterior. The question is then how should
we even differentiate iamitives from the perfect if the proposed core meaning of iamitives is not a
good indicator of their difference. The decision of how to distinguish these two categories would
be arbitrary. In the case of our five Oceanic languages they would all be either iamitives because of
the change of state, or all perfects because of other functions. We can thus conclude that iamitives
are not a useful category because their defining meaning of change of state does not predict a new
semantic space which would be different from perfect and ‘already’. Instead of positing the existence
of the category of iamitives, the semantic space covered by the perfect aspect and ‘already’, which
is represented by the semantic map proposed in Section 6.2.2, is sufficient to explain the clusters of
these meanings in languages of the world. Choosing a restricted area within this space does not
tell us anything new about the categorization of these meanings cross-linguistically. The relations
between the perfect and ‘already’ meanings remain the same and iamitives do not add any new in-
sight to our understanding of the interrelatedness of these meanings. So, when a marker in a given
language covers more meanings than expected by the traditional category of perfect aspect, as is the
case in all surveyed languages in this chapter, we can offer a theoretical solution to this puzzle, as
for instance in Section 5.2.2 regarding aspectual coercion. It is important to keep in mind that the
solution relying on aspectual coercion of states into changes of state is not simply explaining things
away through theoretical reasoning. The basic assumption underlying the idea of aspectual coercion
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Figure 6.10: Semantic map of the proposed iamitive functions (Olsson, 2013)
is that languages which do not have rich morphology of lexical derivation, i.e. no dedicated change
of state or inchoative morphology, behave differently when it comes to the interface of lexical and
grammatical aspect. Thus, the existence of the change-of-state meaning is not an indication of a
fundamentally different grammatical category, but is instead a result of the interaction of the perfect
aspect and lexical aspect, which in many ways differs from well-studied Indo-European languages.
For instance, the lexical aspect in Oceanic languages is often underspecified in comparison to Indo-
European languages, leading to ambiguity in telicity in some languages, as in Unua and Niuean. The
aspectual coercion of states is simply a process by which we theoretically model the fact that the
semantic definition of states in some languages is more flexible than in Indo-European languages, in
that the states are more easily interpreted as changes of state without undergoing any morphological
changes. However, there is much more research needed to be done to fully flesh out these complex
interactions between lexical aspect and the perfect in typologically diverse languages. Regarding
the point about the validity of iamitives as a separate grammatical category, we can conclude that a
simpler, and thus scientifically more attractive theory is to assume a smaller number of categories,
perfect and ‘already’ in this case, which already accurately describe the relevant semantic space. The
differences between languages in covering different parts of this semantic space can hardly be ex-
plained by positing yet another aspectual category. A simpler alternative is to analyze the effects of
different parts of the language structure on the relevant category, as is the case with lexical aspect
and perfect aspect in Oceanic languages. In fact, by dissociating the iamitive from the perfect, as a
new category, we might offer a solution that inhibits trying to understand the factors which govern
the cross-linguistic diversity of the perfect aspect.
Having established the main argument against the validity of iamitives, I turn now to the discus-
sion of other meanings and effects. The meaning of expectedness, which was proposed by Olsson
(2013) as associated with iamitives in some languages, was only occasionally found with relevant
markers in Nafsan and Unua. The main finding, however, is that the interpretation of the studied
markers in Nafsan and in Unua as involving expectedness is triggered only in certain contexts, and
it does not seem to be a part of the semantics of the markers in question, as argued in Section 5.2.3
for Nafsan and Section 6.3.3 for Unua (examples (34) and (35)). Quite to the contrary, in Nafsan,
for instance, the meaning of expectedness also arises independently of the perfect marker pe (see
Section 5.2.3).
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I also considered some other effects which are not a part of my proposed semantic map of per-
fect/‘already’/iamitive. These effects are not a part of the map either because there is a lack of ev-
idence of how these meanings relate to the meanings on the map or because they are not actual
semantic meanings, but rather an effect or restriction associated with the usage of that marker in a
specific context. The expression of immediate future, suggested to be a feature of iamitives by Olsson
(2013), is expressed as a combination of an irrealis or future-referringmarker and perfect14 in all stud-
ied languages. However, languages differ in how this combination is realized formally. In Nafsan,
the perfect marks the verb to ‘stay’ which then takes an irrealis complement clause. In Toqabaqita
and Unua the postverbal perfect markers co-occur with the future and irrealis subject marking, re-
spectively. There is also a certain level of uncertainty about whether the marker kua in Niuean and
Māori necessarily combines with the marker meaning ‘nearly’ when this meaning is intended. In
some languages, imperatives can also be expressed by the perfect marker. In Toqabaqita this mean-
ing can arise as a combination of the sequential subject marker and perfect or perfect alone, and in
Unua as a combination of the irrealis subject marking and the perfect marker. Although more fine-
grained research on these structures in needed, futurate meanings associated with perfect/‘already’
markers typically need to combine with a marker of future reference, which suggests that they alone
do not carry the immediate future meaning (see also Section 5.2.2). Another piece of evidence for
this is the fact that in all studied languages the futurate marker alone can express the meaning of
immediate future, the perfect marker being optional. This is exemplified in (57) with Unua where
the irrealis marker alone expresses immediate future. In all languages of Olsson’s (2013) sample, the
meaning of immediate future is also derived by a combination of some future reference marking and
the iamitive marking, as shown in the Vietnamese example with the prospective and the marker rồi
(58), repetition of (37) from Section 4.2.2. If we assume that the prospective marking determines the
immediate future reading, then rồi is only being used as denoting the meaning of change of state
which happens to be compatible with the prospective reading in Vietnamese.
(57) i-re
3g-feel
dabango-n,
belly-3g
dabango-n
belly-3g
nga
comp
b-i-pasus.
i-3g-give.birth
‘she felt her belly, her belly that was about to give birth.’ (PB.05.40.029, PB.05.40.030, Pearce
2009)
(58) (At a birthday party for a child:) Little brother is about to arrive! (So hide the gifts/get ready
to scream “surprise!”)
Nam
boy
sắp
pp
đến
come
rồi!
iam
‘Little brother is about to arrive!’ (Olsson, 2013:22)
Some duality effects have been attested in Nafsan, Toqabaqita, and Unua, but they do not necessarily
arise with the studied markers. In all three languages the negation of relevant perfect/‘already’
markers with dynamic verbs does not result in the meaning of ‘not anymore’. As I showed in Section
14For the sake of brevity, I use the term “perfect” to refer to the Oceanic markers studied in this chapter, although some
of the studied markers might not exactly represent this category, e.g. ju/goj (nu) in Unua.
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5.2.2 for Nafsan, this could indicate that duality is only related to the change-of-state meaning and
is not a general property of these perfect markers. As we can see, all these additional meanings
associated with iamitives by Olsson (2013), such as expectedness, immediate future, and duality,
are in many cases a result of specific properties of discourse or other types of language-internal
structures. Thus, assuming that these effects can equally well be a result of structural interactions
not related to iamitives weakens the predictive power of positing iamitives as a category.
For the case of the perfect/‘already’ co-occurring with temporal adverbs, none of the languages
had enough unambiguous information on this feature. For Niuean, Matthewson et al. (2015) report
the incompatibility of the perfect with past temporal adverbs, which is, however, subject to varia-
tion, as some past temporal adverbs are marginally accepted. In the case of Toqabaqita, there was
one example of the perfect co-occurring with a past temporal adverb (15), in an avertive irrealis
meaning and not in the present perfect meaning. Thus, there is no evidence for any of the studied
languages that perfect can co-occur with past temporal adverbs with a present perfect meaning. Fur-
ther research is needed in order to establish whether the restriction on past temporal adverbs with
the present perfect meaning found in Nafsan is also a feature of other tenseless languages.
Now I turn to another previously mentioned issue regarding the variability across languages
when it comes to the perfect aspect. The fact that languages cover different distributions of mean-
ings of this semantic space can be accounted for, at least to a large extent, by taking into considera-
tion paradigmatic effects. The best evidence for this in our data is the availability of the ‘hot news’
meaning in certain languages. In all languages in which the studied markers cannot express the ‘hot
news’ meaning, there is another marker specialized for that meaning. This is the case in Nafsan, To-
qabaqita, and Unua. As argued in Section 5.3.1, markers specialized for specific meanings can block
the usage of another marker in the paradigm for that meaning, even when its semantic definition
would be compatible with the said meaning. In other words, there is nothing in the semantic defini-
tion of the perfect markers in Nafsan, Toqabaqita, and Unua to restrict their usage in the ‘hot news’
contexts. It is the pragmatics of the paradigm relations that would make the usage of perfect for
those meanings odd, since there is another more specific marker to be used. This type of reasoning
can be taken further to explain why the markers in Mandarin Chinese, Indonesian, and Thai said
to be iamitives do not express the experiential meaning of perfect. Besides their markers proposed
to be iamitives (Indonesian sudah, Mandarin le, and Thai lɛ́ɛw), all three languages have markers
which are specialized for the experiential reading of perfect, and these are pernah, guo, and khɤɤi,
respectively. Thus, these markers pragmatically block the usage of the other “iamitive” markers in
experiential contexts. I illustrate this point further in the case of Thai. Jenny (2001) writes: “Thai
expresses the ‘experiential’ regularly with the marker khɤɤi, while the orientation verb maa ‘come’
is used to express ‘the perfect of persistent situation’ and ‘recent past’ and lɛ́ɛw is used, among other
functions, to cover the ‘resultative’.” This tells us that Thai has several markers, each specializing for
one meaning of the perfect. Thus, it comes as no surprise that lɛ́ɛw is then not used for the meanings
already expressed by the other more specific markers. We can conclude from this that in some lan-
guages the perfect/‘already’ semantic space will be expressed more granularly, with several different
markers, and in some, with markers occupying a larger number of functions.
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The analysis of some basic distributions of meaning of perfect/‘already’ markers in Toqabaqita,
Unua, Niuean, and Māori has enabled us to find additional evidence for the arguments against iami-
tives expressed in Chapter 5. The distribution of functions covering most, if not all, perfect functions
together with the meaning of change of state is a striking feature of all studied languages. Moreover,
when paradigm effects of blocking are taken into account we see that languages can choose any num-
ber of meanings in our semantic map as long as they do not overlap in their functions with other
markers (excluding co-occurrences due to compatibility with certain meanings, see Section 5.3.2).
These observations speak against positing the category of iamitives, because a) they can no longer
be identified and differentiated from perfect based on their core meaning of change of state, and
b) a more restricted number of functions expressed by the marker than expected from the “typical”
perfect aspect can be successfully explained by the paradigmatic effects of blocking.
Having now discussed the category of perfect aspect, in the next chapters I turn to a discussion
of the realis and irrealis mood, as the other two major TMA categories in Nafsan discussed in this
work.
Part IV
Mood and modality: realis and irrealis
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Chapter 7
e realis/irrealis distinction and related
categories
In this chapter I turn to the discussion about the realis and irrealis mood, and the debate about their
cross-linguistic and semantic validity as TMA categories. I present several problems identified in the
literature, with a special focus on issues regarding Oceanic languages, which will also be addressed
in the case of Nafsan in Chapter 8.
7.1 e meaning of the realis/irrealis distinction and the surrounding
debate
7.1.1 e basics of the realis/irrealis distinction
In this section I describe some of the first proposals for analyzing the realis/irrealis distinction and
the surrounding core problems that have been most discussed in the literature.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the term “irrealis” was probably used for the first time by Sapir (1930)
in his description of Southern Paiute. Sapir (1930:168) describes irrealis in the following way:1 “This
element indicates that the activity expressed by the verb is unreal, i.e. either merely potential or
contrary to fact.” Some years later, Dempwolff (1937) described the binary distinction between the
modus realis and modus imaginativus, which is today referred to as realis and irrealis, respectively.
In the 1970s this distinction started to be more widely used in language descriptions and analyses
of diverse language groups, such as Austronesian languages of Papua New Guinea (Capell, 1971),
Australian languages (Dixon, 1980), creole languages (Bickerton, 1975), and Papuan languages (Foley,
1986), among others. More typologically oriented works aiming at explaining the cross-linguistic
features of realis/irrealis emerged in the 1990s (observed by von Prince et al., submitted) and include
works by Roberts (1990) on Papuan languages, Bugenhagen (1993) on Austronesian languages of
PapuaNewGuinea, Foley&VanValin (1984), Givón (1984, 1994) and Palmer (2001) on cross-linguistic
features of irrealis, and Mithun (1995) and Chafe (1995) on Amerindian languages. At the same time,
1This quote was identified in Elliott (2000:55).
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some of the first criticism of the cross-linguistic validity of this category emerges (Trask, 1993; Bybee
et al., 1994; Bybee, 1998). The discussion presented here starts in this time frame. I begin by analyzing
the first proposals for a cross-linguistic semantic definition of irrealis, such as Roberts (1990), Givón
(1994) and Mithun (1995), following with the ensuing criticism most prominently taken up by Bybee
(1998). I focus on some works answering to this criticism in this section (e.g. Elliott, 2000; Van Gijn
& Gipper, 2009) and continue in more depth in Section 7.1.2 with Elliott (2000) and McGregor &
Wagner (2006), where I also analyze the latest wave of criticism (e.g. de Haan, 2012; Cristofaro, 2012)
and the corresponding opposite opinions usually held by linguists working on individual languages
(e.g. Michael, 2014; Matić &Nikolaeva, 2014). It is necessary to keep inmind that there is an extensive
literature on realis and irrealis in individual languages and on diverse topics on categories which can
be classified as either realis and irrealis in certain languages. It is the aim of this work to focus on
most influential works when it comes to the theory of realis and irrealis and on works on individual
languages which bear particular importance for analyzing the realis/irrealis distinction in the context
of Nafsan and other Oceanic languages.
Based on his study of Amele [aey] and several other Papuan languages, Roberts (1990) contributes
both to the understanding of different meanings expressed by realis and irrealis markers, as well as
to the understanding of more general semantic domains they belong to. Papuan languages are well
known for chained clauses consisting of medial clauses that precede the final clause in the chain.
The medial clauses often have switch subject markers, which can additionally encode TMA values.
Roberts (1990) shows that in Papuan languages the realis and irrealis notions are expressed by realis
and irrealis subject markers on verbs in medial clauses, which then agree with more specific TMA
values marked in the final clause. This is illustrated with examples from Amele, (1) with realis and
(2) with irrealis.
(1) Ho
pig
bu-busal-en
im-run.out-3g.d.eal
age
3pl
qo-in.
hit-3pl.em.p
‘They killed the pig as it ran out.’ (Roberts, 1990:371)
(2) Ho
pig
bu-busal-eb
im-run.out-3g.d.i
age
3pl
qo-qag-an.
hit-3pl-f
‘They will kill the pig as it runs out’. (Roberts, 1990:372)
Table 7.1 shows fine-grained meanings expressed on final verbs, classified according to their co-
occurrence with realis and irrealis markers inmedial clauses in Amele. Out of nine Papuan languages
analyzed by Roberts (1990:392), six of them converge on expressing the past and present reference by
realis markers, including graded past tense in some languages. All nine languages express future ref-
erence with irrealis markers, seven languages also use irrealis in imperatives, and six languages use it
for counterfactual meanings (Roberts, 1990:392). An important observation by Roberts (1990:383) is
that Bargam is the only language in the sample that uses irrealis to express habitual past (cf. Carlson
& Spejewski, 1997). Taking these different meanings into consideration, Roberts (1990) argues that
realis should be semantically analyzed as referring to the real world and irrealis to unreal worlds,
which can be further subdivided into future possibilities and non-future possibilities (counterfactu-
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Table 7.1: The modal meanings of final verb categories classified according to their co-occurrence
with realis and irrealis markers in medial clauses in Amele by Roberts (1990:375)
Realis Irrealis
habitual past tense future tense
remote past tense imperative mood
yesterday’s past tense hortative mood
today’s past tense prohibitive mood
present tense counterfactual/prescriptive mood
apprehensive mood
intentive mood
desiderative mood
habitual desire
abilitative mood
purpose
Table 7.2: The division of modal meanings expressed by the realis/irrealis distinction by Roberts
(1990:398).
Unreal worlds(s)
Real world (future) (non-future)
e factually true in real
world (positive)
potentially true
in real world
not potentially true in real world but true in
unreal world (counterfactual)
fale factually false in real
world (negative)
potentially false
in real world
not potentially false in real world but false in
unreal world (negative counterfactual)
als), as shown in Table 7.2. The irrealis markers in Amele express both the possible (future in Table
7.2) and the counterfactual (non-future in Table 7.2) meanings.
Givón (1994) treats realis and irrealis as notional categories that describe the modal semantic
space rather than strictly grammatical categories of a given language. He defines realis and irre-
alis in terms of what the speaker intends to assert, so, for instance, a realis assertion means that
the proposition is strongly asserted to be true and the irrealis assertion means that the proposi-
tion is weakly asserted as either possible, likely, uncertain, necessary, desired or undesired (Givón,
1994:268). Bybee et al. (1994) and Palmer (2001) subscribe to the same definition of mood.
Bugenhagen (1993) studies several Oceanic languages of Papua New Guinea, where realis and
irrealis are expressed either within the subject marking paradigm or as free particles, as discussed
in Section 2.2 for Oceanic languages of Melanesia. Bugenhagen (1993) shows that there is consider-
able variety in what irrealis denotes across these languages. In some cases, what has been labeled as
irrealis in one language does not even overlap in the distribution of its functions with the irrealis cat-
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egory in another language. However, he finds several prototypical contexts in which irrealis forms
are found and those are future, hypothetical and counterfactual conditionals, complements of predi-
cates expressing ‘want’, and negative purpose clauses (Bugenhagen, 1993:37). Some of Bugenhagen’s
(1993) results will be discussed in Section 9.2.2.
Two early prominent works on the realis/irrealis distinction published in the same edited volume
about modality (Bybee & Fleischman, 1995) are Mithun (1995) and Chafe (1995). Mithun (1995:386)
describes the difference between irrealis and realis in the following way: “events and states classi-
fied as nonactualized, those that remain within the realm of thought and imagination, are overtly
distinguished from those portrayed as actualized, having occurred or currently occurring.” While
both Mithun (1995) and Chafe (1995) adopt this definition of realis/irrealis, they focus on different
language-specific issues in two Amerindian language, Central Pomo [poo] and Caddo [cad], respec-
tively. In Caddo, the realis/irrealis distinction is marked by subject markers which combine with
other TMA markers (Chafe, 1995), as shown in (3). Chafe (1995) reports that irrealis subject markers
in Caddo express yes-no questions, negation, prohibitive, obligation, conditionals, and counterfac-
tual meanings. Realis, on the other hand, marks WH questions, imperatives, and future, which is
rather unexpected for realis mood. However, Chafe (1995) does not draw conclusions from this un-
expected behavior, and he also does not justify why realis markers should be analyzed as realis at
all. A possible conclusion might be that the realis subject markers do not denote realis, but are in
fact simple person and number subject markers (see discussion below as well as Chapter 8).
(3) sahʔ-yibahw-nah?
2ag.i-see-pf
‘have you seen him?’ (Chafe, 1995:354)
Mithun (1995) addresses the issue of the cross-linguistic variability of irrealis, put forward by Bybee
et al. (1994) as the main obstacle to positing irrealis as a meaningful linguistic category. Mithun
(1995:367) summarizes succinctly the issues of variability of irrealis in the following quotation:
“Construction types marked as Irrealis in one language may be marked as Realis in
the next. In some languages Imperatives are classified as Irrealis, in others as Realis;
futures, questions, and negatives also show some variation. The formal expression of
the distinction varies cross-linguistically as well. In some languages, only the Irrealis
category is expressed overtly, in others both Irrealis and Realis are expressed, and in
still others one or the other is expressed by multiple markers. The distinction may be
indicated in various areas of the grammar: by particles, by clausal clitics, by verbal
inflection, and perhaps even by verbal derivation (Eatough Ms. on Nisenan). In many
languages it is carried as a feature of markers that also express other functions, such
as tense or aspect, clause linking, or pronouns, as in Caddo (Chafe, 1995)2 and Amele
(Roberts 1990).”
Despite this variability of irrealis, Mithun (1995) adopts the realis/irrealis labels for two sets of
2Changed to a full reference in comparison to the original which references the same edited volume.
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clause linkers in Central Pomo and argues that assuming this distinction can lead to fruitful cross-
linguistic observations. She reports that irrealis is used in counterfactuals, conditionals, deontic con-
structions, future, hortative, and imperative. The realis clause linkers express the past and present
reference, and they can be further specified for simultaneous and sequential events. Questions and
negation also follow the distribution of realis and irrealis according to these functions. In other
words, they do not play a role in determining the selection of realis and irrealis. Mithun (1995) notes
that certain core modal functions, such as conditionals and counterfactuals, are cross-linguistically
typically associated with irrealis, while other functions, such as imperatives, futures, questions, and
negatives display more cross-linguistic variation. She offers grammaticalization-based explanations
of how these variable functions are semantically consistent with both realis and irrealis interpre-
tations, and in a given language this can result in them being expressed by either category. Her
most notable contribution in this discussion is the proposal for the differences in scope between the
realis/irrealis markers, and the interrogative and negative markers. She proposes that interrogative
and negative markers scope over the realis/irrealis markers in Central Pomo, while the reverse is the
case in Caddo. Since the interrogative and negative markers scope over the realis/irrealis in Caddo,
they affect the interpretation of the mood. AlthoughMithun’s (1995) approach is formally attractive,
my observation is that it cannot be universally adopted as explaining questions and negation in all
languages with the realis/irrealis distinction. In order to make the claims about scope falsifiable,
a linguist needs to carefully examine language-specific data and analyze scope effects in a given
language.
I turn now to the criticism against realis/irrealis by Bybee et al. (1994:236-140) and Bybee (1998),
presented in the following three main arguments:3
1. The realis/irrealis is rarely realized as a binary morphological distinction in a given language.
2. Irrealis markers rarely denote the whole irrealis semantic domain.
3. If the realis/irrealis differs so vastly among languages – what is realis in one language can be
irrealis in another language – then this distinction is not cross-linguistically valid.
Regarding the first point of criticism, Bybee et al. (1994) and Bybee (1998) argue that the re-
alis/irrealis meaning is typically not expressed as a binary distinction, as languages typically employ
several markers in both domains. As we have seen above in the case of Amele and Caddo, the
realis/irrealis markers combine with other more specific TMA markers. However, that does not
invalidate that realis and irrealis are in a binary relationship, and contrast both semantically and
morphologically (by occupying the same slot). Authors who responded to Bybee’s (1998) criticism
often argue that many languages in fact do have a clear binary distinction between realis and irrealis
3One argument omitted here for the purposes of conciseness is the claim that irrealis is “sometimes used to cover ety-
mologically related elements in very different constructions that are perhaps not synchronically related” (Bybee, 1998:264).
Bybee (1998:264) illustrates this with the example of the verb have in two synchronically unrelated constructions: [have
+ past participle] and [have + to + verb]. However, in most published work on realis and irrealis, linguists typically deal
with one and only morphological category with the realis/irrealis distinction, and not several different constructions.
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(Elliott, 2000; McGregor & Wagner, 2006; Michael, 2014; von Prince et al., submitted). Elliott (2000)
provides an example of Manam [mva], an Oceanic language spoken on Manam island in Papua New
Guinea, as a language with a binary realis/irrealis distinction. Table 7.3 shows the realis and irrealis
paradigms of portmanteau subject prefixes in Manam. According to Lichtenberk (1983), realis ex-
presses the past and present reference in relation to the utterance time or another time in discourse
(4), and irrealis is used to express “imagined” events (5), including future reference, commands, ex-
hortations, warnings, and counterfactual events.
(4) u-nóʔu
1g.eal-jump
‘I jumped.’ (Lichtenberk, 1983:183)
(5) záma
tomorrow
ʔúsi
loin.cloth
né-gu
po-1g
mi-ásaʔ-i
1g.i-wash-3g.obj
‘I will wash my loincloth tomorrow.’ (Lichtenberk, 1983:184)
Table 7.3: Realis/irrealis portmanteau subject prefixes in Manam (Lichtenberk, 1983:182-183)
Realis Irrealis
1g u- m-
2g ʔu- go-
3g i- ŋa
1pl.incl ta- ta
1pl.ecl ʔi- ga
2pl ʔa- ʔama-
3pl di- da-
Besides the case of Manam, in a joint paper with members of the MelaTAMP project (von Prince
et al., submitted), we found that in a convenience sample of 70 Oceanic languages spoken in Melane-
sia, 24 languages have a binary system of realis/irrealis marking, while 46 languages do not have a
binary system. As we can see, the binary realis/irrealis distinction is not at all a rarely occurring lin-
guistic distinction. However, in most languages we do in fact find more than two distinctions in this
semantic domain. The three main such cases are: a) combining specific modal markers with more
general realis and irrealis markers, as in Amele, Caddo, Nyulnyulan languages (see Section 7.1.2), and
Nafsan (see Section 8.3), b) having the realis/irrealis distinction as well as other TMA distinctions
expressed in the same morphosyntactic slot, as is the case with realis/irrealis/perfect paradigms in
Nafsan, and c) having several markers with different modal meanings (see North Ambrym in Section
9.2.2). Another case of a non-binary distinction would be that a given language has a morphologi-
cal expression of only realis or only irrealis, in other words that one of the categories is unmarked
(Elliott, 2000:57). In Chapter 8 I argue that that is also the case in Nafsan, where the paradigm of
subject markers labeled as realis is semantically underspecified for the meaning of realis and con-
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Figure 7.1: Implicational hierarchy of realis/irrealis in several languages studied by Van Gijn & Gip-
per (2009:174), SC = speaker commitment, TR = temporal
trasts pragmatically with the specified irrealis. In this work, I use the case of Nafsan (Chapter 8) and
a few other Oceanic languages (Chapter 9) to show that having a non-binary distinction does not
invalidate the existence of the realis and irrealis as linguistic categories.
A second point of criticism expressed by Bybee (1998) has to to with the invalidity of the irrealis
semantic domain. Markers labeled as irrealis do not always cover the whole semantic domain of
irreality, which would mean that their core meaning is not irreality (Bybee, 1998). Bugenhagen
(1993) even notes that in his survey the meanings of irrealis markers in several languages do not
even overlap in their distribution. Many authors have also responded to this criticism, namely by
arguing that the irrealis semantic domain is not randomly rendered into different markers in different
languages. Instead, the irrealis semantic domain consists of natural meaning parts which can either
have specialized modal markers in a given language or serve as cut-off points between the meanings
of irrealis in different languages. According to Van Gijn & Gipper (2009), these meaning parts of
irrealis are hierarchically ordered, so that only the markers which have certain irrealis meanings are
also expected to have others, hierarchically lower meanings. Similarly to Roberts (1990), Van Gijn &
Gipper (2009) propose the tripartite realis/irrealis division into counterfactual, possible, and factual
meaning. The schema of these meanings as applied to several languages by Van Gijn & Gipper
(2009) is represented in Figure 7.1, and it follows from the following assumptions made by Van Gijn
& Gipper (2009:175):
“Irrealis minimally includes counterfactual events; if it contains possible events, it
will also contain counterfactual events; within the category of possible events, languages
may also draw a boundary between [–speaker commitment] and [+speaker commit-
ment] events. Inclusion of the latter into the irrealis category implies inclusion of the
former; if a language includes habituals [-temporal],4 it will also include possible and
counterfactual events.”
4The word “[-temporal]” was added here for clarity.
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Van Gijn & Gipper (2009) use the parameter of speaker commitment to explain the problematic
variable status of futures and imperatives, which are in some languages, such as Caddo, expressed by
realis, and in others, such as Amele, by irrealis. Van Gijn & Gipper (2009) also mention that future
tense in Central Pomo and imperatives in Alamblak can be expressed either by realis or irrealis.
Thus, when it comes to futures and imperatives, the lack of speaker commitment to the truth of
the proposition can be associated with irrealis, and the presence of such commitment with realis. It
depends on the language whether this parameter will play a role and where the cut-off point will be
within the domain of “possible”. The parameter of temporality divides the factual domain and aims
at explaining the nature of the habitual aspect which can also be expressed by both realis and irrealis,
depending on the language (Roberts, 1990; Givón, 1994; Bybee et al., 1994). Van Gijn & Gipper (2009)
use atemporality to describe the temporally non-specific reference of habituals (Givón, 1994; Baker
& Travis, 1997),5 which makes them similar to generics which are not tied to a specific time frame
(Krifka et al., 1995; Bertinetto & Lenci, 2012). Thus, in languages in which [-temporal] plays a role
when it comes to habituals, such as in Yurakaré (Van Gijn &Gipper, 2009), habituals can be expressed
by irrealis. These proposals for dividing the possible and factual domains into further parameters
address directly the third point of Bybee’s (1998) criticism, namely the high variability between
languages regarding certain meanings which can be expressed by both realis and irrealis. Other
such ambivalent meanings mentioned by Mithun (1995) above are negation and questions, which
she resolved by positing different scope relations (see above). In this work, however, I do not focus
on resolving how these different debated cases taking realis or irrealis in different languages can be
understood better from the semantic point of view. Instead, I focus on questions about the categorial
status of realis and irrealis, pertinent to Oceanic languages. These questions include a) positing a
cross-linguistic semantic definition of irrealis, b) differentiating irrealis from other categories, such
as future tense, and c) differentiating portmanteau realis/irrealis subject markers from unmarked
subject markers.
7.1.2 e cross-linguistic meaning of realis and irrealis
In this section I focus on the proposals for the cross-linguistic meaning of the categories of realis and
irrealis by Elliott (2000) and McGregor & Wagner (2006), as well as the criticism of such definitions
by de Haan (2012) and Cristofaro (2012). In the end of the section I also discuss some recent works on
realis/irrealis in different language groups (e.g. Cleary-Kemp, 2014;Michael, 2014;Matić &Nikolaeva,
2014).
Elliott (2000:66-67) builds on the work by Roberts (1990) and Mithun (1995) and proposes seman-
tic definitions of realis and irrealis based on their prototypical semantics:
“A eali proposition prototypically asserts that an event or state is an actualized or
certain fact of reality;
5Baker & Travis (1997) develop a full account of the irrealis mood in Mohawk (Amerindian) as a marker of verbal
definiteness/specificity, by which they explain why it is used in habituals.
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an ieali proposition prototypically implies an event belongs to the realm of the imag-
ined or hypothetical, and as such it constitutes a potential or possible event but it is not
an observable fact of reality.”
Using Comrie’s (1985) model of defining tense as the “grammaticalized expression of location in
time”, Elliott (2000:67) proposes that “the grammatical category of reality status can be described as
the grammaticalized expression of location in either the real or some unreal world”. Stemming from
her definition of realis and irrealis, Elliott (2000) justifies the cross-linguistic variability of irrealis
by highlighting the observation made by Chung & Timberlake (1985) that there are more ways in
which an event can be unreal than real; while there is only one real world, there are many unreal
worlds. Elliott (2000) proposes prototypical semantic contexts in which realis and irrealis occur; for
realis these are different types of past and present reference (and future in some languages), and for
irrealis potential events, conditionals, counterfactuals, events qualified by modality, and commands.
As discussed in Section 7.1.1, in some languages irrealis can also be used with negation, habituals,
and interrogatives. Although Elliott (2000) provides examples of different languages studied in the
literature for each of these realis and irrealis meanings, she does not offer a comprehensive semantic
account of how these different uses relate or are constrained by her semantic definition provided
above.
McGregor & Wagner (2006) study irrealis in Nyulnyulan languages (non Pama-Nyungan, Aus-
tralian) and propose that the core meaning of irrealis is the meaning of unrealized, which is under-
stood as referring to possible worlds. Figure 7.2 shows a graphic representation of the actual and
possible worlds by McGregor & Wagner (2006). McGregor & Wagner (2006:369-375) respond to the
irrealis debate by saying that irrealis has the core cross-linguistic meaning of “unrealized”, which
can be identified across languages. They also argue that the contrast between real and unreal events
is a “viable conceptual contrast”, as shown by its applicability to Nyulnyulan languages. While the
feature of +unrealized is a semantic invariant of irrealis, other language-specific meanings can be
derived in different ways in each language system. Nevertheless, McGregor & Wagner (2006) still
have the problem of semantically relating potential and counterfactual meanings of irrealis, because
the counterfactual worlds are not accessible from the “now” index in their model (for a detailed ex-
planation see Section 7.1.3). For that reason, they assume that the core meaning of irrealis is only
“unrealized” and that the counterfactual meaning can arise when the described event is in the past
or present, and, thus, analyzed as an unrealized past or present event.6 The same problem of relating
the potential and the counterfactual meanings of irrealis is discussed by Verstraete (2005), who pro-
poses that the counterfactual meaning is derived as an implicature in non-Pama-Nyungan languages,
while the core meaning of irrealis is that of “potential actualization”.
6The theoretical explanation of how the counterfactual meaning of irrealis arises is not clearly presented by McGregor
& Wagner (2006), as they do not explicate their assumptions, including the one that the potential meaning of irrealis is
expressed by the speech act of an irrealis clause and not irrealis itself.
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Figure 7.2: The model of the possible worlds by McGregor & Wagner (2006:350)
McGregor & Wagner (2006) make two additional observations important for this work, namely
those about the compositionality of realis and irrealis with other TMA markers and the unmarked-
ness of realis in Nyulnyulan languages. They exemplify the compositionality by showing the com-
bination of a modal marker meaning ‘likely’ with an irrealis-marked verb in Nyikina [nyh] (6) and
the usage of an evasive particle ‘nearly, almost (but didn’t)’ with irrealis in Warrwa [wwr] (7). These
combinations occur only with the future-oriented potential meaning of irrealis.7 In contrast to irre-
alis which has a defined core meaning, for McGregor & Wagner (2006:370) realis is underspecified
for +/-unrealized, as it “it does not specify anything about the actuality status of the situation”. They
draw this conclusion from the fact that the particles of probability, as in (6) and (7), can also combine
with realis in order to express lack of certainty. In Chapter 8 I argue that realis is also underspecified
in Nafsan and in Section 9.1 I extend this analysis to some other Oceanic languages with similar
properties.
(6) [Nyikina (Nyulnyulan, non-Pama-Nyungan)]
Niŋara-do
likely
wa-r-a-bula
it-i-a-come
wandal.
boat
‘It is likely that the boat will arrive./ The boat might arrive.’ (Nekes & Worms, 2006:257)
(7) [Warrwa (Nyulnyulan, non-Pama-Nyungan)]
Miliyarri
nearly
nga-l-yanba-na
1:min:nom-i-step:on-p
kinya
this
juurru
snake
ngayu-na.
1-eg
‘I nearly stepped on the snake.’ (McGregor & Wagner, 2006:358)
The main contribution of Elliott (2000) and McGregor & Wagner (2006) to the realis/irrealis debate
is proposing that, although irrealis is a cross-linguistically variable category, it is still possible to
7The combinations of irrealis with other TMA markers were also noticed by Palmer (2001:145) who calls them “joint
marking”.
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establish its prototypical or core meaning which is valid cross-linguistically. As an answer to this
view and the growing irrealis debate, Caterina Mauri and Andrea Sansò edited a volume of Language
Sciences dedicated to the irrealis debate. Among several discussions published in this volume, I focus
on the contributions by de Haan (2012) and Cristofaro (2012) who build on Bybee’s (1998) work and
argue against the possibility of establishing a prototype of irrealis. I first focus on de Haan’s (2012)
criticism and then on Cristofaro’s (2012) proposal.
According to de Haan (2012), realis is defined as a set of real events and irrealis as a set of unreal
events. He focuses on the category of irrealis and argues that a cross-linguistically valid prototype of
irrealis cannot be established because there are no meanings that are universally marked as irrealis.
He exemplifies this by comparing Limbu [li] (Tibeto-Burman), where irrealis gɔ:ni is restricted to
marking counterfactual conditionals (8), and Hualapai [yu] (Pai, Yuman), where irrealis is used to
express relative future and it cannot be used in conditionals (9). Crucially, the semantic distributions
of these two markers labeled as irrealis do not even overlap.
(8) [Limbu (Tibeto-Burman)]
yaŋ
money
kɔ-u-ŋ-gɔ:ni
have-3pl-1g.ag-i
iŋ-u-ŋ-ba.
buy-3pl-1g.ag-ipf
‘If only I had the money, I would buy it.’ (van Driem 1987:140–142, cited in de Haan 2012)
(9) [Hualapai (Pai, Yuman)]
olo-h-ch
horse-dem-bj
ha:
water
thi:-hi-k-wi
3/3.drink-i--a/be
‘The horse is going to drink the water.’ (Watahomigie et al. 2001:309–314, cited in de Haan
2012)
We can see that the irrealis markers in Limbu and Hualapai would be better described as having
more specific TMA labels. For this reason, de Haan (2012) argues that irrealis “is itself made up
of other categories”, which means that specific irrealis meanings can be expressed by individual
formal categories in different languages. Thus, he concludes that both realis and irrealis do not have
semantic cross-linguistic core meanings nor core syntactic expressions, which shows that reality is
only a philosophical and not a linguistic notion. In Section 9.2 I address this problem and show that
some languages indeed have specific modal categories, which are also a part of the irrealis semantic
domain, while other languages have irrealis markers which cover the entire semantic domain of the
irrealis category. The proposal for the semantics of irrealis is outlined in Section 7.1.3.
Cristofaro (2012) builds her work on Bybee’s (1998) argument that the grammatical structures
labeled as realis/irrealis might be based on other grammatical notions that are not even related to
mood distinctions. Focusing on portmanteau subject markers in switch-reference systems, as in
Amele, and preverbal subject markers, as in Manam, Cristofaro (2012:135) notes the following:
“From a conceptual point of view, the notion of person is completely independent
of the realized vs. unrealized status of the state of affairs being described, so there is
no obvious reason why the distinction between realized and unrealized states of affairs
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should be encoded at the level of person marking. The morphological structure of some
of the relevant forms suggests in fact that this may not actually be the case.”
Cristofaro (2012) proposes that the subject markers labeled as irrealis might in fact be simple
subject markers, whose perceived restriction to “realized” or “unrealized” contexts might be a con-
sequence of an entirely independent grammatical restriction of forms labeled as realis and irrealis.
Although Cristofaro (2012) does not develop this argument fully on cases of individual languages,
her proposal captures an important observation that some paradigms of portmanteau subject mark-
ers are indeed underspecified for TMA and that their morphological structure and diachrony might
be additional pieces of evidence for this claim.
Cristofaro’s (2012) proposal as it could apply to Oceanic languages is further discussed in Sec-
tion 7.2.1, and its implications are discussed on the case of Nafsan and other Oceanic languages in
Chapters 8 and 9. A related line of criticism of assuming that realis/irrealis might in fact be an-
other category altogether deals with questioning whether realis/irrealis can be reanalyzed as non-
future/future tense distinction (e.g. Velupillai, 2016). This problem regarding Oceanic languages is
addressed in Section 7.3.
Other recent works on realis/irrealis in individual languages include Michael (2014) and Matić
& Nikolaeva (2014). Michael (2014) responds to the irrealis criticism by adopting Corbett’s (2012)
“canonical” approach to grammar in which the best, clearest, indisputable features of a given cate-
gory are established as canonical. Michael (2014) proposes that realis/irrealis in Nanti, an Arawak
language of Peruvian Amazonia, could be considered to have the canonical realis/irrealis distinction.
Realis is used for non-future temporal reference and positive clauses, while irrealis is used in future
temporal reference, negative clauses, hypothetical, counterfactual meanings, imperatives, obligation,
need, purpose and prospective complement clauses (Michael, 2014). On the basis of their work on
Tundra Yukaghir, Matić & Nikolaeva (2014) argue that it should be possible to analyze realis and ir-
realis as “notional” moods in languages in which they may lack an overt morphological expression,
but can be derived through pragmatic enrichment.
The work on realis/irrealis based on Oceanic languages by Krifka (2016) and von Prince et al.
(2019d, submitted) is discussed in Section 7.1.3, and the work by Barbour (2011), Cleary-Kemp (2014)
and Pearce (2016) in Section 7.3. Some further literature on tenselessness in other language families
is also discussed in Section 7.3.
7.1.3 e proposal for the semantics of realis and irrealis
In this section I outline the proposal for the semantics of realis/irrealis made by von Prince (2019),
von Prince et al. (2019d, submitted), and Krifka (2016), followed in this work.
As we have seen in McGregor & Wagner’s (2006) model in Figure 7.2, realis and irrealis can
be represented as referring to the actual world and possible worlds, respectively. Many linguists
adopt similar approaches when it comes to the modeling of time and modality (e.g. Condoravdi,
2002; Iatridou, 2000). In this work I adopt the branching-times approach from von Prince (2019),
von Prince et al. (2019d, submitted) and Krifka (2016). von Prince’s (2019) branching-time model
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builds on the work byThomason (1970, 1984) and Dowty (1977), who developed the branching-times
model represented in Figure 7.3, where i1 and i2 are partially ordered temporal indices, referring to
a past moment and the present moment, respectively. The branches b1…b6 denote possible worlds
which branch out in infinite possibilities from a given moment in time. Thus, b1, b2, b5, and b6 are
counterfactual possibilities of the past, and b3 and b4 are future possibilities. As von Prince (2019)
notes, this model is based on the idea of historical necessity – while the statements about the past and
the present are necessarily true, the statements about the future might be true or false (Prior, 1957;
Thomason, 1970, 1984). In other words, while there is only one actual world in the past and present,
there are many possible worlds when it comes to the future reference. In order to formalize this
historical necessity logically, Thomason (1970, 1984) uses the necessity operator and introduces the
assumption that the quantification over different worlds is restricted only to the branches identical
up to the present moment. Thismeans that from the actual present i2 in Figure 7.3, we can only access
and quantify over the possible future b3 and b4, but not the counterfactual possibilities b1, b2, b5, and
b6.8 As shown in Section 7.1.2, relating the counterfactual and possible future semantically was also
a problem discussed by McGregor & Wagner (2006) and Verstraete (2005). In order to solve this
problem, von Prince (2019) gives up the restriction imposed byThomason (1970, 1984) and allows for
the quantification of all three domains of actual, counterfactual, and possible. Figure 7.4 illustrates
these areas within the branching-times model, and the following quotation from von Prince (2019)
defines each of the areas formally:
1. ic9 and predecessors of ic (the actual);
2. successors of ic (the possible);
3. and indices that are neither successors nor predecessors of nor identical with ic (the
counterfactual).
Figure 7.3: A graphical representation of Thomason’s (1984) model by von Prince (2019)
8We could quantify over b1…b6 by shifting back to the past i1 (e.g. Ippolito, 2013), but in that case we cannot quantify
exclusively over b1, b2, b5, and b6, because they are not accessible from i2, and from i1 they cannot be distinguished from
b3 and b4.
9The subscript “c” stands for context and ic are then indices of the actual present.
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Figure 7.4: The three domains of the modal-temporal space, relative to the actual present ic: the
actual (eal); the possible (po); the counterfactual (cf), adapted from von Prince et al. (2019a).
Figure 7.5: The three temporal domains of the modal-temporal space: the past (p); the present
(p); the future (f), adapted from von Prince et al. (2019a).
Regarding themodal areas represented in Figure 7.4, we can now define realis as corresponding to
the actual domain, and irrealis to the non-actual domain consisting of the counterfactual and the pos-
sible meanings. We can see that this type of model follows the literature which posits the three main
areas within the semantic domain of realis and irrealis, such as Roberts (1990) and Van Gijn & Gipper
(2009). The advantage of this model, however, is that it combines the modal meanings and temporal
reference, which captures the intuition that realis typically refers to the past and present, and irrealis
mainly to the future, but also to other temporal references. von Prince (2019) additionally assumes
that the indices in her model are ordered temporally. In the graph in Figure 7.5, vertically aligned in-
dices are taken to be simultaneous, so any given pair of indices stands in a particular temporal order.
This model captures the intuition of interrelatedness between mood and temporal reference, which
is essential for explaining how temporal interpretations are derived in mood-prominent languages
without any categories of tense.
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7.2 Oceanic subject markers and semantic underspecification
7.2.1 e case study of Unua
As discussed in Section 7.1.2, Cristofaro (2012) proposes that what has been labeled as a realis/irrealis
distinction in some languagesmight in fact be subject marking semantically underspecified formood.
This issue is particularly important in the case of Oceanic languages, because there aremany reported
cases of realis/irrealis markers interacting in different ways with the marking of subject person and
number on the verb. Different morphosyntactic strategies of this interaction were addressed in Sec-
tion 2.2, where I showed that some Oceanic languages have subject marker paradigms with mor-
phologically segmentable material, some of which might include realis/irrealis affixes, and others
have portmanteau morphemes which are not easily segmentable in their synchronic systems. In
this section I focus on a language in which the paradigms of subject markers are morphologically
segmentable into person/number information and realis/irrealis information, and in which realis is
morphologically unmarked. The main issue explored here is whether the realis paradigm is seman-
tically specified as being realis or whether we could assume that we are dealing with simple person
and number marking, semantically underspecified for the realis meaning. In this section I focus on
Unua, an Oceanic language spoken on the Malakula island, Vanuatu), based on the available material
by Pearce (2009, 2015a, 2016).
Pearce (2015a, 2016) describes Unua as having the binary contrast between realis and irrealis
expressed on the subject markers, as shown in Table 7.4 and in examples (10) and (11). Realis marks
the past and present reference and irrealis occurs with the future reference, imperatives, prohibitives,
purpose clauses, different types of complement clauses, and conditionals.
Table 7.4: Subject prefixes with the verb xa ‘to go’ in Unua (Pearce, 2015a:212)
Realis Irrealis
1g no-xa b-a-xa
2g u-xa b-u-xa
3g i-xa b-i-xa
1d.incl rru-xa rru-b-xa
1d.ecl mor-xa mor-b-xa
2d mur-xa mur-b-xa
3d ru-xa ru-b-xa
1pl.incl rra-xa rra-b-xa
2pl.ecl mam-xa mam-b-xa
2pl mum/mim-xa mum/mim-b-xa
3pl ra-xa ra-b-xa
(10) Xina
1g
reken
today
no-xa
1g-go
vex
to
raman.
loc.garden
‘Today I went to the garden.’ (Pearce, 2015a:235)
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(11) Xina
1g
reken
today
b-a-xa
i-1g-go
b-e-xr-i
i-1g-dig-
ba
aen
rraxum
crab
‘Today I am going to go to dig for crabs.’ (Pearce, 2015a:235)
Realis is morphologically unmarked in Unua, except for 1g, and irrealis is marked by the affix b,
which is in first position in singular and between other person/number morphemes in the other
persons. As we can see from Table 7.4, the forms labeled as realis are also formative elements of
the irrealis paradigm. The question is whether this morphological phenomenon is related to the
semantics of these subject markers. If we consider the meaning to be compositional, given that the
“realis” forms are also formative elements of the irrealis forms, we can posit a hypothesis that the
realis paradigm can be analyzed as simple subject-agreement marking without being semantically
specified for mood.10 However, there are at least some forms in which the realis mood is expressed
overtly in the morphology, such as 1g.eal no-. Apart from the subject markers, the expression of
realis/irrealis also seems to be encoded in relative clauses in Unua. In relative clauses, realis does
have the morphological expression in form of m inherited from the Proto-Oceanic realis *mw-, as
shown in the contrast between a realis relative clause in (12)11 and an irrealis relative clause in (13).
(12) Naxerr
time
[nga
comp
m-u-xa],
el-2g-go
u-sar
2g-fly
re
loc
nemen?
plane
‘When you went, did you go by plane?’ (Pearce, 2016:68)
(13) Naxerr
time
[nga
comp
b-u-xa],
i-2g-go
b-u-sar
i-2g-fly
re
loc
nemen?
plane
‘When you go, will you go by plane?’ (Pearce, 2016:68)
Pearce (2016) provides a diachronic solution to the realis appearance in relative clauses by arguing
that m- underwent a lenition process which was favored in main clauses. On the other hand, the
salience ofm- as a marker for modifying adjectives helped the preservation ofm- in relative clauses.
This particular case bears relevance in the discussion regarding Cristofaro’s (2012) proposal, because
it indicates that diachronically there used to be an overt realis marker, which still exists in certain
constructions and in 1g. Thus, this diachronic contrast could still be playing a role in the synchronic
system of subject markers. Following the reasoning about linguistic categories byWiltschko’s (2014)
(originally made for number marking), if we find realis interpretation even in the absence of overt
morphological marking, that is indicative of the presence of the realis category, while the absence of
a dedicated realis interpretation is indicative of the absence of such a category. In order to test this
in Unua, I studied the semantics of these subject markers and looked for any evidence that would
disprove that the realis subject markers have the function of expressing the realis mood. I looked for
any cases of the usage of the realis paradigm in non-actual contexts where irrealis would otherwise
be expected, such as different types of conditional clauses. I found that in hypothetical and counter-
factual conditionals, we find both realis and irrealis occurring in the protasis (Pearce, 2015a:243), as
shown in the hypothetical conditionals (14) and (15), and the counterfactual conditionals (16)-(17).
10Full subject pronouns have an entirely different set of forms (Pearce, 2015a:212).
11Note that Pearce (2016:68) glosses the realis marker in the synchronic Unua data as el (relative).
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If the realis subject markers were truly marking the realis mood, they would not be grammatical in
non-actual contexts referring to possible and counterfactual worlds.
(14) Avra
if
no-xa
1g-go
vex
to
Lakatoro
Lakatoto
mevix,
tomorrow
b-e-vr-i
i-1g-buy-
raes
rice
bi-sobon.
i-some
‘If I go to Lakatoro tomorrow, I will buy some rice.’ (Pearce, 2015a:243)
(15) Avra
if
be-ke-i,
1g.i-see-
go
and
no-rrang
1g-not.able
mu
again
be-bboer
1g.i-follow
taxo
behind
xai.
2g
‘If I see it, I am no longer able to go behind you.’ (RBa.04.54.011/12, Pearce 2009)
(16) Avra
if
no-xa
1g-go
vex
to
Lakatoro
Lakatoro
nano,
yesterday
b-e-vr-i
i-1g-buy-
raes
rice
bi-sobon.
i-some
‘If I had gone to Lakatoro yesterday, I would have bought some rice.’ (Pearce, 2015a:245)
(17) Avra
if
b-a-xa
i-1g-go
ma
only
nano
yesterday
vex
to
Vila,
Vila
b-e-ke-i
i-1g-see-
ju
already
nabburen
friend
so-g.
gen-1g
‘If I had gone to Vila yesterday, I would have seen my friend.’ (Pearce, 2015a:246)
This unusual usage of realis in conditional protases has also been reported by McGregor & Wagner
(2006) for Nyikina (non-Pama-Nyungan), Bugenhagen (1993) for Sursurunga (Western Oceanic) , and
by Exter (2012) for Wogeo (Western Oceanic). In Chapter 8 I discuss the same issue in Nafsan and
propose the reanalysis of the realis paradigm as the general paradigm of subject marking. In the case
of Unua, it seems likely that the realis paradigm is in fact only the subject marking in main clauses,
and that it is not specified for the realis mood. The analysis proposed for Nafsan in Chapter 8 might
be applicable to Unua’s case, as well as to other languages mentioned above (see also Section 9.1), all
of which express realis by subject markers.
7.2.2 Temporal reference in languages without tense
As established in Section 7.1.3, the semantics of realis and irrealis is inextricably connected to the
expression of temporal reference – realis expresses the past and present, and irrealis expresses the
future, but also the possibilities of the past and present. In this section I focus on the consequences
of reanalyzing some of the Oceanic realis paradigms as subject markers underspecified for TMA, as
proposed in Section 7.2.1. If Unua only has subject markers which are not specified for realis, how
does the temporal reference of past and present arise at all? There has been a lot of work in the
literature on this topic regarding tenseless languages and languages without an overt category of
tense in general. I discuss some of the current proposals and how they could relate to the Oceanic
issues.
The work on tenselessness has focused on languages without any overt morphological tense
marking. However, these types of languages usually lack the overt marking only in the past and
present, while the future is typically obligatorily marked by a future marker. This has been re-
ported for St’át’imcets [lil] (Salishan) (Matthewson, 2006), Mandarin Chinese (Lin, 2006), Kalaallisut
[kal] (Greenlandic Inuit) (Bittner, 2005), Yukatek Maya [yua] (Bohnemeyer, 2002), and Paraguayan
Guaraní [gug] (Tonhauser, 2011), among others. St’át’imcets examples (18) and (19) show the lack of
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overt tense marking which results in the past and present reference, respectively. However, when
it comes to the reading of future reference, the clause cannot be left unmarked for tense (20), as the
future marker kelh is obligatorily used (21).
(18) táyt-kan
hungry-1g.bj
lhkúnsa
now
‘I am hungry now.’ (Matthewson, 2006:677)
(19) sáy’sez’-lhkan
play-di-1g.bj
i-tsilkstásq’et-as
when.p-Friday-3conj
‘I played on Friday.’ (Matthewson, 2006:677)
(20) *táyt-kan
hungry-1g.bj
natcw/
one.day.away/
zánucwem
next.year
‘I will be hungry tomorrow/ next year.’ (Matthewson, 2006:677)
(21) táyt-kan
hungry-1g.bj
kelh
f
‘I will be hungry.’ (Matthewson, 2006:678)
In order to explain the discrepancy between the lack of overt tense marking in the past and present
and obligatorily marked future tense in St’át’imcets, Matthewson (2006) develops an analysis in
which tense is covertly present in St’át’imcets. Matthewson’s (2006) proposal is that the superfi-
cially tenseless sentences as in (18) and (19) contain a phonologically null tense morpheme ene,
which “introduces a variable over time intervals (the reference time) which receives its value from
the contextually determined assignment function” (Matthewson, 2006:680). She defines the lexical
entry of ene as being restricted to non-future. Although Matthewson’s (2006) proposal does not
offer a strictly semantic explanation of why there is a fundamental difference in markedness between
past/present and future, it captures the fact that the observed structures in St’át’imcets behave se-
mantically equally to languages with a morphologically expressed non-future/future distinction. In
the context of Oceanic languages in which the realis subject markers can be reanalyzed as general
subject markers underspecified for TMA, as in Unua and Nafsan, this problem would correspond to
understanding where past and present temporal interpretations come from. One approach would
be to adopt Matthewson’s (2006) analysis and posit either a covert ene or mood morpheme in the
paradigm, or to analyze the general markers as entirely tenseless/moodless12 and adopt a pragmatics-
based approach. The former approach, however, does not have any advantage over simply assuming
that the whole paradigm of subject markers simply denotes the realis mood, the only difference be-
ing that the realis morpheme is considered to be covert.13 For that reason, I turn to two other types
of approaches rooted in pragmatic reasoning.
Other approaches to explaining the temporal reference in tenseless languages offer pragmatic
12For the discussion about distinguishing mood from tense, see Section 7.3.
13The difference between St’át’imcets and Oceanic languages is that the subject markers in St’át’imcets are true general
subject markers that do not interact with TMA meanings and there is no other verbal category which tense values could
be ascribed to. Thus, Matthewson (2006) needs to posit an independent covert morpheme.
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and aspect-based explanations. Matthewson (2006) also notes that the lexical aspect plays a role in
determining the temporal reference of tenseless sentences – states highly prefer the present inter-
pretation, activities do not have a strong preference, and achievements prefer past interpretations.
These default aspect-based temporal interpretations have shown to be at play in many languages, in-
cluding Yukatek Maya, Inuktitut (Bohnemeyer, 2002; Bohnemeyer & Swift, 2004), Mandarin Chinese
(Lin, 2006), Navajo (Smith et al., 2007; Smith, 2008), and Hausa [hau] (Mucha, 2015), among oth-
ers. Aspectual and other pragmatic constrains on different types of temporal interpretations have
been most systematically laid out by Smith & Erbaugh (2005), Smith et al. (2007), and Smith (2008)
for Mandarin Chinese and Navajo, followed by Mucha (2015) for Hausa. I turn now to the theory
of pragmatic constraints of temporal reference proposed by Smith et al. (2007), Smith (2008), and
Mucha (2015).
Smith et al. (2007) and Smith (2008:231) propose the following pragmatic constraints of temporal
reference:
e Deictic Principle
Speech Time is the central orientation point for language. The Present time is located at
Speech Time; the Past precedes it, the Future follows.
e Bounded Event Constraint
Bounded situations may not be located in the Present.
e Simplicity Principle of Interpretation
Choose the interpretation that requires least information added or inferred.
These principles say that the default interpretation of unbounded situations is present, for bounded
it is past, and the the simplest interpretations are preferred.14 In order to illustrate this, Smith
(2008:233) uses the sentence Mary is working (now/tomorrow), which can have either the present
or future reading, to show that its default reading is the present. She predicts this by the Deictic
and Simplicity Principles. According to the Deictic Principle, the present is the preferred tempo-
ral location and according to the simplicity principle, the present is simpler than future. For Smith
(2008:233), the present is simpler because it does not involve an element of uncertainty as future
does. In other words, while the present is known to the speaker, it is uncertain which of the possible
futures will actually occur (see also Section 7.1.3).
Smith (2008) uses the case of Mandarin Chinese to show the effects of the Bounded Event Con-
straint. She shows that when overt aspectual markers denoting boundedness, le and guo,15 are used,
the temporal interpretation is situated in the past, as shown in (22) and (23). On the other hand,
when the progressive marker zaì is used, the default interpretation is that of the present reference,
as shown in (24).
14The Simplicity Principle results from Grice’s second Maxim ofQuantity by which people say the minimum necessary
to transmit the information. This principle “constrains the inferences that people make when they infer what is not
explicitly asserted” (Smith et al., 2007:60).
15Smith (2008) analyzes Mandarin Chinese le and guo as perfective markers. In Section 6.4 we discussed their status as
perfect markers, and le was classified as iamitive by Olsson (2013). For this point, however, it is crucial that, regardless of
the classification of le and guo, they express boundedness.
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(22) Wŏ
I
shuāiduàn-le
break-LE
tuĭ
leg
‘I broke my leg (it’s still in a cast).’ (Smith, 2008:236)
(23) Wŏ
I
shuāiduàn-guo
break-GUO
tuĭ
leg
‘I broke my leg (it has healed since).’ (Smith, 2008:236)
(24) shìshí-shàng
fact-on
zhè-zhŏng
this-kind
móshĭshĭ
model
zaì
ZAI
chaōxí
copy
kēxué
science
‘In fact, this model is already copying the natural sciences.’ (Smith, 2008:238)
For zero-marked clauses without any overt TMAmarkers, Smith (2008:241) also extends the Bounded
Event Constraint to lexical or situation aspect in her terminology and calls it Temporal Schema Prin-
ciple, so that the atelic events behave as unbounded, and telic events as bounded events. The crucial
point in Smith’s (2008) argumentation is that the defaults presented in (22)-(24) can be overridden by
explicit temporal information in the context. This is the case of the future reference inMandarin Chi-
nese, which needs to be indicated by either the future marker jiāng, future temporal adverbs, future-
oriented verbs such as ‘plan’ or ‘expect’, or similar contextual information. If applied to Oceanic
languages, this pragmatic approach would potentially be able to explain why, for instance in Unua,
the “realis” subject markers typically have the past and present reference, except for some specific
modal contexts in which they can have future and counterfactual readings.
Mucha (2015) builds on the work by Smith et al. (2007) and Smith (2008), and formally motivates
the need for the Bounded Event Constraint in Hausa. Mucha (2015:67) presents three main compo-
nents of the Bounded Event Constraint in Hausa in the following quotation (ET = Event Time and
RT = Reference Time below correspond to what I have called TSit and TT, respectively):
Temporal boundedness: [ET ⊆ RT]
Temporal boundedness means that the running time of the event is included in the ref-
erence time. Since temporal boundedness is expressed by grammatical aspect in Hausa,
this is a hard–wired semantic restriction in perfective sentences.
Present interpretation: [RT = UT]
In the case of a present interpretation of sentences containing event predicates, the ref-
erence time is identical to the utterance time.
Instantaneous UT: ∀t [t ⊆ UT→ t = UT]
Pragmatics dictates that speech acts are instantaneous, i.e. an interval t can only be a
subinterval of the contextually defined utterance time if it equals the utterance time.
The Bounded Event Constraint explains why durative events marked for perfective in Hausa
receive past readings by default rather than present (Mucha, 2015:68), as shown in (25). The dura-
tive event of playing in (25) cannot be interpreted as having occurred within the Utterance Time,16
which would be the default time. Since the perfective aspect requires the event to be included in the
16For the issue of incompatibility of the present and perfective see Malchukov (2009) and De Wit (2016).
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Reference Time, the only possible interpretation is to shift the Reference Time to the past (Mucha,
2015:68).
(25) Bashir
Bashir
yā
3g.m.pf
yi
do
wā̀sā
play
‘Bashir played.’ (Mucha, 2015:68)
In order to explain why the past reading rather than the future is the default reading in (25), Mucha
(2015:69) organizes the three temporal references into a Hierarchy of Simplicity (based on the Sim-
plicity Principle of Interpretation), by which the three temporal references are ordered as present >
past > future, from the simplest to the most complex. Thus, after the present, the past is the next
most available meaning because it is more complex than the present and simpler than the future.
The criteria for what constitutes simplicity of these interpretations are presented in the following
quotation by Mucha (2015:69):
Hierary of Simplicity
RT = UT: Present time reference is the simplest kind of temporal reference since (i)
an utterance situation always provides a time interval to which an RT variable can be
anchored, namely the utterance time, and (ii) present interpretation requires no displace-
ment of either the time or the world of evaluation.
RT < UT: Past time reference is more “complex” than present time reference since it
requires displacement of the reference time from the concrete utterance situation.
RT > UT: Future interpretation also involves reference time shifting and is hence more
complex than present interpretation. It is also more complex in comparison to past time
reference, because17 it adds the complication of modal displacement and thus increases
the level of abstraction required for interpreting the utterance.
Since the present reference is the highest in this hierarchy, it is preferred over past and future in-
terpretations, as shown in (26)with an imperfective-marked event that gets the present interpretation
by default. However, Mucha (2015:70) warns that these default interpretations can be overridden by
more specific temporal contexts, as shown in (27) in which an imperfective event has a past temporal
interpretation.
(26) Bashir
Bashir
ya-nā̀
3g.m-ipf
wā̀sā
play
‘Bashir is playing.’ (Mucha, 2015:70)
(27) Context question: What was Bashir doing when Ibrahim entered his house yesterday?
Lōkàcîn
When
dà Ibrahim
Ibrahim
ya
3g.m.el.pf
zō,
come,
Bashir
Bashir
ya-nā̀
3g.m-ipf
wā̀sā
play
‘When Ibrahim came in, Bashir was playing.’ (Mucha, 2015:70)
17For reasons of clarity, this sentence was slightly edited.
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Mucha (2015:70) captures this pragmatic influence of the context over the temporal interpretation
by formalizing the following principle:
Contextual Reference Time Anoring
Explicit temporal informationmay override pragmatic defaults. If the previous discourse
context provides an RT alternative to the pragmatic default, this RT can serve as a tem-
poral anchor for the time variable of the sentence.
The proposal for explicit pragmatic principles governing temporal interpretation by Smith et al.
(2007), Smith (2008), and Mucha (2015) offers a possible explanation of how temporal reference can
be derived in clauses with underspecified subject markers in Oceanic languages.
7.2.3 Semantic underspecification and pragmatic competition
In Section 7.2.2, we focused on deriving the semantics of temporal interpretation in languages which
lack any morphological expression of tense or, in some cases, any TMA categories. In this section
we turn to the cases when a language has morphological marking of TMA, but one of the categories
is in a pragmatic competition with another TMA category. I focus on implicated presuppositions
(Heim, 1991; Sauerland, 2008), which have been argued to play a role in deriving the meaning of
certain semantically unmarked TMA categories (e.g. Sauerland, 2002; Schlenker, 2005).
Implicated presuppositions are presuppositionswhich arise through the pragmatic blocking prin-
ciple Maximize Presupposition (28) proposed by Heim (1991). This principle says that when we have
two alternative morphemes, the one that has a stronger presupposition must be used whenever its
presupposition is satisfied. In order to illustrate this, let us look at example (29) as Heim’s (1991)
motivation for proposing this principle. Heim (1991) follows Hawkins (1981) in analyzing the indef-
inite article a through its pragmatic competition with its lexical alternative, the indefinite the. She
analyzes the definite the as having a presupposition of uniqueness (cf. the interpretation of unique
father in (30)), while the indefinite a does not have that presupposition (29). This forms an impli-
cational scale 〈the, a〉 in which the is more semantically specified and more informative (strong) in
comparison to a (weaker), which means that due to Maximize Presupposition the should be used
whenever its presupposition is satisfied in the common ground, i.e. knowledge shared by speakers
in the context. On the other hand, whenever the presupposition of the stronger item is not a part of
the common ground, the weaker item, a in this case, is used. This implicates that the presupposition
of the stronger item is not true, or not known to be true by the speaker. Based on this, by using
the indefinite a in (29), the presupposition of a unique father is due to Maximize Presupposition (28)
considered to be either false or uncertain, which results in an interpretation that the victim does not
have a unique father.
(28) Maximize Presupposition: Make your contribution presuppose as much as possible! (Heim,
1991)
(29) #A father of the victim arrived at the scene. (Sauerland, 2008)
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(30) The father of the victim arrived at the scene.
Sauerland (2008) argues that Heim’s (1991) approach outlined above can be generalized and ap-
plied to different sets of lexical alternatives, including {the, every, a, both}, {believe, know}, {g, pl},
{peake, heae}, {peen, pa}. For instance, Sauerland et al. (2005) argue that plural is seman-
tically unmarked, as it can refer to either singular or plural entities, cf. ‘children’ in (31) can refer to
a singular or a plural number of children. In his account, the meaning of plurality of the plural cat-
egory is derived as an implicated presupposition deriving from the pragmatic competition between
plural and singular, resulting in the meaning that the singular reference is false or uncertain.
(31) You’re welcome to bring your children. (Sauerland et al., 2005)
Sauerland (2002) also offers a short proposal for analyzing the present tense in English as semanti-
cally unmarked and he derives its typical present reference from competition with past tense (see
also Vennemann, 1983). He bases this proposal on the fact that present can be used even when the
temporal reference is in the past, as examples (32) and (33) could both be truthfully uttered after the
last Tuesday of “this month”, putting the event of fasting in the past. He suggests an analysis where
the past has the meaning of “presupposes that t is before the time of utterance” (Abusch, 1997) and
the present tense is semantically unmarked with no presupposition. Thus, by applying Maximize
Presupposition, the usage of present gives rise to an implicated non-past presupposition.
(32) Every Tuesday this month, I fast.
(33) Every Tuesday this month, I fasted.
I now turn to the applications of this pragmatic principle in the area of mood, regarding the pragmati-
cally derivedmeaning of the subjunctive (Schlenker, 2005). Schlenker (2005) analyzes the subjunctive
in French as a semantic default, which is in competition with other moods, such as the imperative
and the infinitive. The main argument for this is that, although subjunctive is expected to occur in
certain environments based on its modal semantics, it does not occur there because other moods,
such as imperative, indicative or infinitive are morphologically available and, thus, occur in that en-
vironment. Schlenker (2005) provides examples (34) and (35) to show that subjunctive is used with
an imperative meaning only in 3g for which there is no morphologically available imperative form.
(34) e
That
votre
your
Altesse
Highness
soit
be:bj
prudente!
cautious!
‘Let her Majesty be cautious!’ (Schlenker, 2005:11)
(35) #e
That
tu
you
sois
be:bj
prudent!
cautious!
/#Sois
/Be:2g:imp
prudent!
cautious!
Intended: ‘Be cautious!’ (Schlenker, 2005:11)
Schlenker (2005) shows several modal environments in French in which subjunctive is not morpho-
logically available. He explains the absence of subjunctive by assuming that other available cate-
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Figure 7.6: The temporal modal domains of the realis marker (dashed outline) and the distal marker
(solid outline) by von Prince (2018d)
gories, such as imperative, infinitive, or indicative are more semantically specified and informative
than subjunctive. Since subjunctive is semantically underspecified, it derives its meaning through
an implicated presupposition via pragmatic competition with other moods.
Another pragmatic approach is held by von Prince (2018d), who studies the competition between
the distal and the realis marker, which are in paradigmatic opposition in Daakaka, and shows that it
cannot be explained through Maximize Presupposition. The realis and the distal marker overlap in
expressing the meaning of actual past, but they differ in that realis can also express present reference,
and distal also has modal counterfactual meanings, as represented in Figure 7.6 based on the model
of realis/irrealis from Section 7.1.3. Since neither of the two markers logically implies the other, the
two expressions do not form a scale, and we cannot establish a competition between stronger and
weaker alternatives (von Prince, 2018d). However, the meaning of realis is more restricted than distal
because it refers to the actual past and present world, while the distal includes the actual past as well
as any number of past counterfactual worlds. In order to explain the preference of using realis over
distal when it comes to the expression of the actual past, von Prince (2018d) proposes a pragmatic
principle of simplicity, inspired by the simplicity principles by Smith et al. (2007) and Mucha (2015):
Simplicity Principle of Production:
Always choose the TAMmarker quantifying over the narrowest possiblemodal-temporal
domain.
This principle aims to explain the preference for the more specific realis marker in comparison
to the distal as a more underspecified marker, but without considering them as alternatives of each
other. von Prince (2018d) additionally expands the simplicity hierarchy by Mucha (2015) to counter-
factual past/present/futures, which are according to von Prince (2018d) placed lower than the future
in the hierarchy. In other words, the counterfactuals are even more complex than the future. This
makes it less preferable to choose a marker that can also denote the counterfactual reference in the
actual past context (when the meaning of actual past is intended), if another more specific non-modal
marker is available.
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The concept of pragmatic competition between two categories, studied in this section, bears
importance for the cases of semantic underspecification in Oceanic languages. In Chapters 8 and 9
I discuss and apply certain concepts from proposals presented here to explain the observed facts in
Nafsan and other Oceanic languages.
7.3 Realis/irrealis mood or non-future/future tense?
In this section I focus on the issue of distinguishing the realis/irrealismood from the non-future/future
tense analysis in Oceanic languages. I discuss some of the choices made in labeling of these cate-
gories in the literature on Oceanic languages and the criteria used by linguists for distinguishing
tense from mood.
In some language descriptions of Oceanic languages, we find the usage of the label “non-future/future”,
even when there is some indication of possibly modal meanings being expressed by the future. For
instance, besides expressing the relative future reference, in Arosi (Makira, Solomons) and Vinmavis
(Malakula, Vanuatu) future marking is also used in imperatives (Lynch et al., 2002). In Toqabaqita,
the future subject markers are used in some of the typical irrealis context, such as counterfactuals,
purpose and complement clauses, and apodoses of conditionals (Lichtenberk, 2008), as shown by the
multiple modal translations of the future marker in (36).
(36) Wela
child
naqi
this
ki
pl
keki
3pl.f
fanga.
eat
‘The children will/should/must eat.’ (Lichtenberk, 2008:851)
In both Arosi [aia] (Makira, Solomons) (Lynch et al., 2002) and Toqabaqita (Lichtenberk, 2008), the
non-future subject markers are semantically underspecified. The following quotation from Lichten-
berk (2008:677,679) describes the distribution of the future and non-future markers in Toqabaqita:
“The non-future markers are used to encode not only past and present situations,
but occasionally also future situations, especially situations that are imminent, about to
obtain. And they are also used in positive imperatives. The future markers are used to
encode future situations, but they also function, jointly with another particle, to encode
counterfactual past situations. Furthermore, the same set of subject-tense markers that
signals future tense is also used to express the imperfective aspect: habitual and general
events, and events in progress, including such events in the past.
[…]
Future-tense marking is required or is an option in certain syntactic environments
that involve irrealis contexts; for example, in complement clauses embedded under cer-
tain verbs, such as ‘want’; in clauses expressing purpose; in the apodoses of conditional
sentences; and in clauses encoding unfulfilled past situations.”
Judging from this definition of non-future/future markers in Toqabaqita, we can assume with
some certainty that they could also be described as markers of mood. Although an in-depth analysis
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of the language would be necessary to confirm this, appearing in past counterfactual situations is not
a characteristic of a future marker, but it is a characteristic of an irrealis marker. Lichtenberk (2008)
also mentions the appearance of this set of subject markers in past habituals, a context that has been
related to irrealis markers, but would on most accounts be incompatible with future tense. Examples
(37) and (38) show the appearance of the future subject markers in a counterfactual wish and a past
counterfactual conditional, respectively. Taking in consideration that the non-future markers can be
used in immediate future (quotation above) and protases of counterfactual conditionals, Toqabaqita’s
non-futuremarkers might simply be subject markers underspecified for TMA, as discussed in Section
7.2.1 for Unua.
(37) Nau
1g
ku
1g.nf
thathami-a
want-3.obj
wela
child
nau
1g
ki
pl
sa
i
keki
3pl.f
qadomi
help
nau
1g
faafi-a
concerning-3.obj
raa
work
nau
1g
ki.
pl
‘I wish my children would help me with my work (lit.: works).’ (Lichtenberk, 2008:1003-4)
(38) Ma=sa
or=i
qo
2g.nf
qaa∼qadomi
ed∼help
nau,
1g
kwai
1g.f
qadomi
help
qoe.
2g
‘If you had helped me, I would have helped you.’ (Lichtenberk, 2008:1120)
Coming back to examples (37) and (38), we can see that there is an additional irrealis marker sa
in both of them. Although Lichtenberk (2008:1119) analyzes sa as an irrealis marker contributing
the counterfactual meaning in these examples, the future markers would still need to agree with
that meaning situated in the past, which would not be expected from a future marker. Ultimately,
the fact that there is the additional irrealis particle in Toqabaqita might have been the reason why
Lichtenberk (2008) chose a tense label for the subject markers. This seems to be a recurrent problem
when choosing labels in language descriptions, in particular in languages with rich TMA systems,
whose markers are semantically very similar. Ridge (2019), in her study of Vatlongos (Southeast
Ambrym, Vanuatu), encounters a similar problem. In the realis domain, Vatlongos has a prior and
non-future marking, and within the irrealis domain it exhibits immediate future, distant future, ap-
prehensive, imperative, and prohibitive markers. The immediate and distant future meanings occur
in fact in many similar modal contexts, but since the temporal domain is the only area in which the
two markers contrast semantically, Ridge (2019) opted for an analysis of tense rather than mood.
These cases show that linguistic categories in individual languages are often a result of identifiable
language-internal contrasts rather than cross-linguistically postulated TMA categories.
Barbour (2011) discusses different criteria for determining whether the portmanteau subject
markers denote realis/irrealis mood or non-future/future tense in Neverver (Malakula, Vanuatu). Ta-
ble 2.2 in Section 2.2 outlines the subject marker and mood paradigms in Neverver. Barbour (2011)
discusses several meanings attributed to irrealis in the literature and focuses on meanings or con-
structions which served as decisive criteria for Neverver. I outline here three most relevant points
for our discussion. The first one has to do with imperatives and prohibitives (39), which she analyzes
as “unrealized” and therefore a sign of irrealis, and not future tense. The second one are the protases
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of counterfactual conditionals (40), which are “unrealized” possibilities in the past, and should thus
be expressed by irrealis markers and not future tense. And lastly, by looking at false beliefs and in-
definite relative clauses (41), which qualify as unrealized because they have no referent in the actual
world, Barbour (2011) shows that Neverver indeed has a category of irrealis and not future tense.
Although many meanings that serve as evidence for the irrealis analysis in Neverver are debated in
the literature, it is clear that when a given marker appears in an overwhelming number of different
contexts expressing possibilities with different temporal references, as in Neverver, there is good
evidence to analyze it as encoding mood.
(39) Kum-khan
2i.g-eat
ibiskham!
one
‘Eat one!’ (Barbour, 2011:207)
(40) Besi
if
abit-lav∼lav
3i.pl-get∼get
si
neg
kek
cake
ang
ana
im-bbu
3i:g-go
tuan
loc.pe
ei.
3g
‘If only they hadn’t assigned the cake (making) to him.’ (Barbour, 2011:212)
(41) Ei
3g
i-khan
3eal.g-eat
si
neg
navuj
banana
ibi-skham.
3i.g-one
‘He didn’t eat a (future/nonactualized) banana. (Barbour, 2011:216)
The issue of distinguishing tense from mood is also relevant for Nafsan. In his Honors thesis, Bacon
(2013) argues that Nafsan should be reanalyzed as having the non-future/future distinction instead
of realis/irrealis for several reasons, including the fact that an epistemic marker typically combines
with “realis”, “realis” is available in conditionals and counterfactuals, and negation also occurs with
“realis” and not irrealis. The next chapter deals with these and other questions by offering a fine-
grained analysis of the portmanteau subject markers that were labeled as realis and irrealis in Nafsan
by Thieberger (2006).
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Chapter 8
Realis and irrealis in Nafsan
In this chapter I identify problems in the current analysis of the realis and irrealis mood in Nafsan
and provide semantic reanalyses of this distinction, based on a detailed study of the distribution of
fine-grained meanings encoded by the realis/irrealis subject proclitics in Nafsan.
8.1 Portmanteau subject proclitics
In this section I discuss the morphology of portmanteau subject proclitics in Nafsan, with the focus
on those labeled as irrealis by Thieberger (2006). I discuss their diachrony and synchrony and show
that, despite being partially morphologically compositional and formed on the basis of the general
(realis)1 subject proclitics, the irrealis proclitics are not productively compositional in the synchronic
system, which justifies treating them as portmanteau subject markers.
In Section 2.2 I discussed several Oceanic languages with different degrees of morphological
separation and fusion between the subject markers and TMA markers. For example, I classified the
realis and irrealis marking in Neverver as agglutinative, with clearly defined formative elements, but
also morphologically dependent and integrated in the subject marking paradigm. In Neverver, the
irrealis marker appears always in the same slot and contrasts with the zero-marked realis forms (see
Table 2.2 in Section 2.2). However, languages like Nafsan have portmanteau subject markers whose
morphology cannot be as easily analyzed as being compositional. Table 8.1 shows a tentative mor-
phological segmentation of subject proclitics. As we can see, the irrealis paradigm can be segmented
into the general (realis) personmarking followed or preceded by k and the perfect-agreeing paradigm
follows a similar addition of k and final i. We can observe certain regularities, such as k being the
first element in singular, and in dual occurring as the last element in irrealis and in the middle in
the perfect-agreeing paradigm. In plural, k is again the first element in 1ecl.pl and 2pl in irrealis
and when it comes to perfect there is a lot of variation in available forms. The only person in which
there is no visible morphology involving k in irrealis is 2g which is, nevertheless, pronounced as
[k͡p], suggesting it might have derived from a form with an initial k. However, these “regularities”
1In Section 8.3 I offer my reanalysis of realis subject proclitics (Thieberger, 2006) as general subject proclitics. In the
preceding sections in this chapter I refer to them as “general (realis)”.
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typically apply to not more than two or three persons, and even then it is not clear what grammatical
factor is governing the position of k. The only true regularity for the irrealis paradigm is that in the
whole of dual k follows the general (realis) forms. Needless to say, there are no other TMA markers
that follow this type of distribution and interaction with the general (realis) paradigm. Thus, we can
conclude that there is no simple way of morphologically segmenting the proclitics in the synchronic
system. The only conclusion we can take is that, from a diachronic perspective, the general (realis)
seems to have served as the formative element to both the irrealis and the perfect-agreeing paradigm.
Table 8.1: Tentative segmentation of subject proclitics in Nafsan, based on Thieberger (2006:150)
General (realis) Irrealis Perfect-agreeing
1g a= k-a= k-a-i=
2g ku= p̃a= [k͡pa] k-u-i=
3g i= k-e= k-i=
1d.incl ta= ta-k= ta-kai=, ta-i=
1d.ecl ra= ra-k= ra-kai=
2d ra= ra-k= ra-kai=
3d ra= ra-k= ra-kai=, ra-i=
1pl.incl tu= tu-k= tu=, tu-i=, tu-koi=
1pl.ecl u= k-o= u-i=, k-o-i=
2pl u= k-o= k-o-i=
3pl ru= ru-k= ru-i=, ru-kui=
From a diachronic point of view, the situation in Nafsan must be a result of complex permu-
tations between subject markers and TMA markers. In their work on Western Oceanic languages,
Ross & Lithgow (1989) show that many subject proclitics can be segmented into different TMA and
person/number elements. However, the reconstruction of these forms to Proto-Oceanic is difficult,
as most of the paradigms seem to be explainable only by language-specific developments, which are
hard to generalize to other languages. An interesting observation is that the irrealis paradigms are
typically morphologically formed on the basis of what is analyzed as realis subject markers.
Regarding the possible irrealis k element in Nafsan, one hypothesis of its origin is the Proto-
Oceanic sequential marker *ka, which according to Lichtenberk (2014) has developed into a future
tense, irrealis, or inceptive marker in many Oceanic languages. A piece of evidence that strengthens
this hypothesis is the existence of an irrealis particle ga in Lelepa, a neighboring language of Nafsan,
situated in North Efate. Lelepa shares many lexical similarities with Nafsan, as can be seen even in
grammatical elements, such as subject proclitics shown in Table 8.2. Lelepa has only one paradigm
of subject proclitics, except for the 2g with the irrealis form p̃a=,2 which has the same form as in
Nafsan.3 These subject proclitics attach to the irrealis marker ga, as shown in (1). This type of co-
occurrence of the subject marker and the irrealis marker could have led to their merging in Nafsan.
2The marker p̃a= also exists in Nguna (North Efate), with the meaning of irrealis (Schütz, 1969).
3The reason for the existence of a dedicated irrealis form in 2g might be the fact that the 2g tends to be more frequent
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This is further supported by the fact that Nafsan lost all the final vowels still attested in Lelepa, as for
instance wi ‘good’ in Nafsan compared to wia ‘good’ in Lelepa. Since this is a general rule in Nafsan,
a form like ta=ga from (1) would have easily became tag and then tak in Nafsan.
(1) Ae,
hey
ta=ga
1d.incl=i
fan,
go.i
ta=ga
1d.incl=i
loso
bathe
lau.
seawards
‘Hey, let’s go, let’s bathe down at the beach.’ (Lacrampe, 2014:402)
Table 8.2: Subject proclitics in Lelepa (Lacrampe, 2014:243)
1g a=
2g ku=/ i p̃a= [k͡p]
3g e=
1d.incl ta=
1d.ecl ar=
2d kar=
3d ar=
1pl.incl tu=
1pl.ecl ur=/au=
2pl kur=
3pl ur=
These diachronic observations show why it is hard to meaningfully morphologically separate
the TMA-marking elements from the person/number-marking elements in Nafsan in the synchronic
system. Given that in the synchronic system the morphological formation of the irrealis and perfect-
agreeing subject markers is relatively intransparent, the best approach is to treat them as portman-
teau subject markers. The purpose of this tentative diachronic discussion was to show that the
appearance of diachronic TMA markers as deeply integrated in the subject marking system as in
Nafsan cannot be explained by postulating that we are dealing solely with subject markers which
happen to be restricted to certain contexts, as suggested by Cristofaro (2012) in her criticism of port-
manteau subject markers (see Section 7.1.2). In the following sections I focus on the semantics of the
general (realis) and irrealis subject proclitics in Nafsan.
8.2 Challenges for the analysis of realis and irrealis in Nafsan
In this section I present the main challenges for the analysis of realis/irrealis subject proclitics in
Nafsan, stemming from the description by Thieberger (2006) and the initial analysis of the Nafsan
corpus. I limit my focus to the challenges addressed in this work and thus restrict my claims in
the thesis to these particular questions. The choice of these research questions was guided by the
in irrealis contexts (Meyerhoff & Holcroft, 2019).
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overarching question of whether subject proclitics in Nafsan encode the realis/irrealis distinction.
For this reason, the TMA markers that combine with them are analyzed only in terms of how they
contribute to the realis or irrealis interpretation.
Analyzing the subject proclitics as realis and irrealis byThieberger (2006) explains a large number
of their occurrences, as the general (realis) subject proclitics tend to be interpreted as past or present
referring to actual world, as shown in (2) with a past reference and (3) with an imperative and future
interpretation (see also Section 2.3.1). However, there are many challenges for the analysis of realis
and irrealis if we look at more semantic contexts. The main challenge for the analysis of the general
(realis) subject proclitics as denoting realis mood is their occurrence in contexts denoting possible
future and counterfactual meanings, which belong to the irrealis domain (see Section 7.1.3). In this
section I focus on a few cases exemplifying this problem. As shown in Section 2.3.1, Thieberger
(2006) notes that the conditional and possibility markers f and fla obligatorily occur with the general
(realis) subject proclitics instead of irrealis. Example (4) shows the usage of the general (realis) forms
of subject proclitics with the marker fla ‘might’, as well as the usage of the general (realis) forms with
future reference indicated by the adverbial matol ‘tomorrow’. These meanings belong to the irrealis
domain and are not expected to be compatible with realis markers. Bacon (2013) also argues that
the fact that the epistemic fla ‘might’ requires realis and not irrealis suggests that we are dealing
with the distinction of future/non-future tense and not mood. According to Bacon (2013), an irrealis
marker should be able to express epistemic meanings and since he does not find evidence that it does
so in Nafsan, he proposes reanalyzing the irrealis subject proclitics as denoting future.
(2) me
but
malpei
before
kotkot
really
a=mes
1g=play
naor
place
laap.
many
‘but in those days I played at lots of places.’ (063.083)
(3) p̃a=leperkat-i-ø
2g.i=look.out--3g.obj
ka=fo
1g.i=pp.i
wat-gi-k
hit--2g.obj
‘You look out, I am going to hit you.’ (013.021)
(4) Ko
or
ru=fla,
3pl=might
ru=fla,
3pl=might
mees
today
i=fla
3g=might
ta
neg1
nom,
finish
i=fla
3g=might
ta
neg1
nom
finish
mau,
neg2
matol
tomorrow
ru=mai,
3pl=come
pkaskei
same
pa
go
pnut
close
nawesien
work
gar.
3p.ben
‘And if it is not finished today, if it is not all done, tomorrow they’ll come to their work.’
(085.017)
Different kinds of possibilities are often expressed by general (realis) subject proclitics in the Nafsan
corpus, alone or in combination with modal markers, such as f and fla. For instance, example (5)
describes a mere possibility of the speaker going to war in Solomon islands. However, each verb is
marked with general (realis) subject proclitics, and one of them combines with the modal marker
f. The most striking usage of “realis” is in the protases of conditional clauses, including counterfac-
tual conditionals, as in (6) where the general (realis) proclitics combine with the conditional marker
f. Thus, the challenge regarding f and fla lies in explaining why a) “realis” combines with modal
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markers, and b) irrealis does not occur with these modal markers. Both issues bear relevance for our
analyses of the Nafsan subject proclitics as encoding a category of mood. The implications of the
co-occurrence of realis proclitics with f and fla, as well as with other modal markers, are discussed
in more detail in following sections.4
(5) Naal
war
me
but
a=pa,
1g=go
i=f
3g=might
pi
be
nmaten.
funeral
A=mat
1g=die
kat
bite
kantri.
country
‘If there is a war I will go, it might be (my) funeral. I could die for the country.’ (040.012,
040.013)
(6) Ru=f
3pl=cond
to
hab
nigmam
1pl.ecl.ben
traus-i-ø,
tell-3g.obj
ko=fo
1pl.ecl.i=pp.i
tae,
know
me
but
gar
3pl
i=tik.
3g=neg
‘If they had told it to us, we would know, but they didn’t.’ (Thieberger, 2006:259)
Thieberger (2006:304) also describes irrealis as occurring in different types of complement clauses
expressing possibilities, such as evaluative and desiderative clauses (see Section 2.3.1), as shown in
(7) and (8) with wi ‘be good’ and mur ‘want’ as main verbs and irrealis proclitics in the complement
clauses, respectively. However, there are several cases in the Nafsan corpus in which the complement
clause of a desiderative clause has general (realis) subject proclitics, as shown in (9). This poses a
puzzle because there is no obvious governing factor for choosing realis over irrealis in desiderative
clauses. These issues regarding both desiderative and evaluative clauses are tackled in Section 8.6.2.
(7) i=wi
3g=good
na
comp
akit
1pl.incl
tuk=pei
1pl.incl.i=first
infom-ki
inform:bi-
sesin.
session
‘It is good that we inform the session (of the church).’ (Thieberger, 2006:309)
(8) ru=mur-i-n
3pl=want3g.obj
na
comp
ruk=welu
3pl.i=help
ser
every
mal
time
akit.
1pl.incl
‘They always want to help us.’ (119.015)
(9) i=lek-a-ø
3g=look3g.obj
na
comp
elau
sea
i=mat
3g=low.tide
top
big
i=semsem
3g=happy
i=mur
3g=want
nag
comp
i=siwer
3g=walk
ur
along
nskau.
reef
‘He saw that the tide was out. He was happy, he wanted to walk along the reef.’ (101.010)
Another issue is the expression of false beliefs by complement clauses, as shown in examples (10)
and (11) with complement clauses expressing beliefs shown to be false in the context. Despite their
similar semantics, examples (10) and (11) differ in their choice of mood, (10) with general (realis)
proclitics and (11) with irrealis proclitics, with no discernible difference in their interpretations of
counterfactuality caused by false beliefs.
4Note that it has been shown in the literature that protases of conditionals can lack mood marking (e.g. Haspelmath,
2014), which is compatible with Ramsey condition for conditionals, which refers to a preliminary increase of the assump-
tions made, with respect to which then an assertion is made (Ramsey, 1931). This observation is consistent with my
analysis of the general (realis) proclitics as semantically underspecified for mood in Nafsan, see Section 8.3.
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(10) u=mro-ki-ø
1pl.ecl=think3g.obj
na
comp
i=sa
3g=bad
me
but
mees
today
u=po
1pl.ecl=pp.eal
pam̃or-i-ø
find3g.obj
na
comp
i=po
3g=pp.eal
i=wi
3g=good
‘we thought it would be bad, but today we find that it is good.’ (068.021)
(11) a=mro-ki
1g=think
nen
comp
ka=fei
1g.i=first
ler
return
me
but
elau
sea
ki=pe
3g.pf=pf
mu
high.tide
top
big
‘I thought I could get back but the tide was too high.’ (101.041)
As we could see in this section, identifying challenges regarding the realis/irrealis distinction
in Nafsan revolves around analyzing the subject proclitics used in different contexts of meaning
pertaining to the realis and irrealis domains. The main issue in the Nafsan data is the occurrence
of general (realis) proclitics in contexts that express reference to non-actual worlds and would be
expected to require irrealis. This poses a problem for the definition of both realis and the irrealis
mood as encoded by the subject proclitics in Nafsan. These issues are discussed in the following
sections.
8.3 e distribution and meaning of realis and irrealis
In this section I analyze the basic distribution of general (realis) and irrealis proclitics in the Nafsan
corpus and my fieldwork data and argue for initial analyses of their meanings.
8.3.1 Combinations with TMA markers and the underspecification of realis
In this section I present the combinations of the subject-marking paradigms labeled as realis and
irrealis (Thieberger, 2006) with TMA markers, as they are attested in the Nafsan corpus (Thieberger,
1995–2018) and my fieldwork data (Krajinović, 2017b). I use the presented data to argue for an initial
analysis of the realis paradigm as a general subjectmarking underspecified formood. In the following
sections more specific modal contexts will be analyzed and used to support and expand this analysis,
and Section 8.7 offers a theoretical pragmatic account of the underspecification of realis.
As shown in Section 8.2, the combinations of subject proclitics and TMA markers can provide
important insight into the meaning of subject proclitics as encoding the realis/irrealis distinction.
A good way of creating an overview of all combinations of subject proclitics and TMA markers is
to quantify their occurrences in the corpora. This way, the TMA markers also serve to establish
clear and quantifiable TMA contexts which would otherwise require additional annotations of the
corpora. In order to quantify these occurrences I selected only the markers in the ma slot, which
immediately follow the subject proclitics (see Section 2.3.2), namely the perfect pe (pf), prospective
realis po (pp.eal), prospective irrealis fo (pp.i), counterfactual conditional f mer (cond.cf), and
fla ‘might’. For the purposes of this particular quantification, in the case of the marker f I limited
my search to the cases in which it combines with the counterfactual markermer in order to capture
the counterfactual conditional meaning as isolated from other meanings of f, discussed in Section
8.5. The quantification was performed by a simple Python program that searches and counts the co-
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Figure 8.1: Co-occurrences of subject proclitics and TMA markers in two Nafsan corpora
occurrences of each of the subject proclitics and the TMAmarkers. I then applied this program to the
Nafsan corpus (Thieberger, 1995–2018) as well as my storyboard corpus (excluding meta-linguistic
elicitation). The co-occurrences from the two corpora were added and are shown in Figure 8.1.
We can see that the irrealis and perfect subject proclitics occur with the markers that match
their TMA values: the prospective irrealis fo, the counterfactual conditional f mer and fla combine
with irrealis and the perfect pe combines with perfect-agreeing proclitics. However, none of these
markers combine only with irrealis or perfect proclitics, because they can also felicitously combine
with the general (realis) proclitics. In some cases general (realis) is in fact preferred, as withfla, and in
others irrealis is largely preferred, as with the prospective irrealis fo. The prospective realis po is the
only marker that accepts only one paradigm of proclitics – the general (realis) one. This is expected
because the prospective realis meaning would not be compatible with irrealis and perfect-agreeing
meanings (see Section 5.3.1). This initial picture of the distribution of the subject proclitics is crucial
for choosing how to approach the challenges for the analysis of realis/irrealis in Nafsan, outlined
in Section 8.2. Figure 8.1 shows us that the general (realis) proclitics are not only interchangeable
with irrealis proclitics in certain contexts, but also with perfect-agreeing proclitics. This was already
discussed in Section 5.1.1, where I showed that the general (realis) proclitics can combine with the
perfect pe in all perfect contexts, including those with future reference, as shown in (12) repeated
from Section 5.1.1. There are also other cases of the general proclitic being usedwith future reference,
as in (13) from the Future Questionnaire.5 This shows that the general (realis) proclitics are not
restricted to the past and present reference of the actual world.
5The choice of the general proclitic might be related to the choice of the temporal adverb. Examples including ‘in a few
minutes’, ‘in the evening’, and ‘tomorrow’ were produced with irrealis and the prospective irrealis fo.
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(12) Malnen
when
p̃a=ler,
2g.i=return
a=pe
1g=pf
mtir
write
natus
letter
su.
pf
‘When you come back, I will have finished writing the letter.’ (AK1-083-01, based on Dahl
2000b:FQ 17)
(13) [There are black clouds in the sky.] It RAIN (very soon). (Dahl, 2000b:FQ 47)
Us
rain
i=wo
3g=rain
pelpel.
soon
‘It will rain soon.’ (AK1-086-01)
The protases of counterfactual conditional clauses with f mer have more or less equal chances of
having general (realis) or irrealis proclitics, with 30 and 32 occurrence in total, respectively. Exam-
ples (14) and (15) (repeated from Chapter 1) as future counterfactual conditional clauses, show both
options attested in the storyboard data. The combinations with the marker f are also interesting in
that the co-occurrence with irrealis proclitics is restricted only to proclitic forms ending in a vowel,
due to phonetic restrictions. This is discussed in more detail in Section 8.5.1.
(14) a=f
1g.=cond
mer
cf
mes
play
matol,
tomorrow
go
and
nfag
sore
nen
el
kin
comp
a=tai
1g=cut
nakn-i-k
finger--1g.dp
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
mer
again
makot
break
‘If I played tomorrow, the sore I cut onmyfingerwould bleed again.’ (AK1-098-01, 00:03:39.185-
00:03:57.063)
(15) ka=f
1g.i=cond
mer
cf
mes
play
volibol
volleyball
matol,
tomorrow
nakn-i-k
finger--1g.dp
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
mra
bleed
‘If I played volleyball tomorrow, myfingerwould bleed.’ (AK1-004-01, 00:03:27.921-00:03:33.286)
Given that the prospective markers are the only TMAmarkers encoding the realis/irrealis distinction
themselves, it is strange that we find some occurrences of the general (realis) proclitics and the
prospective irrealis fo (see below the explanation of the semantics of fo). Examples (16) and (17)
show two such cases from the Nafsan corpus. One important observation regarding example (16) and
others with similar forms is that Nafsan has the tendency to lose the pronunciation of velars in coda
position (Billington et al., submitted). Thus, the irrealis form ruk can occasionally be pronounced as
ru, which is the general (realis) form. This would mean that the phonological representation of ru=fo
in (16) is in fact ruk=fo. This explanation can account for almost all occurrences of fo with general
(realis) proclitics, but it does not account for (17), in which case the 1pl.ecl irrealis proclitic would
have the form ko=. Thus, there must be another explanation for the very few cases like u=fo in (17),
because in elicitation speakers routinely reject the combination of general (realis) proclitics which
are not eligible for the deletion of k and fo. Nevertheless, they accept the proclitics with the elided
k, cf. recordings AK1-111-01 and AK1-112-01. In any case, the fact that phonological effects can
occasionally result in the loss of distinctions between realis and irrealis even with the marker which
denotes irrealis itself, is a strong indicator of just how easy it is to develop complex correspondences
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between the phonological form and the meaning of subject proclitics.
(16) Teesa
children
ru=pak
3pl=go.to
ektem
outside
ru=fo
3pl.pp.i
tae
know
nae
what
kin
comp
i=wi
3g=good
ga
and
nae
what
kin
comp
i=sa.
3g=bad
‘Children go outside and will know what is good and what is bad.’ (085.008)
(17) go
and
komam
1pl.ecl
u=fo
1pl.ecl=pp.i
paakor-wes
arrive-3g.obl
ki
dem
u=fo
1pl.ecl=pp.i
mer
again
tm̃alu
depart
naur
island
ki
dem
u=mer
2pl=again
mai
come
pak
to
e-sa
loc-here
‘And we would be born there and we would leave the island and come here.’ (047.019)
Fla is a modal marker that combines almost exclusively with the general (realis) proclitics. In our
corpora there are 123 occurrences with realis and only 5 with irrealis. In Chapter 8.5 I compare
the case of fla with f and argue for a phonological constraint on the occurrence of fla and irrealis
proclitics. Examples (18) and (19) illustrate a storyboard context in which one speaker used the
combination of flawith a general (realis) proclitic and another speaker used an irrealis proclitic with
the marker fo. The intended meaning in these examples is that of epistemic modality, which belongs
to the domain of irrealis. Thus, it is surprising that realis and not irrealis proclitics combine with the
epistemic marker fla to express this meaning.
(18) I=fla
3g=might
to
pog
pi
be
Yokon
Yokon
kin
el
i=paam
3g=eat
nawi
yam
miel
red
gaag.
2g.po
‘Yokon might be the one who ate your red yam.’ From the storyboard “Red Yam” (von Prince,
2018e) (AK1-008-01, 00:07:43.588-00:07:48.810)
(19) Ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
pi
be
Yokon
Yokon
m̃as
only
kin
el
i=paam
3g=eat
nawi
yam
miel
red
nig
of
neu.
1g
‘Yokon might be the one who ate your red yam.’ From the storyboard “Red Yam” (von Prince,
2018e) (AK1-075-01, 00:01:48.008-00:01:57.326)
So far we have seen the general (realis) proclitics appearing in many modal contexts in Nafsan,
including future possibilities, counterfactual, and epistemic contexts. Figure 8.2 visually summarizes
the meanings expressed by the general (realis) proclitics and irrealis proclitics. As we can see, the
general (realis) proclitics share many of the core modal meanings with irrealis. Since this is not a
behavior we would expect from the realis mood, I propose that the evidence presented here suggests
that the general (realis) proclitics are not semantically specified for realis meanings. The issues raised
in this section can be better explained if the “realis” proclitics are analyzed as general subject marking
of person and number underspecified for mood. This reanalysis can explain why this paradigm
of subject proclitics is compatible with virtually any TMA marker and almost any TMA context.
By adopting this analysis, we understand that the meanings represented in Figure 8.2 are simply
compatiblewith the general subject proclitics, and are not semantically expressed by them (cf. similar
argument in Section 5.3.2).
Another support for the underspecification analysis is the frequency of the general (realis) procl-
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Figure 8.2: TMA meanings with which general and irrealis proclitics are used in Nafsan
itics in comparison to the irrealis and perfect-agreeing proclitics. InThieberger’s (1995–2018) corpus
of Nafsan general (realis) proclitics constitute 84% (5793 occurrences) of all proclitics in corpus, ir-
realis 11% (782 occurrences), and perfect-agreeing 5% (308 occurrences). The fact that the general
(realis) proclitics are so much more frequent than others is consistent with their appearance in more
semantic contexts in comparison to the other proclitics, as shown in this section. Thus, from now
on I refer to the general (realis) proclitics as “general proclitics”, which are semantically defined as
subject markers. In the following sections, I discuss in more detail the availability of the general
proclitics in different types of conditional and complement clauses and argue for the validity of the
present analysis. In Section 8.7 I offer a pragmatic explanation of how the realis meaning is derived
in main clauses, and what pragmatic factors drive the usage of general proclitics with specific TMA
markers such as f cond.
8.3.2 Irrealis proclitics
In this section I offer an overview of the distribution of irrealis subject proclitics in Nafsan and argue
that they denote irrealis mood, and not future tense as suggested by Bacon (2013). I also analyze
the combinations of irrealis and the prospective irrealis fo, as well as auxiliary verbs denoting modal
meanings.
Out of all TMA markers and auxiliary verbs, the irrealis proclitics combine most frequently with
the prospective irrealis fo, as shown in Figure 8.1 in Section 8.3.1. Irrealis occurs with fo whenever
the expressed meaning is that of prospective aspect, which is by some linguists also analyzed as
relative future (Comrie, 1985). However, the co-occurrence with fo only accounts for about 17% of
all irrealis occurrences in the Nafsan corpus (Thieberger, 1995–2018). In the rest of the occurrences,
irrealis appears either alone or with other TMA markers and auxiliary verbs. In order to understand
the semantic contribution of fo to the overall irrealis meanings, let us analyze several contexts from
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Figure 8.3: Representation of example (20)
the FutureQuestionnaire (Dahl, 2000b). In a main clause like (20), the prospective irrealis fo situates
the TT (Topic Time) in the pre-time of the described event, as assumed by the prospective aspect
definition by Klein (1994), and it additionally encodes irrealis mood, which means that the event does
not belong to the actual world. In (20) the TT is at the same time the UT (Utterance Time) which
yields an absolute future interpretation of the event, as illustrated in Figure 8.3. However, fo can
appear with irrealis with any temporal reference, as we can see with a future and past subordinate
clauses in (21) and (22), respectively. While irrealis appears alone in both subordinate temporal and
conditional clauses situated in the TT, the event that follows the TT both in the past and in the future
is marked by the prospective irrealis fo. The relationship between the two events is established by the
presence of fo which situates the TT in the pre-time of the event marked by it. This is illustrated in
Figure 8.4 for example (21). Thus, fo can appear with any temporal reference, as long as the described
event is considered non-actual. This makes it an irrealis mirror image of the prospective realis po
(see Section 5.3.1).
(20) [Talking about the speaker’s plans for the evening.] I GO to town (Dahl, 2000b:FQ 32)
Ka=fo
1g.i=pp.i
pak
go.to
taon.
town:bi
‘I will go to town.’ (AK1-086-01)
(21) [The boy is expecting a sum of money] When the boy GET the money, he BUY a present for
the girl. (Dahl, 2000b:FQ 13, TMAQ 103)
Malnen
when
naturiai
boy
ke=wes
3g.i=take
faat,
money
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
nig
ben
nmatuerik
girl
paakot
buy
nauan.
present
‘When the boy gets the money, he will buy a present for the girl.’ (AK1-082-01)
(22) [The speaker knows the boy was expecting money and that he did not get it] If the boy GET
the money (yesterday), he BUY a present for the girl. (Dahl, 2000b:FQ 16, TMAQ 106)
I=f-wel
3g=cond-like
kin
comp
naturiai
boy
ke=wes
3g.i=take
naul
money
nanom,
yesterday
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
pakot
buy
nauan.
present
‘If the boy had gotten the money yesterday, he would have bought the present for the girl.’
(AK1-083-01)
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Figure 8.4: Representation of example (21)
I turn now to the semantics of irrealis proclitics. As we can see in examples (21) and (22), the
irrealis proclitics in the subordinate clauses denote meanings of future and past counterfactual pos-
sibilities, respectively. Another typical context for irrealis is the imperative (23),6 prohibitive (24),
wishes (25), as well as different types of evaluative complement clauses (26). Although understand-
ing the temporal reference of an imperative as either present or future is a debated issue (see also
Barbour, 2011), imperatives (23) and prohibitives (24) denote commands which are modally different
from the simply predictive meaning of future tense. Barbour (2011) also analyzes the usage of rele-
vantmarkers in imperatives as an indicator of irrealis mood and not future tense. Moreover, the event
marked by irrealis in example (26) has a present temporal reference and could not be interpreted as
having a future reference (see also Section 8.6.2). Example (25) also expresses a desiderative meaning
of the type that would not be expected from a simple future tense, which would get predictive future
readings.
(23) p̃a=mai
2g.i=come
totan
sit
nanu-a-k
neck--1g.dp
‘Come and sit on my neck.’ (101.045)
(24) P̃a=ta
2g.i=neg1
pak
go
ektem
outside
mau!
neg2
‘Don’t go outside!’ (AK1-018-01, 00:04:08.715-00:04:16.430)
(25) P̃a=fo
2g.i=pp.i
piatlak
have
nam̃olien
life
wi
good
ser
every
mal!
time
(wishing someone good health:) ‘May you have a good life!’ From (Dahl, 2000b:FQ 108) (AK1-
110-01)
(26) a=mur
2g=like
ka=to
1g.i=hab
sari.
travel
‘I like to travel.’ (AK1-078-01)
The irrealis proclitics can also express present and past epistemic meanings of possibility and neces-
sity with TMAmarkers and auxiliary verbs, as shown in (27) and (28) for the present and (29) for the
past epistemic readings, respectively. Different types of modal force and flavor are analyzed in more
6Verbs without any subject marking can also express imperatives.
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Figure 8.5: The domain of meaning expressed by irrealis proclitics in Nafsan (see model in Section
7.1.3)
detail in Section 8.4. All these different temporal and modal contexts together with the expression of
modal epistemic meanings in examples (27)-(29) could not be explained by analyzing the proclitics
as markers of future tense. Since in all these examples the irrealis proclitics denote different kinds
of possibilities, we can conclude that there is good evidence for maintaining the analysis of irrealis
proclitics as denoting irrealis mood, which refers to any non-actual worlds. The domain of the ir-
realis meaning expressed in Nafsan is visualized in Figure 8.5, based on the branching-times model
presented in Section 7.1.3.
(27) [Context: The policemen are looking for two fugitives hiding in a house, from TFS (2011b)]
Ra=to
3d=pog
ra=na:
3d=say
Me
but
rak=fo
3d.i=pp.i
kus
hide
eswa?
where
‘Then they said: But where could they be hiding?’ (AK1-146-06, 00:03:30.991-00:03:33.748)
(28) [Context: When you disagree about a place of an object that your friend put inside the house
(could be anywhere) and you say:]
i=tik,
3g=neg
ke=lakor
3g.i=maybe
pato
be.at
sanpe.
there
‘No, I think it should be over there.’ (Gray Kaltap̃au, 30/05/2018)
(29) [Context: you saw your friend passing on the path to his garden from a distance, and when
later someone asks where he is, you would say:].
Ga
3g
ke=mas
3g.i=must
pak
go.to
talm̃at
garden
pan
go
nlaken
because
kin
comp
a=lek-a-ø
1g=see--3g.obj
i=mai
3g=come
siwer
walk
pan
go
‘Hemust have gone to the garden, because I saw him on the path.’ (Gray Kaltap̃au, 30/05/2018)
An interesting observation about the meaning of irrealis is the contrast between the irrealis
proclitic occurring alone and co-occurring with the prospective irrealis fo, especially in main clauses
in simple out-of-the-blue contexts. When irrealis proclitics are used alone in main clauses, they
receive an interpretation of immediate future (30). This is further supported by the fact that the
irrealis proclitics alone cannot be used when immediacy is not intended, as in (31). In contrast, fo
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does not have restrictions on how immediate or remote the future event is. We can see that the
interpretation of irrealis with fo can refer both to immediate and non-immediate future events, cf.
(31) and (32).
(30) [Talking about the speaker’s immediate plans.] I GO to town. (Dahl, 2000b:FQ 37)
Ka=fak
1g.i=go.i
taon.
town:bi
‘I’m going to town.’ (AK1-086-01)
(31) [It’s no use trying to swim in the lake tomorrow.] The water BE COLD (then) (Dahl, 2000b:FQ
8, TMAQ 36)
Nai
water
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
mlanr.
cold
(*Nai
water
ke=mlanr.)
3g.i=cold
‘The water will be cold.’ (AK1-082-01)
(32) [Talking about a third person’s immediate plans:] He WORK in the garden. (Dahl, 2000b:FQ
61)
Ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
weswes./
work
Ke=fan
3g.i=go.i
weswes.
work
‘He is going to work in the garden.’ (AK1-086-01)
The question here is why would a general irrealis marker be restricted to immediate future when
occurring alone in these types of main clauses. Note that the immediacy interpretation does not
arise in conditional and complement clauses, as well as in combination with other TMA markers
and auxiliaries, presented in this section. I propose that this immediate future meaning of irrealis in
cases like (30) and (32) comes from the pragmatic effect of simplicity proposed by Smith et al. (2007)
and Smith (2008), described in Section 7.2.2. The reference to the utterance time is the simplest
because it requires the least additional assumptions in communication. For this reason, this is the
meaning that arises by default in out-of-the-blue contexts. Thus, for the irrealis proclitics which
denote reference to non-actual worlds (and exclude the utterance time), the closest reference to the
utterance time is the immediate future.
8.4 Modal force and flavor
In this section I describe how different modal meanings are expressed either by combinations of the
general and irrealis proclitics with TMA markers and auxiliary verbs or by the irrealis alone. Differ-
ent modal distinctions, such as the meanings of obligation (deontic) or inference based on our knowl-
edge (epistemic) are called modal flavors in formal semantics. Although the basic distinction is often
done between the epistemic and other meanings (called root modality), depending on the language
and the theory of modality, there can be many more modal flavors, such as ability or bouletic modal-
ity (related to wishes) in formal semantics (e.g. Hacquard, 2006), or participant-internal modality in
typology (e.g. Bybee et al., 1994; Nuyts & van der Auwera, 2016). Modal force refers to the distinc-
tions between strong and weak possibility and necessity, which are considered to be the two basic
distinctions of meaning in modality (e.g. Kratzer, 2012; van der Auwera & Zamorano Aguilar, 2016).
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I use the storyboard elicitation data to show that there is a great deal of interchangeability be-
tween general and irrealis proclitics in combining with different modal markers in the same con-
texts, which supports the analysis of general proclitics as being underspecified for TMA. Although
the general and irrealis proclitics are interchangeable in most modal contexts presented below, there
are clear tendencies of preferring one of the proclitics for certain meanings or with certain markers.
For instance, the irrealis proclitics are preferred over the general proclitic with auxiliaries tae ‘can’
and kano ‘cannot’ when expressing epistemic possibility and deontic meanings, as opposed to other
modal flavors, such as ability. I also show that the distribution of general and irrealis proclitics in
these different modal contexts is not governed by temporal distinctions.
Modal force and flavors were tested with several storyboards in my fieldwork. The main modal
contexts from these storyboards are presented in Table 8.3. The modal flavors are labeled as circum-
stantial, epistemic, ability, and deontic. I use the term “circumstantial modality” to refer to anymean-
ings that express non-epistemic possibilities or necessities, which are based on the circumstances of
a described situation. Thus, they refer to different kinds of abilities and permissions/obligations,
but the context is vague enough not to distinguish between ability and deontic readings. Ability as
the inner capacity of the participant is considered as a specific meaning. Deontic modality refers
to permissions and obligations and epistemic modality expresses the possibility or necessity of the
described situation taking place, given speaker’s knowledge. Each context was elicited through one
or more frames in the relevant storyboards, as indicated in Table 8.3. I studied the expression of
different modal forces and flavors by analyzing which TMA markers or auxiliaries were used and in
combination with which proclitics. The results can be summarized as follows. There are only two
markers which combine with only one set of proclitics: mas ‘must’ with irrealis and fla ‘might’ with
general proclitics. Other modal markers, tae ‘can’, kano ‘cannot’, and lakor ‘maybe’, can combine
with both proclitics in almost all meanings covered here, but there are some notable tendencies for
preferring one set of proclitics for specific meanings. Nevertheless, there are no categorical rules that
could explain why a certain proclitic is chosen over the other. It is possible that the complex picture
that emerges from the Nafsan data could be made simpler by factoring in new variables, which are
hard to identify through the prism of modal force and flavor at the current stage of the research. In
any case, the data in 8.3 allows for certain generalizations that have impact for our understanding
of the semantics of irrealis and general proclitics in Nafsan.
The auxiliaries tae ‘can’ and its negative counterpart kano ‘cannot’ express all types of possi-
bilities analyzed in Table 8.3. Their only restriction is that they do not express necessity. When
it comes to combining with proclitics, tae ‘can’ and kano ‘cannot’ exhibit very similar tendencies.
When expressing circumstantial possibility and ability general proclitics are preferred, whereas irre-
alis is preferred for epistemic possibility and deontic meanings, cf. Table 8.3. The percentage values
of the number of occurrences of tae and kano with irrealis in Table 8.3 illustrate this preference. Ex-
amples (33) and (34) show epistemic readings with present reference, in which tae and kano combine
with irrealis, respectively. Examples (35) and (36) illustrate the contrast between the usage of irrealis
with kano for deontic meanings (35) and the usage of general proclitics with kano for the meaning
of ability (36).
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Table 8.3: Summarized data of auxiliary and proclitic combinations from storyboard “On the lam”
(OL) (TFS, 2011b), “Tom and Mittens” (TM) (Rolka & Cable, 2014), “Bill vs. the weather” (BW) (Van-
der Klok, 2013), “Chore girl” (CG) (TFS, 2011a) and “Sick girl” (TFS, 2011c)
Meaning TMA/Auxiliary Irrealis procl. General procl.
Circumstantial possibility
(frames OL 8, 9, 10, 11, 13)
tae 0 9
kano 2 6
Circumstantial necessity
(frame OL 15)
mas 1 0
lakor 1 0
Irrealis with fo 1
Epistemic possibility
(frames OL 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24,
TM 6, 7,
BW 18, 20, 22)
tae 6 (100%) 0
kano 5 (63%) 3 (37%)
mas 2 0
lakor 4 7
fla 0 8
Irrealis with fo 5
Epistemic necessity
(frames OL 26,
TM 10)
mas 4 0
lakor 0 4
Irrealis with fo 1
Ability
(frames CG 19,
SG 6, 13, 20)
kano 1 7
Deontic
(frames CG 2, 3, 4, 7, 10,
SG 9, 16, 24)
tae 5 (83%) 1 (16%)
kano 14 (61%) 9 (39%)
mas 5 0
Irrealis alone/with fo or a 8
(33) [Context: The police is looking for two fugitives hiding in a house, from TFS (2011b)]
Te-nraan
de-two
rak=fo
3d.i=pp.i
tae
can
kus
hide
eswa?
where
‘Where could these two be hiding?’ (AK1-147-12, 00:02:53.645-00:02:58.446)
(34) [Context: The police is looks for clues for where the two fugitives are hiding, from TFS
(2011b)]
Rak=fo
3d.i=pp.i
kano
cannot
kus
hide
em̃rom
inside
kes,
box
kes
box
nen
dem
i=sesp̃al
3g=tiny
toop.
very
‘They can’t be hiding in the box, that box is too small.’ (AK1-147-12, 00:03:19.385-00:03:24.781)
8.4. MODAL FORCE AND FLAVOR 189
(35) [Context: Mary’s friends come and ask her to go play with them, but her mom ordered her to
wash the dishes, so she says:, from TFS (2011a)]
Kineu
1g
ka=fo
1g.i=pp.i
kano,
cannot
ka=fei
1g.i=first.i
was
wash:bi
ki
pep
plet.
plate:bi
‘I can’t go, I have to wash the dishes first.’ (20170816-AK-094, 00:00:57.995-00:01:07.171)
(36) [Context: Mary’s friends come and ask her to go play with them, but she broke her leg, so
she says:, from TFS (2011c)]
Kineu
1g
a=kano,
1g=cannot
Mary
Mary
i=tl-i-ø,
3g=say--3g.obj
nlaken
because
a=p̃akot
1g=break
natu-o-k.
leg--1sg.dp
‘I can’t, says Mary, because I broke my leg.’ (20170731-AK-016, 00:01:04.545- 00:01:17.645)
The preference of irrealis for deontic meanings was also confirmed in the elicitation of example (37)
from the Nondum questionnaire, which prompted two modal interpretations in (38) and (39). The
comments in parentheses in both examples were made by the speaker. (38) has a deontic interpre-
tation with irrealis and (39) has an ability reading with the general proclitic.
(37) (Q37) (I didn’t know your neighbor is already 30 years old. Is he married?) He NOTMARRIED
(because he is a Catholic priest, so he can’t marry) (Veselinova, 2018)
(38) Ga
3g
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
kano
cannot
lak.
marry
‘He can’t get married.’ (because he is a priest and it is forbidden) (AK1-156-04)
(39) Ga
3g
i=kano
3g=cannot
lak.
marry
‘He can’t get married.’ (because for some personal reason you are not able to get married)
(AK1-156-04)
Since the general and irrealis proclitics can both occur in most modal contexts with tae and kano,
we could ask whether there is another TMAmeaning that could be governing their distribution, such
as temporal reference. However, examples (33)-(36) all refer to possibilities at the present and not
future time. This shows that irrealis could not be reanalyzed as future tense, and that its appear-
ance in these meanings is related to its meaning of irrealis mood. Another important observation
is the fact that irrealis alone or with the prospective marker fo can also denote circumstantial and
epistemic possibilities, as well as deontic meanings. Examples (40)7 and (41) show epistemic read-
ings with past and present reference, respectively, and (42) a deontic reading. The usage of irrealis
proclitics alone for asking for permission has also emerged during elicitation, as shown in (43). The
fact that irrealis can express different modal flavors and force without combining with any specific
modal auxiliaries denoting modal force and flavor shows that its semantics comprises these modal
meanings. Crucially, this leads us to conclude that the irrealis meaning in Nafsan refers to both
7This example can also be analyzed as expressing an undesirable past possibility, which can be labeled as timitive or
apprehensive, commonly found as a grammaticalized category in Oceanic languages (Lichtenberk, 1995), see also von
Prince et al. (2019b,c).
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mood and modality, categories which are typically considered as separate in semantic theory and in
Indo-European languages (cf. Matthewson, 2010).
(40) [Context: From Vander Klok (2013), Bill brought a coat to work yesterday, but it was warm
and sunny. His friend asks him why he brought the coat despite good weather]
Me
but
nlaken
because
sno
snow:bi
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
mai
come
malnen
when
kin
comp
a=to
1g=stay
naor
place
nawesien.
work
‘Because it could have snowed while I was at work.’ (AK1-062, 00:05:24.576-00:05:36.386)
(41) [Context: The police is looking for clues for where the two fugitives are hiding, from TFS
(2011b)]
Rak=fo
3g.i=pp.i
nru
two
kus
hide
nanre
behind
lukor
curtain
ni
of
nmetklas.
window
‘They must be hiding behind the curtain.’ (AK1-146-06, 00:04:24.565-00:04:29.376)
(42) [Context: From TFS (2011a), Mary’s friends come and ask her to go play with them, but her
mom ordered her to sweep inside the house, so she says:]
Go
and
i=tl-i-ø
3g=say--3g.obj
na
comp
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
kano
cannot
pan
go
mes
play
nlaken
because
ke=fei
1g.i=first.i
broom
sweep:bi
ur
along
em̃rom
inside
esum̃.
house
‘And she said she can’t go to play because she first has to sweep inside the house.’ (AK1-019,
00:06:38.555-00:06:46.826)
(43) Ka=mtir?
1g.i=write
‘Can I write here?’ (AK1-086-01)
There are a few possible concerns that need to be discussed regarding the usage of irrealis in examples
(40)-(43). The first is that the prospective irrealis sets the Topic Time in the pre-time of the described
event (see Section 8.3.2), which leads to the interpretation of a future relation between the Topic
Time and the event. It could be argued that the irrealis and fo in (40) and (41) denote this future
meaning. Example (40) could then be understood as ‘snow would fall while I was at work’ with a
meaning of relative future and (41) as ‘they will be hiding behind the curtain’ with a future predictive
meaning. A similar concern can be raised about examples (42) and (43), where the irrealis proclitics
alone could be interpreted as immediate future (see Section 8.3.2), yielding a meaning like ‘she is first
going to sweep inside the house’ and ‘will I write here?’. However, examples (40)-(42) were produced
in storyboards in which the context clearly required the epistemic and deontic readings, which were
also repeated several times throughout the story. The speakers were familiarized with the story in
Bislama and understood the targeted contexts (for more details see Chapter 3).8 Thus, even if the
prospective irrealis fo contributes some kind of future meaning, as per its semantics, in (40) and (41),
the fact that the epistemic and deontic readings are still available and intended in the cited examples
tells us that irrealis needs be used to express thesemodal flavors. For instance, it is clear in the context
8Whenever there was a reason to doubt speaker’s understanding or the clarity of the intended context, the produced
storyboards were not considered in these results.
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of example (40) that it did not in fact snow when Bill was at work, so that was a mere possibility
and not a prediction for how the future will unfold. This irrealis and prospective combination was
chosen by 2 out of 8 speakers who produced the frame of (40) in the storyboard “Bill vs. the weather”
(for other speakers see Section 8.6.2). Similarly, example (41) necessarily has an epistemic reading
with present reference and the combination of irrealis and prospective was chosen for all epistemic
readings in the storyboard “On the lam” by one speaker. Other speakers chose combinations with
more specific modal auxiliaries shown in Table 8.3. Regarding (42) from the storyboard “Chore girl”,
3 out of 5 speakers used irrealis either alone or with fo in that frame. Other speakers chose more
specific modal auxiliaries such as mas, as for example in (44) which contrasts with (35) referring
to another similar frame. Lastly, the elicited example (43) asks for permission to write and could
not be rephrased as ‘will I write here?’ while maintaining the intended deontic meaning. These
observations can be taken as evidence that irrealis in Nafsan could not be analyzed as tense, and that
it is better analyzed as expressing mood and modality-related meanings.
The markermas combines with irrealis in both the storyboard data and the Nafsan corpus.9 It is
typically used for expressing necessity, both epistemic (45) and deontic (44), but it can also be used to
express possibility (46). In fact, Nafsan does not seem to have any grammaticalized means dedicated
to the expression of necessity. The only instantiation of specifying modal force in general is the fact
that the modals tae, kano, and fla are restricted to expressing possibilities.10 In contrast, the auxiliary
lakor ‘maybe’11 is completely underspecified for modal force, as can be seen in the contrast between
examples (47) and (48). Lakor can also combine with both the general proclitic and irrealis, but the
general proclitic is preferred overall. So far we have seen the general proclitic combining with all
modal markers, while also being interchangeable with irrealis. As argued in Section 8.3.1, this speaks
to its semantic underspecification, which means that it can freely occur in any contexts otherwise
associated with irrealis.
(44) [Context: the same as in (35)]
A=kano
1g=cannot
pa,
go
ka=mas
1g.i=must
pei
first
was
wash:bi
ki
pep
plet
plate:bi
‘I can’t go, I have to wash the dishes first.’ (AK1-034-01, 00:00:50.215-00:00:54.061)
9Thieberger (2006) notes that mas can combine with both the general proclitic and irrealis, but in my data there is
only one occurrence of the general proclitic and mas, and in the Nafsan corpus I have found only 2 such occurrences, in
sentences referenced as 065.045 and 130.195.
10In this respect, Nafsan differs from well-known Indo-European languages in which the distinction between necessity
and possibility is expressed in the lexicon. It is also more underspecified in comparison to St’át’imcets, because it only has
one marker specified for modal flavor (fla for epistemic), whereas St’át’imcets expresses modal flavor lexically but leaves
the modal force to the context (Matthewson, 2010).
11I use the gloss ‘maybe’ given by Thieberger (2006), although lakor has a much more general modal meaning.
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(45) [Context: From Rolka & Cable (2014), Tom is trying to find out where his cat Ado is hidden.
There are three boxes in which he might be hidden: red, yellow, and blue. Tom looked at the
red and yellow box and Ado was not there. Tom says:]
Ado
Ado
ke=mas
3g.i=must
to
stay
naal
basket
blu.
blue:bi
‘Ado must be in the blue basket.’ (AK1-019-01, 00:02:50.251-00:02:57.910)
(46) [Context: From Rolka & Cable (2014), Tom is trying to find out where his cat Ado is hidden.
There are three boxes in which he might be hidden: red, yellow, and blue. Tom looks at the
red box and says:]
Ado
Ado
ke=mas
3g.i=must
kus
hide
to
stay
naal
basket
miel
red
to.
stay
‘Ado might be hidden in the red basket.’ (AK1-019-01, 00:02:06.280-00:02:12.213)
(47) [Context: the same as in (45)]
Ah,
inej
i=lakor
3g=maybe
to
stay
naal
basket
ksakes.
blue
‘Ah, he must be in the blue basket.’ (AK1-012-01, 00:04:13.748-00:04:17.466)
(48) [Context: the same as in (46)]
Ado
Ado
i=lakor
3g=maybe
to
stay
naal
basket
miel.
red
‘Ado might be in the red basket.’ (AK1-012-01, 00:01:27.635-00:01:34.183)
The last marker to be discussed in is fla, a TMA marker used to denote epistemic possibility. This
is the only marker specified for modal flavor, at least in its usage in main clauses (see Section 8.5),
and also the only marker that almost exclusively combines with the general proclitic (49). Although
the analysis of the general proclitic as being underspecified for TMA is perfectly compatible with
that, the puzzle here is why irrealis is not used with fla in the data in Table 8.3. In order to explain
this, I argue that there are some phonological constraints on the combinations of certain irrealis
forms and fla. The irrealis forms that are attested with fla in the Nafsan corpus and my data are
ka=fla ‘1g=might’, p̃a=fla ‘2g=might’, and ke=fla ‘3g=might’. In the data presented in Figure 8.1
in Section 8.3.1, which comprises both corpora, there are only 5 occurrences of these forms. Example
(50) shows a case from the corpus and (51) from the storyboard “The woodchopper” (TFS, 2011d) in
which Mary warns John not to go cutting wood at night. Other attested examples are conditional
clauses, and these types of constructions will be discussed in Section 8.5.
(49) [Context: the same as in (46)]
I=fla
3g=might
to
stay
naal
basket
miel.
red
‘He might be in the red basket.’ (AK1-012-01, 00:03:45.616–00:03:55.380)
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Table 8.4: Combinations of proclitics with fla
General Irrealis
1g a=fla ka=fla
2g ku=fla p̃a=fla
3g i=fla ke=fla
1d.incl ta=fla ?tak=fla
1d.ecl ra=fla ?rak=fla
2d ra=fla ?rak=fla
3d ra=fla ?rak=fla
1pl.incl tu=fla ?tuk=fla
1pl.ecl u=fla ko=fla
2pl u=fla ko=fla
3pl ru=fla ?ruk=fla
(50) Go
and
nafsan
word
ki
pep
tkal
reach
Maarik
man
Naot
village
p̃ur
big
Nmak
Nmak
Kalsaur,
Kalsaur
elag
up
ntaf
hill
nag
comp
i=f
3g=cond
wel
thus
ke=fla
1g.i=might
watpun
warrior
m̃aau
giant
nran
two
wan.
op
‘And the message reached Chief Nmak Kalsaur up on the hill if he would kill these two war-
riors.’ (128.012)
(51) isaa
bad
kin
comp
p̃a=fla
2g.i=might
kraksmanr
miss
nkap
wood
ke=skei
3g.i=one
ke=m̃el.
3g.i=fall
‘It would be bad if you dropped a piece of wood.’ (AK1-146-03, 00:01:17.559-00:01:22.277)
An important piece of evidence for this discussion comes from my elicitations of possible combi-
nations of different TMA markers and proclitic paradigms. This type of elicitation consisted simply
of asking two speakers whether a given TMAmarker can combine at all with the general and irrealis
proclitics. Table 8.4 shows all the accepted combinations for the marker fla. While the whole general
proclitic paradigm was judged acceptable to combine with fla, the only irrealis proclitics that were
accepted without a doubt were the forms ending in a vowel. All the forms which end in -k were
said to sound strange and that in those persons the general proclitic sounded better (cf. recording
AK1-117-01). In fact, if we look at the Nafsan corpora, the sequence of the type -kfC-, where C is any
consonant, are only attested as -kfr- and -kfs-. There is only one occurrence of -kfs- and 10 occur-
rences of -kfr-, all of them with the verb freg ‘make.i’, as shown in (52). There are no occurrences
of the sequence -kfl- in both Nafsan corpora. In Chapter 8.5 I show a very similar pattern for the
conditional marker f. In the case of f, however, the irrealis forms ending in -k were more strongly
rejected because of a seemingly stronger phonological constraint on the sequence -kf #, where # in-
dicates a pause. Since the forms of the type tak=fla are phonologically more acceptable than takf,
they were only judged as sounding odd. Thus, it seems that for reasons independent of the semantics
of fla and the proclitics, fla simply does not combine with irrealis in a large number of forms in the
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paradigm. The fact that combinations with some forms are not available must have an impact on the
paradigm as a whole, which makes the general proclitic the preferred choice.
(52) ale
okay:bi
malnen
then
ru=pan
3pl=go
na
pp
ruk=freg
3pl.i=make.i
talm̃at
garden
‘Then they went to work in the garden.’ (035.009)
8.5 Conditional clauses
In this section I analyze the usage of general and irrealis proclitics in conditional clauses. In Section
8.5.1 I outline different conditional constructions used in Nafsan and I offer a reanalysis of some of
the functions and properties of f and fla in comparison to Thieberger (2006). In Section 8.5.2 I focus
on the combinations of TMA marking and proclitics in the protasis and apodosis of different types
of conditionals, on the basis of results from storyboard elicitations.
8.5.1 Conditional constructions
As previously mentioned in Section 2.3.1 and 8.2, Thieberger (2006) shows that conditional clauses
are introduced by the markers f (53)12 and fla, which he glosses as a conditional and a ‘may’ parti-
cle, respectively. In Thieberger’s (1995–2018) Nafsan corpus fla is also glossed as conditional when
appearing in conditional clauses, as for instance in (54). Conditionals can also be introduced by the
construction i=f-wel (kin) glossed as 3g=cond-like (comp) as in (55), which can also be literally
translated as ‘it might be like (that)’.
(53) [A=f
1g=cond
mer
in.turn
pa]
go
me
but
a=fla
1g=may
lakor
maybe
wel
like
Jimmy
Jimmy
Stevens,
Stevens
ko
or
a=f
1g=cond
lakor
maybe
mat
die
Solomon.
Solomon
‘If I had gone, I could have been like Jimmy Stevens, or I could have died in the Solomons.’
(Jimmy Stevens who went to the Solomons and came back alive.) (041.014)
(54) [ko
or
ku=fla
2g=cond
slat
take
na
de
naik]
fish
[ko
or
ku=fla
2g=cond
slat
take
tete
some
nmatun
thing
tefla=n
similar=d
ne]
this
me
and
ko=slat-i-ø
2pl.i=take3g.obj
mai
come
‘[…] or if you take fish, or if you take something like that, you take it and come.’ (093.013,
093.014)
(55) [I=f-wel
3g=cond-like
kin
el
taos
like
nametrau
family
lap
many
ru=fla
3pl=may
to
stay
weswes
work
te-naor
some-place
welkia
thus
ru=lap],
3pl=many
ru=f
3pl=cond
tae
can
tilusus-i-k.
gossip2g.obj
‘If, like, lots of the family might work someplace, well there are lots of them, then (others)
could gossip about you.’ (Thieberger, 2006:161)
12Conditional protases are indicated by square brackets.
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As shown in examples (53)-(55), the markers f and fla can introduce conditional clauses, and in
these cases they could be analyzed as subordinate conditional markers. However, neither f nor fla
are necessarily interpreted as conditionals. They can both appear in the protasis and the apodosis, as
shown by the contrast between (53) and (55). The apodoses ‘I could have died in the Solomons’ (53)
and ‘then (others) could gossip about you’ (54) cannot be interpreted as starting a new subordinate
conditional clause. They simply express a possible event that would take place, if the condition in the
protasis was satisfied. Thus, the meaning of f and fla in these cases is the expression of possibility.
This is consistent with the fact that fla is an epistemic modal marker in main clauses, see Section
8.4. In Krajinović (2018) I argue for a reanalysis of examples like (53) and (54) as paratactic condi-
tionals. This means that we are dealing with two juxtaposed main clauses and that the conditional
interpretation of sentences introduced by f and fla is pragmatically derived as an inference that the
first clause is a condition and the second one is the outcome that follows it. The juxtaposed clauses
are typically temporally interpreted in the linear order of their appearance (Haiman, 1985). Thus, the
first clause marked by f in (53) is interpreted as an earlier possibility and the second clause marked
by fla is interpreted as a later possibility. This is followed by the interpretation that the two clauses
are in a relationship of cause and effect, which leads to a conditional reading (see Dancygier, 1998).
This type of juxtaposed clauses with a conditional reading are called paratactic conditionals (Haiman,
1983). There is another piece of evidence that supports that this process takes place in Nafsan, namely
that we find other juxtaposed clauses that can also have conditional meanings. Examples (56) and
(57) do not have any conditional marking and they still yield a conditional interpretation, which
means they are also paratactic conditionals.
(56) [natam̃ol
person
p̃a=tu-a-ø
2g.i=give--3g.obj
mal]
time
go
and
ga
3g
i=piatlak
3g=have
educated
educated
wi
good
‘If you give people time they can have a good education.’ (119.025)
(57) [Ku=lak-a-ø
2g=look--3g.obj
npat-i-n
teeth--3g.dp
i=miel],
3g=red
go
and
ga
3g
kin
el
i=paam-i-ø
3g=eat--3g.obj
nawi
yam
gaag.
2g.po
‘If you see her teeth are red, then she is the one who ate your red yam.’ From the storyboard
“Red Yam” (von Prince, 2018e) (AK1-027-01, 00:12:34.908-00:12:38.680)
In contrast to f and fla, the construction i=f-wel (kin) from (55) seems to behave as a typical subordi-
nate construction. The argument for its subordinative character is presented in Krajinović (2018) in
the following way. In paratactic conditionals, the iconicity, i.e. linear order, of the two clauses plays
a role in what is considered to be the condition/cause and what is the consequence/effect (Haiman,
1986). Thus, we expect that the inversion of these two clauses would also invert the interpretation
of what is considered to be the condition/cause and consequence/effect. In subordinate clauses this
should not be so, because there is a subordinator indicating which clause is the subordinate condi-
tional clause. We can see that in an example like (53) the inversion of one of the two consequences
with the condition would result in a different conditional reading. This is because both types of
clauses have the same marking and they are not formally distinguished in any other way. If we look
at the i=f-wel clauses, we can see that the inversion of the clauses is possible while maintaining the
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same conditional interpretation. In examples (58) and (59), the protasis initiated with i=f-wel (kin)
follows the main clause (apodosis) and results in an unambiguous interpretation where the second
clause marked with i=f-wel (kin) is a condition, and the first clause is a consequence. Another indi-
cation of the subordinate character of i=f-wel kin is the fact that it often contains the complementizer
kin that has a subordinative function. Other possible forms of i=f-wel kin are f-wel (kin) and i=wel
(kin).13
(58) He
hey
a=mur-i-n
1g=want3g.obj
na
comp
p̃a=mai
2g.i=come
ni
ben
Kaltog
Kaltog
preg
make
nalkis
medicine
[i=f-wel
3g=cond-like
ku=f
2g=cond
tae
know
preg-i-ø].
make3g.obj
‘Hey, I would like you to come and make some medicine for Kaltog, if you can do it.’ (103.012)
(59) Ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
pakot
buy
nauan,
present
[i=f-wel
3g=cond-like
kin
comp
naturiai
young.man
ke=wes
3g.i=get
naul
money
nanom].
yesterday
‘If the boy had gotten the money (yesterday), he would have bought a present for the girl.’
Based on Dahl (1985:TMAQ 105, 106) (AK1-083-01)
According to Thieberger’s (2006) earlier analysis, f and fla can only be used with the general
subject proclitics. While this is the case for many occurrences of f and fla, see Figure 8.1 in Section
8.3.1, there are also cases of irrealis proclitics attaching to f and fla. Despite occurring more rarely
thanwith general proclitics, we find examples like (60) in theNafsan corpus and (61) in the storyboard
data, with f and fla with irrealis subject proclitics.
(60) ka=fo
1g.i=pp.i
tae,
know
ka=fo
1g.i=pp.i
preg
make
nafsan
story
sees
small
[i=f-wel
3g=cond-like
kin
comp
ka=f
1g.i=cond
mur-i-n].
want-3g.obj
‘I know, I will tell a small story if I want.’ (127.087)
(61) P̃a=pe
2g.i=there
mroususi,
imagine
[ka=fla
1g.i=might
makir
dye
nal-u-k
hair--1dp
ke=miel],
3g.i=red
ka=fo
1g.i=pp.i
lakor
maybe
mai
come
pi
be
natam̃ol
man
ke=skei
3g.i=one
nen
el
ru=to
3pl=stay
sausou
praise
ki
pep
kineu
1g
em̃rom
inside
band.
band:bi
‘Just imagine, if I paintedmyhair red, I would be praised in the band.’ (AK1-146-03, 00:03:44.183-
00:03:56.886)
Inmy investigations in the field (cf. recording AK1-117-01), I elicited the paradigm for themarker
f as shown in Table 8.5. Depending on the subject person, the marker f can be attached to both realis
and irrealis subject proclitics. However, it combines with irrealis only in those persons where the
13Because of the possibility to use f-wel (kin) I treat f as a prefix to wel and not as a separate word (see examples in
Section 8.5.2).
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Table 8.5: Combinations of f with proclitics
General Irrealis
1sg a=f ka=f
2sg ku=f p̃a=f
3sg i=f ke=f
1du (incl) ta=f *tak=f
1du (excl) ra=f *rak=f
2du ra=f *rak=f
3du ra=f *rak=f
1pl (incl) tu=f *tuk=f
1pl (excl) u=f ko=f
2pl u=f ko=f
3pl ru=f *ruk=f
irrealis element -k does not occur, in all of dual, 1pl (incl), and 3pl. The incompatibility of f with
those persons must be based on the phonological constraint on the sequence -kf #, because there
are no attested occurrences of -kf # in the corpora, or any other sequences of the type -Cf # for that
matter. This behavior is similar to the phonological restrictions attested with fla discussed in Section
8.3.2.
8.5.2 Storyboard results
In order to test the frequency of general and irrealis proclitics in conditional protases and apodoses,
I elicited several storyboards targeting different types of conditionals. Table 8.6 shows all the story-
boards I used together with the number of targeted conditionals and their types.
Before presenting the analysis of the collected data of conditional clauses, I describe the con-
ditional types from Table 8.6 and show how they were tested with storyboards. The temporal and
modal distinctions, as described by the branching-times model described in Section 7.1.3, are defined
by different combinations of temporal and modal references. The temporal distinctions are past,
present, and future, and the main modal distinction is between counterfactual and possibility (hypo-
thetical)14 conditionals. Counterfactual conditionals report on possibilities that are either contrary
to the fact (past and present counterfactuals) or expected not to happen in the future (future coun-
terfactuals).15 Future-possibility conditionals denote possibilities for which there does not seem to
be particular belief that they will not occur in the future. In other words, given that the condition is
satisfied under the current circumstances, they are expected to happen. Figure 8.6 shows these dif-
14These conditionals are also referred to as “hypothetical” in the literature (e.g.Thompson et al., 2007; Kroeger, 2019:353),
but here I use the terms “present and future possibility conditionals” that relate with more precision to the temporal and
modal meanings.
15The future counterfactuals have also been referred to as future less vivid by Iatridou (2000).
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Table 8.6: Storyboards eliciting conditional clauses
Title Nº
tar-
geted
cond.
Conditional types Nº
speak-
ers
Festival (FV) (von Prince, 2018c) 3 past and future counterfactual 8
The fortune teller (FT) (TFS, 2010) 6 future possibility, past counterfactual 5
The fortune teller 2 (FT2) (AK1-166-15) 3 future possibility, past counterfactual 2
Making laplap (ML) (Krajinović, 2018c) 1 past counterfactual 6
Making laplap 2 (ML2) (Krajinović, 2018c) 1 future counterfactual 4
The woodchopper (W) (TFS, 2011d) 2 negative past counterfactual 5
Garden (G) (Krajinović, 2018a),
Garden 2 (G2) (AK1-166-07) 2 present counterfactual 6
Red yam (RY) (von Prince, 2018e) 1 present possibility 7
ferent temporal modal areas in the branching-times model.16 The only temporal modal combinations
not indicated in Figure 8.6, are the possible past and present, which include some level of epistemic
uncertainty, such as if he was there yesterday, he has already seen it. In the model from Figure 8.6
they would refer to the area including both the counterfactual indices and the index belonging to
the actual world, either past or present. The inclusion of the actual index captures the fact that the
speaker does not know whether the said possibility has in fact been realized or not. In this work,
past and present-possibility conditionals were not systematically tested, except for a few obtained
examples from the storyboard “Red Yam” (see below).
Counterfactual conditionals were elicited through storyboards by setting a context in the story
in which it is clearly indicated that the antecedent is contrary to the fact or unlikely as can be seen
in examples (62) and (63) from the storyboard “Festival” (von Prince, 2018c) in which two friends
are talking about the ongoing competitions taking place in their town. The text in bold in (62)
expresses a past counterfactual, and in (63) a future counterfactual. Example (64) illustrates the
present counterfactual conditional from the storyboard “Garden” (Krajinović, 2018a).
(62) A: Did you play soccer yesterday?
B: No, it rained. If I had played soccer yesterday, I would have gotten wet.
(63) A: Are you going to play volleyball tomorrow?
B: No, I hurt my finger. If I played volleyball tomorrow, my finger would bleed again.
(64) Mary is in the garden looking for her husband. She calls him on the phone and he lies to her that
16The connections between the nodes of the actual past and counterfactual present and future nodes capture the idea
that had something in the past played out differently (blue), then the present would be different (green), and the future
would be different from what is expected to happen (orange).
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Figure 8.6: Semantic areas of past counterfactual p.cf, present counterfactual p.cf, future coun-
terfactual f.cf, and possible future meaning f.po, based on von Prince et al. (2019d)
he is also in the garden.
Mary: If you were in the garden right now, I would be looking at you right now.
The conditionals expressing a future possibility differ from the counterfactual conditionals in that
their outcome is not yet determined. For instance, in the storyboarde Fortune Teller (TFS, 2010) a
fortune teller gives predictions about the future, considering different conditions, such as ‘marrying
John’, as shown in (65). Here we can see that the future possibility of having children is a possible
outcome of marriage, and it is not considered unlikely to ever happen as it was the case in (62) and
(63).
(65) A: John has asked me to marry him. What will happen if I marry him?
The fortune teller looks into the future and says: If you marry John, you will have many
ildren.
The results regarding the TMAmarking and conditional constructions of the conditional protasis
are presented in Table 8.7. The main conclusions that can be taken from these results are the follow-
ing: a) there is a dedicated counterfactual marker mer used optionally, previously analyzed as mer
‘again’ by Thieberger (2006), b) the general and irrealis proclitics can both occur in past and future
counterfactuals and future-possibility conditionals, although irrealis is preferred in all of them, and
c) conditional protasis with strict present reference referring to the utterance time can only have
general proclitics. I provide evidence for each of these points below.
The counterfactual and future-possibility conditionals can be formally distinguished in Nafsan.
The counterfactual conditionals can optionally be marked by the markermer, which is not permitted
with the meaning of future possibility. Although both types of conditionals can also be expressed
by the i=f-wel structure, the counterfactuality can be specified withmer. Thieberger (2006) analyzes
mer as an auxiliary verb meaning ‘again/in turn’. Althoughmer does have the meaning of ‘again/in
turn’ in other contexts, in conditionals it is grammaticalized as a counterfactual marker. The typical
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Table 8.7: Storyboard results for conditional protases, storyboards from Table 8.6, gen – general
proclitic, irr – irrealis proclitic
Conditional type Protasis TMA Nº occurr. Gen/irr ratio
Past counterfactual
(frames FV 11,
FT 19, 21, 22, W 17, 20,
ML 15, FT2 21, 22)
gen + () + mer 5
general 31%,
irrealis 69%
(i)f-wel (kin) + gen 7
irr + () + mer 15
(i)f-wel (kin) + irr 12
Present counterfactual
(G 10, G2)
gen + () + mer 5 general 100%(i)f-wel (kin) + gen 7
Future counterfactual
(frames FV 15, 18, ML2 3)
gen + () + mer 3
general 22%,
irrealis 78%
(i)f-wel (kin) + gen 2
irr + () + mer 8
(i)f-wel (kin) + irr 9
isaa kin ‘it is bad that’ + irr 1
Present possibility
(RY 14) (i)f-wel (kin) + gen 2 general 100%
Future possibility
(frames FT 12, FT2 12)
(i)f wel (kin) + gen 2 general 25%,
irrealis 75%(i)f-wel (kin) + irr 6
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counterfactual construction is formed by either a general (66) or irrealis proclitic (67) attached to f
and then followed bymer. However, there are also cases of either realis or irrealis proclitic attaching
directly tomer (68), which suggests that the reading of counterfactuality is due to the presence ofmer.
Some of the corpus examples, such as (53) can now be reanalyzed as involving the counterfactual
mer.
(66) [Context from (64)]
[ku=f
2g=cond
mer
cf
to
stay
talm̃at
garden
to]
stay
ka=fo
1g.i=pp.i
lek
see
ag.
2g
‘If you were in the garden, I would see you.’ (AK1-154-01, 00:04:45.106-00:04:52.520)
(67) [Context from (62)]
[ka=f
1g.i=cond
mer
cf
pei
first
p̃i
kick
bol
ball:bi
nanom],
yesterday
ka=fo
1g.i=pp.i
lom
wet
usrek.
completely
‘If I had played soccer yesterday Iwould have gottenwet.’ (AK1-004-01, 00:01:57.691-00:02:13.145)
(68) [Context from (62)]
[Nanom
yesterday
p̃a=mer
2g.i=cf
mes
play
futbol],
soccer
p̃a=fo
2g.i=pp.i
lom
wet
uus.
rain
‘If you had played soccer yesterday, you would have gotten wet.’ (AK1-048-01, 00:03:16.213-
00:03:22.490)
In comparison to bj.po=() +mer + verb as a dedicated counterfactual construction, i=f-wel kin
is a more general construction that can be used for all types of conditionals, as can be seen in Table
8.7. Examples (69) and (70) with i=f-wel (kin) mirror the counterfactual examples (66) and (67) with
() mer, respectively. This shows that i=f-wel (kin) is a default conditional expression and thatmer is
indeed an optional marker of counterfactuality. If we look back at example (53) in Section 8.5.1, we
see that the presence of mer was due to counterfactuality.
(69) [i=f-wel
3g=cond-like
kin
comp
ku=to
2g=stay
talm̃at
garden
malfanen],
now
ka=fo
1g.i=pp.i
lek
see
ag.
2g
‘If you were in the garden right now, I would see you.’ (AK1-151-01, 00:03:29.643-00:03:33.778)
(70) [i=f-wel
3g=cond-like
kin
comp
ka=fan
1g.i=go.i
mes],
play
go
and
ka=fo
1g.i=pp.i
lom.
wet
‘If I had gone to play, I would have gotten wet.’ (AK1-098-01, 00:02:54.008-00:03:00.871)
More evidence for the dedicated meaning of mer constructions is that they are not considered
felicitous in future-possibility and present-possibility conditionals, as shown in examples (71) and
(72). All speakers chose i=() wel (kin) for these types of conditionals, and in the follow-up elicitation
they also confirmed that a construction with mer would not be appropriate (cf. recording AK1-
075-01). Table 8.8 summarizes available conditional structures in the storyboard data17 (apodosis is
17For possible diachronic reasons and register, other conditionals constructions, such as those starting with fla and f
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Figure 8.7: The irrealis domain in Nafsan, solid outline: irrealis subject proclitics; dashed outline:
optional mer, from von Prince et al. (2019d)
further discussed below) and Figure 8.7 represents the meaning ofmer and irrealis in the branching-
times model of modality.
(71) [Context from (65)]
[I=f-wel
1g=cond-like
kin
comp
ku=taulu
2g=marry
John],
John
akam
2d
rak=fo
2d.i=pp.i
pitlak
have
teesa
children
ruk=fo
2pl.i=pp.i
laap.
many
‘If you marry John, you will have a lot of children.’ (AK1-010-01, 00:02:11.561-00:02:17.625)
(72) [Context from (65)]
[F-wel
cond-like
kin
comp
p̃a=lak
2g.i=marry
skot
with
John],
John
rak=fo
2d.i=pp.i
pitlak
have
teesa
children
laap.
many
‘If youmarry John, you twowill have a lot of children.’ (AK1-018-01, 00:17:43.236-00:17:47.525)
Table 8.8: Structure of conditional clauses in the storyboard data
Type Protasis Apodosis
default (i=)() wel (kin) + bj.po=verb bj.po=(fo) + verb
counterfactual bj.po=() + mer + verb bj.po=(fo) + verb
Regarding our semantic analysis of subject proclitics, the most important finding is that the
general proclitics are completely interchangeable with irrealis proclitics in the protases of future-
possibility conditionals and past and future counterfactual conditionals. Examples (71) and (72) above
show the same conditional clauses with the interpretation of future possibility with the general
alone (Thieberger, 2006) did not appear in the storyboard data, see Krajinović (2018) and Krajinović & Thieberger (2018).
However, they were accepted in elicitation, see also example (61) from a non-targeted storyboard context.
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proclitic and the irrealis proclitic in the protasis, respectively. Similarly, (73) and (74) show the same
conditional clauses with the interpretation of a future counterfactual with the general proclitic and
the irrealis proclitic in the protasis, respectively. In conclusion, examples (71)-(74) show that general
proclitics can have anymodal and temporal reference established in the context and by TMAmarkers,
such as the conditional f. Crucially, the fact that general proclitics can have future reference is a good
indicator that they should not be treated as realis mood or non-future tense.
(73) [Context from (63)]
[a=f
1g=cond
mer
cf
mes
play
matol],
tomorrow
go
and
nfag
sore
nen
el
kin
comp
a=tai
1g=cut
nakn-i-k
finger1g.dp
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
mer
again
makot
break
‘If I played tomorrow, the sore I cut onmyfingerwould bleed again.’ (AK1-098-01, 00:03:39.185-
00:03:57.063)
(74) [Context from (63)]
[ka=f
1g.i=cond
mer
cf
mes
play
volibol
volleyball:bi
matol],
tomorrow
nakn-i-k
finger1g.dp
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
mra
bleed
‘If I played volleyball tomorrow, myfingerwould bleed.’ (AK1-004-01, 00:03:27.921-00:03:33.286)
As we can see in Table 8.7, the only types of conditionals that combined exclusively with the general
proclitic are the conditionals with present reference, including the counterfactual (66) and present-
possibility conditionals (75).18 The fact that irrealis does not occur with the elicited present con-
ditionals must be related to the fact that both elicited contexts refer exactly to the utterance time.
When the present reference is considered to be more generic, irrealis readily appears in counterfac-
tual contexts, as in (76).
(75) [Two friends are discussing whether their friend Yokon has eaten their red yam. (von Prince,
2018e)]
[F-wel
cond-like
kin
comp
npat-i-n
teeth3g.dp
i=miel],
1g=red
go
then
Yokon
Yokon
m̃as
only
kin
comp
i=paam
1g=eat
nawi
yam
miel
red
gaag.
2g.po
‘If her teeth are red, then Yokon is the one who ate your red yam.’ (AK1-060-01, 00:03:48.433-
00:04:01.225)
(76) [ka=f
1g.i=cond
mer
cf
pram]
tall
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
wi
good
‘it would be good if I was taller.’ (elicited, AK1-046-01)
18In the targeted present-possibility conditional from “Red yam” only two speakers, counted in Table 8.7, produced a
stative verb with a necessarily present reference and 5 speakers produced dynamic verbs which are better interpreted
as having a future reference. These interpretations are due to the relationship between stative verbs and present modal
orientation, while dynamic verbs relate to the future modal orientation (Condoravdi, 2002).
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Regarding the TMAmarking of the apodosis, all conditional types in Table 8.7 have the combina-
tion of the irrealis proclitic and prospective irrealis fo, except for the present-possibility conditional
from the “Red yam” storyboard (75). Since in this example the reference of the apodosis is situated
in the past, the general proclitic is chosen instead of irrealis. This shows that the function of fo in
apodoses is indeed to denote that the protasis is temporally in the pre-time of the apodosis. The
function of irrealis proclitics in the apodosis is the same as in the protasis – denoting meanings of
possibility and counterfactuality.
8.6 Complement and relative clauses
8.6.1 False beliefs and relative clauses
The study of mood in complement and relative clauses has been mostly tied to the study of the
subjunctive in Indo-European languages, which differs widely across different languages. For that
reason, it is hard to postulate “expected” behaviors of a category of mood in complement clauses.
In this section I outline a few subjunctive-like characteristics that were considered in this work
and focus on the expression of false beliefs and non-specific relative clauses in Nafsan. The work on
subjunctive in complement clauses hasmostly centered around accounting for different complement-
taking verbs and the mood they select (e.g. Giannakidou, 2017), as shown by the contrast of examples
(77) and (78) from French. While the verb savoir ‘know’ selects a complement clause with indicative
describing a fact pertaining to the actual world (77), the verb vouloir selects a subjunctive clause
expressing a possibility pertaining to non-actual worlds (78). The same type of contrast exists in
Nafsan with the general and irrealis proclitics, as we can see in (79) and (80), respectively.
(77) Marc
Marc
sait
knows
que
that
le
the
printemps
spring
est/
be:ind:3g/
*soit
be-bj.3g
arrivé.
arrived
‘Marc knows that spring has arrived.’ (Giannakidou, 2017:177)
(78) Marc
Marc
veut
wants
que
that
le
the
printemps
spring
soit/
be:bj:3g/
*est
be:ind:3g
long
long
‘Marc wants spring to be long.’ (Giannakidou, 2017:177)
(79) natokon
village
e
hey
teetwei
before
a=tae-ki
1g=know-
teetwei
before
i=piatlak
3g=have
tete
some
ntwam
devil
‘Long ago in the village, I know that long ago there were some devils.’ (073.051)
(80) natam̃ol
man
nra
two
ne
dem
ra=mur
3d=want
na
comp
rak=taulu
3d=marry
Mary
Mary
‘The two men wanted to marry Mary.’ (AK1-146-09, 00:00:15.790-00:00:18.133)
Apart from these relatively simple contrasts between knowledge and desire predicates, there are
many types of complement-taking verbs whose selection criteria of indicative and subjunctive in
Indo-European languages are far from trivial (cf. Schlenker, 2005; Marques, 2009; Giannakidou, 2017).
Let us take an example of expressing false beliefs, which refer to non-actual worlds, in Portuguese –
both the subjunctive and indicative can be chosenwithout any difference in themeaning, as indicated
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by Marques (2009:199), who says “In fact, (81),19 either with the indicative or the subjunctive, may
be felicitously asserted in a context where the speaker accepts that Ana is ill, as well as in a context
where he accepts that she isn’t.”
(81) pensei
think:1g.p
que
that
a
the
Ana
Ana
estava/
be:3g.p.ind
estivesse
be:3g.p.bj
doente
sick
‘I thought Ana was sick.’ (Marques, 2009:199)
Departing from these characteristics of subjunctive and indicativemood in Indo-European languages,
as well as commonly cited meanings of irrealis as referring to different types of complement and
relative clauses (e.g. Roberts, 1990; Bugenhagen, 1993; Barbour, 2011), I investigated the usage of
irrealis and general proclitics in these contexts in Nafsan. The data elicitation of complement clauses
in Nafsan included both storyboards and meta-linguistic elicitations about the complement-clause
structures found in storyboards. The expression of false beliefs was tested in Nafsan with the sto-
ryboard “Bundle of bananas” (von Prince, 2018a) in which two friends realize that the bananas they
were trying to get from the river are just a reflection of a banana tree. All speakers used the general
proclitic to express a false belief in this context, as shown in (82). Thus, false beliefs do not trigger the
use of irrealis proclitics in Nafsan. In fact, all complement clauses introduced by complement-taking
verbs expressing propositional attitude behave the same as main clauses, regarding the expression
of TMA meanings. Thus, the irrealis proclitic typically receives future and modal reference and the
general proclitic past and present reference. A deontic reading of a complement clause marked by
irrealis, equal to deontic readings of irrealis in main clauses, is exemplified in (83). The same pattern
holds for complement-taking predicates analyzed by Noonan (2007) as utterance predicates (saying,
asking), immediate perception (seeing, hearing), and knowledge (know, discover) predicates. The
negation of the complement-taking predicate also does not influence the selection of the general and
irrealis proclitics, as shown in (84). We can conclude that in Nafsan the types of predicates mentioned
above do not influence the selection of the general and irrealis proclitics, as their distribution can be
explained by the same principles postulated for the appearance of general and irrealis proclitics in
main clauses, as explained in Section 8.7.
(82) Go
and
ra=to
1d.ecl=pog
mro-ki-n
think3g.obj
na
comp
nlak
tree
nanr
banana
i=to
3g.eal=stay
etan
down
nai.
water
‘Andwe thought that the banana treewas in thewater.’ (AK1-017-01, 00:11:51.930-00:11:55.920)
(83) Ku=mro-ki-n
2g=think3g.obj
na
comp
ka=lak
2g.i=marry
skot
with
John
John
ko
or
i=tik?
3g=not
‘Do you think I should marry John or not?’ (AK1-018-01, 00:17:12.011-00:17:15.691)
19Example number in this work and not from the original quotation.
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(84) Mary
Mary
i=tap
3g=neg1
mro-ki-n
think3g.obj
na
comp
Adam
Adam
i=pi
3g=be
marik
husband
wi
good
toklos
regarding
teleekot
fortune.teller
mau.
neg2
‘Mary doesn’t think Adam was a good husband to the fortune teller.’ (elicited, AK1-133-01)
Another context often considered to be a property of the indicative/subjunctive and realis/irrealis
distinctions is the usage of subjunctive and irrealis in relative clauses headed by non-specific NPs,
because they have no referent in the actual world (see Barbour 2011 for Neverver). Judging from the
corpus data presented in (85) and (86), Nafsan seems like a good candidate to encode the specificity
distinction by the choice of irrealis and general proclitics. Example (85) uses irrealis on the numeral
determiner ‘one’ to refer to a non-specific unknown place and (86) uses the general proclitic because
the place is specific and known to the speaker.
(85) nlaken
because
ru=ple
3pl=fight
go
and
ru=mer
3pl=again
mai
come
pak
go.to
naor
place
ke=skei
3pl.i=one
go
and
ru=po
3pl=pp.eal
sos-o-ø
call--3g.obj
ki
pep
unity
unity:bi
dei
day:bi
‘[…] because they fought and they came to a place and they called it a unity day.’ (130.267)
(86) u=pak
1pl.ecl=go.to
elag,
up
naor
place
ni
of
[…] naor
place
i=skei
3g=one
ru=sos-o-ø
3pl=call--3g.obj
ki
pep
Tanmililip.
Tanmililip
‘we went up to the place of […] this place they call Tanmililip.’ (022.033)
The hypothesis that relative clauses would behave similarly to (85) and (86) was tested with the
storyboard “Fat pig” (von Prince, 2018b) in which Bong wants to make a traditional kastom ceremony
in Vanuatu, but he needs a fat pig with big tusks. In example (87) he only starts looking for a pig of
that type, which is non-specific. For the purpose of comparison with a subjunctive-type language,
example (88) offers a sentence produced in the same context in Portuguese.20 In the continuation of
the story, Bong loses the fat pig he received from his uncle, and is then searching for that specific
pig. This context is expressed in (89) for Nafsan and in (90) for Portuguese. Both examples from
Nafsan reflect the proclitic marking in the relative clause chosen by all participants. As we can see,
Nafsan does not distinguish between the non-specific and specific referents by the selection of mood
in the relative clause itself. However, in the non-specific context, as in (87), Nafsan can optionally
use the irrealis proclitic on the determiner skei ‘one’ referring to the head of the relative clause. On
the other hand, Portuguese marks this difference by using the subjunctive in the complement clause
in the non-specific context (88) and by using the indicative in the specific context (90).
20The Portuguese examples were elicited from one native speaker.
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(87) Ale,
then:bi
i=to
3g=pog
lel
look
waak
pig
ke=skei
3g.i=one
[nen
el
kin
comp
nap̃l-e-n
belly--3g.dp
i=saal
3g=hang
i=pak
3g=go.to
etan
down
go
and
npat-i-n
teeth--3g.dp
i=top
3g=big
go
and
i=top].
3g=big
‘Then he was looking for a pig [non-specific] whose belly hangs down and whose teeth are
very big.’ (AK1-049-01, 00:01:54.323-00:02:10.118)
(88) Estou
be:1g.p
à
pep
procura
search
de
of
um
a
porco
pig
[que
el
tenha
have:3g.p.bj
uma
a
barriga
belly
gorda
fat
e
and
cujas
whose
presas
teeth
sejam
be:3pl.p.bj
muito
very
longas].
long
‘I’m looking for a pig [non-specific] that has a big belly and whose teeth are very long.’
(89) A=to
1g=pog
lel
look
waak
pig
[nen
el
kin
comp
nap̃l-e-n
belly--3g.dp
i=saal
3g=hang
go
and
npat-i-n
teeth--3g.dp
i=taf
3g=get.out
i=top
3g=big
pe
in
top].
3g=big
‘I am looking for a pig [specific] whose belly hangs and whose teeth are very big.’ (AK1-022-
01, 00:04:03.198-00:04:10.645)
(90) Estou
be:1g.p
à
pep
procura
search
de
of
um
a
porco
pig
[que
el
tem
have:3g.p.ind
uma
a
barriga
belly
gorda
fat
e
and
cujas
whose
presas
teeth
são
be:3pl.p.ind
muito
very
longas].
long
‘I’m looking for a pig [specific] that has a big belly and whose teeth are very long.’
Given that Nafsan does use irrealis proclitics on determiners in non-specific contexts such as
(85) and (87), the best explanation for the lack of irrealis in relative clauses in the context of example
(87) is that the relative clause is outside of the scope of the non-specific reference and receives its
own TMA marking independently of the head of the clause. Similarly to the complement-taking
predicates such as ‘think’, relative clauses also reflect the choice of irrealis and general proclitics
equal to the main clauses.
8.6.2 Desiderative, emotive and evaluative clauses
In this section I address several topics regarding the selection of general and irrealis proclitics in
desiderative, emotive and evaluative complement clauses in Nafsan. In Nafsan, these types of com-
plement clauses proved to have a complex interaction between the complement-taking verb, com-
plementizers and TMA reference of the complement clause. I show that the general proclitic can
appear in many counterfactual and future-oriented contexts, and that different temporal readings of
complement clauses can be indicated by dedicated complementizers, as well as aspectual markers. I
show that these temporal readings of complement clauses can in turn influence the meaning of the
complement-taking verb, similarly to what has been reported for Navajo (Bogal-Allbritten, 2016) and
Daakaka (von Prince, 2015).
Themost important storyboard contexts for obtaining evaluative complement clauseswere frames
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Figure 8.8: Frames 21 and 22 from “Bill vs. the weather” (Vander Klok, 2013)
18, 20, and 22 in the storyboard “Bill vs. the weather” (Vander Klok, 2013). These contexts were tar-
geting past epistemic readings, also analyzed in Section 8.4. However, as Vander Klok (2019) shows,
the targeted contexts are in fact ambiguous between a past epistemic and a past counterfactual read-
ing. These contexts unfold as follows. Forgetful Bill is always unprepared for the weather conditions
on his way to work. The only day he does take all the necessary clothes for rain, snow, and cold,
the sun comes out. The next day his friend wonders why he brought all those winter clothes on a
sunny day, see Figure 8.8. In this context both the general and the irrealis proclitics were produced
in an evaluative complement clause, as can be seen in (91) and (92). Out of the total of 24 sentences
produced by 8 speakers for this frame, 13 sentences are complement clauses introduced by i=sa kin
‘it is bad that’. This construction seems to be a dedicated way of expressing undesirable possibilities,
which can also be analyzed as timitive constructions (von Prince et al., 2019b,c).
(91) [Context: Why did you bring a hat yesterday?]
Nlaken
because
i=sa
3g=bad
kin
comp
nlag
wind
i=fuu.
3g=blow
‘It would be bad if wind had blown.’ (AK1-039-01, 00:05:33.556-00:05:35.681)
(92) [Context: the same as (91)]
I=sa
3g=bad
kin
comp
nlag
wind
ke=sisi.
3g.i=blow
‘It would be bad if wind had blown.’ (AK1-018-01, 00:13:13.680-00:13:19.216)
The ratio of the usage of general and irrealis proclitics in examples like (91) and (92) is almost
50:50, with 7 sentences with irrealis proclitics and 6 with general proclitics (out of which one com-
bineswithfla). Thus, we can conclude that there is no clear preference for irrealis or general proclitics
in these contexts. Since these evaluative clauses express the evaluation of a counterfactual possibil-
ity, the general proclitics have again proved to be underspecified for realis meanings. The question
that arises here, however, is how the evaluative clauses with factual meanings like ‘it is bad that the
wind blew’ can be distinguished from the counterfactual complement clauses like (91) and (92). The
answer I found through meta-linguistic elicitation lies in the choice of complementizers. Thieberger
(2006) identifies three complementizers (kin, nen (kin), na(g)), but during my fieldwork I found a
new complementizer kia, which is necessary for factual interpretations with evaluative and emotive
predicates. Thieberger (2006:146) analyzes kia as a presentative typically translated as ‘here’ or ‘this
one’, but in comparison to my data it is not clear to which extent the demonstrative function plays a
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role in its usage as a complementizer synchronically. In (93) the usage of kia determines the reading
of the complement clause as factual, pertaining to the actual world (because it is a shared knowledge
that there is in fact a volcano on the island of Tanna). In the counterfactual context presented in (91)
and (92), kia would be agrammatical.
(93) I=sa
3g=bad
kia
comp.eal
(*kin)
*comp
i=pitlak
3g=have
volkano
volcano:bi
Tanna.
Tanna
‘It is bad that there is a volcano on Tanna.’ (Elicited, AK1-046-01)
The complementizer kia specifies that the described event has either the past (94) or present ref-
erence, as in (93) and (95). I tentatively gloss it as comp.eal because it is used only in realis contexts.
In the present reference it is interchangeable with the complementizer kin,21 as shown in (95). How-
ever, unlike kia, kin can also appear with future reference, as in (96). The complementizer kin is in
general less specified than kia, because it can occur with almost all temporal references, except for
more remote past and generic references, where kia is used, as seen by the contrast between (97) and
(98). In other words, kin seems to be used more commonly with immediate past (97), present pro-
gressive (95), and future (96). This relationship between kin and kia explains why (91) could only be
interpreted as encoding a counterfactual possibility and not a factual complement clause. Since the
context of the example sets the event on the previous day in the past, kia would have been a better
choice if factuality was intended. Thus, despite the underspecification of the general proclitic when
it comes to the modal interpretation of the complement clause, kin specifies the modal reference as
that of possibility.
(94) [Context: A asks B: Have you eaten? B says: yes, and A replies:]
ah,
ah
i=wi
3g=good
kia
comp.eal
ku=pe
2g=pf
faam.
eat.i
‘Ah, it’s good you have eaten.’ (elicited, AK1-023-01)
(95) i=wi
3g=good
kin/kia
comp/comp.eal
ku=to
2g=pog
faam.
eat.i
‘It is good he is eating (right now).’ (elicited, AK1-023-01)
(96) [Context: A asks B: Have you eaten? B says: not yet, and A replies:]
ah,
ah
i=wi
3g=good
kin
comp
p̃a=faam.
2g.i=eat.i
‘Ah, it would be good if you ate.’ (elicited, AK1-023-01)
21A caveat to my analysis of kin is that this form exists in Nafsan as a complementizer (Thieberger, 2006:297), but also
as object marking on some verbs like mro-ki-n ‘think3g.obj’. In my work I did not find sufficient evidence that
kin has the function of 3g.obj in the examples discussed in this section. Since kia does not seem to be related to
the object-marking function, given that speakers reject the form mro-ki-a, I concluded that kin and kia are most likely
complementizers and not object markers. However, if the transitivity analysis was proven to be the correct one, the TMA
effects described here would hold in any case.
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(97) [Context: in the moment of leaving the house]
a=semsem
1g=happy
kin
comp
a=mai
1g=come
tok
stay
esum̃
house
gamus.
2pl.po
‘I am happy that I stayed at your place.’ (elicited, AK1-078-01)
(98) [Context: meeting the host after a while of having stayed at their place:]
a=trau
1g=really
semsem
happy
kia
comp.eal
a=mai
1g=come
tok
stay
esum̃
house
gamus.
2pl.po
‘I am glad to have stayed at your place.’ (elicited, AK1-078-01)
Another way by which temporal reference can be indicated is aspect. For instance, example
(95) has a present progressive reading because of the imperfective marker to. This influence of to
on the temporal interpretation is independent of its combination with proclitics, because it yields a
present interpretation both with the general proclitic and with the irrealis proclitic, as we can see
in (99) and (100) with the desiderative/emotive verb mur. Since to can mark both progressive and
habitual readings, these aspectual readings in (99) and (100) get interpreted as present reference by
pragmatic defaults of imperfective aspect discussed in Section 7.2.2. In contrast, when the verb is not
marked by to, it gets interpreted as perfective, and the complement clause receives a future reading
due to irrealis marking, as in (101) and (102). As stipulated by Smith et al. (2007) and Mucha (2015)
for Navajo and Hausa, respectively, unbounded events are interpreted as located in the present by
default, due to two factors. Firstly, in the lack of a more specific context, the topic/reference time
of the sentence is the present because utterance time is the central orientation point for language
(cf. The Deictic Principle) and it requires least information added or inferred (cf. The Simplicity
Principle) (Smith et al., 2007). Secondly, unbounded/imperfective events contain the topic/reference
time in their duration, which is the utterance time in the case of a default interpretation (Mucha,
2015).
(99) A=trau
1g=really
mur-i-n
like3g.obj
kin
comp
a=to
1g=pog
tae
know
nafsan.
language
‘I really like that I am learning Nafsan.’ (elicited, AK1-045-01)
(100) a=mur
1g=like
(na)
(comp)
ka=to
1g.i=hab
sari.
travel
‘I like to travel.’ (elicited, AK1-078-01)
(101) a=mur
1g=want
(na)
comp
ka=fan
1g.i=go.i
sari.
travel
‘I want to go travel.’ (elicited, AK1-078-01)
(102) I=pitlak
3g=have
natam̃ol
man
i=nru
3g=two
nen
dem
ra=mur
3d=want
rak=lak
3d.i=marry
skot-i-ø.
with--3g.obj
‘There are two men who want to marry her.’ From “The fortune teller” (TFS, 2010) (AK1-092-
01, 00:00:09.626-00:00:13.148)
So far we have seen that the TMA reference of complement clauses is partially determined by
complementizers, by proclitics (at least in the case of irrealis), and aspect of the complement clause.
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The case of Nafsan is interesting in that the complement-taking verbs do not seem to impose a spe-
cific TMA marking or reference, as it is often reported for Romance languages (e.g. Schlenker, 2005;
Marques, 2009; Giannakidou, 2017). In fact, this process also goes the other way round. As we can
see by comparing examples (99)-(101), the present reference established by the imperfective to gives
rise to the interpretation of mur as ‘like’ in (99) and (100), while the future reference established by
irrealis in (101) gives rise to the meaning of mur ‘want’. This means that the complement clause
can contribute to the interpretation of the complement-taking verb. Since these ‘like’ and ‘want’
meanings were elicited in English, I further tested them through the storyboard “Haircuts” (Kraji-
nović, 2018b), as shown in (103) and (104). The results confirmed that mur is used for both of these
meanings, but there is also the more specified verb lewiki ‘like’ (104) which cannot express wishes.
(103) [Context: Introducing the character Mary who likes to travel.]
nmatu
woman
ne
dem
i=pi
3g=be
nmatu
woman
nen
el
i=mur
3g=like
ke=to
3g.i=hab
siwer
walk
‘This woman is someone who likes to travel.’ (AK1-154-03, 00:00:32.236-00:00:38.581)
(104) [Context: Kal’s hair has grown since the last time Mary saw him. Mary says:]
a=mur
1g=like
go,
that
a=le-wi-ki
1g=see-good-
nal-u-m
hair--2dp
teflan
like.that
kin
comp
i=pe
3g=pf
pei
first
to
stay
‘I like it, I like your hair the way it is now.’ (AK1-152-03, 00:03:54.265-00:04:01.230)
When it comes to desiderative meanings, ‘want’ verbs have been shown cross-linguistically to be
quite polysemous (Khanina, 2008). As a an example of amore extreme lexical ambiguity of a complement-
taking verb, Navajo can receive the meanings of ‘think’ and ‘want’ depending on the aspect of the
complement clause (Bogal-Allbritten, 2016:152). This is shown in example (105), where the same verb
nízin is interpreted as ‘think’ with the perfective clause and also as ‘want’ with the future clause. This
example illustrates well that desiderative meanings are related to futurity and possibility of the ex-
pressed wish coming to happen, while predicates of belief are neutral with regard to TMA reference.
(105) Alice
Alice
[Bill
Bill
Kinłánígóó
Flagstaff.to
‘ííná]
3g.move.pf
dóó
and
[bich’į
3obj.to
deeshááł]
1g.go.f
nízin.
3g.nízin.ipf
‘Alice thinks Bill moved to Flagstaff and shewants to go see him.’ (Bogal-Allbritten, 2016:152)
In fact, even the verb mro ‘think’ in Nafsan can be interpreted as denoting intentions instead of
beliefs, as it was the case in (82) in Section 8.6.1. When the complement clause is marked with the
irrealis proclitic alone (without fo), mro can express an intent or a wish, as shown in (106).
(106) Bong
Bong
i=to
3g=pog
mro
think
na
comp
ke=freg
3g.i=make.i
kastom.
kastom:bi
Bong intends tomake/wants tomake a kastom ceremony. (AK1-028-01, 00:00:10.196-00:00:14.068)
There are a few main conclusions that can be made for this section: a) general proclitics can express
possibilities in complement clauses, b) the temporal and modal reference of the complement clause
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is restricted by the choice of complementizers, c) aspect marking contributes to default temporal
interpretations of the complement clause, d) irrealis expresses counterfactual and future possibilities,
as well as habituals in complement clauses, and e) these temporal and modal interpretations can
influence the meaning of the complement-taking verb.
8.7 Pragmatic account of realis and irrealis
In this section I provide a pragmatic explanation for twomain questions stemming from this chapter:
a) why do general proclitics typically have the non-future meaning in the main clauses, and com-
plement and relative clauses that follow this pattern (see Section 8.6.1), and b) why are general and
irrealis proclitics interchangeable in some modal contexts where irrealis would be predicted seman-
tically. I assess how different approaches presented in Section 7.2 can answer these two questions. I
propose that the Maximize Presupposition principle can offer an explanation for the typically non-
future meaning of general proclitics in main clauses. However, I explain the interchangeability of
the general and irrealis proclitics by postulating an additional pragmatic principle based on economy
of expression, which can come in conflict with Maximize Presupposition.
In Section 7.2 I described several approaches that have been adopted in the literature to explain
how the TMA meaning is derived when a language lacks tense marking (Section 7.2.2) or when one
of the available grammatical categories is semantically underspecified (Section 7.2.3). Let us first
consider how the pragmatic theory of default temporal reference by Smith et al. (2007) and Mucha
(2015) would apply to Nafsan. We could postulate that when the general subject proclitics are the
only marking on the verb in Nafsan, the default temporal reference is that of the present when the
verb is unbounded. We have seen in Section 8.6.2 that the imperfective to contributes to the present
interpretation. This is also the case in many other examples, such as (107). However, if the TMA
reference of sentences like (107) in Nafsan was driven only by defaults, we would expect that in the
right context i=to could also be interpreted with a future reference. Smith (2008) and Mucha (2015)
show that in a future context the unmarked sentences can easily get a future interpretation. However,
in Nafsan the future interpretation is not as easily derived with general proclitics when there is no
additional modal or perfect marking on the verb. If we compare examples (108a) and (108b), we can
see that irrealis proclitics are used with the future reference ‘in the evening’ (108a), and the general
proclitic can also combine with fla to express epistemic uncertainty about the event with the same
future reference (108b). However, the general proclitic cannot be used alone with the future temporal
reference (108b). The same holds for the example (109) in which the general proclitic has to combine
with fla in order to render the conditional future meaning. So, when does the general proclitic get
future and modal meanings at all? Since the general proclitic combines with almost all available
TMA markers and auxiliary verbs, it simply gets its TMA reference from those specific markers. In
(108b) and (109), this is the marker fla and in other cases it might be the conditional f (Section 8.5),
the perfect pe (see example (12) in Section 8.3.1), the complementizer kia (Section 8.6.2), and many
other types of constructions. In some cases, the context might even be sufficiently specific so that the
general proclitic can get interpreted as future without any additional TMA marking (see examples
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(4) and (5) in Section 8.2). However, in out-of-the-blue default cases, the general proclitic simply has
past and present interpretations, while the set of contexts in which a future/modal interpretation is
possible is limited. For this reason, the pragmatic explanation based on defaults would not work for
Nafsan. This approach would be too permissive and it could not explain the temporal restrictiveness
we find with general proclitics, when occurring without additional TMA marking.
(107) [Q: What your brother DO right now? (=What activity is he engaged in?) A by someone
who can see him] He WRITE letters (Dahl, 1985:TMAQ 5)
I=to
3g=pog
mtir
write
natus
paper
‘He is writing letters (right now).’ (Thieberger, 2006)
(108) [There are black clouds in the sky.] It RAIN in the evening. (Dahl, 2000b:FQ 46)
a. Us
rain
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
lakor
maybe
wo
rain
kotfan.
evening
‘Maybe it will rain in the evening.’ (AK1-086-01)
b. Us
rain
i=fla
3g=might
wo
rain
kotfan./
evening
us
rain
*i=wo
3g=rain
kotfan.
evening
‘It might rain in the evening.’ (AK1-086-01)
(109) If it BE COLD tomorrow, we STAY at home. (Dahl, 2000b:FQ 67)
Naor
place
i=fla
3g=might
tok
stay
mlanr
cold
matol,
tomorrow
ka=fo
1g.i=pp.i
tok
stay
esum̃.
house
‘If it’s cold tomorrow, I will stay at home.’ (AK1-103-01)
I turn now to a pragmatic explanation of how the non-future meaning of general proclitics in main
clauses is derived. As shown in Section 8.1, the irrealis and perfect-agreeing proclitics are port-
manteau subject markers because they cannot be consistently separated in the formative parts of
TMA and subject marking in their synchronic form. Thus, although from the diachronic perspective
the general proclitics are morphologically simpler than the other two in not having any recogniz-
able TMA morphology, synchronically all three paradigms can be considered as occupying the same
morphological slot. In this sense, for every utterance the speakers needs to choose one of these
three subject proclitics, which makes them alternatives of each other.22 Nevertheless, not all three
of them are in equal competition with each other. For instance, the irrealis and perfect-agreeing
proclitics cannot appear in the same morphological contexts – the prefect proclitics occur only with
the perfect marker pe and irrealis proclitics cannot combine with that marker at all (even in future
contexts). This simply means that irrealis and perfect-agreeing proclitics do not compete and are not
alternatives of each other. The situation is different with the general proclitics. They can occur in
most contexts where irrealis and perfect-agreeing proclitics can occur too. Thus, general proclitics
are always a viable alternative to these two paradigms. In the case of the perfect-agreeing proclitics,
which are basically limited to occurring with pe (see Section 5.1.1), the only kind of relationship
22See Bochnak (2016) for the argument that in order for two categories to be alternatives that qualify for Maximize
Presupposition, they have to be members of same grammatical paradigm.
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between the general and perfect-agreeing proclitics is that of their interchangeability in occurring
with the perfect marker pe. In other words, they do not compete pragmatically in any other domain
other than co-occurring with pe (for possible exceptions see Section 5.1.1). However, when it comes
to the relationship between the general and irrealis proclitics, there are two types of contexts in
which they pragmatically compete. The first type of context is the same as in the case of the perfect-
agreeing proclitics: there are clear modal/future contexts with markers such as f cond and both the
general and the irrealis proclitics are available in those contexts. The second type of context is that
of main clauses, especially in out-of-the-blue contexts, in which the general and irrealis proclitics
occur alone, or in the case of irrealis, with the only marker (fo) incompatible with the general pro-
clitic. Since the general proclitic is not semantically specified for TMA meanings, we would expect
that it should be able to freely occur without any additional marking in future contexts like (108). I
argue that the reason why it cannot occur in that type of context is because it stands in a pragmatic
competition with the irrealis proclitics, which have a more specific future meaning as a part of their
semantics. The basic derivation of this process can be explained by the Maximize Presupposition
principle (see also Section 7.2.3). This process goes as described in (110).
(110) The underspecified general subject proclitics and irrealis proclitics form an implicational
scale 〈bj.po.i, bj.po〉where the irrealis proclitic bj.po.i presupposes the reference
to non-actual worlds and the general proclitic bj.po has no presupposition. By the princi-
ple of Maximize Presupposition (“Make your contribution presuppose as much as possible!”,
Heim 1991), the use of the weaker subject marking as the only marking on the verb leads
to the pragmatic inference that the reference to non-actual is false, which leads to “realis”
interpretations.
In other words, (110) says that since irrealis proclitics are more semantically specified they should
be used whenever their presupposition is satisfied in the common ground. Thus, when the irrealis
proclitics are not used, we implicate that their presupposition does not hold, and in this case that
means that the reference to non-actual worlds does not hold. Finally, this frequently leads to the
interpretation that the reference to the actual world holds. This is how the general proclitics get
their realis meanings in main clauses as (111), in contrast to (108).
(111) Us
rain
i=wo
3g=rain
(nanom
yesterday
p̃og).
night
‘It rained yesterday night.’ Based on Dahl (2000c:PQ 14) (AK1-119-01)
The basic idea behind the implicated presuppositions derived through Maximize Presupposition
(Sauerland, 2008) and other related scalar implicatures rely on the Gricean maxim of quantity (Grice,
1975), outlined in (112).
(112) a. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the
exchange).
b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
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Applying the maxim of quantity to the Nafsan proclitics, according to (112a), the speaker needs to
be as semantically specific as required in a given context. In other words, if the speaker knows that
the event has a future, possible, or counterfactual reference, the speaker should use irrealis, as pre-
dicted by Maximize Presupposition. And while this pragmatic principle explains the distribution of
general and irrealis proclitics in main clauses, it does not really predict that the general and irrealis
proclitics should be interchangeable in certain irrealis contexts, such as future-possibility and coun-
terfactual conditionals and complement clauses. I argue that in these cases the second part of the
maxim of quantity (112b) plays a role. As already mentioned in the beginning of this section, the
general proclitics occur in irrealis contexts only when the context is either specific enough or there
is morphological marking of conditionals (f ) and counterfactuality (mer) as in (113), or a comple-
mentizer favoring a possibility reading, as kin in (114). There might also be a general preference for
the general proclitics as they are formally simpler and shorter (cf. Haspelmath, 2014).
(113) Selwan
while
i=f
3g=cond
mer
cf
pitlak
have
kompetisen
competition:bi
ni
of
kapu,
laplap
a=mro-ki-n
1g=think3g.obj
ag
2g
kin
el
p̃a=fo
2g.i=pp.i
pi
be
wina
winner:bi
knen.
of.it
‘If therewas a laplap competition, I think youwould be itswinner.’ (AK1-004-01, 00:04:02.080-
00:04:18.430)
(114) [Context: Why did you bring a hat yesterday?]
i=sa
3g=bad
kin
comp
nlag
wind
i=sisi.
3g=blow
‘It would be bad if wind had blown.’ (AK1-062-01, 00:05:54.448-00:05:58.486)
The sentences in (113) and (114) are already informative enough regardless of the subject marking
chosen, due to their discourse context and due to the additional morphological marking of TMAwith
f and kin. Thus, the irrealis proclitics are not really needed in order to transmit an unambiguous
message. Nevertheless, they are still the preferred choice for most of these types of examples (see
Section 8.5). The preference for irrealis which coexists with the availability of general proclitics in
the same contexts can be explained as the result of the conflict between being specific enough (112a)
by obeying Maximize Presupposition and not saying more than it is required in a given context
(112b). This observation leads us to postulate another principle which captures (112b) in a manner
applied to the specific case of realis/irrealis in Nafsan, which I call Economy principle in (115). The
Economy principle can explain why speakers still use the general proclitics in contexts in which the
irrealis proclitics would in fact be semantically more specific, but also redundant. If the context is
already specific enough as shown in (113) and (114), the economy principle suggests the speaker
should choose the least specific grammatical marker needed.
(115) Economy principle:
If the context is specific enough, use the least specific grammatical marker needed.
Some independent evidence for the existence of this principle can be found in similar types of
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contrasts in other languages. For instance, the contrast between the German present and the future
tense can be analyzed as obeying the Economy principle. While the present tense in its default read-
ing refers to the present temporal reference, it can also be used for the future temporal reference.
The future tense, on the other hand, has a more specific meaning, as it is constrained to the future
temporal reference. Interestingly, the use of the present tense is in fact preferred over the future
tense when an explicit adverb of future reference is present in the sentence, such as in (116).23 How-
ever, when no explicit temporal reference is given in the context, as in (117), both options seem to
be equally preferred. I propose that the preference of the present tense in (116) is a consequence
of the Economy principle – when the future temporal reference is specifically indicated by a tem-
poral adverb in German, the present tense, as the less specific TMA marking is preferred over the
semantically more specific future tense.24
(116) Peter
Peter
fährt
travel:3g.p
nästes
next
Jahr
year
nach
to
Neuseeland.
New.Zealand
‘Peter will travel to New Zealand next year.’
(117) Peter
Peter
fährt
travel:3g.p
nach
to
Neuseeland./
New.Zealand
Peter
Peter
wird
a:3g.f
nach
to
Neuseeland
New.Zealand
fahren.
travel:inf
‘Peter will travel to New Zealand.’
An additional piece of evidence that principles based on economy hold in language comes from
psycholinguistics. The research in psycholinguistics, focused on lexical words, shows that words
that appear in more contexts, and especially in semantically more dissimilar contexts are recognized
and produced faster in different kinds of behavioral experiments, such as lexical decision, naming,
or reading (Adelman et al., 2006; Johns et al., 2012; Perea et al., 2013; Vergara-Martínez et al., 2017).
Although these results were obtained in experimental settings and only with lexical words, it is
possible that similar effects can be found in grammar. This would mean that more frequent and
semantically dissimilar grammatical words, i.e. less semantically specified, would be more easily
processed than less frequent and semantically more specific words. Furthermore, Jones et al. (2012)
argue that “repetition of a word produces greater processing savings if the repetition is accompanied
by a change in semantic context” and that this ultimately leads to an easier accessibility of that word
from the mental lexicon. In our case, this would mean that the general proclitics as semantically
more dissimilar words than irrealis proclitics when it comes to TMA are more easily processed than
the irrealis and perfect-agreeing proclitics. One caveat is that the mentioned studies only report on
processing times and not the production of speech. Thus, the future research would need to show
the relation between the processing and production in this domain for this argument to apply to the
Nafsan case.
23Although this preference might vary depending on the register and on the temporal adverbial in question, at least in
the colloquial German I have confirmed this judgment by a corpus search ofWikipedia discussions 2017 (wrd17.i5.xml.bz2)
from http://corpora.ids-mannheim.de/pub/wikipedia-deutsch/2017/. In a simple search of the co-occurrences
of the two tenses with the temporal adverbmorgen, the present tense occurredwithmorgen 84% out of the total occurrences
of morgen (49 out of 58), and future tense only 16%.
24I wish to thank to Manfred Krifka for suggesting this type of argumentation and providing the German examples.
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Possible diachronic explanations could also contribute to the understanding of the synchronic
system. As mentioned in Section 8.1, a hypothesis based on the Nafsan data could be that the general
proclitics were the only subject marking available, which necessarily co-occurred with other TMA
markers. Eventually some of the TMA markers merged with the subject marking and formed the ir-
realis and perfect(-agreeing) proclitics. However, since the new proclitics now occupy the same mor-
phological slot as the general subject proclitics, they started co-occurring with other TMA markers,
such as f and pe. This means that although the irrealis and perfect-agreeing proclitics started being
used in new contexts in which they are semantically appropriate, the process of stabilization of their
occurrence with specific TMA markers might still be happening. For example, the perfect-agreeing
proclitics seem to have stabilized to only occur with pe, even though the data from Thieberger’s
(1995–2018) corpus and Bible translations suggest a much wider usage of these proclitics in the past.
The irrealis proclitics also occur with f in my data more than recorded in Thieberger’s (1995–2018)
corpus (see also Section 8.5.1).
While different diachronic principles led to the complex system we find today in Nafsan, the
pragmatic competition between the general and irrealis proclitics can be synchronically accounted
for by: a) adhering to theMaximize Presupposition principle inmain clauses without additional TMA
marking, and b) assuming the existence of a conflict between the Maximize Presupposition and the
Economy principle, as two opposite forces of Grice’s maxim of quantity.
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Chapter 9
Realis and irrealis in Oceanic languages
In this chapter I provide evidence that the reanalysis of realis done for Nafsan in Chapter 8 can be
successfully applied to other Oceanic languages with similar issues. I also address the debated status
of irrealis as a meaningful linguistic category and show that the meanings of the irrealis category in
different Oceanic languages are all consistent with the semantic definition of irrealis as referring to
non-actual worlds.
9.1 Oceanic languages with underspecified categories: Wogeo
In this section I show that the underspecification of subject markers can explain certain problems
with the categories analyzed as realis and irrealis in Oceanic languages. I focus on the Oceanic
language Wogeo and argue that realis subject markers in Wogeo are semantically unmarked, just
like in Nafsan.
Wogeo is a Western Oceanic language spoken on the island of Wogeo in the north of Papua New
Guinea. The data used in this section were published in an article by Exter (2012) about the distribu-
tion of realis and irrealis inWogeo. The verbal complex ofWogeo is outlined in (1). As we can see, the
subject markers are situated in between different TMA markers and they are obligatorily expressed
in every sentence. These subject markers are also portmanteau markers, because a systematic com-
positional analysis is not possible when the realis and irrealis paradigms are compared. These two
paradigms were already mentioned in in Section 2.2 as an example of high level of syncretism be-
tween their paradigms. The forms are presented again in Table 9.1 for convenience. Exter (2012:180)
notes that there are further morphophonological and morphological complexities regarding these
paradigms, which are not considered for the purposes of his paper on realis and irrealis.
(1) cf + ma + . + inch + ca + ipf + V + ipf […] (Exter, 2012:180)
Exter (2012) reports on the differences between realis and irrealis subject markers: irrealis is
chosen in non-actual environments, such as future and different kinds of possibilities, as shown in
examples (2)-(4), and realis is chosen for the past and present reference, as in (5) and (6).
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Table 9.1: Subject markers in Wogeo (Exter, 2012:181), in their forms as they would appear with the
verb lako ‘go’
Realis Irrealis
1g o- go-
2g go-, ko- go-
3g e- de-
1d to- tog-
2d kad-
3d do- dog-
1pc to- tog-
2pc koto-
3pc doto-
1pl ta-
2pl ka-
3pl da-
(2) go-lako
1g.i-go
‘I must go’, ‘I want to go’, ‘I will go (now)’ (Exter, 2012:182)
(3) iko
you
go-la-boalé
2g.i-inch-tell.3g
va
1g
na
foc
o-taval=te
1g.eal-die=op
‘You must tell him that I did die.’ (Exter, 2012:185)
(4) do-boré
3d.eal-want
dog-va
3d.i-ecp
gon-iak,
play-appl.pl
vaine
woman
boe
and
ramata
man
du-rú
they-d
ma
foc
‘They wanted to sleep with each other, that woman and man.’ (Exter, 2012:185)
(5) o-lako
1g.eal-go
‘I go’, ‘I went’ (Exter, 2012:182)
(6) va,
1g
ilo-g
inside-1g
e-la-muta∼muta-k-iko
3g.eal-inch-be.tired.of∼ipf-appl-2g
‘Me, I became tired of you.’ (Exter, 2012:185)
The issue with the realis/irrealis definition of Wogeo subject markers is that realis and irrealis are
completely interchangeable in occurring with the future, as in (7) and (8), and tentative markers (9),
without a change in the meaning. Moreover, realis appears obligatorily in protases of counterfactual
conditionals (10) because irrealis is not morphologically available with the counterfactual marker s-
(Exter, 2012:186). We can see, however, that realis subject markers are also used in the apodosis of the
conditional in (10). Exter (2012:184) mentions several other modal contexts in which realis markers
occur, such as ability, permission, and protases and apodoses of hypothetical conditionals. The only
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meanings restricted to irrealis are obligation, volition, and immediate future (Exter, 2012:185).
(7) a. m-o-lako
f-1g.eal-go
b. mo-go-lako
f-1g.i-go
‘I will/can/may go.’ (Exter, 2012:182)
(8) a. vavá
name.3g
iko
you
va
I
m-u-1kila-k-an-iko
f-1g.eal-call-appl.3g-ben-2g
udemtaregá
Udemtaregá
‘Its name, which I will call it for you, is Udemtadegá.’
b. va
I
kat
canoe
va
I
mo-go-jale-k
f-1g.i-go.down-appl.3g
oageva
Vokeo
‘I will bring my canoe down to Vokeo.’ (Exter, 2012:186)
(9) a. s-o-lako
en-1g.eal-go
b. so-go-lako
en-1g.i-go
‘I try it by going.’ (Exter, 2012:182)
(10) s-e-vá
cf3g.eal-happen
iko
you
sa-k-lako,
cf2g.eal-go
katé
thus
mo-la-moet
f.2g.ealinchdisappear
‘If you had gone, you would have been lost.’ (Exter, 2012:186)
Evidence provided by Exter (2012) that “realis” can appear with numerous future and modal
meanings mentioned above, including counterfactuals, suggests that the “realis” paradigm could be
reanalyzed as a subject marking of person and number, semantically underspecified for TMA values.
Similarly to Nafsan, this reanalysis can explain why in some contexts the two paradigms of subject
markers are interchangeable or why only the general marking is available due to morphological
constraints (cf. the case of f and fla in Nafsan, Sections 8.4 and 8.5.1). I propose that in the case of
Wogeo a pragmatic analysis similar to the onemade for Nafsan could explain the puzzles identified by
Exter (2012). Thus, the realis meaning in (5) could be a result of the pragmatic competition between
the semantically specified irrealis subject marking, which presupposes the reference to non-actual
worlds, and the underspecified general subject marking, without any such presupposition. Similarly
to Nafsan, through Maximize Presupposition, the usage of the general subject marking would then
implicate that the reference to non-actual worlds is not intended, because the irrealis is not used.
While the exact mechanisms of how the pragmatic competition between the “realis” and irrealis
subject markers in Wogeo might be proven to differ from the one I proposed in Nafsan in Section
8.7, this case study showed us how another language can benefit from adopting the reanalysis of
one of the subject-marking paradigms as not being semantically specified for TMA meanings. The
types of reanalyses proposed in this section, as well as other case studies mentioned throughout
1This form of the vowel instead of o- shown in Table 9.1 is due to morphophonological and morphological complexity
in Wogeo, which includes processes such as vowel assimilation, idiosyncratic fusions, vowel changes, and vowel deletions
(Exter, 2012:180).
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this thesis (cf. Section 7.2.1) provide good evidence that subject markers analyzed as portmanteau
are often not portmanteau markers at all. This conclusion confirms some of the doubts raised by
Cristofaro (2012), who warns against postulating the expression of the realis/irrealis distinction by
subject markers. Nevertheless, we have seen that, due to their complex diachrony, subject markers
can in fact have TMA values, but even then it is not uncommon that one of the paradigms of subject
markers is semantically underspecified, which can in some cases be accompanied by morphological
underspecification.
9.2 e evidence for the validity of irrealis
In this section, I address one of the main points of criticism against the cross-linguistic validity of
irrealis, namely the cross-linguistic variability of irrealis which is considered to inhibit a valid cross-
linguistic definition of irrealis. As de Haan (2012) and Bugenhagen (1993) noticed, the categories
labeled as irrealis in two different languages sometimes do not even overlap in their distribution (see
Section 7.1.2). Bybee (1998) also argues that languages typically have more specific TMA markers
rather than the binary distinction between realis and irrealis. In Section 9.2.1 I use the case of Nafsan
and Mav̋ea to show that the fact that languages have specific TMA markers does not invalidate the
existence of more general realis and irrealis categories, because in both Nafsan and Mav̋ea more
specific TMA markers regularly combine with irrealis subject proclitics. In Section 9.2.2 I analyze
North Ambrym (Vanuatu) which expresses irrealis meanings by more than one marker and show
that, although each of the markers does not cover the full semantic domain of irrealis, they all still
belong to the irrealis domain (in the sense of the model presented in Section 7.1.3). The data from
Oceanic languages studied in this section come from parallel storyboard elicitations done in the
MelaTAMP project and published in von Prince et al. (2019d). All examples also contain references
to their respective corpora. The examples used in this section come from the storyboards “Festival”
(von Prince, 2018c) and “The fortune teller” (TFS, 2010).
9.2.1 Combinations of the irrealis and TMA markers: Mav̋ea
As we have seen in Chapter 8, the irrealis proclitics in Nafsan co-occur with several more specific
modal and aspectual markers, such as prospective fo, conditional f, and counterfactual mer. These
TMA markers have modal and aspectual meanings which are restricted to a smaller number of con-
texts in comparison to the irrealis proclitics. A similar situation is attested inMav̋ea (North Vanuatu),
where irrealis subject prefixes (see Section 2.2) combine with other modal markers, such as the con-
ditional mo and future me in (11).
(11) m̋atan
because
ka-v
1g.i-say
ka-mo-ple
1g.i-cond-kick
tuan
with
varango-ku
finger-1g.po
vutpol
football
i-mo-voreia
3g.i-cond-hit
me
f
ro
then
i-dae
3g.i-blood
‘because if I play with my finger, if the ball hits it, it will bleed.’ (VG20171008.051/52, von
Prince et al. 2019d:198)
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Figure 9.1: The irrealis domain in Nafsan and Mav̋ea, solid outline: irrealis subject proclitics; dashed
outline: optional counterfactual mer and imte, from von Prince et al. (2019d:198)
Similarly to Nafsan, Mav̋ea has an optional counterfactual marker imte, which was attested in the
counterfactual conditionals in the same storyboards as those in Nafsan (see Section 8.5.2). Examples
(12) and (13) exemplify the counterfactual context of Mary asking about what her past might have
looked like in the storyboard “The fortune teller”. In (12) imte is used together with the irrealis
prefixes, and in (13) irrealis prefixes occur with the conditional marker, without imte. This shows
that its usage is optional, similarly to the Nafsan mer.
(12) imte
if.cf
ka-v
1g.i-say
ka-v̋a
1g.i-go
v̋alu-na
to-3g.po
ro
then
me
f
[…] m̋auri
life
rarua
3d
i-isav̋ai
3g.i-how
‘Suppose I had stayed with him […] how would our life have been?” (VG20171047.056-058,
von Prince et al. 2019d:197)
(13) ka-mo-lo-to
1g.i-cond-ipf-stay
tuan
with
me
f
m̋auri-ku
life-1g.po
i-pal
3g.i-like
sa
what
‘if I had stayed with Peri how would my life have been?’ (VG20171060.031-032, von Prince
et al. 2019d:198)
Based on the data of the distribution of the irrealis prefixes and the counterfactual imte in Mav̋ea, in
von Prince et al. (2019d), we propose that the branching-timesmodel of these meanings is the same as
the model of irrealis proclitics andmer in Nafsan, as shown in Figure 9.1. As we can see, the irrealis
meaning comprises both future-oriented possibilities and counterfactuals, while the reference of the
counterfactual markers is limited to counterfactual indices. In both languages, the counterfactual
markers are optional and the subject markers are obligatory. Since the irrealis category is expressed
by the obligatory subject markers, this means that it constitutes a core category of the TMA systems
of Nafsan and Mav̋ea.
As a response to the criticism that languages typically employ more than one TMA marker for
irrealis meanings, we can say that the case of Nafsan and Mav̋ea has indeed shown that there is
typically more than one marker for numerous modal meanings in a given language. However, all
these modal markers still combine with the semantically more general irrealis category. Thus, the
fact that specific markers exist in a language does not invalidate the existence of a general irrealis
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marker. In fact, in languages in which irrealis is expressed with subject markers, the TMA marking
is typically compositional, and the combinations of irrealis and other TMA markers can be increas-
ingly complex, as attested in the Nafsan data. Nevertheless, the dynamics of encoding more general
and more specific modal meanings can take different shapes. In Nafsan and Mav̋ea, irrealis is the
obligatory general modal marking which can optionally get specified for counterfactuality. In other
languages, the distinction between some specific modal meanings might be expressed by obligatory
TMA markers. A language of that type is discussed in Section 9.2.2.
9.2.2 TMA markers in the irrealis domain: North Ambrym
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the criticism against a cross-linguistically valid defi-
nition of irrealis is mainly concerned with the fact that categories labeled as irrealis differ too widely
across languages. In this section I use the data from North Ambrym (Ambrym, Vanuatu) collected
through the MelaTAMP storyboards (von Prince et al., 2019d) and compare it to Nafsan and Mav̋ea.
The discussion presented here is inspired by the ideas that feature in my joint paper with Kilu von
Prince and Manfred Krifka (von Prince et al., submitted). I show that the “irrealis” label is often used
in such a way that twomarkers in two different languages can have different distributions. However,
these markers still belong to the same irrealis domain and through targeted semantic elicitation we
can identify and compare their meanings.
North Ambrym has several TMAmarkers that are integrated in the paradigm of subject markers
and these are the recent past mwe, the non-recent past te, and the irrealis bV (where V stand for a
vowel), named after their 3g forms. These paradigms are shown in Table 9.2. Other modal markers
relevant for this discussion are the potential e and the counterfactual to, which are morphologically
independent and do not merge into paradigms of subject markers, as in the case of mwe, te, and bV
(Franjieh, 2012). Franjieh (2012:124) describes irrealis as occurring in future contexts, complement
clauses, habituals, conditionals, and imperatives. In contrast, the potential expresses potential events,
disbelief, and deontic modality (Franjieh, 2012:127). Through the storyboard elicitations completed
for theMelaTAMP project, it was shown that the irrealis markingwas used for all future conditionals,
including the future possibility (14) and counterfactuals (15). The irrealis marker can also combine
with the potential marker, as we can see in the apodosis in (14) and both protasis and apodosis in
(15). Past counterfactual conditionals are marked with the counterfactual marker to in the protasis
and the non-recent past te in the apodosis, as shown in (16). Based on these data we can see that
the conditionals are not distinguished according to the possible/counterfactual divide, as in Nafsan
and Mav̋ea for example. Instead, the counterfactual conditionals are distinguished according to their
temporal reference, as the future counterfactuals are always marked by the irrealis and the potential
e, and the past counterfactuals are marked by the counterfactual past/present to and the non-recent
past te (von Prince et al., 2019d). Figure 9.2 shows the distribution of thesemeanings in the branching-
times model proposed by von Prince et al. (2019d:200).
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Table 9.2: Paradigms of TMA and subject markers, from Franjieh (2012:114,118,122)
Recent past Non-recent past Irrealis
1g na-m na-rr na-ø
2g o-m o-rr f-o
3g mwe te bV
1d.incl ro-m ro-rr ro-ø
1d.ecl maro-m maro-rr maro-ø
2d moro-m moro-rr moro-ø
3d mo-ro te/to-ro b-ro
1pc.incl su-m su-rr su-ø
1pc.ecl masu-m masu-rr masu-ø
2pc musu-m musu-rr musu-ø
3pc mu-su te-su b-su
1pl.incl yi-m yi-rr yi-ø
1pl.ecl ma-m ma-rr ma-ø
2pl mi-m mi-rr mi-ø
3pl e-m e-rr f-e
(14) Jon,
John
bone
time
fō
2g.i
ktu,
take
lo
then
mwen-amrō
gen.cl-2d.po
teere
child
nyer
pl
e-ve
po-cop.i
lol.
plenty
‘If youmarry John, youwill havemany children.’ (ib1-fortune-na.35, von Prince et al. 2019d:198)
(15) He
if
e-na-ø
po-1g-i
plei,
play
lo
then
ge
b
rrang
blood
e-b
po-i.3g
gurr
flow
mōl
back
mōn
again
‘If I played then the blood would flow again.’ (ib1-lafet-na.27, von Prince et al. 2019d:198)
(16) ō
2g
to
cf
yene
marry
Adam
Adam
lo
then
mwena-mrō
po.cl-2d.po
mane
money
te
nec.p.3g
lam.
big
‘If you had married Adam, you two would have been rich.’ (at1-fortune-na.24, von Prince
et al. 2019d:198)
As we can see in Figure 9.2, the irrealis in North Ambrym covers the area of future possibilities
and future counterfactuals. The past and present counterfactuals are expressed by a different marker.
There is also the potential marker which has more specific modal values within the irrealis meaning.
In comparison to the irrealis category in Nafsan and Mav̋ea, the irrealis in North Ambrym refers
only to a subpart of their semantic domain of irrealis. While in Nafsan and Mav̋ea irrealis refers
to possibilities and counterfactuals with any temporal reference, in North Ambrym the irrealis only
refers to future possibilities and future counterfactuals. Based on this case of dissimilarity between
the irrealis categories, we could follow de Haan (2012) in arguing that the category of “irrealis”
fails to predict a universal TMA reference. However, both types of categories called “irrealis”, the
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Figure 9.2: The irrealis domain in North Ambrym, Solid outline: irrealis; dashed outline: counterfac-
tual (past/present); dotted outline: non-recent past, from von Prince et al. (2019d:200)
irrealis in Nafsan and Mav̋ea and the irrealis in North Ambrym, belong to the domain of irrealis
meaning, which is defined by the reference to non-actual worlds. Thus, depending on the linguist’s
choice, a category within this space can be labeled as “irrealis”. Sometimes a more specific label is
found more appropriate given the TMA paradigm of the studied language, for instance von Prince
(2015) choses the label “potential” in Daakaka for a marker with roughly the same reference as the
irrealis in North Ambrym (von Prince et al., 2019d). However, given that there is already another
marker labeled as “potential”, Franjieh (2012) labels the given category as irrealis. These difference
in the nomenclature of language-specific categories should not be seen as a problem for studying
the typological tendencies regarding the expression of the irrealis mood. The issue of comparing
different categories labeled as “irrealis” can be easily solved by studying their fine-grained values
as done in von Prince et al. (2019d). Once we decide that we are interested in understanding the
grammatical expression of the meanings in the irrealis domain, we expect to come across markers
carving up different areas of this space, as also suggested by Roberts (1990) and Van Gijn & Gipper
(2009). In some languages the category in question will refer to the whole extent of non-actual
worlds, as in Nafsan and Mav̋ea, and in others there will be more than one obligatory marker in the
same space, as in North Ambrym. Moreover, there is additional evidence that the distribution of TMA
categories in the irrealis domain is not random. As argued in Section 5.3.1, the paradigm effects of
blocking play an important role in attributing different distributions to differentmarkers. Crucially, if
a language has a marker dedicated to a specific irrealis meaning, such as counterfactual past/present
in North Ambrym, the irrealis marker is expected to be pragmatically blocked for referring to that
area too. And while in Nafsan and Mav̋ea the counterfactual markers were optional and not in
the same morphological slot as irrealis, which allowed them to co-occur, the counterfactual to and
irrealis in North Ambrym are both equally obligatory in expressing their respective meanings and
they occur in the same morphological slot, if we disregard the fact that irrealis is partially fused with
the subject markers. Thus, the fact that the irrealis in North Ambrym does not refer to counterfactual
past/present can be explained pragmatically by the presence of to, which is already specified for those
meanings.
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Figure 9.3: Semantic areas of past counterfactual p.cf, present counterfactual p.cf, future coun-
terfactual f.cf, and possible future meaning f.po, based on von Prince et al. (2019d)
This discussion on different spreads of functions in the irrealis domain leads us to another set of
cross-linguistic predictions of the branching-times model. These predictions include relationships
between meanings which can be analyzed in the same way as in a semantic map. The areas shown
in Figure 9.3 (repeated from Section 8.5.2) represent different areas of the irrealis domain, which
are ordered according to their semantic closeness. As a semantic map, this model predicts that, for
instance, a given marker is expected to express the past counterfactual and the possible future only
if it also expresses the present and future counterfactual. And while TMA markers can specialize
for only one of the areas, when they denote more than one of the areas in Figure 9.3 they need
to be adjacent to one another. This reasoning is very similar to the hierarchical representation of
irrealis meanings by Van Gijn & Gipper (2009), shown in Figure 7.1 in Section 7.1.1. However, the
difference between Van Gijn & Gipper’s (2009) hierarchy and the branching-times model is that the
branching-times model also incorporates the temporal meanings in the modal domain, which makes
the represented meanings more granular, and, thus, easier to explain the specialization of specific
markers to a single irrealis domains, such as present/past counterfactual in North Ambrym.
9.3 e definition of irrealis in relation to other categories
In this section I provide some final observations about the nature of irrealis as a cross-linguistic
category. I show that many misunderstandings about the meaning of irrealis come from the fact that
irrealis is closely tied to the future tense and to the expression of modal flavors. Thus, the benefit
of accepting this category cross-linguistically is that it can unite the expression of future tense and
modality, as well as mood and modality, in languages in which these notions are not grammatically
distinguished to the same extent as in Indo-European languages.
As mentioned in Section 7.3, one of the concerns regarding the category of irrealis is whether
the categories labeled as irrealis could be reanalyzed as future tense in some languages. The premise
of proposing this analysis is that all instances of irrealis might in fact be better understood as fu-
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ture tense cross-linguistically. This assumption was made by Dahl & Velupillai (2013a) and Velupillai
(2016) in their typological studies of future tense. However, this work, as well as many others, have
shown that linguists typically choose the label “irrealis” for categories that in addition to future
possibility express more modal meanings. These meanings include present, past, and future coun-
terfactual reference, and interaction with modal flavors. In terms of our branching-times model,
the future tense can then be contrasted to irrealis by referring only to the possible future, whereas
irrealis refers to the entire non-actual domain, as represented in Figure 9.4.
Figure 9.4: The domain of meaning expressed by future tense on the left and irrealis mood on the
right (see model in Section 7.1.3)
As we can see in Figure 9.4, the meaning of irrealis comprises the meaning of future tense. Thus,
it is only expected that in languages with irrealis, this category will be used to express the meaning
of future. The advantage of uniting the meaning of tense and mood in the model of branching times
is that it allows us to explain why a category with otherwise modal meanings can express future
temporal reference. Equally, this model also supports the fact that many mood-prominent languages
lack tense morphology (Bhat, 1999), such as Nafsan and many other Oceanic languages studied in
this thesis.
The relationship between mood and tense as outlined above is mainly concerned with absolute
future reference. However, when it comes to relative future, or what I call prospective aspect in
this work, the process of distinguishing the two categories is slightly different. Prospective aspect
is the category that places the Topic Time in the pre-time of the described event (Klein, 1994). As
already shown in Section 5.3.1 and 8.3.2, this category encodes a relation of sequentiality between
the Topic and Situation Time and depending on the language this can be realized in realis and irrealis
domains, as in Nafsan. As an aspectual category, it can appear in any temporal or modal reference,
and could thus be mistaken for the irrealis category. In this respect, the only way to distinguish the
prospective from the irrealis is to find the core meaning that governs the distribution of the category.
For instance, in Nafsan we findmany uses of irrealis in contexts in which the event marked by irrealis
precedes (17) or overlaps with the Topic Time, as in (18) and (19). Examples (17) and (18) express
past and present counterfactuals, and (19) a present epistemic reading. Thus, the definition of the
prospective in which the event needs to follow the Topic Time could not describe these cases.
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(17) Ka=f
1g.i=cond
mer
cf
pei
first
patlas-i-ø.
meet--3g.obj
‘If only I had met him.’ (AK1-045-01)
(18) ke=f
3g.i=cond
mer
cf
tik-ki
not.have-
volkano
volcano
Tanna,
Tanna
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
wi.
good
‘it would be good if there was no volcano on Tanna.’ (AK1-046-01)
(19) Ado
Ado
ke=mas
3g.i=must
to
stay
naal
basket
blu.
blue:bi
‘Ado must be in the blue basket.’ Repeated (45) from Section 8.4 (AK1-019-01, 00:02:50.251-
00:02:57.910)
The situation in Nafsan is even more complex because the prospective markers are themselves
specified for realis and irrealis values. The markers po and fo denote prospective realis and irrealis
respectively, and their morphological stem mutation reflects the requirement that all verbs starting
with p- mutate into having an initial f- after irrealis proclitics (Thieberger, 2006). The question here
is how we can be certain that the realis/irrealis distinction is the one that semantically describes
the contrast between po and fo. This leads us to the next argument regarding the cross-linguistic
properties of irrealis. In Section 8.4 I discussed the occurrence of fo and irrealis with different modal
flavors, such as deontic (20) and epistemic (21). These meanings seem to have an important relation
to irrealis, because irrealis (with and without fo) is preferred over the general proclitic when it comes
to expressing deontic and epistemicmeanings (see Section 8.4). Thus, besides themorphological stem
mutation which binds it to the irrealis proclitics, fo seems to also be tied to the expression of certain
modal flavors, which would not be expected from its prospective meaning alone. Analyzing it as
prospective irrealis allows us to capture this pattern.
(20) Ga
3g
ke=fo
3g.i=pp.i
kano
cannot
lak.
marry
‘He can’t get married.’ (because he is a priest and it is forbidden) Repeated (38) from Section
8.4 (AK1-156-04)
(21) Rak=fo
3d.i=pp.i
kano
cannot
kus
hide
em̃rom
inside
kes,
box
kes
box
nen
dem
i=sesp̃al
3g=tiny
toop.
very
‘They can’t be hiding in the box, that box is too small.’ Repeated (34) from Section 8.4 (AK1-
147-12, 00:03:19.385-00:03:24.781)
Crucially, in comparison to prospective aspect and future tenses in Indo-European languages, the
irrealis and the prospective irrealis fo in Nafsan are not neutral with regard to modality and modal
flavors. As argued in Section 8.4, the meanings of irrealis and fo in (20) and (21) are not predictive,
instead they contribute to the expression of different kinds of possibilities with any temporal refer-
ence. Although at this point we do not know why certain modal flavors are expressed by irrealis in
Nafsan and others are not, a cross-linguistic definition of irrealis needs to be enriched to account for
different kinds of interactions between irrealis and the expression of modal flavors. This is especially
relevant for Oceanic languages in which irrealis has been reported to play a role in the expression
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of modal flavors. In Daakaka, for example, the potential marker and its negative counterpart, the
necessity marker, can express epistemic (22) and deontic possibility (23), regardless of the temporal
reference.
(22) kyun
just
te
conj
baséé
bird
swa
one
mwe
eal
ka
say
ka
mod.el
wo
po
mas
must
i
cop
maa
dove
kyun
just
‘then one bird said, it must have been the dove’ (von Prince, 2015:89)
(23) te
conj
mw=i
eal=cop
or
place
yo
taboo
swa
one
na
comp
vyanten
man
kevene
every
ya
3pl
to
eal.neg
kuowilye
know
ka
mod.comp
ya=n
3pl=nec
vyan
go
‘it’s a sacred place where not everybody can go.’ (von Prince, 2015:371)
The interconnectedness between irrealis and the expression of modality shows that the traditional
Indo-European distinction between mood and modality might not apply to languages with irrealis.
And although from an Indo-European perspective, it might appear that irrealis is a polyfunctional
category which unites different expressions of tense, mood, and modality, by adopting a model of
branching times, a single definition of irrealis as referring to non-actual worlds is sufficient to account
for the distribution of its functions.
Part V
Conclusion
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
In this chapter I offer a summary of the main arguments made in this thesis and relate them to
the relevant debates in the literature. I show that by adopting an approach of understanding the
fine-grained semantics of TMA in Nafsan and Oceanic languages, this thesis has contributed to eval-
uating the cross-linguistic validity of the perfect aspect and the related iamitive gram, as well as the
realis/irrealis distinction.
The starting point for the investigation of both perfect aspect and realis/irrealis mood in Nafsan
was the reference grammar of Nafsan byThieberger (2006) in which three paradigms of subject mark-
ers as well as additional TMAmarkers are labeled as perfect, realis, and irrealis. Themain objective of
analyzing these categories in Nafsan was to describe their semantics and contrast themwith the pro-
posed definitions of these categories in the literature, as discussed in Chapter 1. The methodological
approach of this thesis consisted of the corpus (Thieberger, 1995–2018) study, which allowed me to
form hypotheses about the meaning of these categories (see Sections 5.1.2 and 8.2). These hypotheses
were then tested through storyboards and questionnaires. One of the contributions of this study is
the usage and creation of storyboards as semantic stimuli which minimize the effect of translation,
and can be adapted to the study of any semantic categories. While some of the storyboards relied on
the existing material from Totem field storyboards, most of the storyboards were created to target
particular modal and aspectual categories of interest in the MelaTAMP project. I also created two
storyboards (Krajinović, 2018c,b) that contain perfect-like meanings related to the proposed iamitive
and ‘already’ properties. Since these storyboards are open access (see Chapter 3), they can be used
in future research on other languages, which can facilitate direct comparison of TMA meanings in
diverse languages. These methods are described in detail in Chapter 3.
Some of the main challenges for the description of the perfect proclitics and the marker pe as
perfect in Nafsan were: a) the lack of data on some basic perfect functions, such as experiential and
universal, and b) the existence of an additional function of change of state which has been said to
characterize iamitives and the particle ‘already’ (see Chapter 4). Thus, the initial hypotheses were
that the perfect in Nafsan could be reanalyzed as a iamitive or ‘already’. The storyboard and ques-
tionnaire elicitation showed that the perfect marking in Nafsan has almost all meanings associated
with the perfect aspect: resultative, anterior, experiential, universal, and adverbial restrictions simi-
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lar to the English perfect (see Section 5.2.1). However, it also has the additional meaning of change of
state, and duality effects with negation as a result of the change-of-state meaning (see Section 5.2.2).
The fact that almost all perfect functions, as well as the adverbial restrictions with present reference,
are characteristic of pe in Nafsan was taken as evidence that we are dealing with the category of
perfect aspect and not with iamitives, as they are not expected to have experiential and universal
meanings (Olsson, 2013; Dahl & Wälchli, 2016). Equally, if pe had the meaning of ‘already’, it would
have to express the meaning of expectedness, but since this is the case in only a restricted number
of contexts (see Section 5.2.3), it cannot be reanalyzed as ‘already’. There are also several semantic
and typological contributions within each of the analyzed domains of the meaning of pe. Table 10.1
summarizes the main contributions of the study of the Nafsan perfect to the areas of semantics and
typology, based on the analysis of the perfect in Nafsan in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 5 I argue that the results of the study of perfect in Nafsan show that Klein’s (1994)
definition of perfect as placing the Topic Time in the posttime of Situation Time can best explain the
different readings associated with it. Additionaly, I argue that iamitives are not only an inadequate
label for the case of pe in Nafsan, but their proposed status as a cross-linguistic category is also prob-
lematic. The main reason for that is that Olsson’s (2013) and Dahl & Wälchli’s (2016) definition of
iamitives as being defined by the meaning of change of state is not viable. Based on my work on
the Nafsan perfect, iamitives cannot be defined by the meaning of change of state, because a) the oc-
currence of this meaning with perfects can be analyzed through aspectual coercion, b) this meaning
can be expressed alongside other perfect functions, such as experiential and universal, not predicted
by iamitives, and c) there are other available explanations for markers analyzed as iamitives, e.g.
they could be reanalyzed as ‘already’, or paradigm effects block their use with certain meanings. In
order to find additional evidence for these claims made in Chapter 5, I analyzed markers labeled as
perfect or ‘already’ in four additional Oceanic languages – Toqabaqita, Unua, Niuean, and Māori.
The study of these languages in Chapter 6 provided additional evidence that a single marker can
have the meaning of change of state and other perfect meanings, such as experiential and universal,
which are not a part of the iamitive definition. All studied languages express resultative, anteriority,
experiential, and the change-of-state meaning with their respective perfect markers. The universal
meaning is also expressed by all languages except Niuean. The semantic map of the perfect aspect
(see also Section 6.2.2) in Nafsan, Toqabaqita, and Unua in Figure 10.1 illustrates the most common
spread of perfect functions among the studied languages. This semantic map also shows that the
meaning of ‘hot news’ is expressed by a different marker in Nafsan, Toqabaqita, and Unua, which, as
a more specific marker for that meaning, blocks the usage of the perfect. When a language does not
have a more specific marker for the meaning of ‘hot news’, as in Māori, then the perfect is expected
to be able to express it, as it happens in Māori. Thus, the study of Toqabaqita, Unua, Niuean, and
Māori showed that the results obtained on the Nafsan perfect data can easily carry over to other
Oceanic languages. My proposal for a perfect semantic map also enabled us to visually represent
the relationships between different meanings of perfect and ‘already’. Crucially, this semantic space
contains meanings whose distributions can be well described by adhering to the existing categories
of perfect aspect and ‘already’ (Section 6.2.2). Positing a new typological category consisting of
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the meaning of change of state and the resultative perfect, with the optional reference to expected-
ness does not capture any new insight on the clustering of these meanings (Section 6.4). Moreover,
through analyzing Nafsan and other Oceanic languages, I have provided tools, such as aspectual
coercion (Section 5.2.2), paradigm blocking effects (Section 5.3.1) or meaning compatibility (Section
5.3.2), that can explain why and how in some languages this semantic space is more granular and in
others covered by larger more general categories.
Table 10.1: Summary of contributions of the Nafsan perfect analysis to semantics and typology
Semantics – in a presence of a past temporal adverbial, the perfect is interpreted as past or future
perfect, Section 5.2.1
Typology – tenseless languages can have adverbial restrictions with the perfect (contra Giorgi
& Pianesi, 1997)
Semantics – states marked by perfect in Nafsan are aspectually coerced into changes of states,
Section 5.2.2
Typology – if aspectual coercion can explain the meaning of change of state occurring with
perfects, then iamitives are not needed to explain it (contra Olsson, 2013; Dahl &
Wälchli, 2016)
– since the perfect aspect can also have the meaning of change of state together with
other non-iamitive functions, iamitives cannot be uniquely defined by the presence
of that meaning (contra Olsson, 2013; Dahl & Wälchli, 2016)
Semantics – duality effects in Nafsan are a consequence of the aspectual coercion into a change-
of-state meaning and are not related to ‘already’, Section 5.2.3
Typology – duality is not necessarily a criterion for determining if a marker is a iamitive or
‘already’ (contra Vander Klok & Matthewson, 2015)
Semantics – the expectedness meaning arises independently of the Nafsan perfect and does not
belong to its semantic definition, Section 5.2.3
Typology – the meaning of expectedness arises pragmatically and cannot be considered to de-
fine iamitives semantically (contra Olsson, 2013)
Semantics – the ‘hot news’ meaning in Nafsan is not expressed by the perfect because the
prospective po has that function, which blocks the perfect pe from those uses, Section
5.3.1
Typology – a lack of a certain meaning otherwise expected to be expressed by that category
can be a result of language-specific paradigm effects and not necessarily a sign of a
different category, such as iamitives
Semantics – the perfective su can co-occur with the perfect in most of its meanings, but its core
meaning is the perfective aspect and not perfect, Section 5.3.2
Typology – the aspectual markers called “iamitives” might in fact be simply compatible with
certain meanings of perfect or ‘already’, while their core meanings belong either to
the perfect, ‘already’, or some other aspectual category
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Figure 10.1: Semantic map of Nafsan, Toqabaqita, and Unua with the perfect in red and another
aspectual marker in blue
Regarding the study of realis and irrealis mood, the main challenges to analyzing the subject
proclitics in Nafsan as realis and irrealis (Thieberger, 2006) were a) the occurrence of realis in different
future and modal contexts, which belong to the irrealis domain, and b) interchangeability of realis
and irrealis in contexts in which irrealis would be expected (Section 8.2). Another concern was also
the possibility that realis/irrealis mood could be interpreted as non-future/future tense (Section 7.3).
In Chapter 8 I investigated different aspects of the meaning of subject proclitics labeled as realis and
irrealis by Thieberger (2006), and based on the results from their distributions in the corpus as well
as in the storyboard and questionnaire elicitations, I proposed the following reanalysis (see Section
8.3). The realis subject proclitics are underspecified for TMAmeanings, whichmeans they are general
subject marking of person and number, while the irrealis subject proclitics indeed denote the irrealis
mood. The meaning of irrealis is defined by its reference to non-actual worlds, represented in the
model of branching times in Figure 10.2, see also Section 7.1.3. Realis, on the other hand, is defined
as referring only to the actual world, that is the past and the present. In Chapter 8 I used different
semantic contexts as evidence to argue for the underspecified semantics of general proclitics and the
specified irrealis meaning of irrealis proclitics in Nafsan. These arguments are summarized in Tables
10.2 and 10.3.
Table 10.2: Main arguments for the underspecification of general proclitics in Nafsan
General proclitic
– occurs with all available TMA markers, Figure 8.1
– occurs in past, present, future contexts, Section 8.3.1
– occurs with different types of modal flavors, Section 8.4
– interchangeable with irrealis in protases of counterfactual and future-possibility conditional
clauses, Section 8.5
– interchangeable with irrealis in counterfactual evaluative/timitive complement clauses, Section
8.6
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Figure 10.2: The domain of meaning expressed by irrealis proclitics in Nafsan (see model in Section
7.1.3)
Table 10.3: Main arguments for the irrealis meaning of irrealis proclitics in Nafsan
Irrealis proclitic
– combines with the prospective irrealis fo, Figure 8.1
– occurs in imperatives and prohibitives, Section 8.3.2
– occurs in wishes both in main clauses (Section 8.3.2) and complement clauses (Section 8.6)
– preferred choice for epistemic and deontic modal flavors, Section 8.4
– preferred in protases of counterfactual and future-possibility conditional clauses, Section 8.5
– almost the only choice in apodoses of all types of conditionals, Section 8.5
– occurs in counterfactual complement clauses, Section 8.6
We can see from Table 10.2 that the analysis of general proclitics as underspecified for TMA cor-
rectly predicts their usage with different temporal references and in different TMA environments.
However, most of these environments contain specific TMA markers or are a part of specific modal
subordinate clauses. Another explanation was needed to account for the distribution of general and
irrealis proclitics in main clauses, in which the general proclitics cannot as easily receive irrealis
meanings. In order to explain this, I proposed that the general and irrealis proclitics are in pragmatic
competition, such that irrealis is the stronger item that should be used whenever its presupposi-
tion of referring to non-actual worlds is satisfied in the common ground. If the irrealis is not used
and the general proclitic as the weaker item is used instead, due to the Maximize Presupposition
principle there is an implicated presupposition that the reference to non-actual worlds is false. This
gives rise to the meaning of realis when the general proclitic is used (Section 8.7). Nevertheless,
Nafsan presents us with an additional level of complexity, namely the fact that the general and ir-
realis proclitics are interchangeable in many contexts in which irrealis would be more appropriate,
because its presupposition is satisfied in those contexts. I argued in Section 8.7 that there is an ad-
ditional economy principle (1) stemming from Grice’s maxim of quantity, additionally supported by
psycholingustic evidence. This principle explains why the general proclitic occurs with the irrealis
meanings only in highly specific contexts, such as with specific TMA markers. Although irrealis is
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still preferred as the more informative choice, if the occurrence of irrealis is redundant, the economy
principle can counteract the choice of irrealis. The understanding that this principle might play a role
in allowing the interchangeability of two markers has important consequences for the pragmatics
of TMA, as none of the approaches discussed in Sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3 can explain what allows the
interchangeability of two markers in specific contexts.
(1) Economy principle:
If the context is specific enough, use the least specific grammatical marker needed.
In Chapter 9, the analysis of realis and irrealis meanings made for Nafsan was compared to several
other Oceanic languages. As shown on the case of Wogeo in Section 9.1 and also hypothesized for
Unua in Section 7.2.1, in languages said to have portmanteau subject markers it is not uncommon for
one paradigm to be semantically underspecified for TMA meanings (see also Cristofaro, 2012). This
type of reanalysis can explain at least some of the problems reported for realis and irrealis occurring
with “unexpected” meanings. If a paradigm can be reanalyzed as a general subject marking, then it
is not tied anymore to specific TMA contexts, and any additional TMA effects associated to it can be
explained through pragmatics, as in the case of Nafsan above. Regarding the cross-linguistic diversity
of irrealis, frequently reported as problematic in the literature (Bybee, 1998; de Haan, 2012), I found
that while irrealis markers might refer to different modal domains in different languages, they are
all still a part of the same irrealis domain represented in Figure 10.2, see Section 9.2.2. Moreover, the
existence of dedicated markers for one specific domain might have the effect of blocking the usage
of an otherwise more general irrealis marking, similarly to the case of perfect and ‘hot news’ above.
The approach of this thesis combined the study of typological tendencies and formal semantic
methods. The initial research questions about the cross-linguistic validity of perfect aspect and re-
alis/irrealis mood as linguistic categories were first answered though the prism of Nafsan. A detailed
semantic study of these categories in Nafsan informed us about the possible new angles for improv-
ing our understanding of these and related TMA categories. Specific issues studied in Nafsan were
then compared to similar situations in other Oceanic languages, which provided a slightly larger
typological outlook. The restriction to the Oceanic context, with only occasional reference to other
language families, was necessary in order to maintain the relevance of the discussed issues, such
as the question of iamitives and underspecification of portmanteau subject markers. The additional
Oceanic languages discussed in this work were used to demonstrate the applicability of analyses
proposed for perfect and realis/irrealis categories in Nafsan. Moreover, several cross-linguistically
testable proposals for the semantic space of perfect and irrealis were also made. These are the se-
mantic map of perfect and ‘already’ presented in Section 6.2.2 and the branching-times model of
irrealis (von Prince et al., 2019d) presented in Section 7.1.3 and in Figure 10.2. The outlook for future
research in this area concerns evaluating the approach and methods used in this thesis by applying
them to diverse languages. By using fine-grained semantic tests and relating my results to research
questions of typological nature, I aimed to show that we can gain more precise understanding of
language-specific phenomena as well as the semantics of cross-linguistic TMA categories.
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Appendix A
Examples and languages
For the ease of navigating the large number of examples and tables in different languages in this the-
sis, this chapter offers a list of all the linguistic examples and tables containing linguistic paradigms
per chapter, accompanied by the language represented in the example or the table, together with its
ISO 639-3 code.
Chapter 1
Example Language
(1) Jabêm [jae]
(2) Jabêm [jae]
(3) Jabêm [jae]
(4) Nafsan [erk]
(5) Nafsan [erk]
(7) Nafsan [erk]
(8) Nafsan [erk]
(9) Nafsan [erk]
(10) Nafsan [erk]
Chapter 2
Example Language
(1) Nafsan [erk]
(2) Nafsan [erk]
(3) Nafsan [erk]
(4) Nafsan [erk]
(5) Mav̋ea [mkv]
(6) Mav̋ea [mkv]
(7) Nafsan [erk]
(8) Nafsan [erk]
(9) Daakaka [bpa]
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(10) Daakaka [bpa]
(11) Daakie [ptv]
(12) Daakie [ptv]
(13) Daakie [ptv]
(15) Saliba/Logea [sbe]
(16) Koro [kxr]
(17) Unua [onu]
(18) Daakie [ptv]
(19) Daakaka [bpa]
(20) Daakaka [bpa]
(22) Lelepa [lpa]
(23) Lelepa [lpa]
(24) Mav̋ea [mkv]
(25) Mav̋ea [mkv]
(26) Nafsan [erk]
(27) Nafsan [erk]
(28) Nafsan [erk]
(29) Nafsan [erk]
(30) Nafsan [erk]
(31) Nafsan [erk]
(32) Nafsan [erk]
(33) Nafsan [erk]
(34) Nafsan [erk]
(35) Nafsan [erk]
(36) Nafsan [erk]
(37) Nafsan [erk]
(38) Nafsan [erk]
(39) Nafsan [erk]
(40) Nafsan [erk]
(41) Nafsan [erk]
(42) Nafsan [erk]
(43) Nafsan [erk]
(44) Nafsan [erk]
(45) Nafsan [erk]
(46) Nafsan [erk]
(47) Nafsan [erk]
(48) Nafsan [erk]
(49) Nafsan [erk]
(50) Nafsan [erk]
(51) Nafsan [erk]
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(52) Nafsan [erk]
(53) Nafsan [erk]
(54) Nafsan [erk]
(55) Nafsan [erk]
(56) Nafsan [erk]
(57) Nafsan [erk]
(58) Nafsan [erk]
Table Language
2.1 Daakie [ptv]
2.2 Neverver [lgk]
2.3 Wogeo [woc]
2.4 Mav̋ea [mkv]
2.5 Paamese [pma]
2.6 Sivisa Titan [ttv]
2.7 Nafsan [erk]
2.8 Nafsan [erk]
2.9 Nafsan [erk]
2.10 Nafsan [erk]
2.11 Nafsan [erk]
2.12 Nafsan [erk]
2.13 Nafsan [erk]
2.14 Nafsan [erk]
Chapter 3
Example Language
(1) English [eng]
(2) English [eng]
(3) English [eng]
(4) English [eng]
(5) Nafsan [erk]
(6) Nafsan [erk]
(7) Nafsan [erk]
(8) Nafsan [erk]
Chapter 4
Example Language
(2) English [eng]
(3) English [eng]
(4) English [eng]
262 APPENDIX A. EXAMPLES AND LANGUAGES
(5) English [eng]
(6) English [eng]
(7) English [eng]
(8) English [eng]
(9) English [eng]
(10) English [eng]
(11) English [eng]
(12) English [eng]
(13) English [eng]
(14) English [eng]
(15) English [eng]
(16) English [eng]
(18) English [eng]
(19) English [eng]
(20) English [eng]
(21) English [eng]
(22) English [eng]
(23) English [eng]
(24) English [eng]
(25) English [eng]
(26) English [eng]
(27) English [eng]
(28) German [deu]
(29) German [deu]
(30) Thai [tha]
(31) English [eng]
(32) Indonesian [ind]
(33) Thai [tha]
(34) Mandarin Chinese [cmn]
(35) Mwotlap [mlv]
(36) English [eng]
(37) Vietnamese [vie]
(38) English [eng]
(39) Indonesian [ind]
(40) Thai [tha]
(41a) Mwotlap [mlv]
(41b) Mwotlap [mlv]
(42) Mandarin Chinese [cmn]
(43) Indonesian [ind]
(44) Indonesian [ind]
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(45) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(46) Nêlêmwa [nee]
(47) Tongan [ton]
(48) Tongan [ton]
(49) Tongan [ton]
(50) English [eng]
(51) Tongan [ton]
(52) Niuean [niu]
(53) Niuean [niu]
(54) Niuean [niu]
(55) Javanese [jav]
(56) Javanese [jav]
(57) Javanese [jav]
(58) Javanese [jav]
Chapter 5
Example Language
(1) Nafsan [erk]
(2) Nafsan [erk]
(3) Nafsan [erk]
(4) Nafsan [erk]
(5) Nafsan [erk]
(6) Nafsan [erk]
(7) Nafsan [erk]
(8) Nafsan [erk]
(9) Nafsan [erk]
(10) Nafsan [erk]
(11) Nafsan [erk]
(12) Nafsan [erk]
(13) Nafsan [erk]
(14) Nafsan [erk]
(15) Nafsan [erk]
(16) Nafsan [erk]
(17) Nafsan [erk]
(21) Nafsan [erk]
(22) Nafsan [erk]
(23) Nafsan [erk]
(24) Nafsan [erk]
(25) Nafsan [erk]
(26) Nafsan [erk]
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(27) Nafsan [erk]
(28) Nafsan [erk]
(29) Nafsan [erk]
(30) Nafsan [erk]
(31) Nafsan [erk]
(32) Nafsan [erk]
(33) Nafsan [erk]
(34) Nafsan [erk]
(35) Nafsan [erk]
(36) Nafsan [erk]
(37) Nafsan [erk]
(38) Nafsan [erk]
(39) English [eng]
(40) English [eng]
(41) Nafsan [erk]
(42) Nafsan [erk]
(43) Nafsan [erk]
(44) Nafsan [erk]
(46) Nafsan [erk]
(47) Nafsan [erk]
(48) Nafsan [erk]
(49) Nafsan [erk]
(50) Nafsan [erk]
(51) Nafsan [erk]
(52) Nafsan [erk]
(53) Nafsan [erk]
(54) English [eng]
(55) Nafsan [erk]
(56) Nafsan [erk]
(58) English [eng]
(59) Nafsan [erk]
(60) Nafsan [erk]
(61) Nafsan [erk]
(62) Nafsan [erk]
(63) Nafsan [erk]
(64) Nafsan [erk]
(65) Nafsan [erk]
(66) Nafsan [erk]
(67) Nafsan [erk]
(68) Nafsan [erk]
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(69) Nafsan [erk]
(70) Nafsan [erk]
(71) Nafsan [erk]
(72) Nafsan [erk]
(73) Nafsan [erk]
(74) Nafsan [erk]
(75) Nafsan [erk]
(76) Nafsan [erk]
(77) Nafsan [erk]
(78) Nafsan [erk]
(79) Nafsan [erk]
(80) Nafsan [erk]
(81) Nafsan [erk]
(82) Nafsan [erk]
(83) Nafsan [erk]
(84) Nafsan [erk]
(85) Nafsan [erk]
(86) Nafsan [erk]
(87a) Nafsan [erk]
(87b) Nafsan [erk]
(88a) Nafsan [erk]
(88b) Nafsan [erk]
(89) English [eng]
Table Language
5.1 Nafsan [erk]
Chapter 6
Example Language
(1) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(2) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(3) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(4) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(5) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(6) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(7) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(8) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(9) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(10) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(11) Toqabaqita [mlu]
266 APPENDIX A. EXAMPLES AND LANGUAGES
(12) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(13) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(14) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(15) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(16) Unua [onu]
(17) Unua [onu]
(18) Unua [onu]
(19) Unua [onu]
(20) Unua [onu]
(21) Unua [onu]
(22) Unua [onu]
(23) Unua [onu]
(24) Unua [onu]
(25) Unua [onu]
(26) Unua [onu]
(27) Unua [onu]
(28) Unua [onu]
(29) Unua [onu]
(30) Unua [onu]
(31) Unua [onu]
(32) Unua [onu]
(33) Unua [onu]
(34) Unua [onu]
(35) Unua [onu]
(36) Niuean [niu]
(37) Niuean [niu]
(38) Niuean [niu]
(39) Niuean [niu]
(40) Niuean [niu]
(41) Niuean [niu]
(42) Niuean [niu]
(43) Niuean [niu]
(44) Niuean [niu]
(45) Niuean [niu]
(46a) Niuean [niu]
(46b) Niuean [niu]
(47) Māori [mri]
(48) Māori [mri]
(49) Māori [mri]
(50) Māori [mri]
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(51) Māori [mri]
(52) Māori [mri]
(53) Māori [mri]
(54) Māori [mri]
(55) Māori [mri]
(56) Māori [mri]
(57) Unua [onu]
(58) Vietnamese [vie]
Chapter 7
Example Language
(1) Amele [aey]
(2) Amele [aey]
(3) Caddo [cad]
(4) Manam [mva]
(5) Manam [mva]
(6) Nyikina [nyh]
(7) Warrwa [wwr]
(8) Limbu [li]
(9) Hualapai [yu]
(10) Unua [onu]
(11) Unua [onu]
(12) Unua [onu]
(13) Unua [onu]
(14) Unua [onu]
(15) Unua [onu]
(16) Unua [onu]
(17) Unua [onu]
(18) St’át’imcets [lil]
(19) St’át’imcets [lil]
(20) St’át’imcets [lil]
(21) St’át’imcets [lil]
(22) Mandarin Chinese [cmn]
(23) Mandarin Chinese [cmn]
(24) Mandarin Chinese [cmn]
(25) Hausa [hau]
(26) Hausa [hau]
(27) Hausa [hau]
(29) English [eng]
(30) English [eng]
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(31) English [eng]
(32) English [eng]
(33) English [eng]
(34) French [fra]
(35) French [fra]
(36) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(37) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(38) Toqabaqita [mlu]
(39) Neverver [lgk]
(40) Neverver [lgk]
(41) Neverver [lgk]
Table Language
7.3 Manam [mva]
7.4 Unua [onu]
Chapter 8
Example Language
(1) Lelepa [lpa]
(2) Nafsan [erk]
(3) Nafsan [erk]
(4) Nafsan [erk]
(5) Nafsan [erk]
(6) Nafsan [erk]
(7) Nafsan [erk]
(8) Nafsan [erk]
(9) Nafsan [erk]
(10) Nafsan [erk]
(11) Nafsan [erk]
(12) Nafsan [erk]
(13) Nafsan [erk]
(14) Nafsan [erk]
(15) Nafsan [erk]
(16) Nafsan [erk]
(17) Nafsan [erk]
(18) Nafsan [erk]
(19) Nafsan [erk]
(20) Nafsan [erk]
(21) Nafsan [erk]
(22) Nafsan [erk]
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(23) Nafsan [erk]
(24) Nafsan [erk]
(25) Nafsan [erk]
(26) Nafsan [erk]
(27) Nafsan [erk]
(28) Nafsan [erk]
(29) Nafsan [erk]
(30) Nafsan [erk]
(31) Nafsan [erk]
(32) Nafsan [erk]
(33) Nafsan [erk]
(34) Nafsan [erk]
(35) Nafsan [erk]
(36) Nafsan [erk]
(38) Nafsan [erk]
(39) Nafsan [erk]
(40) Nafsan [erk]
(41) Nafsan [erk]
(42) Nafsan [erk]
(43) Nafsan [erk]
(44) Nafsan [erk]
(45) Nafsan [erk]
(46) Nafsan [erk]
(47) Nafsan [erk]
(48) Nafsan [erk]
(49) Nafsan [erk]
(50) Nafsan [erk]
(51) Nafsan [erk]
(52) Nafsan [erk]
(53) Nafsan [erk]
(54) Nafsan [erk]
(55) Nafsan [erk]
(56) Nafsan [erk]
(57) Nafsan [erk]
(58) Nafsan [erk]
(59) Nafsan [erk]
(60) Nafsan [erk]
(61) Nafsan [erk]
(62) English [eng]
(63) English [eng]
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(64) English [eng]
(65) English [eng]
(66) Nafsan [erk]
(67) Nafsan [erk]
(68) Nafsan [erk]
(69) Nafsan [erk]
(70) Nafsan [erk]
(71) Nafsan [erk]
(72) Nafsan [erk]
(73) Nafsan [erk]
(74) Nafsan [erk]
(75) Nafsan [erk]
(76) Nafsan [erk]
(77) French [fra]
(78) French [fra]
(79) French [fra]
(80) French [fra]
(81) Portuguese [por]
(82) Nafsan [erk]
(83) Nafsan [erk]
(84) Nafsan [erk]
(85) Nafsan [erk]
(86) Nafsan [erk]
(87) Nafsan [erk]
(88) Portuguese [por]
(89) Nafsan [erk]
(90) Portuguese [por]
(91) Nafsan [erk]
(92) Nafsan [erk]
(93) Nafsan [erk]
(94) Nafsan [erk]
(95) Nafsan [erk]
(96) Nafsan [erk]
(97) Nafsan [erk]
(98) Nafsan [erk]
(99) Nafsan [erk]
(100) Nafsan [erk]
(101) Nafsan [erk]
(102) Nafsan [erk]
(103) Nafsan [erk]
271
(104) Nafsan [erk]
(105) Navajo [nav]
(106) Nafsan [erk]
(107) Nafsan [erk]
(108) Nafsan [erk]
(109) Nafsan [erk]
(111) Nafsan [erk]
(113) Nafsan [erk]
(114) Nafsan [erk]
(116) German [deu]
(117) German [deu]
Table Language
8.1 Nafsan [erk]
8.2 Lelepa [lpa]
8.4 Nafsan [erk]
8.5 Nafsan [erk]
8.8 Nafsan [erk]
Chapter 9
Example Language
(1) Wogeo [woc]
(2) Wogeo [woc]
(3) Wogeo [woc]
(4) Wogeo [woc]
(5) Wogeo [woc]
(6) Wogeo [woc]
(7) Wogeo [woc]
(8) Wogeo [woc]
(9) Wogeo [woc]
(10) Wogeo [woc]
(11) Mav̋ea [mkv]
(12) Mav̋ea [mkv]
(13) Mav̋ea [mkv]
(14) North Ambrym [mmg]
(15) North Ambrym [mmg]
(16) North Ambrym [mmg]
(17) Nafsan [erk]
(18) Nafsan [erk]
(19) Nafsan [erk]
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(20) Nafsan [erk]
(21) Nafsan [erk]
(22) Daakaka [bpa]
(23) Daakaka [bpa]
Table Language
9.1 Wogeo [woc]
9.2 North Ambrym [mmg]
Appendix B
estionnaire data
This appendix contains all the results of the elicitations of questionnaires in Nafsan. Most questions
were answered by Lionel Emil, and some byGrayKaltap̃au. Formore details on the elicitation process
see Chapter 3 and Section 3.3. Examples cited in the main text can easily be co-referenced with the
data in the appendix – the number in parentheses in the beginning of each question in the appendix,
such as (1), is referenced in the main text with the initials of the questionnaires, such as PQ, followed
by the said number. Every question also contains the reference to the recording in my PARADISEC
collection (Krajinović, 2017b). All the questions from the questionnaire are in bold and linguistic
examples are in italics. There is typically more than one linguistic example per question, aiming
at providing several possible constructions, and extending the context from the questionnaire when
possible. All linguistic examples fromNafsan are morphologically segmented, but only some contain
full glosses and free translation in English. In conjunction with this work, the corpus (Thieberger,
1995–2018), and the upcoming updated version of the Nafsan dictionary, these examples should be
easy to gloss and analyze by other linguists. Nevertheless, these examples should be used with the
accompanying recordings whenever possible, as possible mistakes in the transcription might have
occurred.
B.1 e Perfect estionnaire (Dahl, 2000c)
In order to quantify different constraints on the use of perfect in Nafsan, I used several tags in the
Perfect Questionnaire, listed below.
POSS : possible among other options (typically general proclitics alone) NOTE: among possible op-
tions, one category can be preferred, or they can be equally acceptable
OBL : obligatory (no other grammatical options for the intended meaning)
AGR : agrammatical in the intended meaning
NEW1 : new meaning generated by the perfect
NEW2 : new meaning generated by the prospective
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NO : not attested
ON : perfect is the only attested category
PS : polarity shift - negation without perfect in a context where perfect would be possible in
English
QS : question shift - perfect obligatory in a question, but only possible in the answer
NEG : negation with perfect
RESULTS (number of occurrences):
POSS : 27
OBL : 5
AGR : 19
NEW1 : 17
NEW2 : 12
NO : 34
ON : 16
PS : 5
QS : 3
(1)1 [OBL]2 (AK1-115-01)3 [A: I want to give your sister a book to read, but I don’t knowwhi
one. Are there any of these books that she READ already?] B: Yes, she READ this book.
(1) Ore, ga ki=pe fe natus ne.
(2) Ore, ga i=pe fe natus ne.
(3) Ore, ga ki=pe fe natus nen su.
(4) Ore, ga i=pe fe natus nen su.
(5) *ga i=fe natus nen su.
(1ex)4 [NEW2] [You are giving A a book and she has to read it. en she forgot and says “I will
read it, I will read it” and then you ask her again: Have you read it? A replies: ‘yes, I did read the
book’.]
1This number refers to the number of the sentence given by the author, in this case Dahl (2000c).
2A tag I used for my own reference, present only in the Perfect questionnaire.
3The reference to the recording in my collection (Krajinović, 2017b).
4Themark “ex” refers to an extended context of the context under (1). These extended contexts were most often offered
by the speaker.
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(6) ku=po fe natus ne?
(7) Ore, a=po fe natus ne.
(2) [AGR] (AK1-115-01) [A: It seems that your sister never finishes books.] B: (That is not quite
true.) She READ this book (= all of it).
(8) A=lek-a-ø welkia kor-e-m i=ta fe silu natus nen mau. I see your sister never finishes any books.
(9) Eh i=tik, i=fe silu natus ne.
No, She read this whole book (already).
(2ex1) [NEW2] [in the context from (1ex)]
(10) I=po fe silu natus ne.
(2ex2) [NEW2] [A asks: Did your sister read all of that book? B replies: Yes, she read all of it.]
(11) Ore, ki=pe fe silu natus ne.
(3) [POSS] (AK1-115-01) [estion: Is the king still alive?] No, he DIE.
(12) I=tik, i=mat.
(13) I=tik, ki=pe mat.
(14) I=tik, i=pe mat.
(3ex) [NEW2] [’po’ is AFTER the UT!] [If the king is si and about to die.]
(15) i=ta m̃ol to ko i=po, i=po tfal?
(16) Eh, i=po mat. I=to pan ale i=po mat.
He is about to die (he is breathing his last breath).
(17) Eh, i=po mat. I=to pan go i=po mat.
He is about to die (he is breathing his last breath).
(4) [POSS] (AK1-115-01)estion: You MEET my sister (at any time in your life up to now)?
(18) Ku=nrus paatlas kor-e-k tete mal?
Have you met my sister any time in your life?
(19) kui=pe nrus paatlas kor-e-k tete mal?
(20) kui=pe paatlas kor-e-k temal?
(4ex) [NEW2] [If you are planning to meet my sister and the time passes and I’m asking: Yester-
day, did you meet her? (You are planning to do something at the exact time and the time passes
by.)]
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(21) ku=po paatlas-i-ø go? Ku=po preg-i-ø?
(5) [POSS] (AK1-115-01) [A ild asks: Can I go now?] Mother: You DO your homework?
(22) kai=pe tae pa malfa?
Can I go now?
(23) kai=pe tae pan malfane?
Can I go now?
(24) ku=pe preg nawesien gaag?
Have you done your work?
(25) ku=preg nawesien gaag?
(5ex) [NEW2] [You send someone to make something, and when he comes ba you say]
(26) ku=po preg-i-ø?
did you do (what I told you to do)?
(6) [POSS] (AK1-115-01) [estion: Do you knowmy sister?] Answer: Yes, I MEET her (so I know
her).
(27) ku=tae kor-e-k?
(28) ore, a=paatlas-i-ø.
(29) ore, kai=pe paatlas-i-ø go kai=pe tae.
yes, I already met her so I know her.
(30) kai=pe paatlas-i-ø preg-i-ø kai=pe tae. I already met her so I know her.
(7) [POSS] (AK1-115-01) [estion: Can you swim in this lake? (=Is it possible for anybody to
swim in this lake?)] Answer: Yes, at least I SWIM in it several times.
(31) ru=tae los naimat ne?
(32) ore, kai=pe nrus los wes tete mal.
(33) ore, a=nrus los wes tete mal.
(34) ore, a=pe nrus los wes tete mal.
(8) [AGR] (AK1-115-01) [Do you know what happened to me just an hour ago?] I WALK in the
forest. Suddenly I STEP on a snake. It BITE me in the leg. I TAKE a stone and THROW (it) at the
snake. It DIE.
(35) ku=tae nae kin i=paakor-ki wou malna i=po nom pa?
(36) ku=tae nae kin i=paakor kineu i=po nrus pi malfane m̃as?
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(37) a=pato/a=to siwer namlas. a=to trau kam m̃at i=skei. i=kat natu-o-k. a=wes faat i=skei. a=trau
p̃akin kai=p̃kapn-i.
I walk into forest.
(38) a=to siwer namlas, a=wes faat iskei, a=trau p̃akin teflan me a=trau p̃kapn-i.
(39) *kai=pe to siwer namlas, kai=pe wes faat i=skei, kai=pe trau p̃akin teflanme kai=pe trau p̃kapn-i.
(9) [AGR] (AK1-116-01) [Do you know what happened to me yesterday?] I WALK in the forest.
Suddenly I STEP on a snake. It BITE me in the leg. I TAKE a stone and THROW (it) at the snake. It
DIE.
(40) ku=tae nae kin i=paakor-ki wou nanom?
(41) a=to siwer pan trau kam m̃at i=skei. A=kam-ti go i=trau kat natu-o-k. A=wes faat i=skei trau
p̃kapn-i.
(42) A=to
1g=pog
siwer
walk
namlas
forest
me
but
a=kam-ø
1g=step3g.obj
m̃at
snake
i=skei.
3g=one
A=kam-ti
1g=step3g.obj
go
and
i=trau
3g=really
kat
bite
natuo-k.
leg1g.po
A=wes
1g=take
faat
stone
i=skei
3g=one
trau
really
p̃kapun-i.
kill3g.obj
(9) (Do you knowwhat happened to me yesterday?) IWALK in the forest. Suddenly I STEP on
a snake. It BITE me in the leg. I TAKE a stone and THROW (it) at the snake. It DIE. (AK1-116-01)
(9ex) [NEW1] [e boss orders X to call people, gather some words in Nafsan, and pay them.
e employee reports on what she did addressing his demands one by one:]
(43) Kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
sos-o-r
call-3pl.obj
su,
pf
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
pestaf-i-r
talk3pl.obj
su
pf
ki
pep
nafsan,
language
rui=pe
3pl.pf=pf
tao
give.me
nafsan
word
faum
new
su,
pf
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
paktof-i-r.
pay3pl.obj
I called the people, I talked to them, they gave me new words, and I paid them. (AK1-116-01)
(44) Kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
sos-o-r
call-3pl.obj
su,
pf
go
and
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
pestaf-i-r
talk3pl.obj
su
pf
ki
pep
nafsan,
language
go
and
ru=pe
3pl=pf
tao
give.me
nafsan
word
faum
new
su,
pf
go
and
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
paktof-i-r.
pay3pl.obj
I called the people, I talked to them, they gave me new words, and I paid them. (AK1-116-01)
(45) A=pe
1g=pf
sos-o-r
call-3pl.obj
su,
pf
a=pe
1g=pf
pestaf-i-r
talk3pl.obj
su
pf
ki
pep
nafsan,
language
ru=pe
3pl=pf
tao
give.me
nafsan
word
faum
new
su,
pf
kai=pe
1g.pf=pf
paktof-i-r.
pay3pl.obj
I called the people, I talked to them, they gave me new words, and I paid them. (AK1-116-01)
(10) [AGR] (AK1-116-01) [Do you know what happened to my brother yesterday? I saw it
myself.] We WALK in the forest. Suddenly he STEP on a snake. It BITE him in the leg. He TAKE a
stone and THROW (it) at the snake. It DIE.
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(46) Komam ra=siwer namlas nanom me i=na i=to i=kam m̃at i=skei, m̃at i=trau kat natu-e-n. I=wes
faat i=skei, i=trau p̃kapni m̃at ki.
[NEW1] PE changes the meaning in the same way as in (9ex).
(11) [AGR] (AK1-118-01) [Do you knowwhat happened to me once when I was aild? (Note:
e speaker was, however, old enough to remember the incident.)] I WALK in the forest. Suddenly
I STEP on a snake. It BITE me in the leg. I TAKE a stone and THROW (it) at the snake. It DIE.
(47) A=pato sari namlas, me akam m̃at i=skei, i=kat natu-o-k, i=kat natu-o-k teflan, a=wes faat trau
p̃kapn-i.
(12) [POSS] [AGR] (AK1-118-01) [is happened to me just an hour ago.] I SIT under a tree, when
an apple FALL on my head. (Or, if more natural: While I SIT under a tree, an apple FALL on my
head.)
(48) Kineu a=sak to etan nkas to kia malnen “apple” i=m̃el tik np̃au-k.
(49) Kineu a=sak to etan nkas to kia malnen “apple” i=m̃el me i=mp̃afu np̃au-k.
I was sitting under a tree when an apple fell on my head and made it bleed.
(50) kineu kai=pe sak to etan nkas to kia malnen “apple” i=m̃el tik np̃au-k.
(51) kineu kai=pe sak to etan nkas to kia malnen “apple” *ki=pe m̃el tik np̃au-k.
(52) Kineu a=sak to etan nkas to kia me (*malnen) “apple” i=po m̃el.
(13) [POSS] [AGR] (AK1-118-01) [Do you know what happened to me once when I was a ild?
(Note: e speaker was, however, old enough to remember the incident.)] I SIT under a tree,
when an apple FALL on my head. (Or, if more natural: When I SIT under a tree, an apple FALL on
my head.)
(53) A=sak to etan nkas to malnen “apple” i=m̃el tik np̃au-k.
(14) [AGR] (AK1-119-01) [It is morning. A wakes up, looks out of the window and sees that the
courtyard (or the street) is wet.] A: It RAIN during the night.
(54) Uus i=wo nanom p̃og.
It already rained at night.
(14ex1) [NEW1] [NEW2] expectation but not earlier than expected [You waited for the rain yes-
terday, it didn’t come and today you wake up but the rain has gone.]
(55) Uus ki=pe wo nanom p̃og.
(56) Uus i=po wo nanom p̃og.
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(14ex2) [NEW1] [It rained, and it stopped and you refer ba to the rain.]
(57) Uus ki=pe wo su.
(14ex3) [NEW1] [You are trying to make something before the rain comes, but suddenly the rain
cates up with you, and you say:]
(58) Oh, uus ki=pe to wo.
(59) uus ki=pe to wo kia me a=fiit sil
The rain started and I ran inside.
(14ex4) [NEW1]
(60) kai=pe to em̃rom to kia me uus i=po to wo.
I was inside and then the rain started.
(14ex5) [NEW2] [Someone comes and says: oh, it’s raining. And you say:]
(61) Uus i=po wo kia.
It has just started raining.
(62) Uus i=po wo malfanen kia.
It has just started raining.
(15) [AGR] experiential-not iterative (AK1-119-01) [estion: You MEET my sister (at any time
in your life up to now)?] Answer: Yes, I MEET her several times.
(63) ore, a=paatlas-i-ø mal sikskei.
(64) *kai=pe paatlas-i-ø mal sikskei.
(15ex1) [NEW1]
(65) kai=pe paatlas-i-ø.
I met her (once).
(16) [AGR] (AK1-119-01) [A question asked at 9 o’cloA.M.: Why do you look so tired?] Answer:
I WAKE UP at 4 o’clock this morning (or: today).
(66) a=pilo 4 oklok p̃ulp̃og
(16ex1) [NEW1] [If your alarm is set for 5am, but by ance you wake up before time, at 4am.]
(67) Kai=pe pilo 4 oklok p̃ulp̃og.
(68) A=pe pilo 4 oklok p̃ulp̃og.
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(69) kai=pe pilo kin me i=po pi 5.
(70) a=pe pilo 4, me i=po pi 5.
(16ex2) [NEW2] [If you are supposed to wake up at 3am and then you wake up at 4am.]
(71) a=po pilo 4 oklok p̃ulp̃og.
(17) [AGR] (AK1-119-01) [A question asked at 3 o’clo P.M.: Why do you look so tired?] Answer:
I WAKE UP at 4 o’clock today.
the same as (16)
(18) [AGR] (AK1-119-01) [A question asked at 9 o’clo A.M.: Why do you look so tired?]
Answer: I NOT SLEEP well during the night.
(72) a=ta matur wi p̃og mau.
(73) a=matur saa p̃og.
(18ex) [NEW1] [If you were expecting to sleep well at night yesterday, but you didn’t.]
(74) nanom na wan kai=pe ta matur wi p̃og mau.
(19) [AGR] (AK1-119-01) [A question asked at 3 o’clo P.M.: Why do you look so tired?]
Answer: I NOT SLEEP well during the night.
the same as (18)
(20) [POSS] (AK1-119-01) [A has got his wages and says:] I GET my wages today, so I can now
BUY you a beer.
Note: In elicitation I said ‘I already got my wages’ prompting the use of P.
(75) Kai=pe wes naul mees kin go ka=fo tae gaag paakot “beer” wanki.
I got my wages today so now I can buy you a beer.
(76) A=pe wes naul mees kin go ka=fo tae gaag paakot “beer” wanki.
I got my wages today so now I can buy you a beer.
(77) A=wes naul mees kin go ka=fo tae gaag paakot “beer” wanki.
I got my wages today so now I can buy you a beer.
(21) [POSS] (AK1-119-01) I GET my wages yesterday, so I can now BUY you a beer.
(78) A=wes nfakoton neu nanom, malfane ka=fo tae gaag paakot “beer”.
(79) A=wes nfakoton neu nanom, malfane *a=tae gaag paakot “beer”.
(80) Kai=pe wes naul neu nanom kin go ka=fo tae gaag paakot “beer”.
(22) [AGR] (AK1-119-01) [Note: ese sentences do not necessarily imply the passive voice though
BE BORN happens to be formally a passive in English. Treat it as a single lexical unit.] A: When
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you BE BORN? - B: I BE BORN on the first of June 1950.
(81) Ku=paakor ngas?
(82) Ngas kin kupaakor wes?
(83) *Ku=pe paakor ngas?
(84) a=paakor naliati i=pei ni atlag ni June ntau 1950.
(85) *kai=pe paakor naliati i=pei ni atlag ni June ntau 1950.
(22ex) [NEW1] [e cyclone Pam came in 2015, and I was already born at that time.]
(86) kai=pe paakor su me i=po mai.
I was born before it came./ I was already born and then it came.
(23) [POSS] (AK1-120-01) [A guide presenting his home town to tourists. Note: is sentence does
not necessarily imply the passive voice, unless it really is the most natural way of expressing this
sentence in L.] Our town BE FOUNDED in 1550.
(87) em̃lel
building
nim̃am
our
rukoi=nrikakin
3pl.prf=build.up
1550.
in 1550
(88) em̃lel
building
nim̃am
our
rukoi=pe
3pl.prf=prf
nrikakin
build.up
1550.
in 1550
(89) ntau
year
ni
of
1550,
1550
ru=tfag
3pl=build
“town”
town
nigmam.
our
(90) ntau
year
na
that
ru=pe
3pl=prf
tfag
build
“town”
town
nigmam.
our
(23ex) [NEW2] [If they plan to do it before 1550, but they didn’t do it when they were supposed
to do, and they build it only in 1550]
(91) ru=po
3pl=psp.real
nrikakin
build
1550.
1550
(24) [AGR] (AK1-120-01) [estion: Do you know what remarkable event TAKE PLACE in 1550?
Note: as in 23.] Answer: In that year, our town BE FOUNDED.
(92) ag ku=tae nae kin i=paakor 1550?
(93) Me ntau wan kia ru=nrikaki “town” nigmam.
(94) Me ntau wan kia ru=tfag “town” nigmam.
(95) 1550 nen kin ipi ntau natfagien nig em̃lel nigmam.
1550 is the year of building of our town./ It was in 1550 that our town was built.
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(96) *Me ntau wan kia ru=pe tfag “town” nigmam.
(97) Ntau na kin ru=tfag “town” nigmam.
(98) *Ntau na kin ru=pe tfag “town” nigmam.
(99) Ntau na rukoi=tfag “town” nigmam.
(25) [AGR] (AK1-120-01) [estion: When Columbus ARRIVE at America for the first time?]
Answer: He ARRIVE at America in 1492.
(100) Columbus
Columbus
i=pei
3sg=first
pan
go
taasak
come.ashore
America
America
ngas?
when
(101) Ngas
when
kin
rel
i=pi
3sg=be
malpei
before
nen
rel
Columbus
Columbus
i=taasak
3sg=come.ashore
America?
America
(102) me kin nlaun nig America, ngas kin i=pi mal pei nen Columbus i=taasak wes?
(103) I=taasak America ntau 1492.
(104) I=pan taasak-wes 1492.
(105) Columbus ki=taasak America ntau ni 1492.
(25ex) [NEW1] [A says: I think Columbus came to America in 1700s.] B says: No, Columbus had
already come in 1492.
(106) Columbus ki=pe pan taasak-wes 1492.
(26) [NO] (AK1-120-01) [estion: What do you know about this novel? Note: is sentence
does not necessarily imply the active voice or the word order given here if it is not natural in L.]
Answer: Graham Greene WRITE it.
(107) ku=tae tenmatuun tokloos natus ne?
What do you know about this novel?
(108) ag ku=nrus tae tenamruun tokloos natus ne?
What do you know anything about this novel?
(109) Graham Greene kin i=mtr-i/kia i=mtr-i.
Graham Greene was the one who wrote it.
(110) Graham Greene kin i=mtr-i.
Graham Greene is the one who wrote it.
(111) Graham Greene go i=mtr-i.
Graham Greene wrote it (that book over there).
(27) [ON] (AK1-120-01) [estion: Your sister still BE at home?] Answer: No, she already GO
AWAY.
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(112) Korem ke=fo ta to esum̃ to ko?
(113) I=tik, ki=pe tm̃alu.
(28) [NO] [PS] (AK1-120-01) [B’s sister is known to have gone to another town. estion: A:
Your sister COME BACK? (Note: a free translation may be needed for B’s answer.)] B: No, she
still GO AWAY.
Perfect obligatory in the positive question, not attested in the negative answer.
(114) Korem ki=pe to Ostrelia ler mai?
(115) Korem ki=pe ler to Ostrelia ler mai?
(116) Korem ki=pe ler to Ostrelia mai?
(117) korem ki=pe to Ostrelia ler mai?
(118) korem ki=pe ler mai?
(119) i=ta tik, i=tap ler mai mau.
not yet, she hasn’t come back.
(120) i=ta tik, i=ta puel.
not yet, she is still away.
(121) i=ta pato Melbourne.
she is still in Melbourne.
(122) i=ta ta pato Melbourne ler mai mau.
she has not returned from Melbourne yet.
(29) [NO] [PS] (AK1-120-01) [As in 28. estion: Your sister COME BACK?] Answer: No, she
NOT COME BACK yet.
(123) Korem ki=pe ler mai?
(124) Korem ki=pe ler?
[NEW2] [If she was expected to return yesterday and you ask the question today assuming that she
has already arrived:]
(125) Korem i=po ler?
(126) I=tik, i=ta tap ler mai mau.
(127) I=tik, i=ta puel.
P is dispreffered with negation: there are only 3 instances of negated perfect in the corpus)
(30) [ON] (AK1-120-01) [A: Don’t talk so loud! You’ll wake the baby.] B: HeWAKEUP already.
(128) P̃a=ta krakpes mau, p̃a=fo pug tes, p̃a=fo pug tauses.
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(129) Ga ki=pe pilo.
(130) ga i=to matur, me ga ki=pe pilo.
he was asleep, but already woke up.
(131) ga i=pe pilo.
(31) [ON] [e baby wakes up one hour earlier than expected and starts screaming. Mother (in
another room):] Oh, no! He WAKE UP already! P is typically translated as ‘already’ in English,
so any sentence with it would always prompt P
(132) ga ki=pe pilo.
(133) ga ki=pe pilo su.
(32) [POSS] (AK1-120-01) [Note: use BE or VISIT, or some other predicate, according to what
sounds the most natural in L.] You BE to (VISIT) Australia (ever in your life)?
(134) Kui=pe nrus pak Ostrelia nam̃olien gaag?
(135) kui=pe nrus pak Ostrelia tete mal nam̃olien gaag?
(136) kui=pe nrus pak Ostrelia tete mal?
(137) ku=nrus pak Ostrelia tete mal?
(138) ku=nrus pak Ostrelia tete mal ko?
(139) ku=pak Ostrelia tete mal?
(140) ku=nrus pak Ostrelia ko?
(141) ku=nrus pan ko?
(33) (AK1-120-01) [ese are alternative answers to 32. ey should all be translated.]
(33.1) [NO] [PS] No, I never BE (VISIT) there.
(142) i=tik, a=ta(p) pak nrog-o-ø mau.
(33.2) [ON] Yes, I BE (VISIT) there.
(143) ore, kai=pe pa.
(33.3) [ON] Yes, I BE (VISIT) there several times.
(144) ore, kai=pe to nrus pan tete mal.
I went there several times.
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(33.4) [NO] Yes, I BE (VISIT) there in January 1987.
(145) ore, a=pan sari sago i=pen atlag ni January 1987.
yes, I went there in January 1987.
(34) [POSS] (AK1-120-01) [A has been talking about the way of life in Australia. Note: the
sentence construction may have to be changed - even in English.] B: You BE to (VISIT) Australia as
you know all that? - A: Yes, I BE (VISIT) there, so I know.
(146) Ag ku=pak Ostralia kin ku=po tae nam̃olien ni sago i=pen?
(147) Ag kui=pe pan kin go ku=po tae nam̃olien ni sago i=pen?
(148) ag kui=pe pak Ostrelia kin go ku=po tae nam̃olien ni sago i=pen?
(149) Ore, kai=pe pan su gawankin a=po tae.
(35) [OBL] ( ) [estion: You MEET my sister (at any time in your life up to now)? Note: All
these alternative answers should be translated.]
(150) (ag) ku=pe paatlas kor-e-k te mal/nrak ko?
(151) (ag) kui=pe paatlas kor-e-k te mal/nrak ko?
(152) (ag) *ku=paatlas kor-e-k te mal/nrak ko?
(153) (ag) ku=pe nrus paatlas kor-e-k ko?
(154) (ag) ku=pe nrus paatlas kor-e-k tete mal ko?
(35.1) [NO] [PS] No, I never MEET her.
(155) Itik, a=tap paatlas nrog-o-ø tete mal/nrak mau.
No, I have never met her.
(35.2) [POSS] [QS] Yes, I MEET her once.
(156) Ore, a=paatlas-i-ø mal i=skei.
Yes, I met her once.
(157) Ore, kai=pe paatlas-i-ø mal i=skei.
Yes, I already met her once.
Missing: Yes, I MEET her in January 1987.
(35ex) [NEW2] [If you are planning to meet my sister and then you confirm you did meet her
according to the plan.]
(158) Ore, a=po paatlas-i-ø.
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(36) [POSS] [QS] (AK1-123-01) [A has been talking to about C’s personal tastes. Note: the
sentence construction may have to be anged - even in English.] B: You MEET her (sometime)
as you know all that? - A: Yes, I MEET her, so I know.
(159) ag ku=pe pei paatlas-i-ø tete mal/ nrak?
(160) Ku=trau tae wi kin.
You seem to know her very well.
(161) me kin ag ku=trau tae wi kin tefla, i=ku, ag ku=pe paatlas-i-ø tete nrak?
You seem to know her very well, what, have you ever met her?
(162) ag ku=paatlas-i-ø kin ku=tae?/ ag ku=paatlas-i-ø kin ku=po tae? is that because you know
her (that you know her so well)? (you met her first and then you know her)
(163) a=paatlas-i-ø kin a=po tae.
I met her, that’s why I know her.
(164) Kai=pe patlasi kin a=po tae.
I already met her, that’s why I know her.
(165) A=paatlas-i-ø gawankin a=tae.
I met her, that’s why I know her.
(166) Kai=pe paatlas-i-ø gawankin a=po tae.
I already met her, that’s why I know her.
(167) a=tae nlaken a=paatlas-i-ø.
I know her because I met her.
(168) A=tae nlaken kai=pe paatlas-i-ø.
I know her because I have met her.
(37) [AGR] (AK1-123-01) [It is cold in the room. e window is closed.] estion: You OPEN
the window (and closed it again)?
(169) ag
you
ku=p̃elgat
2sg=open
nmetklas
window
mer
again
p̃not-i?
close-3.obj
Did you open the window and closed it again?
[if the window is closed while you are speaking]
(170) ag ku=p̃elgat nmetklaas?
Did you open the window (in the meanwhile)?
(37ex1) [NEW1] [You tell someone to open the window, and then you want toe if your order
has been done.]
(171) ag ku=pe p̃elgat nmetklas? (Implication: the window is still open at the time of speaking.)
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e P event does not have to hold at the uttenrance time. (37ex2) [NEW1] [Rosey came back to
the village as expected, but she returned home in the meanwhile.]
(172) ki=pe ler mai me i=mer ler pa.
She came and she returned.
(38) [NO] (AK1-123-01) [is is an answer to 37.] Yes, I OPEN it.
(173) Ore, a=p̃elgat-i.
(39) [NO] (AK1-123-01) [is is an answer to 37.] No, I NOT OPEN it.
(174) i=tik a=tap p̃elgat nrog-o-ø mau.
(175) i=tik, a=tap p̃elgati mau.
(40) [NO] (AK1-123-01) [e window is open but A has not noticed that. A asks B: why is it so
cold in the room?] B: I OPEN the window.
(176) nlaken iku kin em̃rom i=mlanr tefla?
Why is it so cold inside?
(177) kineu kia a=p̃elgat nmetklaas.
(178) Em̃rom san (the place were we are)/sas (the place where I am) i=mlanr nlaken a=p̃elgat nmetk-
laas.
(41) [OBL] [POSS] (AK1-123-01) [estion: Is your sister still abroad?] Answer: No, she
COME BACK and is now staying with us.
(179) kor-e-m i=tap pato etog?
(180) i=tik, ki=pe ler mai go i=skot komam to malfaane.
She already came back and she is with us now.
(181) ki=pe ler mai, ga kin ki=pe skot mam to malfane.
(182) ki=pe ler mai, ga kin ki=skot mam to.
(42) [OBL] [POSS] [QS] (AK1-123-01) [estion: I was told you are writing a book. How
many pages you WRITE by now?] Answer: I WRITE fifty pages.
(183) ru=nrik wou ki na ku=to mtir natus i=skei. Malfaane kui=pe mtir nap̃elgan i=pi ki?
They told me you were writing a book, how many pages have you written by now?
(184) a=nrog-o-ø na ku=to mtir natu i=skei, kui=pe to mtir nap̃elgan kaafi malfaane?
I heard that you were writing a book, what page are you writing now?
(185) ru=nrik kineu kin na ku=to mtir natus i=skei, kui=pe to nap̃elgan kaafi ki?
288 APPENDIX B. QUESTIONNAIRE DATA
They told me you were writing a book, what page are you on?
(186) ru=nrik kineu kin na ku=to mtir natus i=skei, kui=to nap̃elgan kaafi ki?
They told me you were writing a book, what page are you on?
(187) a=nrog-o-ø na ku=to mtir natu i=skei, kui=pe to nap̃elgan kaafi malfaane?
(188) A=mtir nap̃elgan 50.
I wrote fifty pages.
(189) A=to mtir nap̃elgan 50 ki.
I’m writing the fiftieth page.
(190) A=to nap̃elgan 50 ki.
I’m on the fiftieth page.
(191) Kai=pe to nap̃elgan 50 malfaane/ malfaane kai=pe to nap̃elgan 50.
I’m on the fiftieth page now.
(192) A=tap tae nap̃elgan i=pi kin a=mtr-i mau.
I don’t know how many pages I wrote.
(193) A=tap tae sef nap̃elgan kin a=tkos mau.
I don’t know which page I am on.
(43) [POSS] (AK1-123-01) [estion: I was told you collect dolls. You COLLECT many of
them?] Answer: I COLLECT some two hundred dolls by now.
(194) ru=nrik wou/kineu kin na ku=to kruuk-ki “doll”. ku=kruuk-ki telaap?
Have you collected many?
(195) a=nrog-o-ø na kuto kruuk-ki “doll”
(196) a nrog-o-ø ru=tli na ku=to kruuk-ki m̃em. Ku=kruuk-kir ru=laap? m̃em (a seed that spins on
the wind – napuk is the three on which it grows)
(197) Malfaane kai=pe lakor (*fla) kruk-ki m̃eltig ki 200.
Now I have already collected maybe around 200
(198) kai=pe kruk-ki m̃eltig 200 ki.
(199) A=kruuk-kir rui=pe lakor tkal tete naor ni 200 ki. I collected, they reach somewhere around
200.
(200) A=kruk-kir pan tkal m̃eltig ki 200 tefla.
I collected them somewhere up to 200, something like that.
(44) [POSS] (AK1-123-01) [estion: I was told you intend to collect 300 different dolls. How
many you already COLLECT?] Answer: I COLLECT some two hundred dolls by now.
(201) a=nrog-o-ø ru=na ku=to na p̃a=kruuk-ki “doll” fserser i=pi 300, kui=pe kruk-ki i=pi su? / Kui=pe
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kruk-ki kaafi ki?
(202) Kai=pe to kop m̃eltig ki 200 ki.
I’m somewhere around 200.
(203) malfane kai=pe lakor tkal m̃elting ki 200 ki.
now I already reached somewhere around 200.
(204) a=to kop 200 ki/ a=to kop 200 tefla.
I’m somewhere around 200.
(45) [AGR] (AK1-123-01) [estion:I was told you always forget your umbrella somewhere.
Is it true?] Answer: Yes, this year I LOSE five umbrellas.
(205) a=nrog-o-ø na ku=to metp̃aakor suulok gaag sermal/ a=nrog-o-ø na ku=to metp̃aakor suulok
ser nrak , i=tilm̃ori?
(206) Ore, ntau ne a=krak puel-ki sulok ilim. / a=kraksmanr (miss something by falling down) sulok
i=lim.
(45ex) [NEW1] [You are counting shooting stars with your friends. Who will be the first to count
5 shooting stars?]
(207) kineu kai=pe fe ki=pe lim.
I have counted five already.
(208) Ki=pe lim ru=pa.
Five have already passed.
(46) [NO] (AK1-124-01) [A is setting out on a long journey in an old car. asks: What if something
goes wrong with your car on the way?] A: I BUY spare parts and tools in case something happens
( = I have got them now).
(209) me kin te-namrun ke=fla sa m̃p̃atfat gaag malen ku=to pa?
(210) me kin te-namrun ke=fla to sa m̃p̃atfat gaag malen ku=to pa?
(211) me i=f-wel kin te namrun ke=fla sa m̃p̃atfat gaag malen ku=to pa?
(212) me i=f-wel kin te namrun ke=fla to sa m̃p̃atfat gaag malen ku=to pa?
(213) me kin te-nmatun ke=fla sa m̃p̃atfat gaag go selwan ku=to pa?
(214) me kin te-nmatun ke=fla to sa m̃p̃atfat gaag go selwan ku=to pa?
(215) Me i=f-wel kin te-nmatun ke=fla sa m̃p̃atfat gaag go selwan ku=to pa?
(216) Me i=f-wel kin te nmatun ke=fla to sa m̃p̃atfat gaag go selwan ku=to pa?
(217) me kin m̃p̃atfat gaag ke=sa nmal napu?
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(218) Me i=f-wel kin m̃p̃atfat gaag ke=sa nmal napu?
(219) me kin m̃p̃atfat gaag ke=fla to sa mmal napu?
(220) Me i=f-wel kin m̃p̃atfat gaag ke=fla to sa mmal napu?
(221) me m̃p̃atfat gaag kin ke=fla to sa malnen ku=to pa?
(222) me m̃p̃atfat gaag kin ke=fla to sa selwan ku=to pa?
(223) me m̃p̃atfat gaag kin ke=fla to sa nmal napu?
(224) A=paakot p̃al-ki tete nfasuen go tete sernale nawesien knen m̃as i=to, ke=fla to piatlak tete
namrun ke=sok ki m̃p̃afat ne nmal napu.
(225) Ke=fla to pitlak tete namrun ke=sok-ki m̃p̃atfat ne, tete nfaswen go snale nawesien knen kis
a=paaktofir ru=tok.
(226) tete namrun ke=fla sok-ki m̃p̃atfat ne, tete nfaswen go snale nawesien knen kis a=paaktofir
ru=tok.
(227) Tete nfasuen go sernale naesien knewn kis a=slat p̃al-kir to, tu=fla to selsaa-wes napu.
(47) [POSS] (AK1-124-01) [estion: Why do you look so tired? (Note: you may replace
“three days” by “three nights” or whatever seems most natural.)] Answer: I NOT SLEEP for three
days.
(228) Ag ku=ku kin ku=lee-ki nmaoswen to?
(229) a=lek-a-ø wel ku=maos, i=ku? / a=lek-a-ø wel ku=maos. / ku=maos nlaken i=ku? / (ag)
ku=maos nae togo?
(230) a=ta matur p̃og i=tool mau.
(231) kai=pe ta matur p̃og i=tool mau toki.
(232) p̃og i=tool a=trau ta matur mau.
(48) [ON] (AK1-125-01) [She is still wating television! How long she DO that?] Answer:
She WATCH (it) for three hours.
(233) i=ta to maag TV, i=pees mag wes sefmal?/ i=ta to maag TV, i=pe mag-wes malpram? / i=ta to
maag TV go/ki? Ku=lek-a-ø i=pees-wes sefmal?
(234) ki=pe to kop(awer- hour) kaatol ki.
(235) ki=pe nrus pi mal pram ki. /ki=pe nrus pi mal wa. /Ki=pe lakor nrus pi mal pram ki.
(236) ki=pe to kop “hour” i=tool ki.
(49) [ON] (AK1-125-01) [A is still living in this town.] A: I LIVE here for seven years.
(237) kai=pe tok esaan to ntau i=laru.
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(238) kineu kai=pe tok esaan to ntau i=laru.
(239) kineu kai=pe tok esaan to ntau i=laru ki.
(240) kineu kai=pe tok esaan to m̃eltig ki ntau i=laru ki.
(241) ki=pe to kop ntau i=laru kin a=tok esaan to.
(242) Ki=pe to kop m̃eltig kin tau i=laru kin a=tok esaan to.
(243) m̃eltig kin tau i=laru kin a=tok esaan to.
(50) [POSS] (AK1-125-01) [A is still living in this town. As in 49, the intended meaning of
LIVE is ’to dwell somewhere’, not ’to spend one’s life’.] A: I LIVE here all my life.
(244) tok esaam to mal nam̃olien neu.
(245) kai=pe to saan to mal nam̃olien neu.
(246) Mal nam̃olien neu ga a=tu saan m̃as tu.
(247) Mal nam̃olien neu i=mau wi, a=tu saan m̃as tu.
(50ex) [NEW1] [If I use to live somewhere else before I came to live here up until now, example,
serving life sentence in jail.]
(248) mal nam̃olien neu ga kai=pe to saan m̃as to.
(51) [POSS] (AK1-125-01) [A is visiting a town she used to live in several years ago; now she
lives somewhere else.] A: I LIVE here, so I know every street here.
(249) kineu a=pei to esaan go a=tae wi ki ser napu sesereik ni san.
(250) kineu a=pei to esaan go a=tae wi ki siilu napu sesereik no san.
(251) kineu a=tok esaan teetuei/ malpei go a=tae wi ki ser napu seseerik ni sa.
(252) kineu a=tok esaan teetuei/ malpei go a=tae wi ki siilu napu seseerik ni sa.
(253) kineu kai=pe pei tok esan gawankin a=tae ser/ siilu napu seseerik ni san.
(52) [NO] (AK1-125-01) [As in 51. A now lives somewhere else!] A: I LIVE here for seven
years, so I know every street here.
(254) kineu a=pei tok esaan to ntau i=laru go a=tae wi ki ser napu ni sa.
(255) kineu a=pei tok esaan to ntau i=laru gawan kin a=tae wi ki ser napu ni sa.
(256) kineu a=pei mai tok esaan to ntau i=laru go/ gawankin a=tae wi ki ser napu ni sa.
(53) [POSS] (AK1-126-01 mentioned as 54) [As in 51 and 52.] A: I LIVE here for seven years,
but then I had to move away.
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(257) kineu a=pei tok esan ntau i=laru me a=to mer tm̃alu.
(258) kineu kai=pe pei tok esa tok ntau i=laru me a=to kai mer tm̃alu.
(54) [NO] (AK1-125-01 mentioned as 53) [e speaker meets his friend about once a week;
“the film” refers to a different film ea time:] Every time I MEET him, he TELL me about the film
he (just) SEE.
(259) ser nrak nen ka lek-a-ø ,ke=fo neu traus film nen i=po lek-a-ø su.
(260) ser mal nen ka lek-a-ø ,ke=fo neu traus film nen i=po lek-a-ø su.
(261) ser nrak/mal nen ka=lek-a-ø ,ke=fo neu traus film nen i=po lek silwa su.
(262) ser nrak/mal nen ka=lek-a-ø ,ke=fo neu traus film nen i=po lek-a-ø i=nrus pi malfaa.
(263) ser nrak/mal nen ka=lek-a-ø ,ke=fo to neu traus film nen i=po lek-a-ø su.
(264) ser nrak/mal nen ka=lek-a-ø ,ke=fo to mur ke=neu traus film nen i=po lek-a-ø su.
(265) ser nrak/mal nen ka=lek-a-ø ,ke=fo to mur-i-n na ke=neu traus film nen i=po lek-a-ø su.
(55) [ON] (AK1-126-01) [A has just seen the king arrive and reports it to B, who knows that the
king has been expected to visit their town but does not know that he has now actually arrived.]
A: The king ARRIVE!
(266) naot/ maarik kia ki=pe mai.
(267) naot/maarik go ki=pe mai.
(268) naot/ maarik kis ki=pe mai.
(56) [NO] (AK1-126-01) [A has just seen the king arrive. e event is totally unexpected.] A:
The king ARRIVE!
(269) maarik kis i=mai.
(270) maarik kis i=to mai.
(57) [POSS] (AK1-126-01) [Telling what a baby just DO. “N” should be replaced with a girl’s
name.] N just SAY her first word!
(271) N i=po til nafsan pei ga.
(272) N kia i=po til nafsan pei ga malfane.
(273) N ki=pe til nafsan pei ga.
(58) [POSS] (AK1-126-01) [A comes from the kiten very agitated and tells what he has just
seen happen:] A: The dog EAT our cake!
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(274) kori kia i=paam “cake” gakit.
(275) kori i=paam “cake” gakit.
(276) kori kia ki=pe paam “cake” gakit.
(59) [NO] (AK1-126-01) [A comes from the kiten where he has just seen the sad remains of
the cake. He tells what he assumes to have happened:] A: The dog EAT our cake!
(277) kori i=lakor paam cake gakit.
(278) kori kia i=lakor paam cake gakit.
(60) [AGR] (AK1-126-01) [Do you know what happened to my brother yesterday? I did not
see it, but he told me.] He WALK in the forest. Suddenly he STEP on a snake. It BITE him in the
leg. He TAKE a stone and THROW (it) at the snake. It DIE.
(279) ku=tae nae kin p̃aluk i=sua nanom?
(280) ag ku=tae nae?
(281) P̃aluk i=nrik wou kin na i=pan nraf pan trau kam m̃at. m̃at nen i=kat natwen teflaan i=wes
faat iskei trau p̃kapun m̃at ne.
(282) Tai i=nrik kineu kin na i=pa sari namlas nanom me i=kam m̃at i=skei me m̃at nen i=kat natu-
e-n me i=na i=to i=wes faat i=skei trau p̃kapun m̃at nen ki.
(61) [NO] (AK1-126-01) [is is the beginning of a story (tale). “Once upon a time” should be
replaced with the formula stories typically begin with in L.] Once upon a time there was a man.
He WALK in the forest. Suddenly he STEP on a snake. It BITE him in the leg. He TAKE a stone
and THROW (it) at the snake. It DIE.
(283) Nrak i=skei, i=piatlak natam̃ol i=skei. i=pato nraf ur namlas pan me i=kam m̃at iskei. m̃at
nen i=na i=to trau kat natu-e-n. i=kat natu-e-n teflan go natam̃ol ne i=nrau faat i=skei trau
p̃kapun m̃at nen ki.
(284) Nrak i=skei, i=pitlak natam̃ol i=skei. i=pato nraf ur namlas pan me i=trau kam m̃at iskei.
i=kam m̃at nen teflaan go m̃at nen i=na i=to trau kat netu-e-n. i=kat natwen teflan go naat
nen ki nwes faat i=skei trau p̃kapun m̃at nen.
(62) [NO] (AK1-126-01) [A tells what she has heard from her father. Nothing shows that she
would not believe it.] A: When my father BE a child, schools BE better than nowadays.
(285) mal nen apaap neu i=ta pi teesa, nafet “skul” ru=trau wi tol mes.
(286) mal nafitesawen ni apaap neu mana, nafet “skul” ru=mer wi tol mes.
(63) [NO] (AK1-126-01) [A tells what she has heard from her father. Nothing shows that
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she would not believe it.] A: My father TELL me that when he BE a child, schools BE better than
nowadays.
(287) apaap neu i=nrik wou kin na malen i=ta pi teesa, i=na nafet “skul” ru=mer wi tol mes.
(288) apaap neu i=nrik wou kin na malen ga i=tapi teesa sees, i=na nafet “skul” ru=mer wi tol mes.
(64) [NO] (AK1-127-01) [A tells what she has heard people saying. Nothing shows that she would
not believe it, but she does not present this as her own opinion. Add words if needed!] A: Sixty
years ago schools BE better than nowadays.
[NEW1]
(289) a=nrog-o-ø ru=na ntau raalim i=lates na i=pe nom pa, nafet “skul” ru=trau wi tol mes
(290) a=nrog-o-ø ru=na ntau raalim i=lates na i=pe nom pa, nafet “skul” ru=mer wi tol mes
(65) [NO] (AK1-127-01) [A doubts what her father has told her.] My father CLAIM that when
he BE a child, schools BE better than nowadays.
(291) apaap neu i=tli na malen i=ta pi teesa, nafet “skul” ru=mer wi tol mes.
(292) apaap neu i=to tli na malen i=ta pi teesa, nafet “skul” ru=mer wi top tol mes.
(66) [NO] (AK1-127-01) [A does not believe what she has heard from her father; she only
reports what he has told her.] A: When my father BE a child, schools BE better than nowadays.
(293) apaap neu i=na malen ga i=ta pi teesa, i=na nafet “skul” ru=mer wi tol mes.
(67) [POSS] (AK1-127-01) [Said by a person who has just heard about the event but has not
seen it.] The king ARRIVE!
(294) ru=na maarik ki=pe mai
(295) a=nrog-o-ø ru=na maarik i=mai.
(296) ru=na maarik i=mai.
(297) a=nrog-o-ø ru=na maarik ki=pe mai.
(68) [POSS] (AK1-127-01) [As in 67.] My sister just TELL me that the king ARRIVE.
(298) kor-e-k ina maarik ki=pe mai
(299) a=nrog kor-e-k i=na maarik i=mai.
(300) kor-e-k i=na maarik i=mai.
(301) a=nrog kor-e-k i=na maarik ki=pe mai.
(69) [NO] (AK1-127-01) [Investigating a burglary, seeing footprints beneath a window:] The
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thief ENTER the house by this window.
(302) natam̃ol pnak i=ur nmetklas nen sil
(303) nmetklas nen kin natam̃ol pnak i=urees sil.
(70) [ON] (AK1-132-01) [A and are not in the room in whi B’s son has been doing his home-
work. estion: A: Is your son still doing his homework?] B: No, (I think) he FINISH (it) by now
(or: already).
(304) teesa gaag i=ta tok preg nawesien ga go?
(305) i=tik, a=mro kin ki=pe lakor paap̃not nawesien ga toki
(306) i=tik, a=mro kin malfaane ki=pe lakor paap̃not nawesien ga toki
(71) [NO] (AK1-132-01) [An araeologist, having investigated an excavation site, says:] This
BE a huge city.
(307) esaan i=lakor pei pi tete natkoon p̃ur toki.
(308) esaas kis i=to itrau wel tete natkon p̃ur p̃rakot.
(309) esaas i=pi natkon p̃ur p̃rakot.
Kipe only when you are talking about a place where you live – present time.
(72) [POSS] (AK1-132-01) [An araeologist, having investigated an excavation site, says:]
This city BE DESTROYED about three thousands years ago.
[NEW1]
(310) natkoon p̃ur ne ru=lakor pu pri ntau p̃oon i=tol ki=pe nom.
(311) natkoon p̃ur ne rukoi=pe lakor p̃ka pri ntau p̃oon i=tol ki=pe nom.
(73) [NO] (AK1-132-01) [A guide, showing ruins to tourists:] This BE a huge city.
(312) esaan ga i=pi natkoon p̃ur i=skei teetwei.
(313) esaan ga i=pei pi natkoon p̃ur i=skei teetwei.
(74) [NO] (AK1-132-01) [A guide, showing ruins to tourists:] This city BE DESTROYED about
three thousands years ago.
(314) natkoon nen, ru=p̃ka presi ntau p̃oon i=tol kipe nom.
(75) [NO] anteriority (AK1-132-01) [A’s sister finished writing two letters just before A came
home. A tells:] When I COME home yesterday, my sister WRITE two letters.
(315) malen a=mai pak esum nanom go kor-e-k me i=mtir silu natus inru.
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(316) kor-e-k i=po to mtir silu natus i=nru malen a=tkal esum̃.
(317) kineu a=po na a=mai tkal esum̃ nanom m̃as go kor-e-k me i=mtir silu natus i=nru.
(318) kineu a=po mai tkal esum̃ nanom m̃as go kor-e-k me i=mtir silu natus i=nru.
(319) nanom kor-e-k i=mtir silu natus i=nru malen a=mai tkal esum̃.
(76) [ON] [A’s sister was not at home when A arrived. estion: Did you find your sister at
home? A answers:] No, I did not (find her). She LEAVE.
(320) ku=pak esum̃ pan po nrus lek/ lemis kor-e-m na ko?
(321) ku=po lek/ lemis kor-e-m na esum̃?
(322) ku=pan po lek-a-ø/ lemsi?
Did you go see her?
(323) i=tik, a=tap lemis kor-e-k na mau, ki=pe pei tm̃alu.
(324) a=pan me a=tap lek-a-ø mau, ki=pe tm̃alu.
(77) [ON] (AK1-132-01) [A meets B’s sister. Later A moves to the town where and B’s sister
live. Still later, asks A:When you came to this town a year ago, did you knowmy sister? A answers:]
Yes, I MEET her.
(325) malen ku=mai pak “town” nen ntau na i=pa, ag ku=pe pei tae kor-e-k?
(326) Ore, kai=pe pei paatlas-i-ø.
(327) Ora, kineu kai=pe pei paatlas-i-ø.
(78) [ON] (AK1-132-01) [estion: Why did you believe what she told you about Paris? Note:
use BE or VISIT or whatever is most natural in L.] Answer: I BELIEVE her, because she BE to
(VISIT) Paris.
(328) nlaken i=ku kin ku=sraleesok natrauswen ga ni Paris na i=to gaag traus-i-ø?
(329) ore a=seralaasokos nlaken ga ki=pe pak Paris.
(330) ore a=seralaasokos nlaken ga ki=pe pei pak Paris tete mal.
(331) ore a=seralaasokos nlaken ga ki=pe to pak Paris mal laap.
(79) [NO] (AK1-132-01) [e speaker used to meet his friend once a week, but nowadays he
does not see him at all. “e film” refers to a different film ea time:] Every time I MEET him in
those years, he TELL me about the film he just SEE.
(332) mal sikskei nen a=to paatlas-i-ø, i=to neu pusrek ki fim nen i=po lek-a-ø su.
(333) a=to paatlas-i-ø mal sikskei. Me sernrak nen ka=faatlsi, ke=fo to neu pusrek ki film nen i=po to
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lek-a-ø inrus pi malfaa.
(80) [NO] (AK1-132-01) [Looking at a house.] Who BUILD this house?
(334) fei kia i=tfag nasum̃ ne?
(335) fei kin i=tfag nasum̃ ne?
(336) fei kia i=preg nasum̃ ne?
(337) fei kin i=preg nasum̃ ne?
(81) [NO] (AK1-132-01) [Looking at a picture of a house whi has been torn down.] Who
BUILD this house?
(338) fei mana kin ru=tfag nasum̃ ne?
(82) [NO] (AK1-132-01) [estion: Can I get my wages now?] Answer: I NOT PAY you your
wages before you FINISH the entire job.
(339) a=tae wes nfaakotoon neu malfaane?
(340) Ka=fo tap pei tuok nfaakotoon gaag mau pan p̃a=fei paap̃not nawesien gaag.
(341) Ka=fo ta pei paaktofik mau pan p̃a=freg silu nawesien gaag.
(83) [NO] (AK1-132-01) [As in 82 above.] I PAY you your wages after you FINISH the entire
job.
(342) Ka=fo tuok nfaakotoon gaag malen p̃a=faap̃not nawesien gaag.
(343) P̃a=fo wes nfaakotoon gaag malen p̃a=faap̃not nawesien gaag.
(344) Ka=fo paaktofik malen p̃a=faap̃not silu nawesien gaag.
(84) [ON] (AK1-132-01) [B is setting out on a journey. A intends to sell her own house while
is away. A tells about this:] A: When you COME BACK next year, I SELL my house.
(345) malraan p̃a=ler mai ntau nen tu me kai=pe sor nasum̃ neu kia.
(346) malen p̃a=ler mai ntau nen tu me kineu kai=pe lakor sor nasum̃ neu kia.
(85) [OBL] (AK1-132-01) [A beganworking here in June for almost thirty years ago. It is April
and A tells that the anniversary is approaing:] A: In June this year I WORK here for thirty years.
(347) atlag ni “June” ntau nen ke=fo paap̃not ntau ralim i=tool nen kai=pe tok weswes esan.
(348) atlag ni “June” ntau nen ke=fo paap̃not ntau ralim i=tool nen *a=po tok weswes esan.
(349) atlag ni “June” ke=fo pi ntau ralim i=tool nen kai=pe tok weswes esa.
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(350) ntau ne atlag ni “June” ke=fo pi ntau raalim i=tool kin kai=pe tok weswes esan.
(86) [NO] (AK1-132-01) If I GET my wages tomorrow, I BUY you a beer.
(351) i=f-wel ka=(*fo) wes nfaakotoon neu matol ka=fo gaag pakot “beer” ke=skei. (fo not grammat-
ical in the protasis because it implies certainty that the event will happen)
(352) i=f-wel ka=f tok wes nfaakotoon neu matol ka=fo gaag pakot “beer” ke=skei.
(353) i=f-wel ka=fla tok wes nfaakotoon neu matol ka=fo gaag pakot “beer” ke=skei.
(354) i=f-wel kin ka=fla tok wes nfaakotoon neu matol ka=fo gaag pakot “beer” ke=skei.
(87) [NO] (AK1-132-01) [e speaker has not received his wages yet:] The day I GETmywages
I BUY you a beer.
(355) naliati nen ka==wes faat/nfaakotoon neu ka=fo gaag pakot “beer” ke=skei.
(356) naliati nen ka=f tok wes faat/nfaakotoon neu ka=fo gaag pakot “beer” ke=skei.
(357) naliati nen ka=fla tok wes faat/nfaakotoon neu ka=fo gaag pakot “beer” ke=skei.
(358) naliati nen kin ka=fla tok wes faat/nfaakotoon neu ka=fo gaag pakot “beer” ke=skei.
(87ex) [You know whi day you are getting the wages]
(359) naliati nen ka=fo wes faat/nfaakotoon neu ka=fo gaag pakot “beer” ke=skei.
(88) (AK1-132-01) ose who GET their wages tomorrow certainly GO to have beer.
(360) tenen ruk=wes faat matool ruk=fo pan min “beer”.
(361) nam̃er nen ruk=fo wes nfaakooon gar matol ruk=fo pan min “beer”.
B.2 e Iamitive questionnaire (Olsson, 2013) (AK1-156)
(Q1) (I want to give your brother a book to read, but I don’t know whi. Is there any of these
books that he READ already?) Yes, he READ this book.
(362) a=mur ka=tu p̃alum natus ke=skei nen ke=fea, me a=tap tae te-tfale mau. Ga ki=pe fe tete
natus nen su? ore, ki=pe fe-a-r su.
(Q2) I LOSE my wallet! Can you help me look for it?
(363) a=krak puek-ki “wallet” neu! ku=tae welu wou tak leeles?
comments for Q2: kaipe - lost some time before, *kaipe - lost just now, lost (realis) it and found it
(kaipe
(Q3) Did I tell you what happened to me yesterday? I LOSE my wallet!
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(364) kineu a=nrik-i-k ki nae kin i=paakor-ki wou nanom? a=krak puel-ki “wallet” neu.
(Q4) en I got a call from a man. He said he FIND it on the bus.
(365) ale natam̃ol i=skei i=neu pios nmarit. i=tli na i=pam̃ori em̃rom “bus”.
(Q5) (Imagine some fruit that is common in your area) You can’t eat this one. It BE ROTTEN.
(366) ku=kano paam tene, ki=pe sa….. ki=pe p̃o.
(Q6) (Imagine some fruit that is common in your area) You can’t eat this one. It BE RAW.
(367) ku=kano paam tene, i=ta met.
(Q7) (Imagine some fruit that is common in your area) You can eat this one. It BE RIPE.
(368) ku=tae paam tene, ki=pe mam.
(Q8) I received some bad news about uncle X. He BE ILL.
(369) a=nrog tete nanrognrogoon sa ni awo X, ga i=msak.
(Q9) I received some good news about uncle X. He BE HEALTHY/WELL.
(370) a=nrog tete nangornrogon wi ni awo X, ki=pe m̃ol.
(Q10) Her ild already BE A STUDENT.
(371) teesa ga (nega) ki=pe mai pi teesa “skul”.
(Q11) He BE RICH, because he worked hard.
(372) ga i=pi soklep nlaken i=to weswes kerkrai.
(373) ga i=pei faria me ki=pe pi soklep.
he was poor but now he is rich.
(Q12) He BE RICH, what more does he want?
(374) ga ki=pe pi soklep, i=mer mur nae?
(Q13) Her brother doesn’t have to apply for a visa, because he BE AN AMERICAN CITIZEN.
(375) p̃alun i=tap mur na ke=freg nfauswen raki visa mau, nlaken ga i=pi teni America.
(Q14) (A: Your brother is really nice!) B: Oh no, forget about him - he BE MARRIED.
(376) aah p̃a=metp̃akro, ki=pe lak.
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(Q15) Hurry up, we BE LATE!
(377) ko=trapelpel, tuk=fo frak.
(Q16) When we arrived, the prayer (already) START.
(378) malen u=pan paakor, nalotwen ki=pe pees.
(Q17) Oh no, I FORGET to put the ice cream in the freezer! It MELT!
(379) ah no, a=metp̃akro na ka=fus “ice cream” em̃rom freezer, ki=pe ser.
(Q18) (On the telephone: Can I speak to X?) No, he LEAVE 5 minutes ago.
(380) ki-pe tm̃alu minit i=lim ki=pe nom
(Q19) (On the telephone: A: Can I speak to X? B: No, he’s not here…) He GO SHOPPING.
(381) i=ta to mau. i=pan/ki=pe pan paakot tete sernale
(Q20) (Can I see you next month?) No, next month I BE in Japan.
(382) i=tik, atlag nen tu/ atlag faum̃…ka=fo pato Japan.
(Q21) (A: Where is my apple?) B: Oh, X EAT it.
(383) oh, X kia i/ki=pe paam-i-ø.
(Q22) (A: Oh, my stoma hurts now.) B: You EAT too mu!
(384) ku=faam toop
(Q23) (A: How is the reading coming so far?) B: Good, I READ 3 books (so far).
(385) i=wi, kai=pe fe natus i=tool ki.
(Q24) (same context as in Q23) B: Badly, I only READ 3 books (so far).
(386) i=ta wi mau, a=fe-a-ø natus i=tool m̃as.
(Q25) I MEMORIZE all of the poems now.
(387) Malfane kai=pe mrosoksok nafet nalag (malfane).
(Q26) I only MEMORIZE half of the poems (so far).
(388) A=mrosoksok nak nalag m̃as.
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(Q27) As soon as you SEE my brother, come and tell me.
(389) Malnen p̃a=lek p̃aluk p̃a=mai nrik wou ki.
(Q28) (At a birthday party for a ild) Little brother BE ABOUT TO ARRIVE! (So hide the gis he
is to get and be ready to scream ”surprise!”)
(390) Tai sees ke=fe mai ki. /Tai sees ki=pe to na ke=mai ki./ ke=fo mai ta pi twei mau.
(Q29) (To a ild: A: Why are you crying?) B: She PUNCH me!
(391) Ga i=tup̃ kineu. (ki=pe only if you expect it)
(Q30) When the oil BOIL a little, you put the meat in.
(392) Malnen loor ke=nrus in, p̃a=tir ki napkas/ p̃a=fus napkas.
(Q31) (On the phone:) Tell your brother to start working! It’s ok, he WORK (= he is sitting in
front of the computer, working)
(393) I=wi, ga ki=pe to weswes./ Ga kis ki=pe to weswes.
(Q32) It’s ok, he WORK (= he already finished the work)
(394) I=wi, ki=pe weswes su.
(Q33) (At a party/meeting, commenting on whi guests/participant arrived:) Good, my uncle
COME. Let’s go talk to him.
(395) Awo neu me i=po mai / if you are expecting him you can use ki=pe [new context: you are
talking to someone and tell them your birthday, surprisingly it’s on the same date and you
say: oh, ag me ku=po paakor malne!]
(Q34) How strange, my uncle COME. (He wasn’t invited/I thought he wouldn’t come)
(396) Kau, ga me i=po mai!/ Kau, ga ki=pe mai!
(Q35) (Calling to a friend who is at the party) Who COME?
(397) Fei mana ru=mai?/ Fei mana rui=pe mai?
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(Q36) Who COME so far?
(398) Fei mana (kin) rui=pe pei mai? - the first group arriving, the second group would be rumer
mai/ you know a group is coming and you are not there when they are arriving fei mana
rupo pei mai?
B.3 e Nondumestionnaire (Veselinova, 2018) (AK1-156)
Questionnaire designed by Ljuba Veselinova (ljuba@ling.su.se), it continues the numbering of the
iamitive questionnaire.
(Q37) (I didn’t know your neighbor is already 30 years old. Is hemarried?) He NOTMARRIED
(because he is a Catholic priest, so he can’t marry)
(399) Ga ke=fo kano lak.
He can’t get married. (because of his job)
(400) Ga i=ta lak mau.
he is not married/ *Ga ita ta lak mau./ Ga kefo kano lak. (it’s forbidden)
Ga i=kano lak would be used if for some personal reason you are not able to do something.
(401) A=kano waf.
I can’t swim. (it can also be used for forbidden, but you have to say a=kano waf nlaken… ‘I
can’t swim because…’)
(402) Kineu ka=fo kano waf mees (or some adverbial).
I’m forbidden to swim. (it can refer to being unable in the future).
but a person telling you can:
(403) ku=kano waf! pã=fo ta=waf mau!
(404) Ag pã=fo ta=waf mau!
(Q38) (I didn’t know your brother is already 30 years old. Is he married?) He NOT MARRIED
(but he and his fiancée are getting married later this year)
(405) I=ta ta lak mau.
(406) ki=pe ta lak mau.
the marriage was cancelled before getting married, or he got divorced.
(407) ki=pe tap skot mtulep ga to mau.
he is not with his wife anymore.
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(Q39) (Martha’s son has been in the hospital for a while. Is he going home soon?) No, he NOT
WELL.
(408) I=tik, i=ta ta m̃ol mau.
(Q40) (A: How old is your ild now? B: She is 2 years old. A: she TALK?) B: Yes, she TALK.
(409) Ore, ki=pe pes.
(Q41) (A: How old is your ild now? B: She is 2 years old. A: Is she talking already?) B: No, she
NOT TALK.
(410) I=tik, i=ta tap pes mau.
(Q42) (Very early morning, looking outside) e sun NOT RISE.
(411) Aal i=ta ta paakor mau.
(Q43) (X has been living in Japan for about 2 months) A: I NOT SPEAK Japanese
(412) a=ta pes ki Japan mau.
I don’t speak japanese.
(413) A=ta ta pes ki Japan mau.
I don’t speak Japanese yet.
(414) Kai=pe ta pes ki Japan mau.
I knew some at first, but I don’t speak anymore.
(415) a. Ku=po pak “taon”?
b. Kaipe ta pak taon mau. in the end I decided not to go. (=anymore)
(416) A=to kraknrog-o-ø na ka=fes ki Japan me kai=pe tap pes kin mau.
(Q44) (We are running towards theur/mosque/temple) Somebody: Don’tworry, the prayer/ceremony
NOT START.
(417) P̃a=ta mroput mau! Nalotwen i=ta tap pes mau.
(Q45) (Imagine some fruit that is common in your area). You can’t eat this one. It NOT RIPE.
(418) I=ta ta mam mau. I=ta matu (ready) mau./ i=ta mam mau./ *ki=pe ta mam mau.
(Q46) (Can I come over to play with your brother?) No, he NOT FINISH HOMEWORK.
(419) i=tik, i=ta ta pap̃not nawesien gamau./ ki=pe ta pap̃not nawesien gamau. (if you are expecting
him to finish but he didn’t.)
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(Q47) (In a car, about to start a longer road trip. A: Why aren’t we starting) B: I STILL READ
directions.
(420) A=ta to fe napu.
(Q48) (same context as in 48) B: I NOT UNDERSTAND directions YET. (But I hope I will soon)
(421) A=ta ta mrotae napu/nasiweran mau. (with kai=pe it would mean ‘I don’t understand any-
more’.)
(Q49) (Max turn said he would come ba soon and then le) It was two months before I heard
from Max again.
(422) Atlag inru ina itaakro kin go apo mer nrog nanrognrogon (news) ni Max.
(Q50) (Talking about a teenager who didn’t come home on time) Max NOT COME until dawn.
(423) Max i=puel tkal pulp̃og. (ki=pe puel means he was lost/missing.)
(424) Max i=ta mai mau tkal pulp̃og.
(425) Max i=puel pan po mai pulp̃og.
(426) Max i=po puel pulp̃og. (confirming something)
(Q51) (Same context as 50) Max CALL (YET)?
(427) Max ki=pe pios/ring ko?/ Max i=po ring?
(Q52) (Same context as 50) Max NEVER CALL
(428) Max i=ta pios mau.
(429) Max i=ta pios nrog malnen mau.
In this time frame he didn’t call.
(Q53) (Same context as 50) Max JUST COME
(430) Max i=po mai kia.
(Q54) (talking about a loan Max took. A: Has Max paid you ba yet?) B: No, he NOT PAY (I don’t
think he ever will).
(431) i=tik, i=ta ta paakot wou mau.
(Q55) (A: How is the writing of your thesis coming): Good, I WRITE 3 apters already
(432) I=wi, kai=pe mtir namet nafsan i=tool su.
B.4. THE FUTURE QUESTIONNAIRE (?) 305
(Q56) (A: How is the writing of your thesis coming): Bad, I only WRITE 1 page so far
(433) i=trau saa, a=mtir nap̃elgan i=skei m̃as. (*kaipe)
(Q57) (Looking at a fish that’s still in the frying pan). Don’t take it out. It NOT COOKED
(434) i=ta ta maas mau.
(Q58) (Answering a phone call at the office where the caller if asking is Sam still works there) Yes,
Sam STILL WORK here
(435) ore, Sam i=ta to weswes esa.
(Q59) (Same context as in 58) No, Sam NO LONGER WORK here
(436) i=tik, Sam ki=pe ta weswes esa mau.
(437) Sam i=po ta weses mau.
Someone forbid him to work, finally he didn’t/doesn’t work – as a result of the disturbance
(438) Sam i=po weswes.
He is finally working.
B.4 e Futureestionnaire (Dahl, 2000b)
(1) (AK1-082-01) (TMAQ 15)5 [Q: What your brother DO if you don’t go to see him today, do you
think? A:] He WRITE a letter (to me).
(439) Ke=fo
3sg.irr=psp.irr
lakor
maybe
mtir
write
natus
letter
iskei
one
ke=mai.
3sg.irr=come
He will write a letter and send it (lit. to come (to me)).
(2) (AK1-082-01) (TMAQ 16) [Q: What your brother DO when we arrive, do you think? (=What
activity will he be engaged in?)] He WRITE letters.
(440) Ke=fo
3sg.irr=psp.irr
lakor
maybe
tok
prog
mtir
write
tete
some
natus.
letter
He will write some letters.
(3) (AK1-082-01) (TMAQ 17) [Q: What your brother DO when we arrive, do you think? (=What
activity will he be engaged in?)] He WRITE a letter
5This is the number of this sentence in Dahl (1985), put here for purposes of cross-referencing withThieberger’s (2006)
version of that questionnaire.
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(441) Ke=fo
3sg.irr=psp.irr
lakor
maybe
to
prog
mtir
write
natus.
letter
He will be writing a letter.
(4) (AK1-082-01) (TMAQ 22) [Q: What are you planning to do right now? A:] I WRITE letters(=I
MANAGE my correspondence)
(442) Ka=fo
3sg.irr=psp.irr
mtir
write
tete
some
natus
letter
malfane.
now
I will write some letters now.
(5) (AK1-082-01) (TMAQ 23) [Q:What are you planning to do right now? A:] I WRITE a letter
(443) Ka=fo
3sg.irr=psp.irr
mtir
write
natus
letter
ke=skei.
now
I will write a letter.
(6) (AK1-082-01) (TMAQ 24) [Neither A nor B can see B’s brother. A: What he DO right now, do
you think? (=What activity is he engaged in?)] HeWRITE letters (I think so because he does that
every day at this time)
Ku=mrokin ito preg nafte malfane?
(444) Malfane
now
i=pato
3sg=be.at
mtir
write
tete
some
natus.
letter
He is writing some letters (over there).
(ipato means that the speaker is not in the same place as the subject.)
(7) (AK1-082-01) (TMAQ 27) [A: My brother has got a new job. He’ll start tornorrow. B: What
kind of work he DO there?] He WRITE letters
(445) Ke=fo preg sef nawesien?
Which job will he do?
(446) Sef nawesien kin ke=fo preg?
Which job is that he will do?
(447) Ke=fo to mtir natus.
(448) Ke=fo to gar mtir natus.
(8) (AK1-082-01) (TMAQ 36) [It’s no use trying to swim in the lake tomorrow.] e water BE
COLD (then)
(449) Nai ke=fo mlanr.
(450) Nai ke=fo lakor mlanr.
(451) Nai ke=fo lakor to mlanr.
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(452) Nai i=fla to mlanr.
(453) *Nai ke=mlanr.
(8ex) [You are pouring the cold water over the hot/warm water and you are waiting for it to cool
down.]
(454) Nai ke=fo to mlanr.
(9) (AK1-082-01) (TMAQ 79) If you PUT a stone into this bag, it BREAK
(455) I=f-wel p̃a=fai faat ke=fak naal, ke=fo map̃or.
(10) (AK1-082-01) (TMAQ 80) Even if you PUT a stone into this bag, it not BREAK
(456) Ku=fla to pai faat em̃rom, ke=fo kano map̃or.
(457) I=fla to mai, ka=fo kano tausi.
Even if he comes, I won’t go.
Also in (AK1-084-01)
(11) (AK1-082-01) (TMAQ 81) [Q: What HAPPEN if I eat this mushroom?] You DIE
(458) I=f-wel kafam talim, ke=fo tfale?
(459) P̃a=fo (lakor) mat.
(460) Ku=fla to mat.
Maybe you will die.
(Ku=f to mat- if you die)
(12) (AK1-082-01) (TMAQ 82) (According to the contract) we not WORK tomorrow
(461) Taos nanrik soksokien nagit, tuk=fo ta weswes matol mau.
(462) I=tik, ke=fo tik-ki nawesien matol.
(463) Tu=ta weswes matol mau.
(13) (AK1-082-01) (TMAQ 103) [e boy is expecting a sum of money] When the boy GET the
money, he BUY a present for the girl.
(464) Malnen naturiai ke=wes faat, ke=fo nin matuerik paakot nauan.
(14) (AK1-082-01) (TMAQ 104) [e boy thinks that he will perhaps get a sum of money] If the
boy GET the money, he BUY a present for the girl.
(465) Malnen naturiai ke=wes faat, ke=fo nin matuerik paakot nauan.
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(15) (AK1-083-01) (TMAQ 105) [the speaker knows the boy was expecting money, but he
doesn’t know if he got it] If the boy GET the money (yesterday), he BUY a present for the girl.
(466) I=f-wel kin naturiai ke=wes naul nanom, ke=fo (lakor) pakot nauan nin tesa nmatu.
(467) I=f-wel kin naturiai i=f wes
(468) I=f-wel kin naturiai ke=fla
Note: inversion possible, but changes the meaning to the counterfactual
(16) (AK1-083-01) (TMAQ 106) [e speaker knows the boy was expecting money and that he
did not get it] If the boy GET the money (yesterday), he BUY a present for the girl.
(469) I=f-wel kin naturiai ke=wes naul nanom, ke=fo pakot nauan.
(470) Ke=f mer wes naul nanom, ke=fo pakot nauan.
(471) Naturiai ke=f wes naul nanom, ke=fo pakot nauan.
(17) (AK1-083-01) (TMAQ 107) [Talking to someone who is leaving in a while] When you
RETURN, I WRITE this letter (=I FINISH it already at that time).
(472) Malnen p̃a=ler, kai=pe mtir natus su.
(473) P̃a=ler mai me kai=pe mtir natus su.
(18) (AK1-083-01) (TMAQ 108) [Said as an order by a teaer leaving the classroom] When I
RETURN, you WRITE this assignment (=You FINISH it by then)
(474) Malne ka=ler mai, koi=pe mtir su.
(475) Ka=ler mai, koi=pe mtir su.
(476) Ka=fan ler mai, koi=pe mtir-i.
(19) (AK1-083-01) (TMAQ 124) My brother HOPE (right now) that the water BE COLD.
(477) P̃aluk i=mrokin nai i=mlanr patoki.
(20) (AK1-083-01) (TMAQ 125) [Uttered as a promise] PROMISE to COME to you tomorrow.
(478) A=to tilm̃ori ka=fo net matol.
(479) A=preg nanrik soksokien i=skei na ka=fo welu-a-ø me kai=pe ta preg mau.
I made a promise I would help him, but I haven’t done it.
(21) (AK1-083-01) (TMAQ 131) You MUST GO to bed before you GET tired (today)
(480) P̃a=ta to pan p̃a=maos mau, p̃a=matur pelpel.
Don’t get tired, sleep early.
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(22) (AK1-083-01) (TMAQ 132) (Yesterday evening) I GO to bed before my brother COME home.
(481) Nanom p̃og a=pei matur me paluk i=po mai pak esum̃.
(482) Nanom p̃og a=pei matur *go paluk i=po mai pak esum̃. Also in (AK1-084-01)
(23) (AK1-086-01) (TMAQ 145) [Traveller to local:] If you SHOW me the way, I GIVE you
money
(483) I=f-wel kin p̃a=fei ki wou ki napu, ka=fo tuok naul.
(24) (AK1-086-01) (TMAQ 146) [Mother to ild:] If you not STOP PLAY with that ball, I TAKE it
away
(484) I=f-wel p̃a=tap makot “ball” go mau, ka=fo wes lua.
(25) (AK1-086-01) (TMAQ 152) [Said by a young man] When I GROW old, I BUY a big house
(485) Malnen ka=fan toop, ka=fo paakor nasum̃ p̃ur i=skei.
(26) (AK1-086-01) [My brother is late for dinner.] When he ARRIVE, the food BE cold.
(486) Selwan i=mai sok/paakor, nafnag ki=pe mlanr.
(487) Selwan i=mai paakor, nafnag ki=pe mlanr.
(26ex) [If the food gets cold only aer he arrives]
(488) Selwan i=mai sok go nafnag i=mlanr.
(27) (AK1-086-01) [Mother to ildren:] We EAT (alt. HAVE dinner) now!
(489) Tuk=fam malfane!
(28) (AK1-086-01) [Do you intend to stay here?] No, I live in X-place next year.
(490) I=tik, ka=fo tok Berlin ntau nen tu.
(29) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s plans for the evening:] I STAY at home.
(491) Ka=fo tok esum̃ (m̃as to).
(492) i=en matur
He is sleeping (far away from you).
(493) i=pen matur malfane (*su).
(30) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s plans for the evening:] I WORK in the garden.
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(494) Ka=fo pato weswes talm̃at.
(495) Ka=mtir?
Can I write here?
Note: pe in these examples refers to a place in space (demonstrative), not the perfect pe.
(496) Ka=pe lek-a-ø?
Can I see?
(497) P̃a=pe mai!
Come here!
(498) P̃a=pe preg-i-ø namrun?
Can you do something?
(499) P̃a=pe nrus!
Move a bit!
(500) Ka=pe pam?
Can I try?
(501) P̃a=pe pam?
You want to try?
(31) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s plans for the evening:] I WRITE a letter.
(502) Ka=fo mtir natus.
(32) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s plans for the evening:] I GO to town.
(503) Ka=fo pak “town”.
(33) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s plans for the evening:] I GO to bed early.
(504) Ka=fo matur pelpel.
(505) Ka=fo pak nawol pelpel.
I will go to bed early.
(34) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s immediate plans:] I STAY at home.
(506) Ka=fo tok esum̃.
I will stay at home.
(507) Ka=fo pato esum̃ malfane.
I will be at home now.
(508) Ka=fan pato esum̃.
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I am going to be home.
(509) Ka=fak esum̃.
I am going home.
(35) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s immediate plans:] I WORK in the garden.
(510) Ka=fo weswes talm̃at.
(511) Ka=fo to weswes talm̃at.
(512) Ka=fan weswes talm̃at malfane.
(36) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s immediate plans:] I WRITE a letter.
(513) Ka=fo mtir natus.
(37) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s immediate plans:] I GO to town.
(514) Ka=fak “town”. I am going to town right now.
(38) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s immediate plans:] I GO to bed.
(515) Ka=fan matur.
(39) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s plans for tomorrow:] I STAY at home.
(516) Ka=fo tok esum̃ (m̃as tok) matol.
(40) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s plans for tomorrow:] I WORK in the garden.
(517) Ka=fo (to) weswes talm̃at.
(518) Ka=fo pak tam̃at.
(41) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s plans for tomorrow:] I WRITE a letter.
(519) Ka=fo mtir natus.
(42) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s plans for tomorrow:] I GO to town.
(520) Ka=fo pak “town”.
(43) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about the speaker’s plans for tomorrow:] I GO to bed early.
(521) Ka=fo matur pelpel.
(44) (AK1-086-01) [My brother is tired.] He WAKE up late tomorrow.
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(522) Ke=fo pilo frak matol.
(45) (AK1-086-01) [My brother is tired.] He FALL ASLEEP early in the evening.
(523) Ke=fo matur pelpel kotfan (ne)/kotfan matol.
(46) (AK1-086-01) [ere are bla clouds in the sky.] It RAIN in the evening.
(524) Us ke=fo (lakor) wo kotfan.
(525) Us i=fla wo kotfan.
(526) When you are pregnant: I=fla pi nanwi ko nmatu?
(47) (AK1-086-01) [ere are bla clouds in the sky.] It RAIN (very soon).
(527) Us i=wo pelpel.
(528) Us ke=fo (lakor) wo pelpel.
(529) Us i=fla wo pelpel.
(48) (AK1-086-01) [ere are bla clouds in the sky.] It RAIN in a few minutes.
(530) Us ke=fo (lakor) wo nrus pi malfane.
(49) (AK1-086-01) [e weather is anging.] It RAIN tomorrow.
(531) Us ke=fo wo matol.
(50) (AK1-086-01) [e weather is anging.] Maybe it RAIN tomorrow.
(532) Us ke=fo lakor wo matol.
(51) (AK1-086-01) [e weather is anging.] It be COLD in the evening.
(533) Ke=fo mlanr kotfan.
(534) Ke=fo lakor mlanr.
(535) Naor ke=fo mlanr.
(52) (AK1-086-01) [e weather is anging.] It be COLD tomorrow.
(536) Naor ke=fo mlanr matol.
(537) I=pan mlanr.
It slowly became colder.
(538) Ki=pe mlanr.
It is cold. (implying a previous change)
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(539) Ki=pe to (pan) mlanr.
It is/was getting colder.
(53) (AK1-086-01) e sun RISE at six o’clo tomorrow.
(540) Aal ke=fo sook matol “six o’clock” p̃ulp̃og.
(54) [Does your brother intend to stay here?] No, he LIVE in X-place next year.
(541) I=tik, ke=fo tok Berlin ntau nen tu.
(55) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about a third person’s plans for the evening:] He STAY at home.
(542) Ke=fo patok esum̃.
(56) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about a third person’s plans for the evening:] He WORK in the
garden.
(543) Ke=fo (pato) weswes talm̃at kotfan.
(57) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about a third person’s plans for the evening:] He WRITE a letter.
(544) Ke=fo mtir natus.
(58) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about a third person’s plans for the evening:] He GO to town.
(545) Ke=fo pak “town”.
(59) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about a third person’s plans for the evening:] He GO to bed early.
(546) Ke=fo matur pelpel.
(60) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about a third person’s immediate plans:] He STAY at home.
(547) Ke=fo tok esum̃.
(548) Ke=fak esum̃.
(61) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about a third person’s immediate plans:] He WORK in the garden.
(549) Ke=fan weswes.
(550) Ke=fo weswes.
(551) Ke=weswes talm̃at.
(62) (AK1-086-01) [Talking about a third person’s immediate plans:] He WRITE a letter.
(552) Ke=mtir natus.
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He is going to write a letter right now.
(553) Ka=mtir natus.
I am going to write a letter right now.
(63) (AK1-087-01) [Talking about a third person’s immediate plans:] He GO to town.
(554) Ke=fak “town”.
(64) (AK1-087-01) [Talking about a third person’s immediate plans:] He GO to bed.
(555) Ke=fan matur.
(65) (AK1-103-01) When I GET home in the evening, my brother BE HAPPY.
(556) Selwan ka=ler pak esum̃ kotfan, raitok ke=fo semsem.
(557) Malnen ka=ler pak esum̃ kotfan, raitok ke=fo semsem.
(66) (AK1-103-01) If it RAIN tomorrow, we STAY at home.
(558) f-wel ke=f wo matol, tuk=fo tok esum̃.
(559) Ke=f mer wo matol, ka=fo tok esum̃.
(560) Ka=fo tok esum̃ matol, f-wel us ke=f wo.
Other possibilities for the protasis: f-wel ke=wo, if-wel kin
(67) (AK1-103-01) If it BE COLD tomorrow, we STAY at home.
(561) I=f-wel ke=mlanr matol, ka=fo tok esum̃.
(562) Ka=fo tok esum̃ matol, f-wel kin naor ke=mlanr.
(563) Naor i=fla tok mlanr matol, ka=fo tok esum̃.
Note: more formal: I=f-wel kin ke=f to mlanr
Note: old form: Naor i=f mlanr
(68) (AK1-103-01) If I GET the money tomorrow, I BUY a present for you.
(564) Ka=fla tok we naul matol, ka=fo gaag wes nauan ke=skei.
(565) Ka=fo gaag wes namrun iskei, i=f-wel kin kawes faat matol.
(69) (AK1-103-01) If I GET the money today, I BUY a present for you.
(566) Ka=f to wes naul mes, ka=fo gaag pakot tenmatun.
(567) Ka=fo gaag pakot namrun i=skei, i=f-wel kawes faat wes.
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(70) (AK1-103-01) My brother SAY yesterday that he COME here today.
(568) P̃aluk i==tli nanom na ke=fo mai pak esan mes.
(569) P̃aluk i=tilsei nanom na mes ke=fo mai pak esa.
(570) *Tai i=til-i-ø nanom na ke=fo mai naor kia.
(71) (AK1-103-01) My brother HOPE yesterday that you COME here today.
(571) P̃aluk i=to mrokin nanom kia na p̃a=fo mai pak esan mes.
(572) Tai i=to mrokin nanom kia na p̃a=fo mai mes.
(72) (AK1-103-01, AK1-104-01) My brother SAY yesterday that he COME here next week.
(573) P̃aluk i=tli nanom na ke=fo mai pak san “wik” fom.
(574) P̃aluk i=til-i-ø nanom na “wik” faum(fom) ke=fo mai pak sa.
(575) Tai neu i=to til-i-ø na ke=fo mai “wik” fom wanki. (or wikwan kia, ipa)
(73) (AK1-105-01) My brother SAY yesterday that it RAIN today.
(576) P̃aluk i=pe til-i-ø nanom na us ke=fo wo mes.
(577) Tai neu i=pe til-i-ø su nanom na us ke=fo wo mes.
(578) Tai i=to tli malfane.
(579) Tai i=to tli kia. (yesterday)
(580) I=to na naekia?
What was he saying yesterday?
(581) I=to nrik kik naekia?
(582) Kineu a=na i=tefla, me ga i=na i=to i=preg teflan.
I said that, but then he did that.
(74) (AK1-105-01) My brother SAY yesterday that it BE COLD today.
(583) P̃aluk i=tli nanom na mees ke=fo mlanr.
(584) Tai i=til-i-ø nanom na ke=fo mlanr mees.
(75) (AK1-107-01) My brother HOPE yesterday that it BE COLD today.
(585) P̃aluk i=tok mrokin nanom na mees ke=fo mlanr.
(586) Nanom p̃aluk i=to mrokin na mees ke=fo mlanr.
(76) (AK1-107-01) My brother WANT (now) to buy a house.
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(587) P̃aluk i=mur (na) ke=faakot nasum̃.
(588) P̃aluk i=mur na ka=faakot nasum̃.
My brother wants me to buy a house.
(77) (AK1-107-01) is screw does not want to turn.
(589) “Screw” ne i=kano tilmar.
This screw cannot turn.
(78) (AK1-107-01) My brother WANT (now) to be a farmer.
(590) P̃aluk i=mur ke=fi natam̃ol ni talm̃at.
(591) P̃aluk i=mur na ke=mai pi natam̃ol ni talm̃at te-mal. (one day)
(79) (AK1-107-01) My brother INTEND to buy a house.
(592) P̃aluk i=to mro nen kin ke=faakot nasum̃.
(593) I=mur ke=faakot nasum̃.
(80) (AK1-107-01) I HAVE TO thank my brother for helping me.
(594) Ka=mas (*a=mas) psawi p̃aluk nag i=tae welu kineu.
(595) A=psawi kik kin ku=welu kineu.
(81) (AK1-107-01) My brother MUST sell his house now.
(596) P̃aluk ke=mas sor nasum̃ ga.
(82) (AK1-107-01) My brother MUST sell his house soon.
(597) P̃aluk ke=mas sor nasum̃ ga pelpel.
(83) (AK1-109-01) My brother CAN li this stone.
(598) P̃aluk i=tae nrekat faat ne.
(84) (AK1-109-01) My brother CAN read and write.
(599) P̃aluk i=tae feef go i=tae mtir.
(85) (AK1-109-01) I BE ABOUT TO fall asleep.
(600) M̃eltig nen ka=fe matur kis.
(601) Ka=fe pan.
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I’m leaving.
(602) Kai=pe to na ka=matur.
I’m going to sleep now.
(603) P̃a=fe pan go?
You are going now?
(604) P̃a=fe to?
You are staying?
(605) Ka=fe min.
I’m thinking of drinking.
(606) Ka=fe ta min mau.
(607) Ki=pe paam̃or nawesien.
He already found the job.
(608) Ki=pe ta paam̃or nawesien mau.
(609) Kef=e ta weswes mau.
He decided not to work.
(86) (AK1-109-01) Yesterday, I BE ON THE VERGE OF being run over by a car.
(610) Nanom na nrakses (nearly) loto keteet ki wou.
(87) (AK1-109-01) What you DO when you COME home in the evening? I WRITE a letter, (then)
I DRINK some tea and (then) I GO to bed.
Every afternoon:
(611) Ku=to preg nae selwan/malnen ku=ler mai pak esum̃ kotfan?
(612) Ser kotfan, a=mtir natus, i=na i=nom, a=min “tea”, i=na i=nom, a=pan matur/kai=pe matur.
This afternoon:
(613) P̃a=fo preg nae selwan p̃a=ler mai pak esum̃ kotfan?
(614) Ka=fo makir natus, ke=nom, ka=fo min tete “tea”, ke=na ke=nom ale, ka=fan matur/kai=pe
matur.
(88) (AK1-109-01) How I GET to your brother’s house? You TURN le at the crossing.
(615) Ka=fo tfale pak esum̃ ni p̃alum?
(616) Ka=tfale pak esum̃ ni p̃alum?
(617) P̃a=fak napu takot, p̃a=tare pak maur.
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(89) (AK1-109-01) How I GET to your brother’s house? You TURN le at the crossing, (then)
WALK for ten minutes and (then) TURN le again.
(618) Ka==tfale pak esum̃ ni p̃alum?
(619) P̃a=siwer pak napu takot, p̃a=tare pak maur, p̃a=mer siwer parekrik, ke=na ke=nom, p̃a=mer
tare pak maur.
(90) (AK1-109-01) (According to the sedule) the train LEAVE at noon.
(620) “Train” ke=fo tum̃alu aliat.
(621) Maan i=to tum̃alu.
The plane is leaving (now).
(622) Maan i=tum̃alu.
The plane left.
(623) Maan ki=pe to tum̃alu.
The plane is leaving.
(91) (AK1-109-01) My brother SAY (now) that he GO to town tomorrow.
(624) P̃aluk i=to tli malfane na ke=fo pak (*kefan) “town” matol.
(92) (AK1-109-01) My brother SAY (now) that it RAIN tomorrow.
(625) P̃aluk i=to tli malfane na us ke=fo wo matol.
(93) (AK1-109-01) My brother BELIEVE (now) that it RAIN tomorrow.
(626) P̃aluk i=faafat na us ke=fo wo matol.
(94) (AK1-109-01) My brother HOPE (now) that it RAIN tomorrow.
(627) P̃aluk i=trau mur na us ke=fo wo matol.
(95) (AK1-109-01) What you DO right now? I WRITE a letter to my brother in order that he
KNOW that I COME to see him.
(628) Ku=to preg nae malfane?
(629) A=tok makir natus i=skei pak p̃aluk malfane nen ke=tae na ka=fo pan lek-a-ø matol.
(96) (AK1-109-01) What you DO yesterday? I WRITE a letter to my brother in order that he
KNOW that I COME to see him.
(630) Ku=preg nae nanom?
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(631) A=makir natus i=skei pak p̃aluk na ke=tae na ka=fo pan lak-a-ø matol. A=nrik kin na ka=fo
pan lak-a-ø matol knen.
(97) (AK1-109-01) A: You promised to make some food for me. When it BE ready? B: It BE
READY in five minutes.
(632) Ku=tli na p̃a=fo neu preg tete nafnag malfane.
(633) Gas kin/Sef mal kin ke=fo m̃as?
(634) Ke=fo m̃as pak 5 “minit”.
(635) Ki=pe m̃as.
It is already done.
(98) (TMAQ 73) (AK1-109-01) [What kind of sound do cats make?] ey MEOW
(636) Sef nametrau misleo kin pus i=to preg?
(637) Pus i=tok “meow”/ ru=“meow” / i=“meow” / ru=tok “meow”.
(99) (TMAQ 18) (AK1-109-01) [What your brother usually DO aer breakfast?] HeWRITE letters
(638) P̃alum i=tok preg nae ser p̃ulp̃og mal nen kin i=faam su/ ki=pe faam su?
(639) I=to makir/mtir (tete/nafet) natus.
(100) (AK1-110-01) [I heard a funny story the other day.] When you HEAR it, you LAUGH.
(640) A=nrog naaruen i=skei te naliati ne i=pa.
(641) Natrauswen i=skei kia anrogo, i=trau plak namruen (funny).
(642) Malnen p̃a=nrogo, p̃a=fo mur.
(101) (AK1-110-01) [A: I have a headae. B: Take this medicine.] It MAKE you feel better.
(643) Np̃auk i=ptin.
(644) P̃a=min nalkas ne! Ke=fo preg-i-ø na p̃a=nrog tiawi.
(645) A=nrogteesa.
I feel sad.
(646) A=nrogteesa kia natam̃ol ne i=mat.
I am sad that that man died.
At the funeral:
(647) A=nrogteesa kin natam̃ol ne imat.
320 APPENDIX B. QUESTIONNAIRE DATA
(648) Ka=fo nrog teesa i=f-wel kin kemat.
(649) A=nrog teesa kin i=to na ke=mat.
I am sad that he is about to die.
(650) Ke=fo mroler (think back) ki sup̃ na i=preg-i-ø.
He will regret that thing he did.
(651) A=malier kia a=preg…
I am ashamed that I did…
(102) (AK1-110-01) I not LIKE this person (now) and I not LIKE him (in the future).
(652) A=trau mal-ki mees go ka=fo malkin m̃as tok termau.(ever)
(653) A=malkin mees go ka=fo malkin m̃as tok termau.(ever)
(103) (AK1-110-01) I not KNOW where he BE.
(654) A=tap ta esaan i=tkos mau.
(104) (AK1-110-01) (an order:) OPEN the door!
(655) P̃a=p̃elgat nmet!
(105) (AK1-110-01) (let us) OPEN the door!
(656) Tuk=p̃elgat nmet!
(106) (AK1-110-01) (a prohibition:) (do) not OPEN the door!
(657) P̃a=tap p̃elgat nmet mau!
(107) (AK1-110-01) (a warning:) (Look out, do) not STEP in the mud!
(658) P̃a=lekor, p̃a=ta kam nlel mau!
(108) (AK1-110-01) (wishing someone good health:) (may) you always BE HEALTHY!
(659) P̃a=fo (tok) piatlak nam̃olien wi sermal!
(660) P̃a=fo piatlak nam̃olien skot maarik (husband) negaag!
(109) (AK1-110-01) (Uttered at eight o’clo - the speaker’s brother le at six and has not
returned yet:) He RETURN at seven o’clo.
(661) I=na ke=ler mai “seven o’clock” me i=ta puel.
He was supposed to come at seven o’clock, but is not here.
B.4. THE FUTURE QUESTIONNAIRE 321
(662) A=na ka=min.
I am about to drink.
(663) I=na ke=fo saan mal, me i=puel.
He was supposed to come at that time here, but he is not here.
(664) A=na ka=net pak esum̃ gaag, me a=kano net.
(665) A=na ka=fak esum̃.
I’m going home.
(110) (AK1-110-01) Yesterday when I woke up in the morning, there were dark clouds in the sky.
I took my umbrella, because it RAIN in a few minutes.
(666) Nanom selwan a=tokleg p̃ulp̃og, nsau i=malik.
(667) A=pu sulok nlaken parekrik (aer a bit) us ki=wo.
(668) A=pu sulok nlaken parekrik (aer a bit) us i=wo/ke=fo wo.
(669) A=pu sulok nlaken parekrik (aer a bit) us i=to na ke=wo.
I took my umbrella, because it was about to rain.
(111) (AK1-110-01) I met your brother a few days ago. He was very worried, because he GO
to the dentist next day.
(670) Tete naliati na i=pa/tete naliati ki=pe nom pa, a=patlas p̃alum.
(671) I=to mroput nlaken i=to na ke=fak dentist naliati kaaru (knen).
